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SUMMARY 
This thesis attempts to present the story of Afghan-
istan's relations with the outside world during the first 
two decades of this century, and her achievement of complete 
independence in l9l9-2l. In l905 the Government of India 
signed with the Afghan government a treaty reinforcing an 
earlier Anglo-Afghan agreement which forbad the Amir to 
maintain diplomatic relations with any third power. Amir 
Habibullah (l90l-l9) accepted this arrangement readily, 
but subsequent developments changed the attitudes of both 
parties. The Amir was anxious to endow his country with 
the trappings of modernity - with motor roads, schools and 
hospitals - and created in the process a small Afghan 
j.ntelligensia who chafed at their country<s backwardness, 
and resented her inferior international status. The British 
also began to doubt the wisdom of their earlier policy, 
They had sought to exercise influence in Kabul because they 
feared that if they failed to do so Afghanistan would fal.l 
into Russian hands, and that the British position in India 
would then be seriously endangered. They believed further 
that a firm understanding with the Amir would help to keep 
the peace among the unruly tribesmen of India's north-west 
frontier. Continued tribal rebellions forced them to re-
consider their optimism. Developments in the diplomatic 
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world of London and St. Petersburg impelled those who were 
not directl-y concerned with these local problems towards 
similar conclusions. Between l90l and l907 the London 
cabinet considered the possibilit-y of an agreement with 
Russia defining British and Russian "spheres of influence" 
in central Asia. These approaches resulted in the signature 
of an Anglo-Russian "Convention concerning Afghanistan" in 
August l907. The first crac.k had appeared in the previously 
solid structure of Anglo-Afghan relations. The Anglo-Russian 
convention failed to right many of the grievances of both 
signatories, but when a revision of the convention was 
undertaken just before the first world war, the British 
tentatively discussed a plan for the partition of Afghanistan 
with Russia which undermined the basis of their previous 
policy. 
The Amir was disturbed by the Anglo-Russian entente, 
for the Anglo-Russian agreement depreciated the value of 
his friendship with the British, and demonstrated that the 
Indian government were ready to sacrifice Afghan interests 
if the needs of great power politics dictated it. The 
involvement of both his neighbours into the first world war, 
and "he visit to Kabul of a Turko-German mission anxious 
to draw A:fghanistan into the struggle against the allies, 
presented the Amir with an opportunity to demand the 
complete independence of his country in the event of a 
German victory. 
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The allies were victorious in Europe, but the great 
war had altered profoundly the structure of international 
politics in central Asia. Russia was prostrate, and her 
government committed to a doctrine of anti-imperialism, 
The British themselves were weakened by five years of war, 
and their officials in India realised that their earlier 
settlement with the Amir had failed to prevent him from 
signing a draft treaty of alliance with the central powers. 
The Bolsheviks were hostile, but there was no proof that 
their rule would be permanent; a new understanding with 
Afghanistan which allowed the Amir to maintain diplomatic 
contacts with third parties now seemed less dangerous than 
it had done in the heydey of imperialism, and accorded with 
the Wilsonian ideals of independence for minority national-
ities which briefly impressed the post-war world. The 
Indian government in particular were anxious to create for 
themselves a new and liberal image in the middle east; in 
1907 they had opposed the London cabinet's policy of 
sacrificing the interests of powerless Asian states to those 
of world diplomacy, and they now regarded themselves as the 
protectors of middle eastern nationalism (such as they 
interpreted it), When the Amir approached the Viceroy in 
January 1919 for permission to despatch a delegation to 
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the Versailles conference to secure from the great powers 
"the rights of liberty, independence and freedom of action" 
for Afghanistan, the Indian government were not certain 
that his request should be refused. The stage was set for 
the formal recognition of Afghanistan's complete independence. 
The drama developed in a manner unantj_cipated by any 
of the actors. Before the British had despatched a reply 
to the Amir, Habibullah was murdered and his death was 
followed by a struggle for power between his brother Nasrullah 
and his son Amanullah, in which Amanullah soon emerged 
triumphant, Soon after his accession the new Amir repeated 
his father's request for a revision of the British govern-
ment's earlier settlement with Afghanistan, The Indian 
government failed to make clear that their attitude was not 
one of blunt refusal, and saw no reason for rushing to the 
conference table with the Amir. Their expecta tiore that 
they would have time to spare were shattered by events which 
derived partly from the insecurity of Amanullah•s position 
within Afghanistan, Amanullah had forced his uncle from 
the throne, but he could not be certain that his own rule 
was universally accepted; a mutiny among his troops seemed 
likely, and he was forced to disperse his garrisons to the 
eastern provinces of his country, where they were less able 
to influence developmen-ts .in the capital, The news of the 
Punjab dj_sturbances of April 1919 tempted him i;o undertake 
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a more engaging diversion - an attack on India which he 
justified as a war for the independence of Afghanistan. 
In the hostilities which followed his main striking force 
suffered a major defeat along the British-Indian army''s 
main line of advance to Kabul, but his troops penetrated 
into British territory in other sectors, and provoked a 
tribal rebellion along the north-west frontier of India 
which was to engage the attention of the British for many 
months to come. The war was inconclusive, and returned the 
erstwhile combatants to the political status guo ante; what 
was generally unrealised, however, was the fact that that 
status guo differed from the settlement of 1905, and that 
the British had considered revising their policy towards 
Afghanistan before the outbreak of the Anglo-Afghan war. 
When a new Anglo-Afghan treaty was signed at Rawalpindi in 
August 1919 recognising that "Afghanistan is left officially 
free and independent in its affairs, both internal and 
external", it was generally (but incorrectly) believed that 
the Indian government had suffered a diplomatic defeat which 
hardly accorded with their military performance against 
Amanullah's army, 
The British signed the treaty of Rawalpindi with one 
important reservation - that it was not to be regarded as 
permanent. The Government of India believed that a first 
taste of independence would convince Amanullah that its 
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advantages were doubtful, and that he would soon return to 
the British fold, and agree to accept British "advice" on 
his foreign relations under the terms of a second treaty 
which involved no formal restrictions on his independence. 
Their confidence was to be rudely shattered, for the Amir 
quickly struck up contact with Soviet Russia, from whom he 
hoped to gain territorial concessions as '"ell as diplomatic 
support against the British. Amanullah's irridentist aims 
in Russian central Asia soured the atmosphere of camaraderie 
which coloured the initial Russo-Afghan approaches, and 
induced him to accept the Viceroy's invitation to a confer-
ence in Mussoorie, planned by the British in the summer of 
1920 as a delaying tactic which would postpone a final 
settlement with Afghanistan until conditions favoured the 
British side. The red army 1 s victory over anti.-Bolshevik 
forces in central Asia later compelled the Amir to abandon 
his plans for expansion across the Oxus; the Afghans were 
shocked by the rough Soviet treatment of the formerly semi-
independent Amirate of Bokhara, but eventually reconciled 
themselves to the existing frontier with Russia, A major 
obstacle to a Russo-Afghan entente had thus been removed, 
The Soviet demand for permission to use Afghanistan as 
a base for activities against the British in India constituted 
a second such obstacle, and it was one which was made more 
obvious when renewed Anglo-Afghan negotiations began in 
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Kabul in January 1921. The Mussoorie discussions had 
convinced the Indian government that it would be impossible 
to demand the complete exclusion of Russian influence from 
Afghanistan, but they were determined to prevent the 
realisation of Bolshevik plans (such as they may have been) 
for the penetration of north-west India. They were 
prepared also to buy the Amir 1 s friendship with gifts of 
arms and money. In March 1921 the British government signed 
with the Soviets a trade agreement in which Russia undertook 
to refrain from "any attempt to encourage the peoples of 
Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests", 
but the British feared that this formula was insufficiently 
specific, and that the Bolsheviks were unlikely to abandon 
their plans in Afghanistan on its account. Amanullah and 
his Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi saw the force of the 
British objections to the Soviet programme, and eventually 
persuaded the Russians to abandon their demands for repre-
sentation in eastern Afghanistan. The ratification of a 
Soviet-Afghan treaty providing for large scale assistance 
to the Amir 's government duly followed L1. August 1921, and 
there seemed little to prevent the British from concluding 
a similar agreement with Amanullah, 
This logical outcome was prevented by events which the 
British could hardly have predicted at the beginning of 
1921. Amanullah had failed to persuade the Soviet government 
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to grant him new territories in Russian central Asia, but 
he still hoped to induce the British to provide the mili-
tary and financial wherewithal for an anti-Soviet crusade, 
and presented them with an "exclusive treaty" embodying 
this programme. His hopes were not fulfilled. The London 
cabinet had throughout lagged behind the Government of India 
in recognising Afghanistan's independent status, and the 
Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon's abrupt treatment of an 
Afghan diploma tic mj.ssion then touring Europe 2 which amounted 
to the unilateral abrogation by Britain of the Rawalpindi 
treaty, convinced Tarzi (if not Amanullah) t'::mt the 
"exclusive treaty" would endanger Afghanistan's independence. 
The British were equally cognisant of its dangers for 
themselves, and instead proposed a 11 neighbourly treaty" 
which offered Afghanistan no technical or military assistance, 
but which bound the Amir to no reciprocal obligations. It 
was this treaty which Amanullah reluctantly accepted in 
November l92l. 
Treated as the process by which Afghanistan achieved 
full independence,this story may be of interest to those 
concerned with the background to modern Afghan politics, 
for whom a knowledge of Afghan history is an end in itself. 
It fits equally well into a study of great power politics 
in central .Asia, and provides a closing chapter to the story 
of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan during the nineteenth 
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century. By 1921 the British had reached the conclusion 
that the fate of Afghanistan was not of vital importance 
to them; their suggestion of the "neighbourly treaty" was 
a clear indication of this fact, During the 1920s and 
afterwards they lacked both an entente with Russia and an 
alliance wit!:> Afghanistan - the two solutions to the "Afghan 
problem" of the pre-war period - but this fact did not 
disturb them as it would have done before the war, for the 
"Afghan problem" had since declined in importance. Their 
Russian rivals reached similar conclusions; they realised 
that they had little chance of promoting a successful 
socialist revolution in Afghanistan, and neglected to pay 
to the Amir the subsidy which they had promised in the 
Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1921, During the inter-war period 
both British India and Russia became preoccupied with 
problems nearer home - the British with their gradual with-
drawal from India, the Russians with the industrialisation 
and socialisation of their country, Afghanistan was left 
free to follow her own path of internal reconstruction and 
reform, uninfluenced by great power rivalries for her 
favours until after the second world war, 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
This is a study in modern history, not in Persian 
language and literature, and a full system of transliteration 
from the Arabic alphabet, such as would be required in a work 
of the latter type, has not been used. The Arabic letters ) , . 
J' 
' 
;) and.J,? have all been transcribed as z, v 
' 
lf and ~ 
" and .h as (_ 
y 
lS " as s, '-' t, and as ' and and [ as h. J and 
' 
. l have been distinguished as q and gh respectively, as the 
two letters are pronounced differently in Afghan Persian; 
it is also in accordance with Afghan pronunciation that the 
consonant J appears as w, and the final vocalic 6 as ah. The 
"' long vowels I , .J and ) have been transliterated as a, i, 
and u, but the "dummy alif" (as in Lr.l ) has been omitted, as 
has the ) in the combination ~· 
The transliteration of Muslim proper names presents a 
problem in the present context, as many Indian Muslims, and 
some Afghans, write in English, and render their names in the 
Latin script in any way they choose. The writer has chosen 
to reproduce names appearing in the text according to the 
system outlined in the preceding paragraph, but to refer to 
Muslim authors in English in the spelling they themselves 
have used. The great Amir thus appears as 'Abdur Rahman in 
the text of the thesis, but as Abdur Rahman in footnote 
references to his autobiography. 
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To avoid confusion, Turkish names have been transcribed 
as though they were written in the Arabic script. The 
famous Turkish statesman accordingly appears as Jemal Pasha 
rather than Cemal Pa~a. 
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PREFACE 
In describing Afghanistan's advance to independent 
nationhood between 1905 and 1921, this thesis adopts a 
technique not usual in studies of this tYPe• A description 
of the independence movements of India or other Asian or 
African countries will examine the growth of native opposi-
tion to foreign rule, the emergence of indigenous political 
parties, and changing attitudes on the part of the colonial 
authority, Questions of foreign policy will intrude but 
little into the discussion, In the present case th:e nature 
of the topic demands a very different approach. Afghani-
stan's internal history during the first twenty-one years 
of this century is summarised in a few pages, while Russian 
and British relations with Afghanistan and Anglo-Russian 
negotiations in which the Afghan government played no part 
have been examined at some length. 
The reasons for this approach should not be far to 
seek. Afghanistan was incapable of producing an "independ·· 
ence movement" of the Indian tYPe, for she had never been 
fully dependent on any colonial power. The British control 
of his governmentts foreign relations was the sole point 
at which the Amir's sovereignty was formally infringed; 
the established government was his, and Afghan nationalism 
thus lacked the strength that dissatisfaction with the 
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existing political authority lent to the Indian national 
movement, Only fur two brief periods (18)8-42 and 1878-80) 
had the British been in physical occupation of Afghanistan, 
and they had never exercised there the complete hegemony 
which they enjoyed in India, After 1880 no foreigners lived 
and ruled in Afghanistan to remind the ordinary man that 
colonial domination left his country oppressed and backward. 
Afghanistan was generally backward and sometimes oppressed, 
but the sovereign power was Afghan, and it was less easy 
than in India to point the accusing finger at the foreigner. 
Mass participation in the nationalist movement could not be 
achieved with the ease which Indian conditions made possible; 
had the mass of Afghans refused to pay salt tax or its 
equivalent, they would have injured their own government, 
not that of the British, and would have done the cause of 
independence a disservice rather than otherwise, Nationalism 
in Afghanistan, as in Persia and Turkey, was a force which 
penetrated down from the top, not up from the bottom, and 
it was promoted by the Amir as a means of uniting his subjects 
behind him. Even if the sources for such a study existed, 
the writer would have added little to his argument by 
describing more fully the internal politics of Afghanistan 
at the popular level; had he ignored the intricacies of 
d~plomacy, however, he would have left the most important 
part of his story untold, 
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If this is a chapter in diplomatic history, it must 
be admitted that it is a diplomatic history influenced by 
its Asian setting. The cabinets of London and St, Peters-
burg were generally unfamiliar with local conditions or the 
probable effect of their policies, On the British side, 
power was divided between the Government of India and the 
British cabinet, and differences of opinion between London 
and Delhi/Calcutta had much influence on the course of 
British policy. It is for this reason that these differ-
ences have someti.mes been examined at length. 
During the nineteenth century, Anglo-Russian rivalry 
in central Asia made the problem of Afghanistan a fa:irly 
familiar one to the literate citizens of both great powers. 
Since the first world war, the spotlight has been turned 
elsewhere; Afghanistan's fortunes are of some concern to 
those specially interested in the politics of central Asia, 
but not to the ordinary student of international affairs. 
Rivalry between the U.S.A, and U,S,S,R, for the favours of 
her government exists, but it is a rivalry for which 
parallels may be found in most of the capitals of Asia and 
Africa. The first two decades of this century witnessed 
Afghanistan's advance to independence; they witnessed also 
the achievement of a solution to the "Afghan problem" of the 
nineteenth century, The story is worth the telling, but it 
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has so far not been told, Informed and detailed works on 
Afghanistan's relations with Britain and Russia during 
earlier periods have recently appeared, but they all stop 
short at about the point from which this thesis begins, 
Other general studies of Afghan history can be found, but 
their authors can seldom devote more than a few chapters 
to the period discussed here 1 and (with one exception)l 
they have based their work on other published sources, 
Examination of the unpublished records of the Indian Foreign 
Department, the German Foreign Ministry and British Foreign 
Office2 together wj_th the private papers of Lord Minto and 
the published archives of the Soviet Comnissariat for 
Foreign Affairs brings to light much important information 
hitherto ignored and necessitates the revision of several 
earlier conclusions. 
The story of Sir Louis Dane's mission to Kabul of 
l904-05 has been fairly fully toldf while the papers 
selected and published by Gooch and Temperley and Lady Minto 
have already told the story of the Anglo-Russian convention 
l, That of Sir Percy Sykes (History of Afghanistan, 2 Vols.). 
Sykes' book contains unacknowledged quotations which the 
writer traced to the files of the Foreign Department of the 
Government of India, but Sykes' use of these sources is 
highly selective and sometimes inaccurate, 0'ther general 
studies, of limited value for this period, are those of 
Fraser-Tytler and Fletcher, 
2. See infra, ps xxiii, 
3· By Sykes, (op,cit,, Vol.II, pp.2l6-24), 
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of 1907, its reception in India and attempted revision in 
1912, It is after this point that a study of formerly 
closed archives becomes important, While the printed records 
of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry explain the basis of the 
Constantinople agreement, the contemporary negotiations 
over Afghanistan can only be understood after examination 
of secret files dealing with the proposed Tibet convention 
of 1914. The partition of Afghanistan which was tenatively 
suggested at that time has so far passed unrecorded. 
Much the same can be said of the German mission to 
Afghanistan; the draft treaty of alliance between the Amir 
and the central powers has been previously reproduced by 
one German writer but uncommented on, while earlier accounts 
of the mission's activities contain many inaccuracies. The 
fact that the draft German-Afghan treaty was negotiated and 
signed on Habibullah's initiative, and that the Afghan 
government made later attempts to maintain contact with the 
central powers, has not been revealed hitherto; the 
knowledge thus gained forces one to revise tcJ.e conventional 
British opinion that the Amir remained loyal to his engage-
ments with Britain throughout the duration of the war,4 
4, A conclusion devoutly clung to by Lord Hardinge (Mz 
Indian Years, p.lJ2). Hardinge was Viceroy at the time, 
but must have been badly served by his intelligence officers, 
or by his own memory. 
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The British government later published a carefully 
selected volume of documents on the third Afghan war, 
Earlier accounts of the Anglo-Afghan crisis of l9l9 have 
been restricted to the information which this volume contains, 
and bhus ignore the fact that it was ,t\.manullah, not Habibu-
llah, who first requested the British for full independence,.5 
and that the Indian government viewed his approaches with a 
not unfavourable eye, No documeats dealing with the Rawal-
pindi ac1.d Mussoorie conferences have yet been published; 
a study of original government files illustrates contemporary 
differences between the Government of India and the London 
cabinet, and helps to explain Curzon 1 s extraordinary treat-
ment of the Afghan delegation in London. In the field of 
Soviet-Afghan relations the map has been equally blank; 
the writer can find but one pubLished mention of Amal.ullah 's 
territorial ambitions in central Asia, which says next to 
nothing about them, and very little about the contemporary 
Soviet-Afghan dispute on the status of Bokhara. An 
investigation of these topics leads to the conclusion that 
the early development of Soviet-Afghan relations was hardly 
the model of concord which Soviet writers have suggested 
and western authors ignored • 
.5. The exception is again that of Sykes (op.cit., Vol, 
II, p.26.5) who still neglects to notice that rd.s request 
provoked a re-appraisal of their previous policy by the 
Indian government. 
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When Sir W, Kerr Fraser-Tytler wrote of Henry Dobbs' 
mission to Kabul of 1921 that "We need not enter into 
details of this protracted struggle" 6 he followed a prece-
dent set by earlier writers and copied by his successors, 
His cavalier treatment of the topic is difficult to 
understand, for the British rejection of Amar.ullah's 
"exclusive treaty" was almost as important as their 
acquiescence in the original Afghan demands for independence; 
the fact that they proposed a treaty giving them no special 
advantages when the Amir suggested a settlement similar to 
that of 1905 illustrates their conviction that the effort 
and money they had formerly expended in Kabul did not pay 
commensurate political dividends. 
While the sources he has used add much to a tale not 
previously told in detail, the writer realises that a 
fuller study of the London Foreign Office records, which 
he found generally unavailable for years later than 1908, 
might have enabled him to fill in some gaps in the narrative. 
The uncertain fate of the wartime Anglo-Russian agreement 
on Afghanistan represents one such lacuna; the reasons for 
the constant changes in the policy of the Lloyd George 
cabinet and the full story of the Anglo-Russ:ian trade 
agreement are others of possibly greater importance. WithLl 
another six years the Foreign Office archives of the period 
should become open and some of these defects may then be 
remedied. 
6. Afghanistan, p.l99· 
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CHAPTER I 
AFGHAN POLITICS 1 AND AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICIES 
1. A new Amir succeeds to the throne of Afghanistan, 
The death of a reigning monarch shocks his nation and 
forces its citizens to reconsider his character and the 
nature of his rule. When the dying monarch is an absolute 
ruler the crisis will be all the greater, for the transfer 
of the crown may involve a radical change in internal and 
external policies, and may awaken fears of a civil war for 
the possession of the vacant throne. The danger is all the 
more serious in a Muslim state which lacks an established 
rule of primogeniture, and where multiple marriages supply 
a mass of royal rivals. Fears of this kind were awakened 
in Afghanistan on 1 October 1901 1 when the news spread 
around the court of Kabul that 'Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of 
Afghanistan since 1880, was dying in the palace which he had 
built on the fringes of his capital, 
The political crisis which was expected to follow his 
death had been anticipated by the Amir, who had personal 
experience of the inter-dynastic struggles which had erupted 
in Afghanistan after the. death of his grandfather Amir Dost 
Muhammad in 1863. While unwilling to make a formal announce-
1 
men of his choice as successor, '.Abdur Rahman had been at 
1. For a variety of reasons which he explains in his 
autobiography, (The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of 
Afghanistan, by himself, Vol.II, pp.2-J.) 
pains to concentrate the financial and military resources 
of his country in the hands of his own branch of the 
Muhammadzai family, 2 and had gradually transferred much of 
the work of government to his son Habibullah Khan, and to a 
lesser extent to Habibullahts brother Nasrullah Khan. There 
could be little doubt that the Amir intended Habibullah to 
succeed him, On 28 September, aware of his approaching end, 
he had summoned to his palace members of his family and the 
chief officials of Kabul, and asked them to "Consider among 
yourselves whom you believe fit to succeed me".J If those 
present had preferences for the succession which differed 
from those of the Amir, they preferred to treat his request 
as a rhetorical question, and speedily gave their assent 
to the accession of Habibullah, 
Habibullah and his entourage succeeded in keeping the 
news of 1Abdur Rahman's death a secret for two days, a 
precaution which may have contributed to the ease with which 
Habibullah.' s succession was accepted, since it gave his 
rivals no time to solicit support for their own claims. 
On 6 October the new Amir summoned an assembly of the 
officials of his capital and leading mullas (priests) who 
took an oath of loyalty to him, and were told by Habibullah 
2, A summary genealogical table of the Muhammadzais, who 
had enjoyed continuous occupancy of the Afghan throne since 
l8J4 1 is reproduced infra as Appendix JJ, 
J, Angus Hamilton, "Indo-Afghan Relations under Lord 
Curzon", Fortnightly Review, Vol.LXXX 1 p.987, 
2 
that "I will be the guardian of the Mussalmans of 
Afghanistan, who will obey me as their King of Islam". 
A further ceremony was held two days later at which 
Habibullah was invested with the sword, Qur'an and flag of 
his father, and took a second oath to "rule Afghanistan as a 
4 true Mahommedan" , The remarkable had been achieved: an 
Afghan Amir had been installed without serious dispute, 
much less a civil war. Foreign observers who had predicted 
both were confounded, and were convinced that Afghanistan 
had taken an important step towards stability and good 
government, 5 
2, Geographical and social fundamentals, and their 
political effects, 
What was the nature of Habibullah's inheritance? A 
full survey of the economic, social and governmental 
organisation of Afghanistan at the beginning of this century 
6 
can hardly be attempted in these pages, Only the briefest 
4, Ibid. 
5, ~·• F. Noyce, England, India and Afghanistan, p.l48, 
6, Fuller information on these topics will be found in 
the works of the following authors (see bibliography, infra, 
pp, 48~· Geography:Humlum, Social or anisation and 
Ethnology. (a) General: Elphinstone, Schurmann pp.l3-l58), 
Wilber, ed. (pp ,20-7l 1 307-55 and 405-60), Cuyler Young, ed •, 
Cervin, Bellew, Spain, (b) Specialised studies: Schurmann, 
Robertson, Uberoi, Economic organisation: Guha, Hamilton 
(Afghanis tan), Cuyler Young, ed, (pp ,25-58), Wilber, ed, 
(pp.l60-306), Structure of Government and Administration: 
Wilber, ed, (pp.72-l2l), Uberoi (pp.l49-80), Abdur Rahman 
(Vol,I, pp.200-09)• Further titles will be found in D,N. 
Wilber, Annotated Bibliography of Afghanistan, 
survey of these topics can be presented, and only those 
aspects of the internal situation which reacted on 
Afghanistants relations with foreign countries between 1905 
and 1921 will be examined in any detail, This discussion 
can be divided into two broad sections: firstly, a survey 
of the social, geographical and political fixities in 
Afghanistan which influenced relations between the British, 
Russian and Afghan governments during the period under 
discussion; secondly, some description of the contemporary 
changes in the policies of the Amir which affected his 
countryrs foreign relations, 
The Afghan government at the turn of this century was 
an absolute monarchy superimposed on a vertically grouped 
tribal society. The country was geographically delineated 
by boundaries negotiated by Afghanistan's two powerful 
neighbours, Russia and British India. With an area of some 
264 1 000 square miles, Afghanistan is a sparsely populated 
country of mountains and deserts in which intensive 
cultivation is possible only in small and isolated areas, 
Extremes of height and wide seasonal variations in climate 
produce an ecology well suited to the life of pastoral 
nomadism which was led by some 25% of Habibullah's subjects. 
North of the Hindu Kush, the great mountain range which 
splays out from the Pamirs into central Afghanistan, the 
fertile plain of Turkistan provides one of the few large 
cultivable areas. Scattered in the mountains are a number 
of valleys where the spring snow melt makes settled agricul-
ture possible, and it is in one of these that the capital of 
Kabul is situated, The south and south-west of the country 
is predominently arid desert, fertile only around the oases 
of Qandahar and Farah, The s:::attered nature of settlement, 
and the rugged and waterless country which separates the 
settled areas in a country without railways or motor roads, 
made the Amir 1s task of administration a very formidable one. 
Internal geographical barriers were heightened by 
ethnic and sociological ones, The racial structure of the 
country is complicated in the extreme, The northern plains 
are inhabited in their centre by Uzbek agriculturalists, 
and to the west by Turkoman nomads, who share a common 
Turkic racial strain and language, but little else, Iranian 
peoples, the Tajiks 1 occupy the eastern part of the Hindu 
Kush; to their west lies the country of the Hazarahs, a 
people of Mongoloid descent, The southern and eastern 
quarters of the country contain the homes of the "true 
Afghans", the Pashtuns 7 from who Habibullah's family and 
7• No writer on Afghanistan can introduce these terms 
without defining them. "True Afghans" is used here only 
as a point of reference to other writers, (~,, Wilber, ed,, 
Afghanistan, poll) and will not appear hereinafter, "Afghans" 
will be used to refer to all the peoples inhabiting Afghani-
stan, or (by diplomatic historians' convention), the Afghan 
government, "Pashtuns" refers to all those people, inhabiting 
British-Indian as well as Afghan territory who speak Pashtu. 
The Hindustani term "Pathan" will not be used, as its 
appearance would only create confusion, 
6 
many of the leading officials of Afghanistan were drawn, 
and who earned for their country the reputation for 
military ability and courage for which they are chiefly 
remembered by British writers, The total population of 
Afghanistan was estimated at four and a half million in 
l9l2 1 of which around two million people were reckoned as 
Pashtuns 1 900 1 000 as Tajiks 1 450 1 000 as "Hazras and Aimaks" 8 
and JOO,OOO as Uzbeks, 9 Only a few hundred thousand of this 
total inhabited the principal cities of Afghanistan (Kabul, 
Qandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif), but this small 
urbanised population formed a series of separate communities 
of predominantly Pashtun and Tajik blood, 
It is suggested that this complicated racial 
pattern had less influence politically than some contemporary 
8, "Aimaks" refers to the Chehar Aimaq 1 a group of nomadic 
tribes of north-western Afghanistan, whose racial affinities 
are a matter of dispute. (See H.F, Schurmann 1 The Mongols 
of Afghanistan, pp.49-55)• As the estimate here given does 
not list the Turkomans separately, it seems possible that 
they should be included among the "Hazras and Aimaks". 
9, Government of India, Foreign and Political Department 
Records (hereinafter abbreviated as "F.D,") Internal B May 
l9l2 1 Nos 80-82 1 Notes pp.8-9 1 and Appendix to Notes, p.4o, 
This estimate was supplied by the British Agent in Kabul, 
a Muslim Indian, who in turn derived it from "an intelligent 
and educated Afghan, who has had exceptionally good 
opportunities of making himself acquainted with the 
subject 11 -. 
7 
10 
commentators seem to have assumed, Only in certain 
instances were Afghans willing to regard themselves as 
members of a racial or linguistic bloc within the nation of 
Afghanistan; the only rebellion of recent times which assumed 
a specifically ethnic character, that of the Hazarahs of 
1891-92 1 can be explained in terms of the Hazarah's adherence 
to the Shl'ahsect of Islam, a profession which distinguished 
them from the mass of Sunni Afghans, Among the Pashtuns 
there was a high degree of loyalty to the clan to which 
each Pashtun considered himself attached. There were two 
major tribal divisions among the Pashtuns of Afghan 
territory: the Gh "l . ll l t" f h , ~ za~s, a arge propor ~on o w om 
migrated between the Afghan uplands and the plains of India, 
but whose homeland was regarded as the central area of 
eastern Afghanistan round Ghazni, and the Duranis, the tribe 
of the royal family, whose country lay to the south around 
Qandahar, Among the settled Tajiks and Uzbeks tribal and 
clan attachments were generally weaker, though not 
necessarily replaced by loyalties to the nation of Afghani-
stan, The Turkomans and Chehar Aimaq of the north-west, 
however, preserved a powerful tribal organisation; their 
10. ~·• H,W. Bellew, The Races of Afghanistan, PP·9-l4, 
11. More properly, Khaljis, 
nomadic life, with its emphasis on group responsibility, 
probably accounted for this,12 
One further point should be made before this 
brief discussion of Afghanistan's racial and social 
8 
structure is abandoned. Some two million Pashtuns inhabited 
Afghan territory, but about two and a half million of their 
fellows lived in the mountains west of the Indus which lay 
on the British side of the Anglo-Afghan frontier, a fact 
of particular importance in the context of Afghan relations 
with the British Government of India, The Turkic and Tajik 
racial blocs of northern Afghanistan similarly spilled over 
across the Russo-Afghan border, but their presence there 
was a far less significant influence on Afghanistan's foreign 
relations than ·i:;he presence of so many Pashtuns in north-
west India, Whatever the strength of the divisive forces 
among the Pashtuns, the Pashtun origins of the royal family 
gave them an interest in the fortunes of their fellows 
beyond the boundaries of Afghanistan which they rarely1 3 
extended to the Tajiks and Uzbeks who dwelt in Russian 
territory. From the time of the foundation of the Durani 
monarchy in the mid-eighteenth century until the Afghan 
12~ This discussion is developed by V. Cervin, 
"Problems in the Integration of the Afghan Nation", 
Middle East Journal, Vol.VI, 
13, As, for instance, in 1919-20, See infra, PP• 283 ff, 
9 
retreat before the Sikhs in the l8JOs 3 the Pashtun 
territory east of what was to become Habibullah<s boundary 
with the British had been included in the Amir's dominions; 
the Sikhs• frontier with Afghanistan had then passed into 
British hands, with some modifications which were not to 
the Afghans' advantage, It is likely that every occupant 
of the Kabul throne dreamt occasionally of reconquering 
these lost dominions, and of establishing a new Anglo-Afghan 
l4 frontier along the Indus, Certainly the Amirs could find 
excellent fighting material among the Pashtuns of British 
territory, who rivalled their fellows on the Afghan side of 
the border as experts in guerrilla warfare, For centuries 
successive Afghan rulers had gained command of the Pashtuns 
by leading them in profitable wars of conquest in India, 
The advent of the British, for all their superior armament, 
had not altered this traditional pattern of Pashtun thought, 
and permitted the Amir to threaten the Government of India 
with the permanent possibility of tribal disturbances on 
India's north-west frontier. This state of affairs was 
equally a serious embarrassment to those Amirs who were 
concerned to secure the best possible relations with their 
British neighbours, 
l4. Everi the generally anglophilic Habibullah did so 
in l9l5-l6, See infra, P• l88. 
3. The strength and limits of the Amir'.s power, 
and its effect on his foreign relations. 
Such was the strength of the divisions within Afghan 
society that one British observer, Major H.W. Bellew, who 
surveyed the country in its state of anarchy after the 
British invasion of l878, concluded that the Afghans "have 
10 
only been brought together as a nationality by the accident 
of position and the bond of a common religion", and that 
"the Afghan nationality remains a disunited agglomeration 
of different races, who are only loosely held together, so 
long as one or other of them, propped by external alliance 
and support, is maintained in a position of dominance as the 
ruling race",l5 The Afghans' general adherence to Sunni 
Islam was recognised as a powerful unifying force when the 
interests of Afghanistan were threatened by a non-Muslim 
power, and the two Afghan wars with the British (l8J9-42 
and l878-SO) had helped to strengthen this bond among a people 
not previously noted for their fanaticism. The Hazarab& 
profession of Shi•andoctrines represented the sole chink in 
this 0therwise uniform pattern. But Bellew's conclusions 
15. Bellew, op.cit., pp,l2-lJ. It may be noted en passant 
that Bellew believed that this heterogeneity made it 
"incomprehensible,,,that we should again commit the folly 
of restoring the destroyed government of the Amirs", and 
proved that the British should "administer the country,,, 
ourselves, either directly, or through the medium of native 
agency under our own supervision" • C!J~.if!·• PP•9-l0) • 
1i 
were based on observations of an Afghanistan very different 
from that which Habibullah inherited, During the twenty-one 
years of his reign •Abdur Rahman, impelled by British and 
Russian insistence, had bounded his country with a series 
of definite frontiers, and had thus broken with the cyclical 
process of territorial aggrandisement and contraction which 
was the traditional norm of Asian monarchy, and which 
contributed to the impression of political instability which 
many foreigners derived, He had succeeded also in 
constructing an administrative machine which effectively 
brought under his control the bulk of the kingdom which he 
had thus defined, 
The country was divided into six provinces (walayats) 
based on the cities of Kabul, Qandahar, Jalalabad 1 Herat, 
Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad. In each province the Amir 
installed a governor, (Nalib-ul-Huklimat) whose power was 
derived solely from the capital, and who was nearly always 
a stranger to the province to which he was appointed. 
Acting through the subordinate district governors (h~ims), 
he collected the revenue of the province, and performed much 
of its judicial work. A garrison was stationed in each 
provincial capitll1 commanded by a Na 1ib Salar, who assisted 
the governor in maintaining public order. The forces he 
commanded were composed of a mixture of long-service regulars 
12 
and other troops drafted on a national service basis; they 
were usually foreign to their area of posting; and thus 
formed poor material for a provincial rebellion. The Amir's 
orders percolated down through this pyramidical structure 
to affect the majority of Afghans in many aspects of their 
daily life, At the same time, the Amir himself performed 
much of the ordinary administrative work of Kabul which in 
the provinces was delegated to his deputies, His functions 
as a final court of appeal in cases forwarded to him by 
his subordinates kept him in direct touch with many of his 
. t 16 subJec s, 
The Amir controlled personally the administrative 
machine which he had created, •Abdur Rahman's Ma.jlis-i-
Shura 1 described by some foreigners as an Afghan -"cabinet" ,
1 7 
was in reality little more than a consultative privy council 
of the medieval English type, which lacked a fixed member-
ship, and served the sole purpose of lifting some of the 
burdens of decision making from the Amir 1 s shoulders. Its 
authority was that of the Amir himself, and not of his 
subjects or of his rivals to the throne, 'Abdur Rahman had 
defeated in the field the two members of the Muhammadzai 
family, Ayub Khan and Ishaq Khan, who had attempted to oust 
16~ See Angus Hamilton, Afghanistan, pp.269-87, 
17. ~., ~., p.274. 
him from the Admirate, and they had then been banished from 
his dominions.18 While court factionalism was not completely 
eliminated, the counsels of the Shura were generally 
uninfluenced by intra-family rivalries, 
This picture of royal absolutism should not be over-
drawm, Th.e political authority which 'Abdur Rahman bequeathed 
to his son was limited by three factors: one of them 
theoretical, the second a real one which resulted from the 
sociological diversities outlined above, and a third 
inherent in any Muslim monarchy where kingship is based 
on descent. 
Successive Amirs reiterated the principle that the 
monarch was chosen by the people and that it was his duty 
to obtain their consent to decisionsof major importance. 
Their declarations were of purely theoretical significance. 
Habibullah issued a proclamation soon after his accession 
in which he stated that "I, Habibulla Khan, am according to 
his ['Abdur Rahman's] will accepted King of Afghanistan and 
its dependencies by all the chiefs and people cf this country" } 9 
and in this respect he followed a precedent set by his father, 
who proclaimed in Qandahar in l88l that he had only accepted 
the throne after it had been offered to him "by all the 
l8, See Appendix 33• 
19. F.D., S.F. Nov.l90l 1 Nos.l-129 1 Notes p.2l, 
•4 
_l_ 
chiefs of Afghanistan", andihat his rule depended on its 
20 
acceptance by "the Afghan people", Habibullah similarly 
claimed that his father had only been willing to sign a 
treaty with the British defining the eastern frontiers of 
Afghanistan after he had obtained "a power of attorney from 
the tribes to conclude engagements with the British 
21 Government" , There seemed to be some case for concluding 
that the accession of a new Amir, and the signature of 
treaties with foreign powers, required the consent of "the 
Afghan people" , But it needs slight examination of the 
Afghan political situation to show that the provision was 
a loose and informal one, There was no constitution in 
Afghanistan, and no machinery for ascertaining the strength 
and direction of popular desires. Even if he had wanted 
to, Habibullah would scarcely have been able to obtain the 
consent of all his subjects to his own succession within 
the short time at his disposal, All he could do was to 
secure the support of his own brothers, his probable rivals 
for the throne, and of such of the more important Pashtun 
tribal leaders and mullas who happened to be in Kabul at the 
time of his father's death. The ratification of treaties, 
and other major administrative decisions, were subject to 
20, Quoted, F,D,,S,F, Oct,l920 1 Nos.705-806, Notes p.59. 
21, F,D,, S,F, Jul,l905, Nos.61-72, Notes p.24, 
the same informal process of consent. A,N,L. Cater, a 
later official of the Government of India writing after 
Habibullah 1 s death in 1919 1 drew an interesting picture 
of the situation, and of its influence in the field of 
Afghanistan's external relations, 
There is no doubt [cater wrote] that both Amir 
Abdur Rahman and Amir Habibulla professed [sic] 
to consult their people and ascertain their 
wishes, and it was obviously impossible for them 
entirely to disregard the opinions of the big 
Sardars22 and Mullas in matters of real and great 
importance. Moreover it was a convenient excuse, 
if they wanted to evade or decline proposals of 
the Government of India or to adopt a line of 
policy which they knew would be disagreeable to 
the Government of India to say that they were 
forced to do so by the will of the people, 
But the fact remains that they in practice 
ruled as absolute autocrats, Habibulla no less 
than Abdur Rahman,2J 
15 
Cater's analysis was correct to the extent that there 
was no formal system of popular representation in 
Afghanistan, but it failed to recognise that the strong 
clan loyalties of many Afghans sometimes imposed severe 
limits on the Amir_1 s freedom of action. There was no 
22, Sardar means, literally, "headman", It is generally 
applied in modern Afghanistan to important members of 
the royal household, and this is probably the sense which 
Cater here intended. 
2J, F,D,, S,F, Oct.l920, Nos.705-806, Notes p,2l, The 
British sometimes referred to a mythical "public opinion" 
on British relations with Afghanistan, much as the Amirs 
referred to the "will of the people", See infra, P• 357. 
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parliament in Kabul, but the Amir knew that if his 
government became unpopular in any part of eastern Afghanistan, 
a tribal rebellion might well be provoked. A Pashtun clan 
was a self-organised fighting unit; crimes committed by 
any of its members were generally held accountable to the 
clan as a whole, and the tribesman thus had a lifetimets 
experience of fighting the members of other clans. He 
grew accustomed also to the leadership of hereditary or 
elected chieftains or of a group of tribal leaders acting 
in ,jirgah (council). A whole series of semi-autonomous 
local governments thus existed in the Pashtun areas; in 
certain parts of eastern Afghanistan the Amiris writ ran 
only with the consent of the tribal leaders. 
A step forward in time may perhaps be permissible at 
this point, to provide a concrete example of the process 
of tribal rebellion, and the manner in which the Amir was 
forced to deal with it. Khost, a mountainous area near the 
Anglo-Afghan border east of Ghazni, 24 was the scene of more 
than one rebellion against the Amir 1 s government. In March 
1912 the alleged misgovernment of Muhammad Akbar Khan, 
district governor of Khost, provoked a serious rising among 
the Mangal tribesmen of the area, in which the rebels soon 
24. See the map reproduced as Appendix )4. 
overcame the isolated garrisons of regular troops which 
the Amir had posted at various points in their territory,25 
In May the Mangals were joined by war parties from the 
far larger Ghilzai tribe, and Muhammad Akbar was forced to 
evacuate the fort of Matun from which he normally governed 
his district.26 The rebellion was henceforth directed by 
Jehandad Khan, a Ghilzai chieftain who decided to exploit 
the anarchy in Khost to mc~e a bid for the throne of Kabul. 2 7 
What had begun as an isolated revolt concerned solely with 
local issues threatened to develop as a civil war between 
the royal Durani clan and the powerful Ghilzai tribe. 
Habibullah realised the danger of the situation, and ordered 
his General Nadir Khan to quell the rebellion. The regular 
forces under Nadir Khan's command were assisted by many 
irregulars, mainly Tajiks from the valleys north of Kabul 
who could be expected to have little sympathy with the 
rebels, and who looked forward to returning to their homes 
laden with property looted from the Ghilzai and Mangal 
. 28 
vlllages, Nadir Khan and his troops forced the rebels 
to sue for peace by the end of May; Jehandad Khan fled to 
25, F,D;, S ,F, Aug. 1912, Nos 42 and 44, 
26. ~·• No ,80, 
27, ~., Note to No,14o, 
28, See A.C. Jewett, An American Engineer in Afghanistan, 
p.SO, Jewett errs in stating that there were no regulars 
sent to Khost on this occasion, 
British territory, where he failed to interest the 
British frontier authorities in supporting his cause, 2 9 
Preliminary peace negotiations in Khost broke down in 
June 1912, and sporadic fighting between the rebels and 
18 
government forces re-erupted, but by the end of July peace 
was restored; some of the Mangals' grievances were redressed, 
and Muhammad Akbar Khan was replaced by a new hakim,JO 
The Khost rebellion of 1912 served as a demonstration 
of two fixities in the internal politics of Afghanistan, 
Left to itself, a local protest against provincial 
misgovernment could escalate as a rebellion in which the 
throne itself was disputed, provided a tribal leader of 
some stature emerged to command the rebels, Of particular 
interest in the context of Afghanistan's foreign relations 
was the fact that such a leader could always look abroad 
for support, even if he failed to obtain it, The Khost 
revolt served further to illustrate the Amir 1 s weakness 
in a serious crisis of this sort; to overcome the rebellion, 
Habibullah was forced to call for the support of other 
tribes unconnected with those who filled the rebel ranks, 
In this way the fragmentation of Afghan society could be 
turned to his advantage by the Amir, 
1912, Nos,106 and 139• 
JO, See the Kabul newspaper, Sira,j-ul-Akhbar, Vol,I, 
No.19, 
19 
There was a disruptive force inherent in the Afghan 
monarchical system which combined with the rebellious 
tendency of some of the Pashtun tribes to weaken the Amirts 
power over his subjects, 1Abdur Rahman had expelled from 
his country two of his cousins who had once disputed his 
right to rule. 31 It was generally believed in 1901 that 
Ayub Khan and Ishaq Khan, who had lived in exile since the 
1880s, had little chance of promoting a successful 
rebellion aimed at placing either of them on the throne,32 
Their fortunes rested on the Afghan policies of the British 
and Russian governments, to whose territory they were 
respectively confined, and in this sense the problem of 
keeping them at arm's length was virtually the problem of 
defend:Lng Afghanistan against external aggression,33 a1;1d 
thus part of the general pattern of Afghanistan's foreign 
relations, which is discussed separately, 1Abdur Rahman 
31. See supra, P• 12. 
32, See, ~~q Noyce, op .cit,, pp .1,50-,51. 
33• A British official admitted privately in 1904 that 
Ayub Khan "[has not] anything of a party now, and he could 
not establish himself, or hold his own, without British 
assistance". (F,D., Deposit F (Secret), Mar,l919, Nos,,5-8, 
Notes p.4), The British had made more than one unsuccessful 
attempt to instal in Kabul a puppet Amir who lacked the 
support of the more powerful Pashtun tribes, and they had 
decided not to repeat the experiment, It is likely that 
the Russian government had reached similar conclusions 
about their own protege Ishaq Khan. 
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had succeeded in reducing the risk of civil war based 
on inter-dynastic rivalry, but he was unable to exclude 
the possibility of intra-family disputes, Habibullah's 
uncles and cousins could be effectively discounted as 
dangerous rivals, but his own brothers remained as possible 
contenders for his throne. For reasons of humanity, if 
nothing else, Habibullah was unwilling to follow the example 
of the earlier Ottoman Sultans, who murdered or imprisoned 
all but one of their offspring: Habibullah had been 
selected by his father as the new Amir, but Afghanistan 
had no established system of royal succession, much less 
of promogeniture, and Habibullah 1 s brothers were still 
capable of wresting the crown from his hands if they 
showed greater ability, or could summon the support of a 
sizeable proportion of the Pashtun chieftains, of the army 
and of the personnel of the provincial administration, 
Habibullah tackled this problem with a mixture of 
force and compromise, At the beginning of his reign, two 
of his eight brothers could be recognised as his most 
dangerous rivals, One of them, Nasrullah Khan, was 
Habibullahts full brother, and (at twenty-seven) some two 
years younger than the Amir himself,34 Another, 'Omar Jan, 
34~ According to the genealogy reproduced by Abdur 
Rahman, op.cit., Vol,I, p.xv. It should be noted that 
many Muslims -are uncertain of their real age, and that 
these figures must be regarded as approximations, 
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was only eleven years old at the time of Habibullahts 
accession, but was 1Abdur Rahman's son by his principal 
wife Bibi Halima (and thus half-brother to Habibullah and 
Nasrullah); the influence which his mother commanded made 
him a dangerous rival to the Amir, Nasrullah had shared 
with Habibullah some of the judicial and administrative 
work which .•.Abdur Rahman had delegated to his sons towards 
the end of his life 1 but after his accession Habibullah 
made sure that control of the regular army and the 
administrative bureaucracy remained firmly in his own hands, 
This represented the threat of force which Habibullah 
commanded, and which helped to ensure Nasrullah•s 
acceptance of Habibullah•s accession; had Nasrullah ever 
attempted to raise open rebellion, he would have found the 
Afghan army against him, and he would have faced also the 
opposition of the majority of provincial governors.35 
Habibullah reinforced his position by entering into 
a formal agreement with Nasrullah and Bibi Halima, who 
acted on behalf of her son. The British Agent in Kabul3 6 
later reported that at the time of 'Abdur Rahman1.s death 
Habibullah signed a document stating that his own claim 
to the throne would be accepted by his brothers, provided 
35~ Such a situation arose after Habibullah 1 s death 
in l9l9. See infra, PP• 2l3-17. 
36, See infra, ·p. 28, 
Nasrullah was appointed "his [Habibu1.lah's] Naib 
(assistant) 37 and Mohamed Umar Jan wi1.1 be General. and 
wi1.1. be given work in importance next to Nasrul1.a", and 
that "After Habib-ul1.a, Nasru1.la wi1.1 succeed to the 
throne and after Nasru1.1.a Mohamed Umar Jan" , 3 8 Within a 
2? 
few years of his accession, however, Habibul1.ah granted 
to his son '.Inavatullah the tit1.e of Mu(Ln-us-Sa1.t~ah 1 39 
and began to delegate part of his judicial and administra-
tive authority to him. It was general1.y believed that 
Habibul1.ah had chosen 1Inayatullah as his successor, and 
Nasrullah natura1.ly resented this infraction of the agreement 
which Habibullah had signed. Bibi Halima similarly opposed 
the exc1.usion of her son from the position of authority 
promised by Habibul1.ah, Whi1.e Nasru1.lah took care to 
preserve every appearance of amiability towards his brother, 
and carried out faithful1.y his duties as regent during 
Habibullah's absences from the capita1, 40 he nevertheless 
maintained regular contacts with the Pashtun chieftains, 
and with the mullas who~ten wie1.ded much authority among 
- -37. Nasrti1.lah's full. tit1.e was "Na'ib-us-Saltanah~ which 
may be free1.y translated as "Viceregent.of.the.Kingdom". 
38. F.D., Deposit F (Secret) Mar. 1919, Notes pp.l3-14. 
39. "Support of the Kingdom". 1.Inayatu1.1.ah Khan was 
about twelve years old at the time of his fatherfs 
accession. 
40, As, 
in 1.907, 
for instance, during Habibullah's tour of India 
(see infra, pp.74-76), 
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the Pashtun tribesmen of both British and Afghan territory, 
In this way he attempted to balance his brother.'s command 
of the regular troops and administrative personnel by 
extending his authority among the unruly Pashtun tribes, 
The two forces principally opposed to Habibullah's rule thus 
tended to coalesce against him. Habibullah could overcome 
them by keeping them apart, and by strengthening the army 
and bureaucracy which he commanded, The fact that 
Habibullah suppressed the Khost uprising, the most serious 
rebellion of his eighteen year reign, and that he was able 
in this case to separate tribal animosities from intra-
family rivalries, 4 l was a measure of the success which he 
achieved; and of the value of the careful preparations 
made by his father, 
While Habibullah could prevent his brother from removing 
him from the throne, he was generally unable to restrain 
Nasrullah when the latter attempted to create trouble for 
the British along India's north-west frontier, Habibullah 
was anxious to maintain good relations with the Government 
of India; and thus failed to meet Pashtun expectations that 
their sporadic attacks on British installations would 
receive support from Kabul. His brother attempted to fill 
4l, Partly, it must be admitted, by chance, The 
Ghilzais had their own leader in Jehandad Khan, and 
had no need to look to Nasrullah as their figurehead. 
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the gap, by granting arms, ammunition and money to the 
tribal chieftains and ,jirgahs who planned rebellion against 
the British. Nasrullah's campaigns for support among the 
border Pashtuns produced a problem in Anglo-Afghan 
relations which was never fully solved, and represented 
an important effect of Afghanistan's internal politics on 
her relations with the British, 
Another important aspect of the interrelation of 
internal problems and external policies was less specific, 
and probably of declining importance during Habibullah's 
reign. Tribal leaders could raise rebellion against the 
Amir with relative ease, and there was little to prevent 
a foreign power from doing so if its government decided on 
such a policy. Jehandad Khan had applied for help to 
British frontier officials; his requests had been refused, 
but the possibility of British or Russian support of an 
internal rebellion remained, Many of the Hazarahs regularly 
enlisted in the pioneering regiments of the British-Indian 
army, and the Amir and his advisers sometimes feared that 
the British might have gained influence among this minority 
community which could be used to undermine the Amir.'s 
authority over the Hazarahs. 42 The Russian authorities in 
central Asia were less circumspect than their British rivals, 
42; F;D.; S.F. Oct,l908, No,lll. 
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and on one occasion in Habibullah's reign lent open 
support to the rebellious activities of a nomad tribe of 
north-western Afghanistan.43 The British and Russian 
governments had almost permanent fears that the other 
might exploit the dynastic rivalries of the Muhammadzais 
as well as the tribal orientation of Pashtun society, to 
promote civil war in Afghanistan and replace the existing 
government with something more to their advantage. The 
Afghan state had existed as a stable entity only since the 
time of 'Abdur Rahman's accession in 1880 1 there was no 
proof that it might not collapse, and thus usher in a new 
and fateful period of Anglo-Russian conflict in central 
Asia. In this sense, the social and governmental organisa-
tion of the Amir's kingdom reacted upon the attitude of 
the British and Russian governments to one another, as well 
as upon their relations with the Amir. 
4. Afghanistan's relations with Britain and Russia: 
Habibullah1 s initial attitude. 
The foregoing remarks should be placed in the context 
of the specific agreement with the British regarding 
Afghanistants relations with the outside world which had 
been accepted by .'.Abdur Rahman in 1880 after many years 
43 ~ ·see infra, P• 136. 
of Anglo-Afghan and Anglo-Russian conflict on this 
point,44 During the nineteenth century the Russian and 
Indian governments had occupied all but a few hundred of 
the fourteen hundred miles which had separated their 
respective frontiers during the 1820s, The British and 
'" 
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Russian advances gave rise to fears of an open Anglo-Russian 
clash in the mountains of Afghanistan, and it was a clash 
which the more moderate spirits on both sides were anxious 
to avoid, By 1870 the kingdom of the Amir, roughly defined 
as it was, represented the sole tract of territory in non-
Chinese central Asia unconquered by either of the imperial 
powers. The British had twice attempted the conquest of 
Afghanistan - in 1838 and 1878, On both occasions the 
British attack had been motivated by fears that two 
successive Amirs 1 Dost Muhammad and Shir 'Ali, were planning 
an alliance with Russia directed against British India, but 
in both cases the British had found that the task of holding 
the territory across which they had advanced was greater 
than the political advantages warranted, and they had been 
forced to retreat, leaving the country under a new Amir 
44, Only the briefest sketch of the great power conflict 
over Afghanistan of the nineteenth century can be given 
in these pages, Full accounts will be found in the 
works of Sykes, (History of Afghanistan, Vol.II), Fraser-
Tytler, Fletcher, Habberton 1 .Singhal and Ghose, The last 
three are the most detailed and valuable. Further details 
will be found in the bibliography, infra,pp. 483 ff, 
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not of their original choosing. 45 During the 1860s the 
Russian and British governments had discussed the possibil-
ity of recognising Afghanistan as a neutral buffer between 
their respective empires, but the difficulty of defining 
the boundaries of the Amir's territories had brought these 
discussions to a standstill, 46 The programme of securing 
a definite agreement with Russia as to the limits of 
British and Russian influence in central Asia had effectively 
failed, the policy of direct conquest of Afghanistan failed 
also during the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80) and in 
1880 the British were forced back to a third alternative, 
This involved the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a semi-
independent state, whose boundaries were established by 
international agreement, whose forces were armed and partly 
paid for by a British subsidy to the Amir 1 and whose 
sovereignty was restricted only to the extent that the 
Amir was pledged to abstain from all dealings with the 
45. Dost Muhammad, the Amir whom the British 
had attacked in 1838, returned to his throne 
after the departure of the British army from 
Afghanistan in 1842, The Government of India 
was similarly obliged to abandon their support 
for Yaqub Khan, whom they had enthroned after 
their second invasion of 1878 1 and to leave 
Afghanistan in 1880 after recognising the 
succession of _IAbdur Rahman, 
46, See W, Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations 
concerning Afghanistan, .pp.2J-J6, 
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Russian government,47 The British abandoned their 
earlier attempts to install a permanent European representa-
tive at the Amir,1,s court, and communication between 
Afghanistan and India was maintained by the British Agent 
(a Muslim native of India) in Kabul and an Afghan Envoy in 
Calcutta, The Agent was assisted by two British news-
writers in ~andahar and Herat, but exercised no personal 
influence over the politics of the Afghan capital: the 
permanent residence in Afghanistan of any other British 
officials was rigidly forbidden, and no Europeans of any 
nation were allowed to live there unless they were employed 
48 
by the Amir in some technical capacity. The British 
policy of 1880 may be summarised as the arrangement of an 
Anglo-Afghan alliance designed to keep Russia at a safe 
distance from the north-west frontier of India, and it was 
not until 1907 that a revision of this programme was 
47, Under the terms of the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1857 
the Shah of Iran was obliged to break off all direct 
relations with the Amir, Successive rulers of Afghanistan 
and Persia generally abided by this undertaking, and 
accepted British mediation in frontier disputes along the 
southern part of the Perso-Afghan boundary in 1872 and 
1903, (See Sykes, op,cit,, Vol,II, PP•9l-96 and 208-lJ, 
and infra, P• 59 ), The Shah confined himself to the 
despatch of complimentary letters to Afghan rulers on 
their accession, The question of Perso-Afghan relations 
was essentially a minor one after the first Anglo-Afghan 
war of l8J8-42, 
48, For the memoirs of three of the Amir ,•,s European 
employees see Jewett, op,cit,, E. and A, Thornton, Leaves 
from an Afghan Scrapbook, ,and J,A, Gray, At the Court ,of,the 
~· 
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undertaken, This process of adaptation forms the subject 
of later chapters, 
Habibullah 1.s initial attitude towards the British 
control of his foreign relations was not an unfavourable 
one. The new Amir •.s opinions were largely modelled on 
those of his father$ and IAbdur Rahman had given an explicit 
statement of his reasons for accepting the settlement with 
the British of 1880, The Russians, he explained, had not 
abandoned their plans for conquering Afghanistan; the 
British had invaded the country, but had shown by their 
withdrawal that they preferred to leave the Amir free to 
manage all the internal affairs of his kingdom, and that 
they were prepared to lend financial support to his govern-
ment, The bargain which the British had made was infinitely 
preferable to 
he claimed,49 
any which the Russians were likely to offer, 
Nor was his inability to conduct direct 
relations with third powers any real burden for the Amir, 
Were Afghanistan recognised as an independent state, 
embassies of the major world powers would be established 
in Kabul, and 1 as the Amir wrote:-
I would, under no circumstances, allow foreign 
representatives to be at my court at present -
the time is not yet ripe for such a step. In 
the first place, to invite foreign representatives 
to Kabul before we are strong enough to defend 
49. See.Abdur Rahman, op,cit., Vol,II, pp.260-62 
and 269 ff, 
ourselves against foreign aggression, would be 
a great mistake, This is a question which must 
go side by side with opening up railways and 
instituting telegraphs, after adequate military 
preparations have been made, The second danger 
in admitting foreign representatives is that my 
people are not properly educated to understand 
what is for their own good and vice-versa; they 
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are not sufficiently patriotic to understand the 
value of having their own ruler, The foreign 
representatives, while on the one hand they persuade 
my subjects to spread false reports, and to lay 
complaints against my Government before foreign 
courts, will, on the other hand, step in to make 
themselves judges and settle disputes between me 
and my subjects - disputes caused by themselves in 
their own interests to divide up my country, The 
third danger in having representatives at the Court 
of Afghanistan is that my Government would incur 
the danger of foreign intrigues in the country, 
for the purpose of causing disruption among the 
tribes, and so dividing up the country. And 
certainly there would be the danger of every one 
of the Great Powers claiming concessions and 
control of various matters, if we were thus to 50 give them a chance for every sort of interference. 
'Abdur Rahman was clearly unwilling to risk subjecting 
his country to the kind of foreign penetration which he 
had seen around him in P'ersia, the Ottoman empire and China, 
At the beginning of his reign, Habibullah did not believe 
that the existing conditions in Afghanistan and abroad were 
substantially different from those described by his father, 
Only in one respect had 'Abdur Rahman attempted to alter 
the settlement of 1880. He regarded it as damaging to his 
prestige that he, a reigning monarch, should be obliged 
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to correspond with the government of Queen Victoria 
through the subordinate medium of the Viceroy of India, 
He probably realised also that the London and Indian 
governments were not always in accord in their policy 
towards Afghanistan, and he may have hoped to play off 
these differences to his own advantage. In 1895 he had 
despatched Nasrullah to England, where the young prince 
had laid before the British government his fatherts 
proposals for the establishment of an Afghan embassy in 
London. The Government of India was firmly opposed to 
allowing direct communications between London and Kabul; 
Salisbury's Conservative government supported their stand, 
and told Nasrullah no Afghan embassy could be stationed 
in London until the Amir gave permission for the permanent 
residence of a European British representative in Kabul. 
1Abdur Rahman claimed that he was "more than hurt at the 
failure of his [Nasrullah's] mission",5l but realised that 
he had been effectively checkmated, While 'Abdur Rahman's 
request was not repeated until the end of Habibullah's 
reign, it is unlikely t~at the old Amir ever abandoned 
his ambitions for representation in London, and certain 
that Habibullah inherited them,52 
51, Ibid;, Vol.II, p,247, 
52, F;u., Part B (Secret) Aug,l909 1 No.J8, 
3 ') ·?.. 
5· The effects of Habibullah's character and policies. 
While Habibullah raised no objections to the British 
control of his government's foreign relations until 1915-16, 
his own character and his plans for the modernisation of 
his country eventually combined with changes in the 
attitudes of Britain and Russia to produce a situation in 
which release from the British leading-strings was demanded 
by many Afghans and finally by the Amir himself. The loss 
of prestige involved in allowing the British to direct the 
Amir 1 s foreign policy was eventually considered more 
serious than the dangers incurred by allowing foreign 
ambassadors to reside in Kabul. Habibullah seldom expressed 
any opinions which differed from those of his father, but 
there was between father and son something of the same 
difference of character which separated Queen Victoria 
from Edward VII. 'Abdur Rahman was a ruler of Victorian 
sternness; more intelligent and capable than Victoria, less 
swayed by flattery, and forced by conditions in his country 
to adopt Draconian measures of repression at which Victoria 
would have shuddered, but convinced nevertheless of the 
seriousness of his task, and of the need to cast his 
successors in his own mould. The fact that Habibullah 
succeeded to his throne in the same year as the new King 
of England was not the only similarity between them, for 
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Habibullah exhibited many Edwardian characteristics -
a love of lavish display, good living and the company of 
a multitude of mistresses. In the case of Habibullah, a 
light-hearted approach to life had more serious consequences 
than in that of Edward VII, for the Afghan Amir played a 
far greater part in the administration of his country than 
his English contemporary; the Amir•s judicial and 
administrative work often piled up unattended to, while 
Habibullah went shooting, or busied himself with photography~J 
At the same time, Habibullah had an excellent knowledge 
of Persian literature and Muslim theology, combined with 
53• During one of Habibullah's sporting expeditions in 
1906 an enterprising Kabuli distributed a satirical 
proclamation in the Amir's style which bore witness to 
the annoyance which Habibullah's habits caused among his 
subjects. The "proclamation" ran as follows:-
I have heard that serious quarrels and feuds have 
arisen among the quails of Logar [a valley to the 
south of Kabul] and considering the suppression of 
these quarrels of the utmost importance I have dropped 
all other work and come to Logar so that I may kill 
some, imprison some and expel some quails from the 
place and restore peace to the peace-loving portion 
of the population, After I have settled the matter 
of the ~uails the month of Ramzan will begin, No 
Durbar Lcourt] can be held in Ramzan and after Ramzan 
I leave for India and will return thence after six 
months, On return from India I will hear complaints, 
The people who have been waiting here for the last 
three or four years in the hope of my holding a 
Durbar or redressing their wrongs must have reached 
the end of their money or provisions; they should 
therefore return home and return to the capital after 
six months provided with expenses for two years >vithin 
which period it is possible their case may be decided. 
This document was eventually forwarded to the Amir at 
Logar, (F,D., S.F. Feb.l907: No,6J), 
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a surprisingly wide though somewhat diffused acquaintance 
with western technology, As an Indian official who met 
Habibullah during his tour in India of 190754 put it: 
"He is surprisingly digressive and discursive in conversa-
tion; a visit to a factory or a game of Bridge may lead 
one through many chapters of the world's history before 
either can be brought to an end".55 The impression gained 
is that of a lively and ingenuous man who found if difficult 
to concentrate his attention on one subject for very long, 
and was anxious to abandon the cruel methods with which 
his father had strengthened the royal power, Some observers 
believed that this constituted a distinct failing in a 
ruler of Afghanistan; the British Agent, for instance, 
noted in 1908 that "The feeling of dread and respect with 
which the word "Amir" was associated during the time of the 
late Amir Abdur Rahman Khan ,,, [has] almost worn off, 
Amir Habib-ulla Khan is a more civil and gentle ruler than 
the country of Afghanistan demands",5 6 
Habibullah's personal character brought him into 
conflict with the royal advisers whom he inherited from 
his father. 'Abdul Quddus Khan was undoubtedly the most 
54; See infra: PP• 74-76. 
55. F,D., SS. Jul,l907: Nos.l05-37, Notes p.89, 
56, Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-Din 1 Report on the Tour 
in Afghanistan of His Ma,jesty Habib-ulla Khan, p.v. 
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important member of 1.Abdur Rahman's court entourage; 
he was distantly related to the old Amir57 (and hence to 
Habibullah) and had served 'Abdur Rahman as his court 
' . 58 chamber ... aJ..n, Some four or five years after Habibullah's 
accession, however, he fell into disfavour, 5 9 and 
abandoned much of the administrative work which he had 
formerly performed. His place was effectively taken by 
members of a number of Muhammadzai families who had 
emigrated from Afghanistan during •.Abdur Rahman's reign 
or during the civil wars which preceded it. The British 
Agent explained that "His Majesty the Amir likes persons 
of refined manners and habits. Such he finds among refugees 
only11 • 6o The Yahya Khel, 6 l who had followed the ex-Amir 
Yaqub Khan into exile in India in l879 1 was one of the most 
important refugee families reintroduced to Afghanistan: 
after their return to Kabul in l90l/02 62 the leading 
57. See ·Appendix JJ, 
58, Abdur Rahman, op,cit., Vd,I 1 p.206. 
59• The British Agent claimed that his retirement was 
due to a quarrel with Nasrullah; (F.D., S,F, Feb,l907, 
No.l76, p.J). 
60, F,D., S,F, Feb.l909, No,20, 
6l. ~·• the descendants of Sardar Yahya Khan: see 
Appendix JJ • 
62, Burhan-ud-Din Kushkaki, (Nadir-i-Afghan, p.8) 1 writes 
that the Yahya Khel returned to Kabul in . the hi.j ri year 
lJl9 (May l90l-April l902). Marshal Shah Wali Khan points 
out that his family re-entered Afghanistan at the invitation 
of 'Abdur Rahman; (Yad Dashtha-yi-Man, p.~. 
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members of the family, Muhammad Yusuf Khan, Muhammad Asaf 
Khan and their sons, quickly assumed positions of importance 
as provincial governors and military commanders. One of 
Muhammad Yusuf 1 s daughters, Mahbubah, married Habibullah, 
while her brother Nadir Khan soon achieved high rank in 
the army, and was appointed its commander-in-chief after 
the suppression of the Khost revolt of 1912. 63 
The Yahya Khel were faithful servants of Habibullah, 
and although their foreign education and experience injected 
a new and vigorous spirit into the executive branch of the 
. 64 Amlr 1 s government, they were not initially interested in 
influencing the Amir·ts policy towards the British, The 
same was not altogether true of the Tarzi family, who had 
quarrelled with 1Abdur Rahman during the early years of 
the latter's reign, and had subsequently returned to 
Damascus, then within the Ottoman empire, The family 
patriarch, Ghulam Muhammad Tarzi, died in 1901, but his 
son Mahmud succeeded to his position and returned to 
63, Krishkaki, op.cit,, PP•7 and 61. See also supra, P• 17. 
As will be seen from the genealogy reproduced as .Appendix 
33, Nadir Khan succeeded Habibullah's son Amanullah as 
King of Afghanistan (Amanullah changed the title of the 
ruler from 11 Amir" to "King" in 1926) and Nadir's son 
at present occupies the Afghan throne, 
64, Nadir Khan and his brother Shah Wali Khan were 
educated at Dehra Dun in India. 
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Afghanistan in 1903 at Habibullah's invitation, 65 Like 
the Yahya Khel, Mahmud Tarzi, who was married to a Syrian 
lady, cemented a distant blood relationship with Habibullah66 
with a marriage alliance between his daughters Khairiyah 
and Sura yah and Habibullah t s sons 'Inaya tullah and 
Amanullah. He was initially employed as head of the Amir's 
translation department, where he rendered a number of the 
novels of Jules Verne from French into Persian, principally 
for Habibullahts own amusement, but also for general 
publication, Tarzi's own interests, however, led him to 
more serious subjects, He had written an account of his 
travels in Europe and the near east in 1890, and had 
included in it a satirical chapter calling for reform of 
the antiquated governmental machinery of the Ottoman 
. 67 emp~re, The full development of Tarzi 1 s theories took 
place in the years after 1911, and a few words on develop-
ments in Afghanistan during the first ten years of 
Habibullah's reign must be interposed before Tarzi is 
returned to. 
65, Louis Dupree, Mahmud Tarzi: Forgotten Nationalist, 
pp ,2-5. The writer must. acknowledge his debt to Professor 
Dupree's very informative report, on which much of the above 
passage is based, Mahmud Tarzi's son 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi 
very kindly supplied much additional information. 
66, See Appendix 33• 
67, Dupree, op,cit., p.5. Tarzi's book was published 
in Kabul in 1915 as s~yahat-namah-i-seh Qi.t•ah ru-yi-Zamin, 
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Habibullah once told a Kabuli audience that "I 
will be quite content if my name will be accepted among 
those who turned the wheel of fortune of this country in 
. . 68 
the right d~rect~on", By this the Amir meant that he 
was anxious to introduce the appurtenances of westernisation 
to his country, to acquaint his subjects with the advantages 
of western education and technological skill, and to impress 
foreigners with his progressive outlook, provided such 
changes did not threaten his own position, An enthusiastic 
motorist, the Amir constructed motorable roads connecting 
Kabul with his winter resort at Jalalabad and the southern 
capital of Qandahar, and even created an "Afghan Motor 
Company" for the transport of freight, 69 By the end of his 
reign, telephone lines stretched along the roads from 
Kabul to Qandahar and Jalalabad - a genuine gain from the 
viewpoint of administrative efficiency as well as national 
prestige, His father had established in Kabul a mechanised 
munitions plant for the manufacture of field artillery, as 
well as rifles and ammunition; 70 Habibullah showed rather 
68, F,D,, Part B; May 1908, Enclosure in No.85, 
69, Jewett, op.cit., p.219, Jewett adds that "not a pound 
of freight has ever been hauled by the company for the 
benefit of the stockholders, These trucks have been used 
exclusively for carting the royal haram or the ghulam bachas 
[literally, "slave boys", ~·• personal servants] and their 
baggage around Afghanistan", A not atypical outcome of 
Habibullah's enthusiasm, which was probably originally well 
meant. 
70, Abdur Rahman, op.cit,, Vol.II, pp,l4-27, 
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less interest in these activities than 'Abdur Rahman, and 
the output of the arsenal declined during his reign, 71 
but he instituted mechanised production of other items, 
notably woollen cloth and leather, and commissioned the 
construction of a hydro-electric plant some fifty miles 
north of Kabul at Jabl-us-Siraj 1 72 a town named after 
himself. 73 These technical innovations were largely 
inspired by the Amir's personal enthusiasms; Habibullah 
formulated no general plan of economic development, and 
his various schemes were often forgotten by the Amir when 
some new interest engaged his attention, The contact with 
the outside world which their introduction involved may 
however have done something to awaken a spirit of national 
pride among those Afghans who saw the new roads and factories, 
and in this sense led 
country's position in 
them to a greater 
74 the world. 
awareness of their 
Habibullah 1 s innovations in the educational field 
had the more definable effect of creating in Afghanistan 
71, F,D., S.F. May 1909, No,l9• 
72, A,C. Jewett was in charge of this work, and his book 
can be regarded as an authoritative account of the diffi-
culties encountered, The plant did not begin operation 
until just after Habibullah's death in 1919. 
73, Habibullah bore the title Sira,j -ul-Mila t wa ud-D:in, 
("Lamp of the Nation and of the Faith"), :!ill means "hill", 
74, This was the conclusion of Dr Saise, a mineralogist 
invited to Afghanistan by Habibullah in 1909. (F,D., 
S,F, Feb,l910; No.5). 
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a small but vociferous intelligensia who demanded reform 
of the Amir's government and of his policy towards the 
British, In October 1903 Habibullah founded a secondary 
school to teach western sciences to the sons of the Kabul 
aristocracy; the foundation was named after the Amir as 
Maktab-i-Habibiyah, Habibiyah was largely staffed with 
graduates and teachers from the Islamia College of Lahore 
and had an initial enrolment of 400 pupils; some three 
years after its establishment, however, the college had 
declined, as Habibullah lost interest in his brainchild. 
It was reinvigorated in 1907, when Habibullah visited 
Lahore as a state guest of the Government of India, 75 and 
appointed as principal of the school Dr. 1Abdul Ghani 1 a 
former principal of Islamia Lahore. 76 'Abdul Ghani was 
subsequently joined by other Punjabi lecturers, and by a 
number of Turkish instructors and medical doctors (some of 
whom left their homeland just before the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908) 77 who were eventually employed in a 
teaching hospital in Kabul under the Turkish doctor Munir 
•Izzat. Turkish instructors were also much in evidence in 
75• See infra, pp. 74-76. 
76, F.D. 1 S,F. Dct,l909 1 No, 25, 
77, F,D,, S.F. Jun,l908, No,175, 
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the field of military education, for Habibullah realised 
that he needed trained officers to command his forces, and 
in 1908 founded the Madrasah-i-Harbiyah Sira.jiyah 
("Sira.iiyah Military Academy") under the direction of 
Mahmud Sami 1 a former Baghdadi officer of the Turkish army,78 
By 1909 there were about twelve Turks employed in Kabul in 
various capacities, and although some of them soon returned 
to their country, while others were interested solely in 
their professional duties, they combined with the Indian 
Muslim intelligensia whom Habibullah had imported to 
exercise some influence over a new generation of Afghans 
whom they instructed,, 
6, "Freedom and fatherland". 
It would be difficult to define concisely the nature 
and strength of Afghanistan's intellectual awakening, The 
influence of the Turkish revolution of 1908 was undoubtedly 
strong, and combined with the news of the constitutional 
movement in Persia of 1906-07 and the anti-imperialist views 
and British education of the Punjabi lecturers to produce 
a confused amalgam of the theories of British liberalism 
and Turkish pan-Islamism, Russia•s defeat at the hands of 
Japan in 1904-05 had also helped to encourage the intelligensia 
78, F.D., F.B, Oct,l908 1 No,89• See also Sira.j-ul-
Akhbar, Vol,VII 1 No,2, 
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of many Asiatic countries, who had hitherto believed 
that European armies were invincible in Asia, Professor 
Bernard Lewis has written of the Young Turks that "Their 
political ideas were simple and rudimentary - freedom and 
fatherland, the constitution and the nation"; 7 9 something 
of the same could be said of the "Young Afghans". A 
curious feature of the doctrines which penetrated Afghanistan 
during the early years of this century was the fact that 
many of them had been first expounded by an Afghan, Sa•id 
Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, who had left his country in 1869, 
and had subsequently travelled in India, Europe and the 
near east 1 where his doctrines of political reform and 
Islamic revival had much influence on the first generation 
of Ottoman reformers of Sultan •Abdul Hamid's reign. 80 
79. The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p.202, 
So. Sa•i.d Jamal-ud-Din was probably born in Kunar, near 
Kabul, in 18J8/J9• After visits to India and Arabia he 
returned to Afghanistan in 1861 1 and was employed by Amir 
Dost Muhammad as one of his trusted advisers, During Amir 
Shir 'Ali's first reign (1863-66) he was instrumental in 
persuading the Amir to undertake a series of military and 
administrative reforms, and to begin a short-lived public 
education programme not dissimilar to that undertaken by 
Habibullah, Jamal-ud-Din subsequently attached himself to 
Amir Muhammad Afzal, a brother of Shir 'Ali who seized the 
throne in 1866 and held it for one year; he was forced to 
leave Afghanistan after Shir 1Ali returned to power in 1869, 
For the next twenty years Jamal-ud-Din travelled through 
India 1 Europe, Egypt and Turkey, and eventually settled in 
Tehran in 1889 1 where Shah Nasr-ud-Din at first lent a 
sympathetic ear to his reformist proposals. The autocratic 
Shah, however, eventually expelled him, and in 1891 Jamal-ud-
Din left Persia for Constantinople, where he spent the 
/(80) 
In this sense the new doctrinal imports had developed 
from an earlier (and generally unacknowledged) Afghan 
export. There was another important difference between 
the Afghan reformists and their Turkish contemporaries, 
Most of the leaders of Afghanistan's intelligensia were 
themselves foreigners, for whom the term "fatherland" 
could be applied to Afghanistan only in a loose sense, and 
for whom "constitution" was thus a slogan of more immediate 
relevance. 
In the primitive political setting of Afghanistan, 
the early "constitutionalists" allied themselves with 
Habibullah's royal rivals, On 5 March 1909 the Arnir's 
court, at that time in Jalalabad, was shaken by the discovery 
of a plot to murder Habibullah, in which 'Abdul Ghani was 
implicated, The doctor, it was said, had "made a society, 
the members of which used to assemble in his horne at night, 
(so) 
remaining six years of his life, He served at first as 
adviser to Sultan 'Abdul Hamid, but in his later years 
became a state pensioner who was listened to by the journa-
lists and teachers who opposed the Sultan rather than by 
•Abdul Hamid himself, (Sharif-al-Mujahid, Sayyid Jamal al 
D'in al-Afghani: His Role in the Nineteenth Century Muslim 
Awakening, passim), Jamal-ud-D'in had met Mahrnud Tarzi, 
but the most important part of his career was spent out 
of contact with his homeland; it is for this reason, perhaps, 
that the Sa•ld, the most important political theoretician 
produced by nineteenth century Afghanistan, receives little 
mention in such writing as the Afghan reform movement 
produced, A discussion of his ideas fits more easily into 
a study of the contemporary history of Persia and Turkey 
than that of Afghanistan, 
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There he first started to teach them the principles of 
political economy and gradually began to give lectures on 
the advantages of having a Parliament instead of a despotic 
Government". A coup d'etat was then planned by members of 
the society, which was known as the Sar-i-Mili8l and was 
formed largely of the teachers and students of the Sira.jiyah 
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college, Some Afghans believed that 'Abdul Ghani had 
intended to abolish the monarchy in favour of a republic 
under his own leadership; others pointed to his friendship 
with Bibi Halima, and surmised that he had planned to 
instal 'Omar Jan as a puppet Amir, 83 Nasrullah's name was 
also coupled with those of the plotters, and Nazir Safar 
Khan, a Chitrali intimate with Nasrullah, was arrested 
together with .'Abdul Ghani and several of Habibullah's 
personal servants, The arrests promptly extinguished the 
incipient constitutional movement in Afghanistan; while 
8l, "Radish head"; a pun on Habibullah's title Sira,j-
ul-Milat. 
82, F,D,, S,F, May l909 1 No,l47, 
8J, Afghans usually assume that the British were responsible 
for all internal distrubances in Afghanistan during this 
period, Their suspicions are not completely baseless in 
this instance; 'Abdul Ghani had approached the Indian secret 
service for support against Habibullah (~., Note to No, 
l29) but his suggestions had been rejected by the Indian 
government, who wished to befriend the Amir, not to remove 
him. E.H,S, Clarke, Deputy-Secretary in the Foreign 
Department of the Government of India, remarked of 'Abdul 
Ghani's approaches to the British authorities that "We have 
in office here papers sufficient to ~ustify his being hanged 
by the Amir ten times over" , (!.8.:!:2: •} 
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Habibullah took no overt action against Bibi Halima, 
•omar Jan or Nasrullah, the speed with which he acted 
against •Abdul Ghani and his other associates served also 
to discourage his rivals within the royal family, 
"Constitution", as the slogan of the reformist party 
in Kabul, failed in 1909; "fatherland", interpreted as a 
call to throw off the connection 'vith the British and re-
establish Afghanistan as a completely independent state, 
remained as the only part of the "Young Afghans'"philosophy 
which had much chance of survival, Even so, it could be 
expressed only in an indirect sense, which drew attention 
to the crimes of the European powers in the middle east 
rather than those of the British in Afghanistan. Mahmud 
Tarzi was principally responsible for expounding this 
d h . . s· -. Akh - 84 doctrine, an e d1.d so 1.n the pages of J.ra.J-ul- bar, 
a newspaper which he founded in 1911 at Habibullah•s 
suggestion, and which was published fortnightly until 1919, 
In the first issue of his newspaper Tarzi explained 
that it would contain "news of internal and foreign events 
and many other useful matters", and that it had been 
84. "Lamp of the News", Sira.j-ul-Akhbar was not the first 
newspaper published in Afghanistan; the honour is reserved 
to Kabul, of which a few issues appeared in 1867, during 
the brief reign of Amir Muhammad Azam, Jamal-ud-Din 
Afghani played a leading part in establishing this earlier 
newspaper, (Sayid Qasim Rishtia, "Journalism in Afghanistan", 
Afghanistan, Vol.III), 
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introduced as part of the Amir's programme of industrial 
and educational modernisation, 85 Sira,j-ul-Akbar's 
appearance coincided with an international struggle of 
importance to Muslims throughout the middle east - the war 
between Italy and Turkey for the possession of Tripolitania, 
which was represented as a crude exploitation by the 
imperialist powers of contemporary Turkish weakness, 
Although a number of Afghan volunteers left their country 
for service with the Turks in north Africa, 86 Tarzi could 
not call openly for participation in the war by the Afghan 
government, and confined himself to appeals for help for 
the Turkish wounded, a campaign to which Habibullah lent 
. 87 hls support, After the Turkish defeat in Tripolitania, 
Sira.j-ul-Akbbar felt bound to comment on its implications 
for the Muslim world; Tarzi looked at Persia and the 
Balkans as well as north Africa and concluded gloomily that 
"all western powers are at present determined to swallow 
up eastern countries", but was still forced by Habibullah 
to maintain that "it is a common saying in Afghanistan 
that the British government never interferes with the 
religions or places of worship of the people", and that 
85, Sira.j -ul-Akhbar, Vol,I, No.1. 
86, F.D., External B Apr. 1913 1 Nos.JOl-02. 
87, Sira.j -ul-Akhbar, Vol .I, No.5, 
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their behaviour compared well with that of their Russian 
. l 88 D . t r~va s, ur~ng he Balkan wars of 1913, however, Tarzi 
expressed regret at the British attitude of neutrality, 
and thus implied that the Afghans had a duty to their co-
religionists to the west, 89 At other times, when he felt 
the breath of Habibullahts anglophilism on his neck, he 
was forced to adopt milder counsels, and to maintain that 
action against the imperialist powers should be postponed 
until the Muslim nations had sufficiently advanced along 
the path of internal modernisation and reconstruction,90 
He reinforced this contention by stressing the value of 
western education, a principle to which Habibullah still 
raised no o~ction, in spite of the implications of the 
attempted coup d'etat of 1909· 
Tarzi 1s theories did not develop to their logical 
conclusion until the later years of the first world war, 
when Habibullah joined him in demanding a revision of 
88, Ibid., Vol,I; No,l8, Tarzi probably referred to the 
bombardment by Russian troops in Meshed of the shrine of 
the Imam Reza, which occurred in March 1912, 
89, Ibid., Vol.II, No,l. Tarzi maintained that Habibullah 
had w~en to the Viceroy of India to complain that 
"we consider this neutrality of your quite contrary to 
your interests and we object to it very strongly", (Ibid), 
There is, however, no record of any such letter in the 
archives of the Foreign Department of the Government of 
India, where it would normally have been deposited, 
90. ~·• Vol.I, N0 .l8, 
48 
tAbdur Rahman*s settlement with the British, A 
discussion of this metamorphosis must be postponed to 
later chapters. Two consistent lines of thought can 
however be distinguished in the pre-war issues of Sira,j-ul-
Akhbar, and both had their influence on later developments, 
The first was the strong connection with the fortunes of 
the Ottoman empire felt by many Afghan intellectuals, who 
had little first-hand experience of the autocratic rule of 
the Sultans and their successors. Afghan sympathy with 
the Turks had obvious effects when Turkey joined Germany in 
the world war, and gave to the doctrines of Tarzi and his 
associates a distinctly anti-British bias which they had 
hitherto lacked, Among these associates were Tarzi<s two 
sons-in-law, tinayatullah and Amanullah, over whom Tarzi 
exercised an influence which made itself felt when Amanullah 
succeeded to the throne in 1919. Admiration of the Turks 
and Japanese for their adoption of western sciences and 
administrative and military techniques may be distinguished 
as a second strain of thought which arose in Kabul during 
the years before 1914. In Afghanistan, the very fact 
that developments in the outside world were known of and 
discussed was of great importance, The Pashtun tribesmen 
had always been ready to fight foreign invaders; to this 
more primitive spirit of independence there was now added 
a new awareness of Afghanistan's international position, 
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of her existence as a nation rather than a tribal agglomer-
ation, and of the importance of national prestige, The 
British control of the Amir<s foreign relations was to be 
seized upon as a tangible symbol of Afghanistan's backward-
ness, and its removal was naturally to be demanded, It 
would be difficult to claim that this awareness affected 
more than the small circle of Afghan literates, but the 
important positions which many of the intelligensia occupied 
in the Amir 1 s government compensated for the lack of mass 
participation in the nationalist movement, such as it was, 
The success of the nationalists' programme did not 
depend uniquely on the growth of new attitudes in Afghani-
stan, The Amir had become committed to the British for 
special reasons, and only in certain respects; his ability 
to escape that commitment depended largely on the attitudes 
and strength of his Russian and British neighbours. 9 l The 
history of the Afghan independence movement, if such it 
can be called, is in large measure the history of the 
policies of the two great powers during the first twenty-
one years of this century, This complicated story must now 
be discussed in some detail. 
9l. See supra,pp. xvii-xix. 
CHAPTER II 
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: 1900-1917 
l. The Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon and its effect on 
Indo-Afghan relations. 
On 12 December 1904 Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary 
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to the Government of India, 1 arrived in Kabul for negotia-
tions with the Amir Habibullah which the British hoped 
would produce a new treaty between themselves and the 
Afghan ruler. Dane could have cited two events as 
principally responsible for his visit to Kabul: Lord 
Curzon 1 s accession to the Viceroyalty of India in January 
l899 and the death of the old Amir 'Abdur Rahman in 
October l90l. 
Curzon brought a firmness of purpose to his tasks as 
Viceroy which he probably believed that his predecessors 
lacked. Whatever mark he made on India, he was determined 
that it should be a lasting one and a striking monument 
to his own abilities and character. One of his first 
administrative acts as Viceroy was to reform the system 
by which relations with the Pashtun tribes on India's 
north-west frontier were conducted, by removing from the 
control of the provincial government of the Punjab the 
British areas west of the Indus and north of the province 
of Baluchistan, This region was reconstituted as the 
North-West Frontier Province. Many of his colleagues 
doubted the wisdom of Curzon 1 s policy; there is no space 
here to follow their arguments in detail. 2 What is important 
l. Dane's full title, and that of those who succeeded 
him in this post, was "Secretary to the Government of 
India in the Foreign and Political Department," The terms 
"[Indian] Foreigu Secretary" and "Foreign Department" 
will hereinafter be used, for the sake of brevity. 
2. The subject is fully discussed by C,C. Davies, The 
Problem of the North-West Frontier, l890-l908, PP• 99-ll5. 
for present purposes is the fact that Curzon regarded 
British dealings with the Pashtun tribesmen, who had 
intimate connections with Afghanistan, as a problem in 
Indian foreign policy, and not of Punjab provincial 
administration, As he wrote: "there is not another 
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country or Government in the world which adopts a system 
so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to 
interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most 
important sphere of activity the barrier, not of a sub-
ordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on 
the mere geographical plea that the latter resides 
closer to the scene of action••. 3 
Curzon's clear purpose was to remove this barrier 
by creating a separate trans-Indus province, under its 
own Chief Commissioner in Peshawar, who was directly 
4 
responsible to the central government of Calcutta. The 
directly administered part of the province was bounded to 
the west by an "administrative frontier"; between this 
arrl the Anglo-Afghan frontier proper lay a strip of 
"independent" tribal territory, subdivided into five 
Agencies, together with tribal Districts under District 
Officers,5 A Political Agent was stationed in each 
Agency, with the duty of supervising the relations of the 
J, Quoted by Davies, op. cit., p, 108, and Sir Olaf 
Caroe, The Pathans, pp,415-l6. Caroe's wording differs 
from that of Davies, 
4. The capital of British India was technically peri-
patetic, as the Viceroy and central government left 
Calcutta for Simla during the hot weather in Bengal. 
"Calcutta" will however be used hereafter to refer to 
the capital of India, The Chief Commissionership of the 
North-West Frontier Province was an appointment in the 
Foreign and Political Department of the central government, 
5, It should be noted that the tribal Agency system pre-
dated the North-West Frontier Province. 
tribe or tribes within it with those of other Agencies, 
and with the provincial government of Peshawar, No 
attempt was made to enforce British law in the Agencies, 
nor were taxes collected; instead, subsidies were often 
paid to the tribal maliks (chieftains), as bribes for 
the tribesmen's good behaviour, The maintenance of 
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order lay in the hands of locally raised troops, irregular 
khassadars, and regular frontier militias, the latter 
under British officers. 
Curzon 1 s reforms were intended to bring British 
relations with the Pashtuns on the British side of the 
Anglo-Afghan frontier under the more direct control of 
the central government. It was unlikely that Curzon 
would leave his new weapon unused, or that he did not 
intend to make his mark in Kabul as well as in Peshawar. 
The Viceroy stated his belief that India, "once so 
isolated and remote" would be drawn "more and more into 
the forefront of world politics 11 • 6 India's external 
relations were of growing importance, he believed, and 
British relations with the Amir especially so, thanks to 
the growth of Afghan strength after twenty years of 
'Abdur Rahman's tyrannical but effective rule. The fact 
that Curzon had visited Kabul in 1894 as a Member of 
Parliament, and had enjoyed several informal conversations 
with the Amir and his family, probably increased the 
Viceroy's awareness of Afghanistan's importance. 
While many historians,7 and not a few of his 
6. Quoted by Lord Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 
Vol.II, p. 262. 
7. ~., D.P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, pp,l65-72. 
contemporaries, were repelled by Curzon 1 s autocratic 
and pompous manner, they should give him the credit for 
having tackled the Afghan problem in a systematic 
fashion which was followed by few of his successors. 
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It was his inability to foresee practical objections to 
the full enforcement of his programme which constituted 
Curzon 1 s chief failing, The problem of British relations 
with the Kabul government, as Curzon probably realised, 
was twofold; Russian influence had first to be excluded 
from Afghanistan, and the Afghan government had then to 
be prevented from disturbing the peace of the new North~ 
West Frontier Province, The Anglo-Afghan engagements 
by which these relations were governed were both impre~ 
cise and relatively informal. There was in 1900 only one 
fully-fledged Anglo-Afghan treaty in force. This was 
the "Durand agreement" of 189J, negotiated and signed 
by the then Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand 
8 
and Amir 1Abdur Rahman. The agreement defined the 
northern boundaries of Afghanistan, where the Amir' s 
dominions marched with those of Russia9 along the Oxus, 
and the Afghan frontier with British India, between the 
Pamirs and the Indo-Persian boundary, Of the latter 
frontier the agreement stated that "His Highness the 
Amir will at no time exercise interference in the terri~ 
tories lying beyond this line [generally known as the 
"Durand line"] on the side of India", and that the 
British would abstain from interference on the Afghan 
8, The "Durand agreement" actually consisted of two 
agreements, signed simultaneously. See Appendices J and 4, 
9. Technically those of the Amir of Bokhara, a vassal 
of the Russian empire. 
side, 10 but Curzon claimed that this had not prevented 
1Abdur Rarunan from lending covert support to the mass 
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tribal rebellion against 
the frontier in 1897.11 
the British which erupted along 
A final article of the agreement 
12 granted the Amir an annual subsidy of 18 lakhs of rupees 
and the right to import arms freely through India. 1 3 
Many of the most important engagements governing 
British relations with Afghanistan were not covered by 
any formal treaty between the two governments. They 
included the British obligation to defend Afghanistan in 
the event of a Russian attack on that country, to abstain 
from interference with the internal government of Afghani-
stan, and to station no permanent European representatives 
in Kabul, together with the Amir's promise to refrain 
from dealings with any third power. These undertakings 
had been formalised in a series of letters exchanged 
between 1Abdur Raillnan and the British at the time of 
the former's accession in 1880, The British regarded one 
of these letters as of principal importance - that of 
A,C, Lyall, the contemporary Indian Foreign Secretary, 
14 to 'Abdur Rahman, of 20 July of that year. Lyall's 
lO, See Appendix 4, Article (2). 
ll, For a discussion of 1Abdur Rahman's complicity in 
these disturbances, which.was far from proved, see 
Singhal, op,cit., pp. 161-62. 
12. 1 lakh = 10o,ooo. 
lJ. See Appendix 4, Article (7). 
14, Reproduced as Appendix 2;· 
letter was imprecise in some respects1 5 and there was 
nothing to prove that all the correspondence between 
'Abdur Rahman and successive Viceroys of India, much of 
which suffered from a still more serious looseness of 
wording, might not have the same binding force. Curzon 
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was unwilling to clarify all the imprecisions involved 
in Lyall's letter, but he was anxious to make clear to 
the Amir that this document, together with the"Durand 
agreement", was to be regarded as exclusively effective. 
His aim, in fact, was to reproduce the wording of the 
three engagements in a single treaty of a formal type, 
and to obtain the Amir 1 s signature to it. 
15. The passage which dealt with the British commitment 
to defend Afghanistan against attack from a third power 
was certainly defective. See infra, P• 60, footnote 27. 
There was another more serious inconsistency involved 
in the wording of Lyall's letter. The Foreign Secretary 
had claimed that "it is plain that Your Highness can have 
no political relations with any foreign power, except with 
the British Government", and had then gone on to make the 
British undertaking to defend Afghanistan against Russian 
attack dependent upon the condition that "Your Highness 
follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government 
in regard to your external relations". (See Appendix 2. 
Italics supplied), Durand had repeated Lyall's second 
formula in the first section of the agreement whXh he 
signed with ihe Amir in 1893, and it had been proposed by 
'Abdur Rahman in a letter he addressed to Lepel Griffin, 
then "Chief Political Officer at Kabul", in June 1880. 
(This letter was, on Afghan insistence, appended to the 
Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1905, and is reproduced as 
Appendix 1.) It came to be accepted in practice, however, 
that British "advice" on Afghanistan's foreign relations 
amounted to a ban on any foreign relations except with 
themselves - in other words, that Lyall's first formula 
was the binding one - but the point was theoretically 
open to dQlbt, Curzon was evidently unwilling to remove 
this doubt by re-wording Lyall's letter and the "Durand 
agreement". 
2. Anglo-Afghan dif'f':erenq .es and the despatch of' the 
Dane mission: l90l-04, 
Curzon was at this point faced with the problem of' 
finding some argument to persuade the Afghan government 
that his policy was a reasonable one. 'Abdur Rahman 
would undoubtedly become suspicious if' he was asked to 
repeat his signature to a collection of' documen~which 
he had already signed, and would probably create dif'f'i-
culties. Curzon 1 s excuse presented itself by chance 
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with the death of the old Amir in October l90l, The 
Viceroy now declared that the British agreements with 
1Abdur Rahman were personal to that ruler, and could not 
be regarded as binding upon his successor, Curzon 1 s 
point was, as will be seen, open to some dispute, but it 
was one to which he clung steadfastly, He withheld 
from Habibullah the subsidy which had been granted to his 
father by the terms of the "Durand agreement",l6 hoping 
no doubt that this step would force Habibullah to re-
negotiate the obligations which 1Abdur Rahman had under-
taken. Curzon simultaneously invited the Amir to a 
conference with Afghan chief's and Government of India 
representatives, which was planned to take place in 
Peshawar in February l902. 
The Viceroy had an initially high opinion of 
Habibullah 1 s capacity and character, gained mainly from 
his visit to the Afghan court of l894, and perhaps ex-
pected that the Amir would readily fall in with his 
plans, He was to be badly disappointed, It is unlikely 
that Habibullah then had any intention of abandoning his 
father's policy of alignment with the British, so he 
l6. The l8 lakhs subsidy promised to 1 Abdur Rahman in 
l893 had been increased by Rs.50,000 per annum in l897• 
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could raise no objections of principle to the 1880 
engagements. But he was certainly unprepared to leave 
his kingdom so soon after his accession, and before he 
could be certain that his rule had been firmly established. 
He further considered it undignified to travel to India 
as a suppliant, and was upset by the peremptory tone of 
the Viceroy's invitation. As he later explained, "I 
did not consider it proper that I should settle affairs 
in their house": 17 "his [curzon's] letter was not really 
a letter of invitation, but a threat that the subsidy 
18 
would be stopped if I did not obey the summons." To 
explain the reasons for his refusal to attend the 
conference in terms which involved no loss of Afghan 
face, he claimed that 1Abdur Rahman's engagements had 
lost none o:f their validity by virtue of his father's 
death, and that Curzon's proposed treaty was therefore 
unnecessary. This was a technical commitment from which 
he later found it impossible to escape, whatever his 
original reasons for adopting it. 
Curzon repeated his invitation in the June of 1902, 
and was again met with refusal, An impasse was rapidly 
developing, for the Viceroy was as conscious as 
Habibullah of his own dignity, and hence as unwilling 
as the Amir to lose face by visiting the capital of the 
opposite party. The situation was made no better by 
Curzon 1 s determination to bring Habibullah to heel, by 
reminding him of the pressure which the Government of 
17, F.D,, F.B. Feb. 1907, Nos. 200-01, Notes p.l. 
18. Mary, Lady Minto, India, Minto and Morley, P• 75• 
Habibullah's claim was incorrect to the extent that 
Curzon had already cut off the subsidy at the time his 
invitation to the Amir was sent. 
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India could bring to bear on that of Afghanistan, and by 
taking the preliminary step of holding in India a shipment 
of arms bound for Kabul, Habibullah had no choice but to 
jog Curzon 1 s memory in the opposite direction, by 
recruiting Afridis for his army, and maintaining good 
relations with anti-British Pashtun leaders. 19 British 
power to interfere with the trade routes to Afghanistan 
was neatly balanced by the Afghan power to cause dis-
turbances on the north-west frontier, In October 
claimed 
1902, 
(on after Habibullah's second refusal, Curzon 
very scanty evidence) 20 that the Amir was likely to 
arrange some understanding with the Russian government, 
and that the Indian army would then be forced to advance 
to Qandahar, and to crea~a new Anglo~fghan frontier 
21 
along the Helmand, He found "a strange, a rather 
sinister parallelism between the events of the present 
time and those of 1876 11 , 22 The British cabinet saw the 
similarity also, and evidently believed Curzon 1 s part in it 
1as as "sinister" as that of Lytton, They treated the 
Viceroy to a firm rebuff, and Curzon was forced to 
abandon his plans for coercing the Amir into accepting 
the invitation to visit India, 
While Curzon was thus prevented from bringing further 
pressure to bear on the Amir, he was unwilling to solve a 
problem which was largely of his own creation by taking 
the only step which would have been acceptable to 
19. See Angus Hamilton, "Indo-Afghan relations under 
Lord Curzon 11 , p. 99 5. 
20. Especially so in view of the incident described 
infra,pp.95-96 which Curzon certainly knew of. 
21. Ronaldshay, op. cit., Vol, II, P• 267, 
22. Quoted by Singhal, op, cit,, p. 168. 
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Habibullah - the despatch of a British mission to Kabul, 
The opportunity to make this departure occurred only 
with the Viceroy's absence on leave in England between 
April and December 1904, and his temporary replacement 
by Lord Ampthill, Habibullah had in the meantime demon-
strated that his refusal to visit India was not intended 
as a refusal to abide by 1Abdur Rahman's undertakings 
as they affected his relations with third powers, for he 
had accepted British arbitration of a boundary dispute 
with Persia in 1902-03, 23 and the temporary deputation 
to Herat in 1903 of Henry Dobbs, then British consul in 
Seistan, for the supervision of the replacement of 
boundary pillars 
f th t C 'ty. 24 o.. a ~ 
along the Russo-Afghan frontier north 
When Ampthill exploited Curzon 1 s 
absence by asking Habibullah to receive a British mission 
in Kabul, the Amir readily accepted, Habibullah agreed 
also to send his sixteen year old son'Inayatullah Khan 
on a courtesy visit to India in the winter of 1904-05. 
3· Dane's instructions. 
Dane had been sent to Kabul by Curzon's locum tenens 
but his orders were still Curzon 1 s own. The Indian 
Foreign Secretary was instructed to stand firmly on 
Curzon's claim that all British engagements with Afghan 
rulers were valid only during the lifetime o:f i;he Amir 
with whom they were concluded, and to make sure that the 
23. See Sykes, op, cit., Vol, II, pp. 208-13. 
24. Dobbs found on his arrival in Herat that Russian 
frontier officers had already re•erected the pilJ.ars, 
(F,D,, S.F. Feb. 1904, No. 82), but the Amir 1 s anxiety 
to secure British mediation in his dealings with the 
Russians was never in serious question. 
60 
treaty he signed with Habibullah contained a clause re-
cognising this fact, He was to propose a draft treaty 
which repeated the exact words (inconsistent as they 
sometimes were) of Lyall's letter of 1880 and the 
"Durand agreement", compounded in the text of a formal 
treaty "w'hich would present the relations of Great 
Britain and Afghanistan to the outsne world in a form 
which could not possibly be ignored or misunderstood, 112 5 
Dane was further to impress on the Amir the fact that the 
Afghan army was powerless to hold off a Russian attack 
without British assistance, and that if Habibullah refused 
to allow British forces to enter Afghanistan for this 
purpose, his refusal wonld be treated as a repudiation 
o:f the treaty, He was at the same time to avoid telling 
the Amir how many British troops could be expected, and 
to "say that the form of assistance must depend on the 
circumstances as they arose 1126 - in other words, that the 
British were to be the judges o:f Russia's "aggressive" 
motives, and thus of the force of Lyall's assurances to 
'Abdur Rahman. 27 The Government of India had some 
evidence o.f contacts between the Afghan and Russian 
28 
o:f:ficials on minor matters, and Dane was to insist on 
25, F.D,, S,F, Jul. 1905, No, 6l, P• 2, See also F,D,, 
S,F, Jan, 1905, Enclosure No; l in No,74, 
26, F.D., S,F, Jul, 1905, No, 61, P• 2, 
27. Lyall had promised that "If any Foreign Power should 
attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such inter-
ference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the 
territories of Your Highness, in that event the British 
Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent 
and in such manner as may appear to the British Governw 
ment necessary, in repelling it". The British wished 
to reserve to themselves the right to determine the 
applicability of the terms "interference" and "unprovoked 
aggression" to any case which might arise. (See Appendix 
2). Difficulties of a very similar type occurred in l92l; 
(See infra, p.J66.) 
28. See infra, P• ll4, 
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their cessation as an essential condition to the conclusion 
of the treaty which Curzon proposed, 
Before adding his signature to that agreement, Dane 
was to reach a "satisfactory understanding" with the Amir 
on a number of subsidiary points. Many of these were not 
discussed in the course of his negotiations with 
Habibullah, and can therefore be ignored, The delimita-
tion of certain undemarcated portions of the Indo-Afghan 
boundary2 9 and the abandonment of the Amir 1 s allegedly 
"constant intrigues" with the Afridis30 may however be 
noted as the most important of the issues thus covered. 
If the Amir was prepared to meet the British on 
each of these points, he was to be allowed to claim the 
Rs,l8.5 lakhs subsidy granted to his father, and to 
import arms freely through India."' The instalments of the 
subsidy which had been withheld f'rom the Amir between the 
time of his accession and the signature of the treaty 
were to be returned to him if he showed a 11 conciliary 
spirit" with regard to yet another set of Anglo-Afghan 
problems, These included the introduction of better 
means of communication (wireless or telegraphic) between 
the two countries, the grant of a laisser passer to 
British army officers wl.cto wished to inspect the probable 
site of their struggle with the Russians in northern 
Afghanistan, and "The occasional deputation, as in past 
times, of British officers to the frontiers of Afghani-
stan for the purpose of settling disputes likely to lead 
to complications with Foreign Powers, or to disturb the 
mutual relations of the Government of India and the 
Amir",Jl 
29, Notably that section which passed through the country 
of the Mohmand tribe, ,just north of the Kabul river. 
30. F,D,, S.F. Jul, 1905, No. 61, pp. 2-3; 
3l. ~~ P• J, 
As should be obvious from the above outline, Dane 
received a very detailed brief, which was to make his 
task in Kabul a difficult one, Curzon allowed his 
62 
Foreign Seccetary next to no latitude in the conduct of 
the negotiations. Tied by his superiors to a rigid pro-
gramme which failed to ant.Lcipate many of the proposals 
which Habibullah was to make, Dane was unable to trim his 
sails to the changing winds of Kabul opinion; if 
Habibullah objected to any of the items of the British 
draft, the Foreign Secretary was unable to modify it 
without consultation with Calcutta, and often with London, 
and the delay thus involved was as annoying to Habibullah 
as it was to Dane. Nor was anything done to balance 
the concessions which were demanded by the British with 
new advantages for Afghanistan. Habibullah was to 
receive a subsidy which he had never regarded as legally 
withdrawn, and as a mark of especial favour the grant of 
four annual instalments which he claimed were his anyway. 
The later judgment of the Secretary of State for India, 
John 
were 
Brodrick, that "Dane's original instructions •••• , 
faulty1132 was indeed an understatement. 
_4:..:''---'T'-'h=e opening __ of the negotiations and the initial 
Afghan proposals • 
This is not to say that the difficulties Dane faced 
were insuperable; they were indeed minimal compared with 
those with wl.1ich his successors were forced to deal during 
the period which followed the first world war. Soon 
after the beginning of discussions with Habibullah in 
mid-December 1904, the Amir explained clearly that he was 
not opposed to the British control of his foreign relations, 
32. Minto Papers, written correspondence (hereinafter 
11 M.P. 11 ), Brodrick to Minto, 17.11.1905. 
and thus made a formal statement of an intention of 
which the British already had indirect evidence. 33 The 
Amir, in fact, was only too willing to examine the issues 
which Dane wished to have settled as essential preliminaries 
to the conclusion of a treaty, particularly where they 
concerned questions of defence. Habibullah explained 
that if Russia attacked Afghanistan he would "as a friend, 
ask from the British such help as he could receive with-
out damaging his honour and religious prestige, and 
stated that he intended to oppose a Russian advance on 
the line of the Hindu Kush." 34 He later expanded these 
/' 
explanations as a full scale expose of Afghan schemes for 
what the British politely called "military cooperation". 
On 18 December he urged that "as Russia was involved in 
war with Japan, the British and the Afghans should take 
advantage of her weakness by joining in an immediate 
attack on her and turning her out of Asia, If we [the 
British] consented to this, he suggested that we could 
unite the Turks and Persians on our side, and raise a 
,jehad [crusade] of the whole Muhammadan world against 
Russia,n 3 5 This scheme was later elaborated by the Amir's 
privy council (Majlis-i-Shura) in a memorandum which 
Dane was given on 1 January 1905.36 Forts were to be 
built along the Oxus by the British, to be manned by 
Afghan troops, and British and Afghan gun-boats were to 
patrol its waters. More fortifications were to be erected 
in the Hashtadan plain west of Hera t; a railway 1va.s to 
link that city with the Indian system and the area was then 
33· See supra, p.59. 
34, F.D,, S.F. Jul. 1905, No, 61, P• 15. 
35. Ibid, p. 16. The alliance Habibullah now proposed 
had once been suggested by his father - unofficiaJ.ly and 
as a th.eoretical possibility; (Abdur Rahman, op. cit,, 
Vol.II, pp.265-66), 
36. ~.D., S,F, Jul. 1905, No, 61, P• lB. 
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to be garrisoned by the British. The Shura proposed to 
claim an area of British-Indian territory along the 
Anglo-Afghan frontier equivalent to that ceded to Britain 
as the right of way of the Herat railway, As part of a 
general scheme of defence, the Indian army was to hold 
the less easily defensible part of the country around 
Herat, where the main thrust of the Russian counter-
attack could be expected to come, while their Afghan 
allies guarded the passes of the Hindu Kush to the east, 
While the Government of India had no love for 
Tsarist Russia, they naturally approached Habibullah 1 s 
proposals with caution. Dane told the Amir on 22 December 
that although he had received no instructions on this 
topic, "I was sure from what I knew of the sentiments of 
my Government that it [Habibullah's plan for an attack 
on 
no 
Russia] was out of the question, as Russia had given 
cause of offence," 37 Habibullah later explained that 
his proposals for "military cooperation" could only be 
discussed in detail after the treaty (the terms of 
which were still unsettled) had been signed, that they 
could then be approached separately, and that they need 
not be accepted or rejected en bloc. It would appear 
that Dane was at this juncture prepared to regard the 
Amir 1 s plans more favourably than he had at first. He 
was pulled up short by Curzon, who had now returned to 
India, and who informed his Foreign Secretary that the 
mission in Kabul was incompetent to discuss the issues 
which Habibullah had raised. Curzon issued these instruc-
tions for a typically Curzonian reason, The arrangements 
for Dane's visit to the Afghan court had been made during 
37. ~' P• 16, 
the Viceroy's absence, and against his advice; he had 
been obliged to accept the fait accompli after his 
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return to Calcutta in December 1904, but still believed 
that his own face must be saved, and that the Amir should 
be induced to visit India for talks with himself. If 
Dane could explain to Habibullah that his "military cow 
operation" plans could only be discussed in Calcutta, 
Curzon 1 s purpose could well be served, Dane offered a 
succinct explanation of the case several years later:-
They [the Indian government] sought to use the 
Amir 1 s scheme of defence proposed to the Mission 
as a lever for forcing him to come to India, 
which as we now know in the then existing circum-
stances he was determined not to do,,,, 
,,,,acting under my instructions I had brought 
the horse to3~he edge of the pool of military cooperation, and he had his nose in the water 
when he was pulled out of it by the action of 
the Government of India. His Majesty's Govern-
ment were so terrified at the idea of a collapse 
of the negotiations, if the proposal of a visit 
of the Amir to India were pressed, that they 
readily endorsed the opinion that the Amir's 
schemes should not be discussed with the Mission. 39 
The message informing 
decision reached Dane on 19 
him of the London 
40 January 1905, 
cabinet's 
He relates 
that "I did my best to keep the scheme alive" by offering 
the Amir a quantity of Martini rifles which the Indian 
army were then disposing of in favour of more modern 
J8. A survey of the Foreign Department records for 1905 
indicates that it was Habibullah who led Dane to the water 
rather than vice-versa. It is moreover doubtful that Dane 
~ acting on his original instructions in exhibiting 
enthusiasm for Habibullah's plans. 
39· F.D., S,F, Dec. 1907, Nos,S0-90, Notes P• J, See 
also F.D., S,F, May 1905, No. 65, and Notes pp.JO-Jl, 
40. F.D., S.F. Jul. 1905, No, 61, P• 20. 
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weapons, but his suggestions were rejected by the Indian 
41 government. The Afghan tribesmen were subsequently 
rearmed with rifles smuggled into their country from 
the Persian gulf. The British did their utmost to pre-
vent this trade, 42 and ill feeling on both sides was 
produced as a result. 
5• Further disputes in Kabul and the eventual agreement• 
Further animosity was meanwhile aroused by other 
issues which Dane was forced to discuss with Habibullah. 
It will be remembered that the Foreign Secretary had 
been instructed by Curzon to insist on the complete 
cessation of the communications between Russian and 
Afghan frontier officers which had been variously reported. 4J 
The Amir explained that none of his officials on the 
northern frontier of Afghanistan had been allowed to 
communicate with their Russian counterparts except on 
strictly commercial matters, and produced documentation 
to prove his point. 44 Dane was nevertheless told by 
Curzon on ll January that even the limited Russo-Afghan 
contact which had taken place contravened the Amir 1 s 
obligations to Britain and required further explanation. 
Curzon's demands were unacceptable to Habibullah, who 
had no intention of allowing his minor officials to 
intrigue with the Russians, but who was equally unwilling 
to damage Russo-Afghan commercial relations by disallowing 
41. F,D,, S,F. Dec. 1907, Nos.S0-90, Notes P• J, 
42. See Arnold Keppel, Gun-Running and the North-West 
Frontier, pp. 121-207. 
4J. See supr~,6o. 
44. F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1905, No, 61, p. 17. 
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all communications between Russian and Afghan officers, 
As he told Dobbs in the summer of 1904: "It is quite 
impossible to stop communications regarding commerce. 
But about political matters no frontier officers or 
others will have authority to open their mouths without 
my permission, 1145 On the insistence of the India Office, 
Curzon was forced to retreat from his initially uncom-
promising stand on this issue, and to tell Dane on 28 
January that "His Majesty's Government would be well 
content that the present position should be maintained as 
long as possible"; 46 in other words, that the matter 
should continue to be left to the Amir's discretion. 
Curzon's attitude had been diametrically opposed to 
that of the London government, who had decided to accede 
to Russian requests for permission to correspond with 
Afghan frontier officers on minor issues of no political 
importance. The Viceroy had been overriden by the 
Secretary of State for India John Brodrick, but the 
peremptory tone of his first message to Dane had not 
failed to worsen Habibullah 1 s growing hostility. Further 
problems were naturally created when the British were 
obliged to force on Habibullah a policy very different 
from that which Curzon had espoused, thanks to an Anglo-
Russian agreement on the subject in 1907. 47 
The discussions which Dane had had with Habibullah 
between December 1904 and January 1905 had still failed 
to deal with the most serious point of dispute between 
45. F.D,, S,F, May 1913, Note to No.5, See infra,p,ll4. 
46. F.D., S.F. Jul. 1905, No. 61, P• 21, 
47. See infra,Chapter III, 
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the Indian and Afghan governments. The Amir had showed 
no signs of abandoning his claim that the British 
agreements with 1Abdur Rahman were still in force, 
while Dane was equally firmly committed to the opposite 
view. It was obvious that the British envoy could not 
postpone discussion of the problem indefinitely. On 30 
January he accordingly approached the Amir with documents 
with which he hoped to prove that 1Abdur Rahman's 
engagements had lapsed with his death, These included 
a letter from Lepel Griffin, then "Chief Political 
Officer at Kabul", to the Viceroy Lord Ripon, of December 
1880, Griffin had claimed that Lyall's promise to 
48 
'Abdur Rahman was "not an agreement between two States, 
but merely a memorandum of obligation granted to the 
Amir by the British Government", Dane produced another 
letter from H.H. Fowler, Secretary of State for India 
in 1894, to the Viceroy Lord Elgin, which pointed out 
that "the assurances given in 1880 were personal to the 
present Amir," Dane probably realised that Habibullah 
would be unlikely to accept as conclusive evidence 
messages between various officials on the British side 
which had never been forwarded to the Afghan government, 
and the Indian Foreign Secretary thus closed his argu-
ment by maintaining that treaties were normally valid 
unless infringed by one of the contracting parties, and 
that the British had now contravened the agreements 
with 1Abdur Rahman by withholding the subsidy and stopp-
ing shipments of arms bound for Afghanistan. 49 
Dane had chosen an unsuitable moment to raise this 
difficult problem, Habibullah fell ill with gout during 
late January and February 1905, and his place was 
48. See supra, p.54, and Appendix 2 infra. 
49. F.D., S.F, Jul, 1905, No, 61, P• 22, 
effectively taken by his brother Nasrullah Khan and 
1Abdur Rahman's former adviser 'Abdul Quddus, both of 
whom were less concerned then the Amir to maintain good 
relations with the British,50 They pointed out, not 
without justification, that the Indian government should 
be thankful that Habibullah had not taken Curzon at his 
word when the latter claimed that the agreements with 
1Abdur Rahman had lapsed. If Curzon's argument was 
correct, the Amir was now free to open communications 
with the Russians, yet he had refused to do this. To 
claim that the old engagements were no longer binding 
was inter alia to claim that the Anglo~fghan boundary, 
as defined by the "Durand agreement", was defunct; British 
complaints about the Amir's interference with the 
Pashtuns living on the British side of the Durand line 
were therefore without any legal basis. The Afghan 
government had accepted the Durand line, 'Abdul Quddus 
maintained, but the British had nevertheless withdrawn 
the subsidy which had been granted to •Abdur Rahman 
after he had accepted that boundary,5l Nasrullah and 
'Abdul Quddus would have been pleased to know that their 
view was supported by the Secretary of State for India, 
who had admitted that:-
That part of the subsidy which was given under 
the Durand agreement was in consideration for 
value received, territorial and other,' In equity 
the period for which it is due does not seem 
limited to the life of its first recipient, and 
so long as his successors maintain the arrange-
ment for which this subsidy was originally 
granted, it s.eems clear that its payment should 
be continued,52 
50, See supra, pp.23-24 and 34-35. 
51. F,D,, S,F, Jul. 1905, No, 61, p.· 25,' 
52, F.D,, S.F. Feb, 1904, Nos~ 23-32, Notes,p.20. 
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Disputes of this type continued during February 1905, 
and the strength of the Afghan opposition began to con-
vince Dane that Curzon 1 s argument was not worth persist~ 
ing in. 53 On l February the Amir had presented him with 
a draft treaty stating that "I have acted, am acting 
and will act upon the same agreement and compact [as 
1Abdur Rahman], and I will not contravene them in any 
dealing or in any promise," 54 Careful examination of 
this draft wonld have revealed that its acceptance did 
not technically commit the Government of India to the 
view that the British agreements with 'Abdur Rahman 
were still in force; Habibullah was still willing to add 
his signature to a document declaring his adherence to 
them, and thus implied that without his signature to the 
present instrument they would have lapsed. The fact 
that the Amir was willing to append Lyall's letter and 
the "Durand agreement" to his latest draft removed 
Curzon's objection that the new treaty was worthless 
unless it stated which "agreement and compact" it referred 
to. Curzon 1 s refusal to accept Habibullah 1 s draft was 
based on the simple fact that it had been formulated by 
the Afghans, and that it involved a formal deviation from 
his original instructions to Dane. The Viceroy would 
accept nothing short of the draft treaty which had been 
given to Dane before his departure for Kabul, and Curzon 1 s 
obstinacy on this point, which was matched by that of 
Habibullah and his advisers, threatened to bring about a 
complete breakdown of the Kabul negotiations. 
53. F.D., S.F. Jul. 1905, No, 61, P• 25. 
54. Habibullah 1 s draft was eventually signed as the 
Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1905; see Appendix 5. 
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A similar crisis had threatened when Curzon had 
attempted to force Habibullah to come to India for dis-
cussion of the "military cooperation" programme, and had 
only been avoided by the intervention of the London 
cabinet, This process now repeated "itself, Dane later 
claimed in Curzon 1 s defence that re1"ations with 
Habibullah had been improved on 22 February by the return 
to Kabul of 'Inayatullah Khan after his tour in India, 
and that his son had subsequently persuaded the Arnir that 
the British were genuinely friendly, but there can be 
little doubt that the most important d6marche came from 
the British side, and that it represented a fJigaal defeat 
for Curzon, 5 5 On 6 March Dane was told that "his 
[Habibu:Dah 1 s] proposed renewal of his father's engage-
ments had been forwarded to His Majesty's Government, 
''6 
who agreed to it, and authorised me to sign -lt, 11 :> 
Habibullah had gain.ed a resounding diplomatic victory, 
and there was little left for Dane to discuss. The 
cabinet's explicit opposition to Curzon's policy of 
55. 'Inayatullah' s treatment in India hardJ.y warrants 
the assumption that he returned to Kabul imbued wit~ct friend·• 
ship for the British, Soon after his arriiTal in Calcutta 
he had been asked by his hosts "what presents he had 
brought for His Excellency the Viceroy", The young prince 
was reported to have been "thunderstruck" by this request, 
and replied that Afghanistar1 "was not a place for presonts", 
"that the Afghan Government and nation had stipulated to 
give their lives for the British Government in repelling 
its enemie.s", and that Curzon could hardly ask for more, 
He did however present the Viceroy with an Afghan fur. 
Curzon promptly demanded the value, which 'Inayatullah 
put at Rs.2,000. He was disbelieved, and a Britis~ officer 
was accordi.ngly sent to the Calcutta bazaar to obtain a 
second val.uation, The Bengali merc:1ants valued the 
gift at Rs,200, and 'Inayatullah was informed accordj.ngly, 
As a later Indian official wrote: "Figuratively speaking, 
the Government o:f India treated Inaitulla Khan as an 
honoured and distinguished guest, and in the end gave 
him a kick the pain of which was not only felt by the Sardar 
[prince] alone, but by the Amir and the whole of the Afghan 
Government as well''• (M.P., Minto to Morley, 18.4.1906), 
56. F.D., S.F. Jul. 1905, No. 61, P• 27, 
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obstinacy had been vividly demonstrated; there was a 
minor crisis at the eleventh hour when HabibulJ_ah refused 
to accept his own draft, and attempted to add to it a 
preamble stating that the treaty was national and perm-
anent, but he dropped it after a littJ.e persuasion, and 
signed copies of the treaty were duly exchanged on 21 
March. Lyall's letter of July 1880, the "Durand agree-
ment" and (on Nasrulla~-:t 1 s insistence) a letter from 
1Abdur Rahman to Lepel Griffin of June 1880 which ex-
plained the Afghan obligations in a fashion even looser 
than that adopted by Lyall57 were then appended to the 
treaty. 58 
~- C13rzon 1 s r2actions and_t,:qe chal).ge of Viceroys: :J,2Q2, 
Curzon1 s government we>re far :from pleased with the 
results of' Dane's visit to Kabul, although, as they ex-
plained to the Secretary of State, they did not w.ish 
their disgruntlGlnent to re.f'lect on the e.f'forts of their 
Foreign Secretary. 59 Tb.ey d~relt at length on Dane's 
failure to gain what Curzon regarded as an adequate 
assurance .from Habibullah that the treaty now signed was 
personal to the present Amir, and it is clear that the 
Viceroy regarded this as a cardinal de.f'eat. Obsessed as 
he was by what had proved itself a pointless issue, 
Curzon neglected to notice the mO.l'Cl ,3erious failures 
which his obstinacy had partly caused. Thanks to the 
5'7. See supra, pp.55 and 60, 
58, See Appendices l-4. 
59. F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1905, No, 64, 
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Viceroy's abrupt reaction to Habibullah1 s schemes of 
"military cooperation", Dane had been unable to discuss 
the possibility of a survey of the topography of northern 
Afghanistan and the improvement of communications within 
that country - tasks which, had they ever been achieved, 
would have lightened the burden of defending Afghanistan 
against Russia, Nor had Dane been able to clarify the 
conditions under which British military aid would be 
required. Worst of all, Curzon's peremptoriness had pro~ 
duced a general feeling of hostility in the Afghan court 
which augured badly for the future of Anglo-Afghan rela-
tionsc 
Curzon left India in November 1905, His successor 
Lord Minto was a man of a very different stamp, who had 
few of Curzon's intellectual attainments, and none of his 
political experience, The highlights of his previous 
career had included four rides in the Grand National during 
the 1870s and a term as Governor-General of Canada between 
1898 and 1904. 60 He proved to be an excellent Viceroy, 
appointed during its dying months by Balfour's Conserva-
tive cabinet, but still ready to cooperate fully in 
implementing the reforms of Indian government introduced 
by Balfour's Liberal successors, Minto evidently decided 
that he and Dane could do little to remedy the technical 
defects of the treaty of March 1905, but that he might be 
able to improve personal relations with the Afghan ruler. 
After Brodrick's departure from the India Office in 
December 1905 the new Secretary of State John Morley join-
ed Minto in criticising "the dictatorial nature of his 
[Curzon 1 s] correspondence with the Amir, which might 
60. See John Buchan, Lord Minto, A Memoir, pp.J-205. 
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very easily have brought about a war", and supported 
Minto's resolve to patch up Indo-Afghan relations by 
inviting Habibullah to pay a courtesy visit to India. 
7• The modified policy and its effects: 1906-07. 
74 
The invitation to the Amir was issued on 6 August 
1906, and promptly accepted on condition that "all business 
matters as affecting relations between o •• [Britain] and 
Afghanistan are to be strictly avoided~" 62 Right up to 
the time of his arrival in the Khaibar on 2 January 1907, 
however, the Foreign Department remained frightened that 
Habibullah might not abide by his own conditions, and 
they accordingly prepared a lengthy memorandum containing 
"Conclusions of the main questions of policy affecting 
British Relations with Afghanistan in view of any dis• 
cussions that His Majesty the Amir may initiate upon'them. 116 J 
Their apprehensions,Which were based on the fear that such 
discussions might re~awaken the animosities which had 
been produced during Dares visit to Kabul, were happily 
unfounded. The Amir was at first rather suspicious of 
British intentions, and insisted on a full royal salute 
of Jl guns on entering Indian territory, and on being 
addressed as "Your Majesty". 64 During the course of his 
tour,which lasted for over two months and included a 
lavish darbar (reception) at Agra and visits to Delhi, 
Aligarh, Gwalior, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi and Lahore, 
the Amir 1 s initial wariness soon wore off, and he took 
great pleasure in the company of his many British hosts, 
with whom he conversed in his halting English. 6 5 The 
61. Minto, op, cit., p. 49. 
62. Ibid, P• 74, 
6J. F.D., S.F. Jan, 1907, Nos. 37-52, 
64. Habibullah had thus been referred to in the Kabul 
treaty of 1905, although his father had generally been 
addressed as "Your Highness". The British later attempted 
to withhold the title from Habibullah 1 s son and successor 
/(64)(65) 
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good impression was mutual: most of the British officials 
who met him were impressed with the Amir 1 s versatility 
and energy and none more so that Sir Henry McMahon, his 
66 
official escort. McMahon himself was anxious to make 
it clear to Habibullah that Minto and his colleagues 
disapproved of Curzon 1 s peremptory manner, and told him 
that 11 a great mistake 
mistake occurred," 67 
occurred, Amir Sahib, a great 
Habibullah took great interest in 
tours of industrial and educational establishments, and 
his visit probably reinforced his determination to intro-
duce these appurtenances of westernisation to his own 
68 
country. In this respect the effect on the Amir of 
his visit to India paralleled that produced on Amanullah 
as a result of the latter's tour of Europe in 1927-28. 
On the few occasions on which the Amir spoke about 
political matters, he expressed nothing more than a 
friendship for Britain which emphasised (over-emphasised 
(64) Amanullah Khan, and much ink was spilt in an earnest 
discussion of the question. It was a pointless argument, 
to the extent that the Amir was invariably addressed in 
Persian as A 1 11hazrat ("His Majesty"), and correspondence 
with India was usually conducted in that language, 
(65) A full description of the tour appears in Minto, ~ 
cit. , pp. 7 4-89. An Indian viewpoint is supplied by 
MUnshi Sikander 1Ali Khan's Hayat-i-Amir, (in Urdu), 
which bears witness to the high regard in which Habibullah 
was held by Indian Muslims, The book fails to live up 
to its title, as it contains little accurate biographical 
material, apart from a description o.f the Amir 1 s Indian 
tour. The present writer is much indebted to Mr. Simon 
Digby, who brought the book to his notice and translated 
large passages from it. 
66. See F.D., S,F, Jul. 1907, Nos,l05-J7, Notes pp.6J-90. 
67. F.D., F.B. Aug. 1907, Enclosure in No,lOO, 
68, Mary B. Watkins states that "impressed by Aligarh 
University, he [Habibullah] esta.blished Habibia in 1907." 
(Afghanistan. Land in Transition, p.l22) ._As stated 
supra, p. 40, the establishment of the Habibiyah coJJege 
antedated Habibullah's visit to India by several years, 
though the Amir's experiences in Aligarh and Lahore ad-
mittedly encouraged him to reinvigorate the small educa-
tional establishment o.f Afghanistan. 
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perhaps) the probability of a Russian attack on India. 6 9 
Those who expected him to take an exclusive interest in 
the Muslim community of India were disappointed, and his 
visits to the Muslim colleges at Aligarh and Lahore gave 
him an opportunity to announce to the students his firm 
belief in the value of western learning,70 Both Minto 
and Morley were convinced of the success of the Amir 1 s 
visit, and hoped that it would produce an informal atmos-
phere of Anglo-Afghan unity which they considered more 
valuable than the most rigorous treaty stipulations. 
The two aspects of the Afghan problem, the more 
general one of preventing Russian interference in Afghani-
stan, and the local one of maintaining peace on the north-
west frontier, were not unaffected by the atraosphere of 
bonhomie which had been evinced during Habibullah's visit. 
The task of excluding Russia from Afghanistan was however 
taken out of Minto's hands by the London government, 
who had decided to arrange a direct agreement with Russia 
on this very subject. Friendly relations between 
Habibullah and Minto were not essential to this purpose 
- indeed, they represented something of a disadvantage. 
This problem is explained in the following chapter. At 
the same time, a pro-British attitude from Kabul was of 
some value in the local context. An Amir anxious to 
gain British friendship could do something to counter the 
reckless spirit of the Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of 
the Durand line, provided he was able to match words 
with deeds, and to prevent contrary moves by members of 
his own family. 
69. See ~' Minto Papers, telegraphic correspondence, 
(hereinafter "M,P. (Teleg. )'?, Minto to Morley, 15.1.1907. 
70. ~' Minto to Morley, 17.1.1907. 
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Minto's optimism on this score was not to be fully 
confirmed, Habibullah had visited India in holiday mood, 
relaxed and predisposed to friendship with his hosts. 71 
Even McMahon noticed that he paid little attention to the 
comfort of the Afghan officials who accompanied him on 
his tour, and diagnosed the gulf which separated him from 
the traditionalists of Afghanistan. 72 There were rumours 
of "profound dissatisfaction" among the Kabuli mullas who 
had heard of Habibullah's activities in India, and of his 
initiation as a freemason of the Calcutta lodge,7 3 
Habibullah himself recognised the danger of alienating 
himself from his countrymen by showing too great a 
friendship for the British, and told an assembly in Jalala-
bad on l April 1907 that 
The honour shown by the British Government to me 
is ultimately your honour - I meru1 the honour of 
the nation. I said openly there in India that 
if the Government wanted to make me their friend 
they should have regard for my people •••• The 
friendship of myself alone is of no value to them. 
It is the friendship with my nation which will 
keep me bound to continue my friendship with 
them, n7 4 
71. A point well made by Fletcher, op. cit,', p. 174. 
72. F.D., S,F, Jul. 1907, Nos, 105-37, Notes p, 89, 
73• F.D., S,F, May 1907, No. 98, This feeling was 
mitigated to the extent that Nasrullah, the leader of the 
conservative party at the Afghan court, was already a 
member of the order. Lady Minto maintains (op.cit;, p.91) 
that "Rumours of the Amir's undue partiality for Europeans 
had preceded him, and on his way home in 1907, in Lughman, 
between Jellalabad and Kabul, an attempt was made by 
mullahs to assassinate him. He escaped; some of the 
would-be assassins were caught and executed and the 
matter was hushed up." This story is repeated by Sykes, 
op.cit., Vol.II, p, 230. The incident must have been very 
well "hushed up", as there is no mention of it in contemp-
orary British intelligence reports, including those of 
the British Agent at the Amir's court, who was with 
Habibullah in Jalalabad at the time, 
74. F,D,, S.F. June 1907, No, 247, 
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In emphasising the need for a cQmmon approach the 
Amir drew attention to the fact that it would be less 
easy to convince his people of the benevolence of the 
British than it had been to convince himself, 
8, Habibullah's attitude and the problem of the frontier: 
1907-14 
Habibullah's good will was put to the test almost as 
soon as he returned to Kabul. During the autumn of 1907 
the Mahsuds of central Waziristan began raids into the 
directly administered part of the North-West Fronner 
Province, Mahsud attitudes had been violently anti-
British since 1905 (if not before), when they had been 
responsible for the cold-blooded murder of two British 
officers, They had consequently been excluded from ser-
vice in the South Waziristan Militia7 5 and thus further 
estranged from the British authorities. In December 1907 
a delegation from the tribe, under their leader the mulla 
Powindah, 76 visited Kabul in search of arms, ammunition 
and money, but received little support from the Afghan 
officials whom they met. 77 Further north, raids into the 
administered districts by Zakka Khel Afridis forced the 
Indian government to mount a punitive expedition against 
them in the February of 1908. The Amir was informed of 
these operations, and issued a farman (writ) forbidding 
his subjects to join the Zakka Khel. There was no evi-
dence of Afghan support for the Zakka Khel 1 s cause, 
and their war parties were defeated by the British within 
five days, but, as Minto admitted, the incident showed 
75. See Caroe, op. cit., Appendix D. 
76. A preacher whose powers of oratory had gained him 
the leadership of the tribe, 11 Powindah", (from the 
Persian parwandah, "carrier"), is a term usually applied 
to the nomad merchants who traded between Afghanistan 
and India, 
77. F.D,, S.F. May 1908, No, 70, 
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that "he [Habibullah] like ourselves is unable to control 
his frontier tribes,"7 8 
The Viceroy's diagnosis was born out by later 
developments among the Mohmands, a tribal people whose 
territory straddled the Anglo-Afghan frontier. The fact 
that Habibullah had effectively refused Dane's request 
for joint Anglo-Afghan demarcation of the Durand boundary 
at the point where it crossed the Mohman:!1s homeland 
complicated the problem of controlling the activities of 
this warlike tribe. 79 Many Mohmands seem to have believed 
in 1908 that the British intended to bring their country 
under direct control, and a party of 3,000 of their 
warriors invaded villages in administered territory in 
the April of that year, Some of the raiders came from 
the Afghan side of the Durand line; 80 Habibullah was 
duly informed of this, and was asked to recall all those 
Mohmands who had crossed the frontier from Afghan terri-
tory. Fighting between Mohmands and British regulars 
continued into May 1908, but George Roos-Keppel, British 
Political Agent in the Khaibar, reported that Habibullah 1 s 
name "was not directly mentioned in connection with the 
Mullas" who had provoked the uprising, although Nasrullah 
Khan was clearly in contact with the Mohmand chieftains, 
It was said also that Afghan militiamen (khassadars), if 
none of the Amir's regulars, had appeared in the Mohmand 
81 
ranks. Minto maintained that this constituted no 
indictment of Habibullah, He explained that the Amir 
78, M.P., Minto to Morley, 20,2,1908, 
79, See supra, p.6l, 
80, M.P. (Teleg.), Minto to Morley, 23, 4.1908, 
8l. Ibid, Minto to Morley, 8,5.1908. 
80 
exercised no direct control over the frontier tribesmen, 
and that Nasrullah "neglects no opportunity of stirring 
up •••• hatred of us, which is easy enough to do without 
committing his country to war," The Viceroy recommended 
a policy "strictly on the defensive 11 , 82 a principle of 
which Morley undoubtedly approved, Habibullah told Minto 
on 5 May 1908 that "I have issued orders to all my 
Sirdars and officials on the frontier that they should 
try their best to stop the people from going to help the 
Mohmands", 83 but there was other evidence that Habibullah 
was forced to adopt what was at worst a non-committal 
attitude towards Mohmand delegations who visited him. 84 
S.H. Butler, Dane's successor as Indian Foreign Secretary, 
believed that "A British jury ••• would unquestionably find 
against the Amir. But the position is still such that a 
case can be made out for the view which may be politically 
expedient"; 8 5 in other words, that to press Habibullah too 
strongly in the matter would probably force him to adopt 
a more openly hostile attitude, After warning the Amir 
· d. t· 86 M. t f d t t· of the 1mpen 1ng opera J.ons, 1n o was orce o sane J.on 
the invasion of the "independent" Mohmand territory by 
British forces on lJ May; the swift success which the 
Indian army had enjoyed in the case of the Zakka Khel 
was repeated, and the Mohmand leaders were forced to come 
to terms by 25 of the same month, 8 7 
82. F .D., S .F. June 1908, Note to No. 399· 
8J. Minto, OE· cit., P• 195. 
84. F .D. , S.F. June 1908, No, 272. 
85. Ibid, Note to No. 476. 
86. M.P. , Minto to Morley, 21.5.1908, 
87. Minto, 012· cit., P• 196. 
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Minto remarked of this satisfactory outcome that "I 
cannot help feeling somewhat pleased in thinking that my 
personal friendship with the Amir has done a good deal to 
help us out of recent difficultiesJ188 In making this 
claim the Viceroy did little justice to the contemporary 
efficiency of the Indian army on the frontier, 89 and 
ignored some of the points about Habibullahls lack of 
control over the frontier tribes which he himself had 
earlier made, The Amir was always capable of provoking 
insurrection among the "independent" Pashtuns i:f he 
chose, but he was not always able to restrain them from a 
rebellion which they had undertaken on their own initiative, 
or on the instigation of some other powerful member of the 
Kabul hierarchy, It was as a result of Habibullah 1 s 
weakness in this respect, and out of a desire to avoid 
offending him, that the Government of India carefully 
avoided mention of the part which he and Nasrullah had 
played in the Mohmand revolt in the papers which were 
presented to the British Parliament in July 1908,,90 Nor 
was the problem of control confined to the Afghan side, 
As Minto admitted while the Mohmand expedition was still 
under preparation, "as far as I can gather a jehad is 
being preached on our behalf in every mess on the frontier! 
and irresponsible talk on our side is undoubtedly as much 
repeated in Kabul as the wildest rumours from Afghanistan 
are scattered wholesale throughout India."9l 
Nasrullah Khan had adopted rul attitude towards the 
rebellious Mohmands which was very different from that of 
88, M,P,, Minto to Morley, 4.6,1908, 
89. An efficiency which fell off markedly at the end of 
the first world war. 
90, M.P. (Teleg.), Minto to Morley, lJ.7,1908, 
91, F,D,, S.F. Jun. 1908, Note to No, 399• 
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risk, the position in India would be immediately taken 
advantage of by political agitators, 
bably have to ask for reinforcements 
and we should pro-
102 from home." 
The situation of l9l4wl8 was potentially fraught with far 
more danger than that of 1908: far from being able to 
request "reinforcements from home", the Indian government 
were forced to send their own reinforcements to the 
British army fighting in the middle east; "Mahommedan 
sympathy in India" was already seriously endangered by 
Turkish propaganda to the effect that the war with the 
allies was a ,jehad, a struggle in which all Muslims should 
join the central powers, for the greater glory of Islam. 
It was hardly likely that these facts would escape the 
notice of the frontier tribesmen, whatever the formal 
attitude of the Amir of Kabul. 
As it was, events on the frontier during the first 
world war proved a pleasant suprise for the British, 
Trouble arose where it was most expected - among the 
Mahsuds of Waziristan, a tribe whose hostility to the 
British had been demonstrated several times before the 
lOJ 
war, Elsewhere on the frontier, the crisis of world 
war was passed with remarkable little trouble, in spite of 
energetic attempts to raise a jehad, made by Turkish 
agents who penetrated to Afridi territory, 104 
Raids by the Mahsuds on British installations began 
soon after August 
Powindah had died 
1914. The former Mahsud leader mulla 
105 in November 1913, but his place was 
effectively taken by his son Fazl-ud-Din. A British 
102. M.P., Minto to Morley, 25.8.1908, Lady Minto repro-
duces passages of this letter, (op, cit., p. 181), but 
omits the sentence here quoted. 
lOJ, See supra, p.78, 
104. See infra, pp,l9J-94. 
105. Siraj-ul-Akhbar, Vol,III, No.ll. 
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tribes concerned, Claims made by or.e side were balanced 
out by claims presented against it, The British paid 
the Afghan authorities about Rs,2,800 on account of the 
remaining cases, but failed to gain similar compensation 
from the Afghans to cover claims made by their own sub-
jects, Roos-Keppel, now Chief Commissioner of the 
North-West Frontier Province, admitted that "I have been 
obliged to state that the actual cash gains of our people 
have not been great and that many of their just claims 
have been excluded. :f'rom consideration", but pointed to 
"the fact that British and Afghan Commissioners have 
worked for so long in harmony [which] should in future lead 
to a better understanding between the two nations. 119 5 
Sardar 1Abdul Wru1ab himself professed amazement at the 
lawless state of the Anglo-Afghan border, and told Donald 
that the Amir was quite ignorant of conditions along the 
:fL'ontier.96 He admitted that many of the bandits from the 
Afghan side were encouraged and protected by the Amir's 
hakim of Khost, Muhammad Akbar Khan, who shared with 
them the proceeds of their raids, 97 
The findings of the Anglo-Afghan commission on 
border crimes showed that the Amir was often unable to 
control his own officials, let alone the tribesmen's 
leaders. Muhammad Akbar Khan's iniquities were of course 
more than partly responsible for the Khost rebellion of 
1912, and the outbreak ofanarchy in this part of Afghani-
stan removed such control as the Amir had ever exercised 
95, F,D,, S.F, May 1911, No, 46, 
96, F.D,, S.F, Nov, 1910, No, 82, 
97, F.D., S,F, May 1911, Enclosure in No, 25, 
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over the local tribes. Attacks on British subjects 
and installations increased once more. The British 
were uncertain of the policy they should adopt towards 
these depredations; they felt obliged to approach the 
Amir for an explanation, and for an assurance that the 
bandits of Khost would be restrained, but they realised 
that the situation in Khost was effectively beyond 
Habibullah 1 s control, and that protests addressed to him 
were unlikely to have any effect,98 Lord Hardinge, 
Minto's successor as Viceroy, nevertheless wrote to 
Habibullah in July 1913 complaining about the tribal 
attacks from Khost,99 Habibullah's reply was predictable 
enough; all possible would be done to prevent raiding 
into British territory, but it was clear that "all 
possible" did not mean very much, 
9, Frontier disturbances during the Great War: 1914-17 
The problem of maintaining order on the north-west 
frontier was naturally increased after the outbreak of 
the first world war. Habibullah had early proclaimed his 
t l •t 100 neu ra J.. y, but the Indian military authorities, who 
had been forced to mobilise a very large proportion of 
their establishment to deal with the frontier revolt 
of 1897, .realised that they would be unable to deal 
effectively with a wartime rebellion in the Afghan border-
land,101 Minto had admitted in 1908 that "if we should 
have war with Afghanistan, or with the tribes alone on a 
large scale, Mahornrnedan sympathy in India would be against 
us, the effect on our Mahornrnedan troops would be full of 
98. F.D., s.F. Aug. 1913, Note to No. 8. 
99· F.,D., s.F. Aug. 1913, No. 9· 
100. See infra, p.l62. 
101. See infra, P• 182, footnote 48. 
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risk, the position in India would be immediately taken 
advantage of by political agitators, 
bably have to ask for reinforcements 
and we should pro-
102 from home." 
The situation of 1914-18 was potentially fraught with far 
more danger than that of 1908: far from being able to 
request "reinforcements from home", the Indian government 
were forced to send their own reinforcements to the 
British army fighting in the middle east; "Mahommedan 
sympathy in India" was already seriously endangered by 
Turkish propaganda to the effect that the war with the 
allies was a jehad, a struggle in which all Muslims should 
join the central powers, for the greater glory of Islam, 
It was hardly likely that these facts would escape the 
notice of the frontier tribesmen, whatever the formal 
attitude of the Amir of Kabul, 
As it was, events on the frontier during the first 
world war proved a pleasant suprise for the British. 
Trouble arose where it was most expected - among the 
Mahsuds of Waziristan, a tribe whose hostility to the 
British had been demonstrated several times before the 
war.
103 Elsewhere on the frontier, the crisis of world 
war was passed with remarkable little trouble, in spite of 
energetic attempts to raise a jehad, made by Turkish 
agents who penetrated to Afridi territory, 104 
Raids by the Mahsuds on British installations began 
soon after August 
Powindah had died 
1914, The former Mahsud leader mulla 
105 in November 1913, but his place was 
effectively taken by his son Fazl-ud-Din, A British 
102. M.P., Minto to Morley, 25.8.1908, Lady Minto repro~ 
duces passages of this letter, (op. cit., p. 181), but 
omits the sentence here quoted. 
lOJ. See supra, p,78, 
104. See infra, pp.l9J-94. 
105. Siraj-ul-Akhbar, Vol,III, No.ll. 
86 
officer who served many years in Waziristan describes 
Fazl .. ud-Din as "but a shadow of his father 11 , 106 but the 
son nevertheless succeeded in persuading a large number 
of his fellow-tribesmen to raid into directly administered 
territory in January 
'th h . l 107 w1 eavy oss, 
1915, The invaders were driven back 
but the British decided that they 
had no troops to spare for an invasion of the Mahsud 
country, and accordingly engaged in temporising discussions 
with Fazl-ud-Din during most of 1915 and 1916, The older 
members of the Mahsud tribe, the maliks with whom the 
British Political Agents generally dealt, and through 
whom the British subsidies were normally paid, tried hard 
to restrain the younger tribesmen. Fazl-ud-Din, however, 
like most of the tribal mullas, had gained nothing from 
the Agency system, and was more than ready to sacrifice 
the tribe's subsidy for the sake of personal glory, He 
gathered a lashkar (war party) of some 3,000 Mahsuds, and 
laid srege to the British fort of Sarwakai, in south 
Waziristan, on l March 1917. The tribesmen withdrew 
108 
within a week, but Fazl-ud-Din 1 s spirit was not defeated, 
Mahsud attacks on British columns and posts continued 
during the following May; on 9 of that month the Sarwakai 
garrison intercepted a large party of tribesmen returning 
from a raid, and the Mahsuds inflicted 170 casualties on 
the British before escaping. Such a signal defeat was 
felt by the local British officers to require stern 
retribution, and a punitive expedition against the Mahsuds 
was accordingly resorted to. The British forces, who 
benefited from the novelty of airborne support, accomplished 
106. H,R,C. Pettigrew, Frontier Scouts, p. 6, 
107, H. de Watteville, Waziristan 1919-20, P• J4. 
108, Pettigrew, op, cit., p. 7. Colonel Pettigrew remarks 
that "The Mahsud likes his victory to be quick, He has no 
stomach or patience for long drawn out affairs," (Ibid). 
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their mission with little difficulty during the June of 
1917. 109 
Throughout these disturbances, Habibullah's 
attitude remained much what it had been in 1908. Nasrullah, 
however, failed to repeat the tactics which he had earlier 
employed, and Habibullah's policy of discouraging the 
Mahsuds was accordingly more successful. At a jirgah 
(tribal assembly) convened by the Mahsud elders at their 
"capital" of Kaniguram on 29 May a message from the Amir 
was read out, to the effect that the rebels could expect 
no help from Kabul, and that their plans for attacks on 
the British should be abandoned. 110 IIardinge informed 
Habibullah of the intended Mahsud expedition before opera~ 
tions commenced, and received a reply similar tothat 
which Minto had obtai.ned in May 1908, in which the Amir 
promised to prevent the Mahsuds from obtaining arms or 
supporters from Afghanistan. 111 The British military 
authorities were convinced that "The Mahsuds •••• received 
112 
no encouragement of any kind from Afghan sources", 
and recognised that Habibullah's attitude had contributed 
to their speedy victory over the Mahsuds. They realised 
nevertheless that the Mahsuds had been isolated in 1917, 
unsupported by the other Pashtun tribes as well as the 
Amir, and that if a general call to rebellion sounded 
throughout the border hills, the Amir 1 s good will would 
be unable to prevent general hostilities between the 
Indian army and the tribal Pashtuns of both British and 
Afghan territory. 
109. de Watteville, 0)2• cit., PP• 35-42. 
110. F.D., S.F. Jul, 1917, No. 232. 
111. ~. Nos. 155 and 272. 
112. de Watteville, 0]2• cit., P• 44. 
10, Reconsideration of previous British policy in the 
light of its effects on the frontier, 
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A later British officer has stated of the area he 
knew best that "The Mahsuds would never stop raiding 
unless they were made to, and it was no good making them 
unless some other means of acquiring things which their 
own meagre country could not supply could be made possible 
for them,"llJ Much the same could be said of the other 
tribes along the Anglo-Afghan frontier, notably the Wazirs, 
Afridis and Mohmands. In their franker moments, Morley, 
Minto and their successors conceded that tribal raids 
and rebellions were an almost permanent feature of life 
on the north-west frontier of India, and that they re"' 
sulted from the violent basis of blood feud on which 
much of Pashtun society was organised, the tribesman's 
inability to support himself and family in the arid 
mountains to which he was confined, and the solution 
offered by raids on the richer districts of the plains, 
The Pashtuns on the British side of the Durand frontier 
were above all opposed to the rule, however "indirect", 
of a non-Muslim government; the remoteness of their home-
land, and their high state of military efficiency, made 
them more able to give violent proof of their opposition 
than the mass of India's inhabitants. The tribal mullas 
were generally stigmantised by the British as the 
principal instigators of rebellions on the frontier, but 
some doubted that they were uniquely to blame\ as one 
Political Agent wrote: "What Burke wrote of demagogues 
may possibly be true of the Mullas: 'superficial 
observers consider such persons the cause of the public 
llJ, Pettigrew, op. cit,, P• J, 
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uneasiness when they are nothing more than the effect 
of it'".114 The Amir was sometimes as obliged as the 
religious leaders of the tribal country to bow to the 
winds of frontier opinion, whatever his formal obligations 
to the Government of India. The British-Indian army was 
often unable to maintain the peace of the North-West 
Frontier Province; the Afghan government - for all the 
primitiveness of their military organisation - were gen-
erally more successful on the western side of the Durand 
line, but they were bound by treaty not to infringe the 
Anglo-Afghan frontier, and could hardly be expected to 
enter British territory to put down rebellions against 
the Indian government. To ask Habibullah to cooperate in 
securing stability in the frontier regions was to demand 
of him a purely negative function - that he should refuse 
to support risings against the British. A positive 
Afghan policy in the "independent" tribal territory 
could mean only one thing; active support from Kabul of 
the anti-authoritarian attitudes of the tribesmen, and 
frontier rebellions on a very serious scale. This was 
substantially the situation which followed the Anglo-
Afghan war of 1919, and the resultant collapse of the 
British settlement with 1Abdur Rahman. 
To attempt here a full description of the turmoils 
which eruPBd in the Pashtun country after the first world 
war is to anticipate a later chapter. But any British 
officer who surveyed the frontier scene in 1918 would 
have been hard put to it to claim that the system 
established by Curzon some seventeen years earlier 
had proved a total success. It will be remembered that 
the "Curzon system" on the north-west frontier hinged:on 
two separate principles; firstly, the full control by the 
114, F.D., S,F. Jul, 1908, No, 205, 
90 
centralgovernment, through the Chief Commissioner at 
Peshawar, of the affairs of the North-West Frontier 
Province, and the creation of locally raised militias 
for the maintenance of peace among the frontier tribes; 
secondly (and this was a policy which was not of Curzon 1 s 
own creation) a firm understanding with Kabul on the 
limits of Afghan authority and the extent of Afghan obliga-
tions, to be purchased by the grant of an annual subsidy, 
and a promise of British help in the event of an attack 
by Russia, The execution of Curzon 1 s plans, modified as 
they were by Minto's policy of buttressing formal agree-
ments with personal friendships, had not prevented the 
wastage of much blood and money on the frontier between 
1901 and 1918. Some of the features of Curzon 1 s North-
West Frontier Province could be held to blame; the tribal 
militias which he created could prove unreliable in a 
crisis, 115 while the militia outposts in the "independent" 
territory were often dangerously isolated, and unprovided 
with good communications, 116 Between the two world wars, 
the British attempted to remedy some of these defects by 
constructing a network of motor roads through the tribal 
territory; the British lines of advance were thus improved, 
and the tribesmen simultaneously encouraged to abandon 
raiding for useful labour on construction projects. The 
process has been further continued, in a wider field and 
with greater success, by the government of Pakistan, 
These improvements could be carried out almost 
irrespective of British relations with the Kabul govern-
ment, Yet a firm control over Afghan dealings with the 
"independent" tribes had been equally part of Curzon 1 s 
115. As in the case of the Mahsuds of the South Waziristan 
Militia in 1905; see supra, p.78, Far more serious 
incidents of disloyalty were to occur in 1919. 
116. See Davies, op. cit. , p. 18 6 • 
system, There was little to prove that this control 
had achieved complete success; as has been seen, the 
Amir was often unable to dissuade the tribesmen from 
rebellion, and was generally unable to prevent his 
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brother from supporting them, While the Amir 1 s hostility 
was undoubtedly dangerous, his full cooperation was not 
always obtained by enforcing the terms of the 1880 settle-
ment. By 1918 some British authorities may have begun 
to wonder whether the effort expended in an attempt to 
uphold the principles of Lyall's "memorandum of obligation" 
and the Durand treaty was altogether justifiable by 
results, and whether the policy which these instruments 
represented might not be abandoned for &~ alternative one 
by which Afghanistan was to be kept friendly, but was to 
enjoy nevertheless a fully independent status, 
Events on the frontier between 1907 and 1917 may 
equally have effected the attitude of the Afghans towards 
the terms to which Habibullah had agreed in 1905, In 
doing what he could to restrain the tribesmen, Habibullah 
had won the commendation of the British, but had forfeited 
the respect of many of his warlike subjects., Several 
important members of his entourage, and they included the 
Amir's son Amanullah as well as Nasrullah, began to 
doubt that the price was worth paying. Whatever his 
responsibility for his father's death, Amanullah certainly 
seized the chance of Habibullah 1 s murder in 1919 to experi-
ment with the opposite policy, soliciting popularity 
among his countrymen by encouraging the Pashtuns on both 
sides of the international frontier to attack the British. 
To explain the change in British and Afghan attitudes 
towards the 1880 settlement in these terms alone is to 
ignore another more complicated and more important aspect 
of the subject. British relations with Afghanistan were 
ultimately directed by the cabinet in London (working 
92 
through the Indian government) the Amir in Kabul, and 
the Russian Foreign Ministry, and not by the Pashtun 
tribal leaders or the British officers on the Afghan 
frontier. For these higher authorities, the petty warfare 
with which the Pashtun borderlands were beset was of 
infinitely less importance than the relative strength of 
the two major powers in central Asia - Britain and Russia, 
Great power politics played the major part in impelling 
the British towards a revision of their policy towards 
Afghanistan, and it is to this theme that attention must 
now be drawn. 
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CHAPTER III 
BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTJL~, 1900-1914: 
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, ITS RESULTS AND REVISIONS 
1. The Indian government's "Afghan problem" in the 
context of Anglo-Russian relations: the two solutions, 
In sending Dane to Kabul in 1904, and in inviting 
Habibullah to India in 1907 1 Curzon and Minto were not solely 
concerned with the maintenance of peace on India's north-west 
frontier, or with the task of persuading the Amir, by force 
or flattery, to desist from encouraging rebellion against the 
British by the frontier Pashtuns. They were worried also by 
the threat to India which they believed Tsarist Russia still 
represented, and they believed that the best way to meet this 
threat was to arrange an effective Anglo-Afghan alliance 
which would insure that a Russian army bent on invading India 
would have a troublesome time crossing Afghanistan. Essential 
to the success of this policy, it was believed, was an under-
taking by the Afghan ruler that all his foreign relations 
would be controlled by the British. The Times correspondent 
Valentine Chirol summed up the contemporary Calcutta attitude 
when he wrote:- "The maintenance of a strong and friendly 
Afghanistan as warden of the passes which have served from 
times immemorial as the highway of invasion from the North 
is now one of the fundamental principles of British-Indian 
statesmanship" •1 
1, Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, or some 
Political Problems of Indian Defence, P•JJ4. 
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The containment policy espoused by the Indian govern-
ment was not without its dangers. To enforce Afghan 
allegiance to the Anglo-Afghan alliance, British military 
intervention was an almost permanent possibility, and this 
gave a loose rein to those servants of the Government of 
India, military and civil, who preferred fuller involvement 
in Afghanistan's internal affairs than would have been liked 
by the London government. Overt friendship with the British 
could also involve the Amir in conflicts with his subjects 
which robbed him of his power within his country, and a 
powerless, even if friendly Amir was almost as useless to 
the British as a hostile one. Above all, the British commit-
ment to defend Afghanistan against Russian invasion was a 
serious one, and rendered no easier by the lack of precision 
of Anglo-Afghan undertakings on this issue, the lack of 
modern communications in Afghanistan, and the lack of British 
information on the topography of the probable battlefield, 
These last were defects which Curzon had attempted to remedy 
by sending Dane to Kabul, but Sir Louis• departure from the 
Afghan court left the British and Afghan obligations almost 
as vague and potentially dangerous as when he had arrived. 
There was always an alternative solution. Early Anglo-
Russian attempts to solve the Afghan problem by direct 
negotiation between London and St. Petersburg had failed in 
1873 1 and it was not until 1906 that determined endeavours 
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were made to repeat the approach of the late l86os, and to 
avoid the problems which an Anglo-Afghan alliance had raised 
by securing a formal treaty in which Russia promised not to 
interfere in Afghanistan, 
2, Anglo-Russian approaches, 1900-1906. 
These discussions were the product of tentative negotia-
tions which had begun in 1900.2 In February of that year the 
Russian ambassador in London had presented the British Foreign 
Secretary and Prime Minister Lord Salisbury with a memorandum 
requesting some revision of the British monopoly of the Amir's 
foreign relations, which greatly impeded the settlement of 
minor disputes along the Russo-Afghan frontier. The memoran-
dum further suggested that Russia be accorded the right to 
send "connnercial agents" to Afghanistan. 3 Realising, perhaps, 
that these approaches to the British were likely to be 
unfruitful, the Russian authorities in Bokhara made simultaneous 
attempts to bypass British objections by writing to 'Abdur 
Rahman, expressing a desire for closer relations. 4 They 
2, The writer does not intend to give a detailed account of 
the Anglo-Russian negotiations of 1900-06, which are in any 
case well described by Habberton, op.cit., pp.68-77• He 
obtained access to little material which was not available to 
Habberton, and would not wish to place any very different 
interpretation on the documents used, (except in one respect; 
see infra, pp. 159-60, 
J• G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, eds., British Documents on 
the Origins of the War 1 1898-1914 (hereinafter "G.& T,"), 
Vol.I, No.376. 
4. ~., Vol.I, No.J77 1 p.J09. 
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later repeated these tactics with Habibullah, 5 but on both 
occasions with negative results, for the two Amirs forwarded 
their letters to the British, and rejected the Russian 
advances. 
It was hardly likely that the Russian memorandum would 
be accorded a warm welcome in India. Curzon surmised that 
the Russian government was attempting to gain permanent 
representation in Kabul, and summarily rejected their proposals, 
on the grounds that they would destroy the basis of the British 
paramountcy in Afghanistan for which the Indian government 
6 had already fought two wars in the Hindu Kush. The reaction 
of the London government was no more positive, though perhaps 
less bluntly expressed. The British army was preoccupied 
by the war in South Africa and ill-prepared to meet a new 
Anglo-Russian crisis in central Asia. Some British statesmen 
had become aware of their isolated position in Europe, and 
5· Angus Hamilton, "Indo-Afghan relations under Lord 
Curzon", p.998. 
6. G.& T., Vol.I, No.J77 1 pp.Jl0-11. It may be noted that 
Curzon 1s determination to oppose what he regarded as a general 
diplomatic offensive by Russia in Afghanistan and Persia 
led him to suggest a scheme for the partition of Persia 
between Russia and Britain. He assumed that the Foreign 
Office would become so frightened by such a plan that they 
would refuse to give way before the Russian demands. He 
must have been shocked in 1907 to find that he had himself 
laid down the principles of the Anglo-Russian "arrangen:e nt 
concerning Persian" (See Ravinder Kumar, 11 Curzon and the 
Anglo-Russian 'Negotiations' over Persia (1899-1901)", 
Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedin s, Vol.XXXVI, 
Part II • 
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regarded the Russian proposals as an attempt to make capital 
out of temporary British weakness, Salisbury replied to the 
Russian memorandum by instructing the British ambassador in 
St.Petersburg, Sir Charles Scott, that he was to avoid 
mention of Afghanistan in conversation with Russian officials? 
It was fortunate for Salisbury and his colleagues thatfue 
Russian Foreign Minister Muraviev made no further attempts 
to discuss the issues raised by the memorandum, for the 
British had formulated no definite counter-proposals, and 
were anxious to postpone discussions until conditions 
favoured their side, 
The tentative negotiations of 1900 had taken place 
against a background of Russian weakness, the effect of 
Britain's involvement in the Boer war, and her isolation in 
the European diplomatic scene. These conditions were reversed 
by the Russian defeat by Japan of 1904-05, and the revolution-
ary turmoils which erupted in St.Petersburg between February 
and October of the latter year. The Anglo-Japanese alliance 
of 1902 had been renewed in 1905 in terms which guaranteed 
Japanese support if Britain were attacked by 
rather than two powers, as had been formerly 
7• G, & T,, Vol,IV 1 No,465 1 P•5lJ, 
a single 
8 
agreed, 
power, 
and 
8, Of some importance in the Afghan context was the removal 
of the proviso that Japan would only support Britain if the 
latter power were involved in a war in the far east. 
For all the formal completeness of the Japanese alliance, the 
British General Staff noted that "so far as military operations 
/(8) 
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Russian statesmen could be excused for thinking that it was 
now Britain's turn to resume the diplomatic offensive in 
central Asia. Nor had Dane's failure in Kabul convinced 
the Russian government that Britain was weaker than she 
seemed, for the Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Afghani-
stan was interpreted in Russia as an attempt to reduce the 
Amir "to the position of a vassal of India",9 and compared 
to the Younghusband mission to Lhasa of 1903.10 During the 
earlier stages of the Russo-Japanese war the St,Petersburg 
press had discussed schemes for the invasion of India as an 
11 
alternative to war in the far east, but once the full 
implications of their defeat by Japan had been brought home 
to the Russian officers they began to doubt their ability 
( 8) 
are concerned neither party can be of direct assistance 
to the other; and indirectly only to a problematical extent", 
(G.& T., Vol.IV, Enclosure in No.l27)• They pointed out 
that in the event of a second Russo-Japanese war the British 
would be obliged to attack Russia across Afghanistan, that 
this would be regarded as aggression by the Afghans, and 
that they would undoubtedly resist, It would be up to 
Britain to prove that the war had been started by Japan, 
and that British intervention was therefore uncalled for. 
9. In the words of Count Benckendorf; (Die Grosse Politik 
der europ~ischen Kabinette, Vol.XIX (2), No,6356). 
10, See the letter from the Kaiser William II to the Tsar 
reproduced in The Memoirs of Alexander Isvolsky,trans, 
C,L, Seeger, pp.46-47. 
11. According to Captain Gervais Lyons, Afghanistan: 
The Buffer State, p.lll. 
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to defeat the Afghan army, let alone that of British India,12 
Other Russian authorities began to fear that the British 
might "raise the Mahomedans against them [the Russians] and 
hurl the Afghans against their borders",lJ When the British 
Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne suggested to the Russian 
ambassador in London Count Benckendorf that the Tsarist 
government should give a treaty assurance that they would 
continue to refrain from any interference in Afghanistan in 
return for British permission for limited relations between 
Russian and Afghan frontier officials, it was the Russians' 
turn to reply that the time was inopportune, and that Lans-
downe's proposals,"seem to raise questions which in present 
circumstances Count Lamsdorff [the Russian Foreign Minister] 
. . 14 did not feel d1.sposed to dJ.scuss", 
3, Entente in St,Petersburg: 1906-07, 
The period of Russiats growing weakness during 1904-05 
was for the most part unaccompanied by any important recorded 
developments in the field of direct relations between the two 
powers: Lamsdorfts plea that the time was inopportune seems 
to have been accepted by Lansdowne whereas Salisbury's 
12, This was the conclusion of Staff~aptain P,A, Rittich, 
The Afghan Q.uestion, p,l2, See also Count K,K, Pahlen, 
Mission to Turkestan, p,150. 
13, G,& T., Vol,IV, Enclosure in No,476, 
14, ~·> Vol,IV, No,466(a), 
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similar plea of four years earlier had been ignored. 
British policy, in fact, was to wait until Russia was 
prepared to discuss the question of Afghanistan in a serious 
spirit, but while the events of 1904-05 continued to keep 
her in a submissive mood, This policy of moderation did 
much to make an eventual entente possible. The fact that 
the British had refused to join Japan in a war against 
Russia, and the fact that the tragi-comedy of the Dogger 
Bank episode had failed to produce the expected Anglo-Russian 
conflict, had produced by 1905 a degree of friendship between 
London and St. Petersburg which few would have believed 
possible in 1900. Some began to see an Anglo-Russian entente 
as a natural complement to the existing entente cordiale with 
France, an interpretation which, while it read more logic 
into contemporary British foreign policy than was probably 
justified by the facts, was indicative of a trend in 
British thinking which favoured a settlement with Russia.1 5 
15, See Viscount Grey, Twenty-Five Years, Vol.I, p.l5J• 
Although he realises that a full discussion of this topic 
lies outside the scope of this thesis, the writer should state 
his belief that few British statesmen at the time saw their 
successive ententes with France and Russia as part of an 
integrated policy leading logically to the alignments of the 
first world war. Both were conceived separately as specific 
settlements of unrelated colonial problems - with the French 
in Egypt, with Russia in central Asia. In arranging an entente 
with France, Balfourts government had originally intended to 
make Britain a more attractive ally to Germany, not to forge 
an alliance against her. Both the French and Russian ententes 
arose out of the unexpectedly peaceful settlement of isolated 
crises, at Fashoda and in the far east respectively. 
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As important as the opportunity now offered was the 
will to seize it. The resignation of Balfour's Conservative 
cabinet in December 1905 brought a Liberal government to 
power under Campbell-Bannerman, and a new Foreign Secretary 
in Sir Edward Grey. Grey later implied in his memoirs that 
the programme of agreement with Russia was initiated by the 
16 
new government, but his implied claim is not fully born 
out by the facts, As we have seen, Lansdowne had already 
raised with Benckendorf some of the issues involved in a 
settlement with Russia over Afghanistan in the March of 1905, 
and Morley later admitted to Minto that Lansdowne had made 
proposals to Russia "exactly on all fours with our present 
plans" in "the winter of 1904-05" •17 The more instrumental 
government changes took place in Russia, where Lamsdorf was 
succeeded at the Foreign Ministry by the anglophilic Izvolsky 
in May 1906 1 and in India, where the departure of Curzon 
removed a stern proponent of the "local alliance" concept of 
Indian defence. The first serious step in the execution of 
the new policy followed in June 1906 when the British 
ambassador in St, Petersburg laid before Izvolsky first 
proposals for a detailed agreement aimed at establishing a 
line beyond India's northern and western frontiers which 
16 , Ibid., p .152 • 
17• M.P., Morley to Minto, 11.7.1907. 
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would delimit British and Russian "spheres of influence", 
Nicolson and Izvolsky then entered into a series of protracted 
negotiations which culminated in the signature of an Anglo-
18 Russian convention on Jl August 1907, 
The agreement thus negotiated touched on three separate 
problems, In Tibet, the British were willing to give a treaty 
promise not to interfere in the politics of Lhasa, in return 
for a similar undertaking by the Russian government. In 
Persia, where the governmental and economic structure was 
already riddled with foreign concessions, and where the Shah's 
government was incompetent to prevent further such penetration 
in the future, a complete withdrawal by both powers was 
considered impractical, "Spheres of influence", British and 
Russian, were to section off the northern and south-eastern 
18. Although the British proposals on Afghanistan were pre-
sented to Izvolsky at the commencement of the negotiations, 
serious discussion of the Afghan section of the proposed 
agreement did not begin until the following February. The 
British were anxious to put the Russian Foreign Ministry in 
an amiable frame of mind by impressing them with the moderation 
of the British terms on Tibet, and to ascertain Russian 
desiderata in Persia before discussing Afghanistan. See 
Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line, Vol.I, Chapter 6, and G.& T., 
Vol.IV, Nos,468 and 226, (As Dr, Lamb 1 s book was consulted 
in proof form, it has not been possible to quote page references 
to it), 
For reasons which are partly explained in G.& T., Vol.IV, No, 
281, it was eventually decided that the whole agreement should 
be called a "convention", The section dealing with Iran was 
called an "arrangement concerning Persia", and the term 
"arrangement" was also used to refer to those clauses of 
the convention which affected Tibet. The Afghan section 
of the agreement was somewhat confusin~ly known as the 
"convention concerning Afghanistan". (_See ~·• Vol.IV, 
Appendix I) • 
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areas of the country, and were to be separated by a "neutral 
sphere" under native control. In Afghanistan, the British 
and Russian demands corresponded to those made during the 
discussions of l900 and l905. The Russian government were 
to declare that they regarded Afghanistan as "outside the 
sphere of Russian influence", in return for some concession 
by the British to Russian demands for limited contacts 
between Russian and Afghan frontier officials. 
This simple statement of the points raised during 
Nicolson's conversations with Izvolsky between February and 
August -l907 ignores the many and serious problems whose 
existence their discussions disclosed. At the same time, 
the St. Petersburg negotiations involved a volume of corres-
pondence which it would be unnecessary to analyse in detail 
or in strictly chronological sequence. Certain issues, which 
were to have an important hearing on the nature of the agree-
ment subsequently arrived at 1 must be pinpointed in turn. 
This discussion may equally help to explain why the two 
signatories were later anxious to revise the settlement which 
they had reached in l907. 
4. Obstacles to agreement, l907: (i) Was Afghanistan 
a "buffer state"? 
In voicing his fear in March l907 that the British 
meant to change the status of Afghanistan from that of"a 
"buffer state" into an avant-garde of the Indian Empire",l9 
l9. ~.,vol.IV 1 No.47J• 
Izvolsky reflected the Russian apprehensions about the 
purpose of the Dane mission which have already been noted: 
as well as the Russian contention that Afghanistan owed 
particular allegiance to neither Britain nor Russia, but 
could be regarded as an independent neutral, It was evident 
that the Russian government attached some importance to the 
use of the phrase "buffer state" as a description of 
Afghanistan's international status, In the first draft 
agreement on Afghanistan which Izvolsky presented to Nicolson 
on l5 May 1907, he included a stipulation to the effect that 
Britain and Russia recognised Afghanistan as a "buffer state" 
th . t. t . t . 20 between e1r respec 1ve err1 or1es. The Russian view 
was hotly disputed 
India, Sir Arthur 
by the India Office and the Government 
21 Godley pointed out that "Afghanistan 
has something more than the status of a "buffer state" 
assigned to her by M. Izvolsky, by reason of the special 
position we have long occupied under ••• [inter alia] our 
engagements with successive rulers of Afghanistan ending 
22 
with the Kabul Treaty of Jlst March 1905"• Nicolsonts 
20, See Appendix 6, column l, Article I, 
21. Then permanent under-Secretary of State at the 
India Office, 
of 
22, F,D,, s.F.Jun,l907, No,494. It may be noted that the 
phrase "buffer state" is equally disliked by modern Afghans, 
though for very different reasons. See Muhammad Maiwandwal, 
Remarks on the Conference Theme, (pp.ll9-2J~ in Current 
Problems in Afrhanistan, Ed, T.Cuyler Young)• Mr.Maiwandwal 
is at present November 1965) the Prime Minister of 
Afghanistan. 
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refutation of the Russian claim that Afghanistan should be 
recognised as a "buffer state" was to some extent hamstrung 
by the fact that Lamsdorf had referred to Afghanistan as a 
"buffer state" in a conversation with Lansdowne of March 1905 1 
and the the British Foreign Secretary had inadvertently 
replied that "it seemed to me an appropriate description 
of the position which both Governments desired to assign to 
. 2J Afghan:t.stan", The British managed to escape such commitments 
as they already had on this issue by pointing out that the 
phrase was technically meaningless, and that, in Grey's 
words, "there is no recognised definition of this phrase 
and it must be taken as defined by what follows". 24 The onus 
of disputing the Russian point of view was effectively thrown 
onto the wording of the clauses in the eventual agreement 
which were to establish the precise rights and obligations 
in Afghanistan of each of the contracting parties. 
Obstacles to agreement: (ii) "Commercial agents" 
and trading rights. 
The Russian government's proposal that they should be 
allowed to send "commercial agents" to Afghanistan was, as 
has been noticed, one of the major reasons for Curzon 1 s blunt 
rejection of Lamsdorf's suggestion of a new Anglo-Russian 
23, G.& T,, Vol.IV, No.466(b). 
24. Ibid., Vol.IV, Minute to No,478, 
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agreement about Afghanistan in 1900. British fears that 
Izvolsky would persist in this demand were re-awakened on 
20 March 1907 when the Russian Foreign Minister told 
Nicolson that he expected that "there would be a proposal 
to establish [Russian] Commercial Agents in Afghanistan",25 
It soon became evident however that the submissive temper 
to which Russian foreign policy had been reduced by the 
events of 1904-05 meant that Izvolsky was not prepared to 
press this demand to extremes, His sole concern was to 
secure some formal admission by Britain of Russian commercial 
rights in Afghanistan, which he could then show to the St. 
Petersburg Ministry of Commerce as proof that he was protect-
ing their interests. At the beginning of April he actually 
told Nicolson that "probably the question of commercial agents 
26 
would be dropped"; he was not however able to secure the 
complete exclusion of the topic from the draft agreement on 
Afghanistan which he submitted to Nicolson on 15 May, which 
included the stipulation that the Russian and British 
governments would enter into an "exchange of views" on the 
question of Russian commercial representation in Afghanistan 
"If ••• the development in the future of Russian commerce 
with Afghanistan should demonstrate the evident utility of 
25, Ibid., Vol.IV, No.473· 
26, Ibid,, Vol.IV 1 No,474. 
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commercial agents in that country".27 Izvolsky attempted to 
secure Nicolson's acceptance of this provision by telling 
him that the clause was quite harmless, and that it "would 
in practice remain inoperative" • The contingencies under 
which Russia would claim the right to send commercial agents 
to Afghanistan would never arise, he claimed.28 Nicolson 
was evidently persuaded by these arguments to accept the 
limited Russian proposals on this point, and Izvolsky's draft 
formula was thus incorporated in the text of the signed 
convention, 2 9 but it nevertheless aroused serious misgivings 
in India. In providing for an Anglo-Russian "exchange of 
views" on the question of commercial agents Izvolsky was 
concerned principally with appearances. Minto realised 
however that appearances would be all that Habibullah would 
have before him when the news of the convention reached Kabul, 
and that he and his courtiers would regard a bilateral Anglo-
Russian decision to send any representatives to Afghanistan 
as a serious infringement of their country's internal auto-
nomy. Such a striking reversal of Dane's stated determination 
to exclude all Russian influence from Afghanistan, a 
determination to which Habibullah had shown no opposition 
27, See Appendix 6, column 1 1 Article IV. 
28, G,& T,, Vol,IV 1 No.478. 
29, See Appendix 6, column J 1 Article IV. 
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during his conversations with Sir Louis, would strike the 
Afghan government as incomprehensible as well as perfidious. 
The issue became part of a general discussion of the advisa-
bility of submitting the convention to the Amir, a problem 
which is discussed below. 
Difficulties of a very similar kind arose when Izvolsky 
demanded that Russian traders in Afghanistan should be 
accorded the same treatment as British30 and Anglo-Indian 
merchants in that country, and that they should pay the same 
31 
customs dues. The Russian government evidently believed 
that the Amir 1 s officials favoured Indian merchants at the 
expense of their Russian rivals~2 The British were able to 
point out that the Russian fears on this score were unfounded13 
and it is evident that the Tsarist government's complaints 
30, There were of course no British merchants in Afghanistan 
at that time. This stipulation serves only as a reminder of 
the Russian government's lack of information about Afghan 
conditions$ 
31, See Appendix 6, column l, Article VII, 
32. The British voiced complaints of a very similar kind, 
Russian goods were sold in Afghanistan at an artificially low 
price, they claimed, because the Russian government paid subsi-
dies to exporters which the British, with their rigid commit-
ment to the principles of free trade, were unwilling to recipro-
cate. The Indian government had evidently failed to realise 
however that the Russian subsidies system was a general one, and 
that to ask the Russians to abandon the payment of subsidies to 
exporters to Afghanistan was in effect to ask for a revision 
of Russia's entire commercial policy. The Tsarist government 
anticipated British objections by declaring in Article VI of 
their draft agreement of l5 May 1907 that the subsidies paid 
on account of exports to Afghanistan would not exceed those 
laid down in the general schedule of subsidies, (See ibid,, 
Article VI). ----
33· M.P., (Teleg.), Morley to Minto 1 26.4,l907 1 and Minto to 
Morley, ll,6.l907. 
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were caused essentially by the contemporary lack of any 
regularised customs service or fiXed tariff schedule in 
Afghanistan.J4 If the Russian demand for "a uniform customs 
system ["regime"] ••• along the whole of the Afghan frontier"J5 
was to be complied with, then a wholesale reform of the 
machinery of Afghan government would have to be effected, 
and such a reform could never be enforced by the Indian 
government. Nicolson eventually induced Izvolsky to accept 
a clause recognising "the principle of equality of treatment 
in matters concerning commerce", 36 and the Russian Foreign 
Minister was evidently content with this vaguely worded 
formula. Indeed, Izvolsky later admitted to Grey that the 
"Afghan trade was really of little importance"J? and that 
the sole purpose of the Russian demands had been to convince 
a generally hostile Russian cabinet that their country's 
J4. Although the Amir occasionally issued farmans (writs) 
laying down the customs rates to be charged on various art-
icles, there was no general list of import duties in Afghani-
stan. Contemporary evidence goes to show that the customs 
houses were farmed out for a fixed annual sum, and that the 
officer in charge then levied whatever he thought the traffic 
would bear, (See~~ Jewett, op.cit., p.7) • If Russian 
merchants paid higher duties than their British competitors, 
then it was only because they had not bribed the customs 
officers so effectively. 
35• See Appendix 6, column I, Article VIII, 
]6, Ibid,, column J 1 Article IV, 
J7• Foreign Office Confidential Prints, "Correspondence 
respecting Central Asia" 1 1908, (hereinafter "F .0 .Prints") 1 
No ,l02. 
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commercial interests had not been left unprotected. 
Habibullah however was not to know of these private assurances, 
and it is obvious that he regarded the interference with his 
internal affairs which the formal wording of the Anglo-Russian 
agreement involved as an unwarrantable intrusion. Once 
again, it was clear that the full execution of the terms of 
that agreement turned largely on the Amirls assent and 
cooperation. 
6. Obstacles to agreement: (iii) The Russian demand 
for "local communications' with Afghanistan • 
Thanks to Izvolsky 1 s assurances, the problems raised by 
Russian demands in the commercial sphere proved no insurmount-
able obstacle to the signature of the convention. The Russian 
Foreign Minister was however unwilling to admit that his 
government's request for the right to settle minor disputes 
arising along the Russo-Afghan frontier by direct communica-
tion between Russian and Afghan officials was of "little 
importance", Fortunately for Izvolsky, the British Foreign 
Office had from the start manifested no outright opposition 
to the principle of Russo-Afghan "local communications", 
It was in accordance with earlier British declarations on 
this subject3 8 that Grey instructed Nicolson in the February 
of 1907 that he was to "raise no objections to the establish-
ment of direct communications between Russian officials and 
JS. See supra, p.99. 
officials designated by the Ameer of Afghanistan as to 
matters of purely local character and of non-political 
complexion" •39 A clause which repeated this formula was 
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incorporated in a British draft agreement which Nicolson 
presented to Izvolsky on 17 June, and was again reproduced 
in the text of the convention which was signed on 31 August 
following, 40 One serious problem was however raised by this 
proposed clause the problem of defining "local questions of 
1+1 
a non-political chzracter". As a later commentator pointed 
out, "We may well ask what kind of relations may arise which 
are void of any political bearing on the mutual relations 
. 42 between Russ~ans and Afghans" • Commercial questions, for 
instance, could easily assume a "political character", while 
boundary disputes were not always of purely "local" importance. 
The British never attempted to draw a precise line separating 
npol.iticaltt from "non-political" (or 11 local 11 ) questions. 
They preferred to stipulate instead for a limitation on the 
number of Russian frontier officers who were to be entitled 
to engage in direct relations with their Afghan counterparts, 
and to demand that they be "specially designated for the 
purpose" , 43 Nicolson evidently hoped that the centralisation 
39· G.& T., Vol.IV, Enclosure in No,472• 
40. See Appendix 6, column 2 1 Article III, and column 3, 
Article III. 
41, In the words of the final convention, 
42, Arminius Vambery 1 "The Anglo-Russian Convention": 
Nineteenth Century, Vol.LXII,p .897, 
43, See Appendix 6, column 2 1 Article III, 
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of the Russian bureaucracy would ensure that such officers 
would never be entrusted with the settlement of major 
questions of "political" significance. Izvolsky however 
refused to produce the list of "specially designated" officers 
which the British required, 44 and it seemed clear that Grey 
and his colleagues would have to be content with Russian 
protestations of good faith, and a declaration that Afghanistan 
was outside Russia's "sphere of influence", as their sole 
surety against misuse by the Tsar's officers in central Asia 
of their power to conduct "local relations" with the Afghan 
authorities, As Morley later wrote, "It came to this at 
last, - a choice between accepting the drawbacks and losing 
the Convention" , 45 
The British were bound to ask themselves what the 
"drawbacks" of the present Russian demand were. One was the 
possibility that the local Russian officers might stretch 
the definition of "local relations" to include direct 
correspondence with the Amir, Nicolson had presumably decided 
that the risk was worth running, that the Amir would be un-
likely to reciprocate such advances, and that direct pressure, 
diplomatic and otherwise, could be brought to bear on the St. 
Petersburg government if the authorities in Russian Turkistan 
played the British false. There was a second problem which 
44. F.D., S,F,Nov.l907, Nos,26-l45, Notes p.4o. 
45, M.P., Morley to Minto, 2.8,1907, 
113 
could be considered more serious, The Government of India 
had their own reasons, their own suspicions of Russian 
d:iplomacy, for contesting the "local communications" clause, 
Above all, they were sure that it would be unacceptable to 
the Amir 1 and that it would thus destroy the warm atmosphere 
of Anglo-Afghan friendship which they believed they had 
created by inviting Habibullah to India in l907. They had 
sent Dane to Kabul in order to ensure that all Habibullah's 
foreign relations were controlled by Britain, and the "local 
communications" clause thus threatened to bring about a head 
on collision between British and Anglo-Indian foreign policy, 
Why was Habibullah expected to oppose the Russian 
proposals for limited relations between Russian and Afghan 
frontier officials? To refuse dealings with one or other of 
the great powers whose territory adjoined that of Afghanistan 
was, after all, to throw away the strongest card in the 
Afghan hand, the power to force up the price of Afghan good 
will by flirting with a second suitor. Two possible answers 
suggest themselves. Most of the arguments used by 'Abdur 
Rahman to justify his exclusive contract with the British46 
were repeated by his son, and this may help to explain 
Habibullah 1 s attitude. There was a second point of crucial 
importance. While the Amir himself was prepared to abide by 
46, See supra, PP• 29-JO, 
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his father's policy of alignment with the British, there was 
no proof that the provincial governors and hakims (district 
governors} in northern Afghanistan would be prepared to 
follow him. Indeed, there was every possibility that they 
might cultivate Russian friendship, and then exploit the 
natural Russian antipathy towards a pro-British Amir to gain 
Russian support for a rebellion against the Kabul government, 
Habibullah must have known that his governor of Herat, 
Muhammad Sarwar Khan, was in direct contact with Russian 
officials, and regularly settled minor border problems with 
them, 47 but the Amir was unwilling to legitimise such contacts 
in a way which would make it possible for officials less 
trustworthy than Muhammad Sarwar Khan to engage in intrigues, 
however minor, with Russian frontier ff • 48 A t d" o 1cers, "' no 1s-
similar situation obtained along the Anglo-Afghan frontier, 
where the British normally settled minor frontier disputes 
by direct correspondence with Kabul (a correspondence which 
they naturally forbad the Russians to reciprocate). It was 
thus expected that the "local communications" clause of the 
Anglo-Russian agreement would be rejected by the Afghan 
47, As Henry Dobbs had reported after his visit to Herat. 
See supra, P• 60 and F.D., S.F.Feb.l904 1 Nos,82 and 91, 
S.F,Jul,l904, No,l07 1 and Enclosure No,l in No,85. 
48. It will be remembered that Habibullah was not willing 
to ruin the profitable Russo-Afghan trade by forbidding trans-
frontier correspondence on commercial matters. See supra,p. 67. 
government as a menace to the internal security of 
Afghanistan, 
7• Obstacles to agreement: (iv) The question of the 
Amir 1 s consent to the proposed convention, 
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Convinced as he was that Izvolsky would never drop or 
neutralise the "local communications" clause, Nicolson was 
left with only one method of preserving the Afghan section of 
the convention. The Amir (and by the same token the Govern-
ment of India) must be forbidden any effective voice in the 
Anglo-Russian negotiations. Freed from the objections 
raised by the Calcutta authorities, the central governments 
of Britain and Russia would be able to secure an agreement 
which contained what Grey and Izvolsky, if no one else, 
regarded as valuable advantages, Yet to secure such exclusion 
was not altogether easy, The Government of India had from 
the first insisted on their right to be consulted before any 
proposals were put to Izvolsky, and had secured a promise 
from Morley that their counsels would not go unheeded. 49 
They had stipulated also that the proposed agreement would 
need the Amir•s consent before it could be signed by the 
British and Russian governments, and Nicolson had accordingly 
told Izvolsky in February 1907 "that it would be necessary 
to first obtain the consent of the Ameer before any arrangements 
49. M,P;, Morley to Minto, 15,8,1906, 
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50 
were concluded". By the following May, however, the 
British Foreign Office had decided to reverse their stand 
on this issue. They gave Morley a copy of their comments on 
fue first Russian draft agreement51 on 24 of that month, hoping 
that "if it meets with Mr. Morley's approval it may not be 
necessary to obtain the Ameer's adhesion before proceeding 
further with the negotiations with the Russian Government",5 2 
Grey had decided that Nicolson and Izvolsky should proceed 
independently to the signature of the convention, and that 
the fait· accompli should then be submitted to the Amir for 
his approval. No policy was devised to deal with the possib-
ility that he might reject it in toto. At the same time Grey 
trusted Morley to see that the Government of India's 
objections were overcome. As he wrote to Campbell-Bannerman 
soon after the conclusion of the convention: "without 
Morley we should have made no progress at all, for the 
50. G,& T., Vol,IV, No.472, 
51, Reproduced as column l of Appendix 6, 
52, G.& T,, Vol.IV, No,479• Who initiated this change in 
British policy? The evidence is conflicting. Morley 
informed Minto on lJ June 1907 that the Foreign Office had 
originally insisted that the proposed agreement be submitted 
to the Amir, and that he and the India Office had been res-
ponsible for the reversal of their attitude. (Minto, op.cit., 
p.l75)• Grey, on the other hand, had told Nicolson early 
in the previous April that "I think he [Morley] will be pre-
pared to agree and settle with the Amir·afterwards", 
(quoted in Grey, op.cit,, Vol.I 1 p,l6J)• This evidence 
suggests that Grey proposed the change to Morley, and not 
vice versa-
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Government of India would have blocked every point and 
Morley has removed mountains in the path of the negotiations"~) 
Morley's achievement consisted of seeing that no discussion 
of the "local communications" clause went beyond the confines 
of his own office, By thus cutting the Gordian knot, however, 
Morley created as many problems as he solved, The Government 
of India realised by May 1907 that they were being excluded 
from the St,Petersburg negotiations, and they much resented 
the fact,5 4 They realised also that if the Amir was left 
unconsulted until after the convention was signed, he would 
take it as a mortal insult, and would probably withhold his 
approval on this score alone.55 Subsequent events were to 
prove that their fears were all too correct. By ignoring 
the Indian and Afghan governments Nicolson and Izvolsky were 
able to conclude their convention, but they severely prejud-
iced its chances of effectiveness, 
8, Obstacles to agreement: (v) What was a "sphere 
of influence"? 
One further problem remained to be solved before the 
convention could be concluded. Though few of those concerned 
realised the fact, it rested essentially on the definition 
53• ~uoted in Grey, op.cit., Vol.I 1 p.165, 
54. F.D., S.F.Jun,l907 1 Nos.469-55J 1 Notes p.6, 
55, F ,D., S.F.Nov,l907 1 Nos,26-145, Notes p.2, 
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of the term "sphere of influence", a phrase constantly on 
the lips of the diplomats of the day. The Russian government 
had from the first been willing to recognise that Afghanistan 
"is outside the sphere of Russian,influence",5 6 and it was 
thus generally assumed that that country was to be regarded 
as lying inside the sphere of British influence,57 At the 
same time, their fear that the British might attempt to 
exercise in Afghanistan the degree of control which they 
enjoyed in the "native states" of India58 convinced the 
Russian Foreign Ministry that it would be wise to demand a 
British promise "not to annex or occupy any part of Afghani-
stan or its dependencies and not to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the country".59 The British were ready to under-
take not to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs, in 
56. See Appendix 6, column l, Article II, 
57• A point which might seem open to doubt on a reading. of 
the successive draft agreements, (Parts of Persia, for 
instance, were to lie outside both the Russian and British 
"spheres of inf'luence"), But it requires little knowledge 
of contemporary British policy to realise that the British 
believed that Afghanistan lay within their "sphere", and 
that they wanted the Russians to recognise this fact. 
58, See supra, P• lOJ. 
59, In the words of the Russian draft agreement of l5 May 
l907. See Appendix 6, column l, Article III, 
The use of the phrase "or its dependencies" created an 
unnecessary complication, Afghanistan had, after all, no 
"dependencies" at this time, and her frontiers had been 
defined by a series of Anglo-Afghan and Anglo-Russian agree-
ments, Any attempt to prove that she had any "dependencies" 
threatened to destroy much of what had been achieved since 
l880. Nicolson pointed this out to Izvolsky on 29 May l907 3 
and Russian insistence on the appearance of this phrase then 
ceased., 
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the sense that they did not intend to meddle in day-to-day 
matters of Afghan administration, But they were unwilling 
to deny themselves the right to threaten the Amir with 
invasion, annexation or occupation, For all the fine words 
about Anglo-Afghan friendship which might be uttered by 
Minto or by Habibullah, both the British and the Afghans 
recognised that such control as the Government of India 
exercised over the Amir depended ultimately on superior 
British force. As the Foreign Office put it:-
Any restriction of such liberty of action [as the 
Russian government proposed] on the part of Great 
Britain could not fail to imperil gravely the peace 
of Central Asia by encouraging the Ameer and his 
subjects to ignore the Treaties by which the relations 
of Great Britain and Afghanistan are governed. Such 
an eventuality as hostile operations by British 
forces in Afghanistan must always be kept in view, 
not merely in defence of Anglo-Afghan treaties, but 
also to secure the terms of the present convention,60 
Anglo-Russian discussion of this point revealed a serious 
difference of views resulting from different interpretations 
of the phrase "sphere of influence", The Russians were 
willing to admit that Afghanistan was in the British "sphere 
of influence" but they were not prepared to allow the Indian 
government to attack or occupy the country at will, To permit 
the British such liberty of action was to allow them to treat 
the Afghan "sphere of influence" as a fully-fledged colony. 
60. G, & T., Vol,IV, Enclosure in No.492. 
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The British, on the other hand, maintained that if Afghani-
stan were to be kept within the British "sphere", then the 
threat of invasion must be made to hang over the Amir's head. 
Subsequent developments in Persia were to show that both 
sides eventually adopted the British interpretation of the 
term, and that the line between a "sphere of influence" and 
a "native state" of the Indian type was fine indeed. The 
Russians occupied points within their "sphere" of northern 
Persia, and the British were to reciprocate on a smaller 
scale, sending punitive expeditions into southern Iran when 
the interests of India dictated it,61 Before the convention 
was signed, however, the right of each signatory to send 
troops into its respective "sphere of influence" was still 
an open question, and it was a right which the Russians were 
unwilling to extend to Britain in the case of Afghanistan, 
The Foreign Office devised a formula which they hoped 
would meet the Russian objections, Their principal aim was 
to ensure that Habibullah remained true to his engagements 
to Britain; unless the Russians invaded Afghanistan, they 
had no reason for undertaking military operations in 
that country. They therefore proposed (as part of Article 
II of the draft agreement which Nicolson submitted to 
Izvolsky on 17 June) that they would engage "not to annex 
or occupy , , , any portion of Afghanistan, or to interfere 
61, See, ~·• Keppel, op.cit., pp.l4l-86, 
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in the internaL administration of the country, provided that 
the Amir fuLfiLs the engagements aLready contracted towards 
His Majesty<s Government under the above-mentioned Treaty", 
62 (i.e., the AngLo-Afghan treaty of L905)• UnfortunateLy 
for NicoLson, this formuLa was initiaLLy unacceptabLe to 
the Russians. IzvoLsky pointed out that the British were 
to be the soLe judges of HabibuLLah's faithfuLness, and 
that:-
the resuLt of this couLd be: at any given moment, 
the occupation or even the annexation of a part of 
Afghanistan or of the whoLe of that country; on the 
other hand: the same articLe obLiges Russia to respect 
in aLL circumstances the integrity and invioLabiLity 
of that
6
country, in an absoLute and unconditionaL 
manner, 3 
Grey then authorised NicoLson to add an additionaL 
sentence to ArticLe II of the British draft, to the effect 
that "shouLd any changes occur in the politicaL status of 
Afghanistan, the two Governments wiLl enter into a friendLy 
64 interchange of views on the subject", It was not untiL 
62, See Appendix 6, column 2, ArticLe II, 
6], G,& T., Vol,IV, EncLosure in No,49L. 
64, Ibid,, VoL,IV, No,492, This proposaL naturaLLy encoun-
tered-strong opposition from the Government of India; Minto 
maintained that it wouLd be "absoLuteLy fatal to our poLiti-
caL reLations with the Amir", (M.P,, Minto to MorLey, 21,8, 
L907), MorLey informed him that he had "stood out against 
"interchange of views" as Long and as hard as I could", and 
admitted that "The notion of his [the Amir's] two neighbours 
"exchanging views" about annexing·and occupying him wiLL 
naturaLLy have a very ugLy Look of Partition in his eyes", 
(Ibid,, MorLey to Minto, 2,8,L907)• But Minto's objections 
did not arrive in London untiL after NicoLson had presented 
IzvoLsky with this new formuLa. 
122 
the Russian government produced a new wording of this 
sentence that Grey realised its dangers. On 19 August, some 
two weeks after the British Foreign Office had first suggested 
an "interchange of views", Izvolsky produced a version of 
Article II which provided for Anglo-Russian discussions in 
the event of "any modification whatsoever in the political 
status of Afghanistan" , 65 Grey dismissed this formula as 
dangerously imprecise, 66 and told Nicolson on 21 August that 
he was to abandon any further proposals for a future "inter-
change of views" on Afghanistan. 67 The respective negotiators 
had returned to the position of the beginning of August. 
65, Ibid,, Vol,IV, No.502. 
66, It must be admitted that Grey's fears were theoretically 
well founded, "Any modification whatever ••• in the political 
status of Afghanistan", (while differing from the original 
British formula only by the inclusion of the word "whatever") 
could be held to include such developments as the training 
of the Afghan army by Turkish instructors - a subject on 
which the Russians were somewhat sensitive. (See infra, P•l4J,) 
The British could not allow the Russians to obstruct the 
progress of the military and economic reforms which the 
Amir was anxious to force on his country. 
67, John Buchan maintains that "Minto's protest [see supra, 
P• 121,footnote 64] eventually had its effect, and the 
objectionable clause [sic] was dropped", (op.cit,, p.26o). 
There is other evidence to suggest that the British abandon-
ment of their earlier proposals for an "interchange of 
views" was brought about by the Government of India, (~., 
F,D,, S,F,Nov.l907 1 Nos,26-145, Notes pp.lJ-14). A survey 
of the papers reproduced by Gooch and Temperley indicates, 
however, that the Foreign Office were not motivated by the 
objections of the Indian government, and that Grey decided 
to drop the "objectionable clause" only after Izvolsky 
had unintentionally demonstrated its dangers. 
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9· The signature of the convention, August l907. 
It is just possible that this incident convinced 
Izvolsky that persistence in his earlier objections to 
Article II of the British draft would result in the loss of 
the entire convention, Be that as it may 1 Nicolson must 
have felt highly relieved on 2J August when Izvolsky told 
him that the clause in question would be accepted by the 
68 Tsar's government, This, the last serious obstacle to 
the conclusion of the convention, had been overcome only by 
a Russian demarche, and in this sense the solution reached 
paralleled that resulting from the final British acceptance 
of the "local communications" clause drafted by the Russians. 69 
Izvolsky had only to obtain the approval of the Tsar 1 s 
council of Ministers before proceeding to the signature of 
the convention, While his consultations with the other members 
of the Russian cabinet were not without their delaying effect7° 
he and Nicolson were able to set their seals to the final 
instrument on the last day of August, l907, It is unlikely 
that either of them seriously believed that all Anglo-Russian 
differences had now been laid to rest, or that their decisions 
68, G, & T, 1 Vol,IV 1 No.505, 
69. See supra, PP• ll0-l2. 
70, Izvolsky's colleagues raised objections to the proposed 
Article IV, demanding a close definition of the phrase "the 
principle of equality of treatment in matters concerning 
commerce", (G.& T., Vol,IV, Nos.506-l2), In view of Izvolsky 1 s 
later admissions about the unimportance of Russo-Afghan trade, 
(see supra, p.l09) 1 it seems very likely that the council 
seized upon this clause because they wanted to discredit 
Izvolsky 1 and not because they attached much importance to the 
subject of Article IV, (See also supra, p, l06). 
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would be accepted without demur in Tashkent, Calcutta or 
Kabul. But it is equally improbable that they foresaw that 
withinfiveyears serious attempts would be made by both sides 
to effect fundamental revisions of the terms to which they 
had just agreed, The reasons for these developments must 
now be examined. 
10. British and Afghan reactions to the convention, 1907-08, 
The publication of the convention on 26 September 1907 
aroused a storm of criticism in the expected quarters. Curzon 
told the House of Lords that "we had obtained nothing [in 
Afghanistan] in return for most substantial concessions", 71 
Other critics of the convention, both conservative and pro-
gressive, added their voices to the chorus. 72 The Government 
of India had maintained from the first that no treaty 
assurances by the Russian Foreign Ministry would restrain 
the Russian officers in central Asia, 73 The reaction of the 
Russian officials whom the British distrusted so deeply was 
very similar, The British Military Attache in Meshed noted 
that Russian army officers in that city expressed "a complete 
71, F,D,, S,F,Mar,l908, Nos,4-l9, Notes P•5• 
72, ~·• Vambery 1 op.cit. 
73, Morley admitted to Minto that "the Czar ••• told one 
of our people in St.Petersburg that "it would take a year 
before the officers on the spot would realise the new policy 
to which he (the Czar) was giving his solemn adhesion"." 
(M.P., Morley to Minto, 19.9.1907). 
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disbelief in the British respecting the terms of the Conven-
tion 1 and say that their Government has again been caught 
napping and involved in the net of British diplomacy" ,74 
The Russian consul-general in India was further reminded 
that "your duty is continually to watch for the exact fulfil-
ment by the Anglo-Indian Government of the terms of that 
agreement in any way",75 
We have seen that the Amir's reaction to the convention 
was expected to be of great importance, for the agreement 
concerning his country still required his approval before its 
terms could be considered formally effective. 76 Morley 
claimed in public that Habibullah would probably give his 
assent to its terms, 7 7 but it is likely that his private views 
were very different, and certain that Minto did not share 
such confidence. Soon after the conclusion of the convention, 
and before its publication, the Viceroy wrote to Habibullah 
to explain its provisions, adding with a conviction which 
74, F.D., S.F.Mar,l9081 Nos,4-l9 1 Notes p.l, Sir Clarmont 
Skrine, who held a succession of consular and diplomatic posts 
in Persia, refers to the convention as "This most regrettable 
instrument", and adds, "Never was a nation's goodwill so 
unnecessarily and uselessly thrown away in pursuit of a will-
o '-the-wisp" , (World War in Iran, p ,25), While Sir Clarmont 's 
remarks here apply to Iran, they might equally have been 
written by British officials whose work concerned Afghanistan, 
75• "Collection of secret documents extracted from the Arch-
ives of the former Ministry for Foreign Affairs", (hereinafter 
Russian Blue Book), No.l, 
76, See supra, p, ll6 and Appendix 6 1 column 3, Article V, 
77• F,D, 1 S,F.Mar.l908, Note to No.l4, 
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can hardly have been heartfelt that "I cannot but think that 
Your Majesty will regard the conclusion of this Convention 
with lively satisfaction11 , 7 S He further attempted to retain 
Habibullah's good will by continuing the purely private 
correspondence with him which he had begun after the Amir's 
visit. to India, sending him some old sketches of Afghanistan 
which he had discovered, and slipping in a word about the 
convention as a pretended afterthought. 79 No reply was 
received from the Amir for over a year 1 an eventuality which 
. so Morley had pred1.cted, The Afghan government's procrastin-
ation was naturally regretted by the London authorities, 
since it formally postponed the validity of the Afghan section 
of the convention, and laid them open to Russian charges of 
bad faith. The Viceroy and Secretary of State discussed 
several possible methods of inducing the Amir to accept the 
agreement: Morley once told Minto that "My own notion is 
that we shall have to bribe your friend" and asked "Can you 
not invent some quiet bribe?"Sl Minto rejected the idea that 
the Government of India should repeat Curzon's tactics by 
cutting off the Amir's subsidy 1 S
2 but such a scheme was 
7S, M,P. 1 (Teleg,) 1 Minto to Morley, 5·9·1907. 
79, M.P., Minto to Morley 1 1S,9.1907. 
So, As he later told Minto, "I never expected a point-blank 
assent, only wondered between absolute silence and Oriental 
evasion11 • (Minto, op.cit., p .. l81) (I 
Sl, M.P., Morley to Minto, 4,6,l90S, The italics are Morley's, 
S2, Ibid, 1 Minto to Morley, l4.9.l90S, 
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evidently under tentative consideration. 
The plan most thoroughly discussed was to send a British 
officer to Kabul to explain the terms of the convention, and 
to soften the blow by personal contact with Habibullah. 
McMahon's name was the most frequently mentioned in this 
connection, During the January of 1908 Habibullah was by 
custom resident at his winter palace in Jalalabad, and the 
Viceroy then admitted that "there should be no difficulty at 
all in our sending an officer there" , 83 Further consideration 
forced Minto to abandon his support for this scheme, and he 
evidently persuaded Morley that if McMahon were sent to Kabul 
he would probably meet the fate of three earlier British-
Indian representatives, Macnaughten, Burnes and Cavagnari, 
who had been murdered by the citizens of Kabu1. 84 In spite 
of the serious disturbances on the Anglo-Afghan frontier which 
occurred during 1907-08, 85 it is difficult to believe that 
Minto's fears were entirely justified, Several British 
missions had visited Kabul since 1880, and at no time had the 
lives of their members been seriously endangered. One is 
forced to conclude that many servants of the Government of 
8J. ~·• Minto to Morley, 22,1,1908, The tour through 
his kingdom which the Amir had undertaken between June and 
November 1907 had evidently forced the Government of India 
to postpone consideration of this plan until the end of 
the same year. 
84, Minto, op.cit,, pp.178-79• 
85. See supra, pp.78-80. 
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86 India shared the views of S.H. Butler that "The ideal solu-
tion from the local point of view would be to leave the 
matter unsettled ••• [since] We have nothing to gain from the 
convention", 87 that they invented what they hoped was a 
reasonable excuse for deferring the idea of sending McMahon 
to Kabul, and then persuaded the Viceroy to accept it, 
There were those who believed that the effective Afghan 
answer to the Anglo-Russian convention had been given by the 
frontier risings of 1907-08, and local rumour sometimes 
supported their views. 88 The fact that Habibullah formally 
expressed his disapproval of those Pashtuns who participated 
in the disturbances does not disprove their point, for it was 
known that Nasrullah Khan gave moral and material support to 
the rebel tribesmen, 89 and that he was the principal Afghan 
opponent of the convention. 90 Others, like S,H, Butler, 
dismissed the idea that the uprisings had been caused by the 
Afghan reaction to the convention, and pointed out that the 
rebellion of the Zakka Khel Afridis had been fostered by 
Nasrullah several months before the publication of the Anglo-
Russian agreement,9l 
86, The Foreign Secretary to the Indian government, 
87, F.D., S,F,Oct.l908 1 Note to No.ll2, 
88. M.P., (Teleg,), Minto to Morley, 8,5,1908. 
89, See supra,pp.Sl-82, 
90, F,O, Prints, Enclosure No.2 in No.8, 
91. F.D., S,F,Jun,l908, Note to No.40l, Butler's view was 
concurred in by Minto, (M.P., (Teleg.), Minto to Morley, 
4.5.1908). 
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Whatever the truth of Butler's belief, the arrival in 
India of an official statement of the Afghan privy council's92 
views on the convention in September 190893 showed clearly 
that Afghan ratification of that instrument would be hard to 
obtain, The council failed to indicate whether the Amir's 
assent to the agreement was given or refused, and Morley, 
who believed that their reply was "not at all unpromising",94 
may have understood this to mean that Habibullah would even-
tually add his signature to the convention 0 Morley's hopes 
were never fulfilled; and the council's letter remained the 
only official Afghan pronouncement on the Anglo-Russian 
agreement. Nasrullah Khan was said to have remarked that 
"The reply is most reasonable and is at the same time polite; 
we should hope that we will not be bothered by the question 
any more. The British will have to drop the matter",95 
While Morley would probably have disputed the first part of 
Nasrullah's statement, he was subsequently obliged to admit 
the correctness of the second, 
The Afghan reply was not without its surprises, The 
Amir and his advisers probably realised the dangers to 
92, The Ma.iJ.is-i-Sllurii. (See supra,p. 12), It was said that 
Nasrullah and 'Abdur Rahman's old adviser 1Ab.dul Q,uddus Khan 
had been largely responsible for drafting the Afghan reply. 
(M.P., (Teleg,), Minto to Morley, 28,9,1908), 
93• F,O,Prints, Enclosure in No.76, 
94, M.P., (Teleg,), Morley to Minto, 23,9.1908, 
95, M,P., (Teleg,), Minto to Morley, 28.9.1908, 
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Afghanistan inherent in Articles III and IV of the convention, 
but they never openly stated their objections to them, To 
admit that the proposal to establish communications between 
Russian and Afghan frontier officers (contained in Article 
III) was a threat to the internal security of Afghanistan 
was to admit that the loyalty of the Amir's officials was 
not always what it should have been, To point out that 
"commercial agents" of either Britain or Russia (Article IV) 
might fall into difficulties calling for military intervention 
by one side or the other, was to point to a lack of security 
in outlying areas.96 In this sense, there were obvious 
reasons for the council's failure to mention what Minto had 
regarded as the principal obstacles to Afghan acceptance of 
the convention. At the same time, the council detected flaws 
in its text which had probably passed unnoticed by the 
British, Russian and Indian governments. The Afghan authori-
ties had read carefully the sections of the agreement which 
referred to Persia and Tibet, and rightly pointed out that 
"the words "freedom!< and it independence 11 have no meaning as 
applied to Persia,97 since that country has been divided up 
96, See supra, PP• 105-08, 
97• The preamble to the Persian section of the convention 
begins: "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having 
mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence 
of Persia ., , have agreed as follows" , ( G, & T., Vol.IV, 
Appendix I), 
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into three parts", They claimed that "As the Convention 
regarding Afghanistan does not mention these words ,,, it is 
thereby implied that Afghanistan holds only a subordinate 
position'~9S The council further maintained that the ban on 
railway and telegraph construction contained in the Tibetan 
section of the convention, 99 and the non-appearance of any 
similar provision in that dealing with Afghanistan, was 
clear proof that Bri!ain and Russia meant to extend railways 
100 
and telegraph lines into their country, 
Minto produced reasoned explanations which he hoped 
would convince Habibullah and his counsellors of the baseless-
ness of the fears which they had voiced, but he realised that 
"the real sting, which is that the Amir was ignored during 
the negotiations, will not be relieved by this argument•~ 101 
The loss of prestige which they had thus suffered was princi-
pally responsible for the Afghans' attitude, he believed, 
The Afghan council linked the convention with the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, which they regarded as another example 
of British tergiversation, and sought to convince the British 
government that these new friendships were worthless. In 
98. 
out 
F.O. Prints, Enclosure in No,76, It should be pointed 
that this is only a condensed version of the Shura's 
letter. 
99, "Arrangement concerning Tibet", Article IV, (G, & T,, 
Vol,IV, Appendix I), 
100, F.O. Prints, Enclosure in No,76. 
101. ~·> Enclosure in No.92, 
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telling the Amir that "The value of old friendship is not 
lessened by making new friends" 1 l
02 Minto drew attention to 
the fact that many Afghans felt precisely the opposite, 
There were two more fundamental implications of the 
convention which could not fail to prejudice the Afghans 
against it. The Amir's privy council had used the wording 
of the "arrangement concerning Persia" to support a somewhat 
tortuous argument to the effect that the convention denied 
the independence of Afghanistan, Popular Afghan reactions 
were simpler, though no less scathing, Ordinary Kabulis 
realised that the Anglo-Russian agreement had resulted in the 
virtual dismemberment of Persia, and concluded, not illogic-
ally, that Afghanistan was next on the list. British 
intelligence sources reported in August l908 that a line along 
the Hindu Kush was freely discussed in Kabul as the boundary 
between British and Russian "spheres of influence" in 
Afghanistan,103 As will be seen, developments in Anglo-
Russian relations during the years immediately preceding the 
outbreak of the first world war were to prove these fears 
were well founded, 
The Amir 1s government had no direct evidence that the 
convention of 1907 involved the partition of their country, 
but they were bound to oppose an agreement which was intended 
l02. Ibid, 
103, M.P., Minto to Morley, 18,8,19081 Enclosure. 
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to remove the principal reason for British willingness to 
support and subsidise a semi-independent Afghanistan - the 
threat of a Russian attack on India, Grey claimed in the 
House of Commons several years later that "It was an agreement 
essentially in the interests of Afghanistan. That neither 
Great Britain nor Russia should pursue a forward policy is 
obviously the very thing to preserve Afghanistan from being 
interfered with" •104 Few Afghans would have disputed the 
apparent advantages of an agreement forbidding direct foreign 
intervention in their country, But most must have realised 
that any entente between Britain and Russia lessened their 
own value to either, The St,Petersburg newspaper Rech 
commented with approval: "it is no longer possible now for 
Afghanistan to play off Russia against England" , 105 Russian 
approval of the new situation was a measure of Afghan 
disapproval, 
11. Difficulties created by the Afghan attitude, and 
its effects on Anglo-Russian relations, 
The British Foreign Office were naturally embarrassed 
by Habibullah 1 s failure to ratify the convention, since it 
demonstrated that the system of conducting all Russo-Afghan 
relations,through the British government was ineffective, 
104. 
(ed. 
105. 
Quoted in Viscount Grey, Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 
Paul Knaplund), p.192. 
G, & T,, Vol,IV, No,5l4. 
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and that Britain was incapable of securing the Amir's 
adherence to agreements with Russia which she had concluded 
on his behalf. As Nicolson told Grey in July l90S:-
We shou:J_d have to publicly admit that although we 
decline to permit Russia to have any direct relations 
with the Ameer, we are ourselves incapable of exercising 
any influence over that potentate in matters of external 
policy affecting his country. Russia would in that 
case, have some justification in asserting that we 
were useless as intermediaries, and that it would be 
more to her advantage to treat direct with the Ameer 
should the occasion for doing so ever arise,l06 
Grey's embarrassment was to some extent relieved by 
Russian assurances that they would be prepared to overlook 
Habibullah's refusal to adhere to the convention, As early 
as May l90S Izvolsky told the Councillor at the British 
embassy in St,Petersburg that the Russian Foreign Ministry 
would not "take advantage of the fact that the Ameer had not 
consented to the recent Convention respecting his dominions", 
and that "Russia meant absolutely to observe the spirit of 
the Convention",l07 Morley, who continued to believe that 
"It is out of the question that we should at this stage act 
on the supposition that the Amir 1·s refusal is final" ,lOS 
nevertheless hoped that the visit to England of Izvolsky 
in October l90S would give the Foreign Office an opportunity 
l06. 
l07. 
lOS. 
Ibid,, Vol,IV, No,5l6, 
~., Vol,IV, N0 .5l5· 
M.P., (Teleg,) 1 Morley to Minto, 29·9·l90S, 
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to arrange some temporary accommodation with Russia which 
would define the situation until the Amir's assent was 
obtained.109 He was not to be disappointed, During Izvolsky's 
visit, Grey reported that the Russian Foreign Minister had 
told him on 13 October "that, in his opinion, the consent of 
the Ameer was not necessary to the working of' the Convention, 
and he proposed that we should continue to work it without 
waiting for the Ameer 1 s consent", Grey and Morley, while they 
impressed on Izvolsky the fact that "we would continue our 
110 
efforts to secure the Ameer •.s consent" must have been 
relieved by this assurance that the Russian government did 
not intend to make capital out of' Habibullahfs non-adherence 
to the convention, 
Had he troubled to analyse it, Grey would have realised 
that Izvolsky 1 s simple statement that "we should continue to 
work it" left many questions unanswered. While the Russian 
Foreign Minister's assurance that "the consent of' the Ameer 
was not necessary to the working of' the Convention" may have 
been a correct description of' his own opinion, it hardly 
fitted the facts of' the situation as they presented themselves 
in central Asia, The Russian declaration that Afghanistan 
was outside the Tsarist "sphere of' influence", the principal 
British gain from the convention, did not depend for its 
109, M.P., Morley to Minto, 24,9,1908. 
110, F,O,Prints, N0 ,l02, 
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effectiveness on the Amir•s consent, But the most important 
provision from the Russian point of view, the right to carry 
on "local communications" with Afghan frontier officials, 
could be rendered nugatory by a hostile attitude from Kabul. 
SomeRussian authorities seem to have assumed that "working ,,, 
the Convention", in existing conditions, meant that Britain 
was to enjoy all the advantages she derived from that 
instrument, but that Russia was to lose all hers, 
This expectation was more than partly borne out by devel-
opments along the Russo-Afghan frontier, During the autumn 
of 1908 friction was caused between Russian and Afghan offic-
ers by the activities of the Jamshedis, a nomad tribe of the 
Chehar Aimaq tribal bloc, who wintered on both sides of the 
Russo-Afghan boundary, but who usually passed the summer in 
Afghanistan.111 The execution by 'Abdur Rahman of the former 
Jamshedi chieftain Khan Aga, after an earlier rebellion in 
the 1880s, had done little to reduce the Jamshedist hostility 
112 towards any authority, Russian or Afghan, In 1908 Khan 
Aga'ts successor Sa'id Ahmad Bey visited Russian territory 
and obtained arms and other support from the Russian provincial 
administration of Turkistan. He subsequently persuaded 600 
111. SeeK. Ferdinand, Chapter 19, "Les Nomades 11 in J, 
Humlum, La Gtographie de 1 1Afghanistan, map p.278, Ferdinand 
does not maintain that any of the nomads regularly cross the 
frontier today, but it is evident that they did so before 
the first world war. 
112, M.P., (Teleg,), Minto to Morley, 17.9.1908, 
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families of his fellow-tribesmen to join him in raiding into 
Afghanistan from his new Russian base,llJ There was a 
fairly clear case for the settlement of the problem by direct 
Russo-Afghan negotiations 2
114 but the British, who had learnt 
of the Jamshedis* doings through their Meshed consulate, 
realised that "if we refuse to address the Amir then Russia 
will obviously have the right to address him direct",ll.J 
They were evidently determined to prevent this, and accord-
ingly wrote to Habibullah 2 asking him to suggest a solution 
to the Jamshedi problem, The Amir proposed that the bulk of 
the tribe should be returned to Afghanistan with the promise 
of a free pardon, but that Sa 1 Id Ahmad Bey and six of his 
principal companions should remain in Russia, to be kept 
116 
under surveillance, Nicolson put these proposals to 
Charikov, then adviser to the St,Petersburg Foreign Ministry, 
117 
on 24 September 1908, and they were readily accepted, 
The problem was thus satisfactorily overcome, but at 
the cost of Russian claims that such matters were fit subjects 
for direct negotiation between the local Russian and Afghan 
llJ, Ibid,, Minto to Morley, ],8,1908, 
114, In the sense that it was a "local question". But was it, 
in the words of Article III of the convention, of a "non-
political character"? The obscurity of the wording of this 
Article was here clearly demonstrated, 
115, M.P., (Teleg,), Morley to Minto, 24.7.1908. 
116, Ibid,, Minto to Morley, 17.9.1908, 
117. M,P., Morley to Minto, 7,10,1908, Enclosure, 
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officers. The Amir had effectively forbidden Muhammad Sarwar 
Khan, his governor of Herat, to contact the Turkistan 
authorities, and continued to do so even after the Government 
of India had suggested that he might arrange the details of 
ll8 
the Jamshedis.' return with the Russian governor of Transcaspia, 
When the Russians made their only attempt at direct contact 
with Muhammad Sarwar they were specially requested by the 
British not to mention Article III of the convention, 119 and 
they received no reply from the Afghan governor. Article III 
could thus be regarded as inoperative for all practical 
purposes, 
12, The revision of the convention: first approaches, 1912, 
It was unlikely that the Russian government would put up 
with this situation indefinitely. The principal architect of 
the convention on the Russian side; Alexander Izvolsky, left 
the Foreign Ministry in 1910, It gradually became evident 
that his successor S.D. Sazonov was less anxious than Izvolsky 
118, Officially known as "Chief of the Transcaspian region", 
(M.P., (Teleg,), Minto to Morley, 12,1,1909 and J.2,l909)• 
In view of the fact that Muhammad Sarwar Khan was reported 
to have been in fairly regular contact with Russian frontier 
officials on previous occasions, (see supra,p.ll4), one 
suspects that Habibullah was particularly anxious to ensure 
that he ignored them on this one, He may have hoped that 
this would serve as practical proof of his opposition to 
the convention, 
119. F.D,, S.F.Feb,l909, No,J2, 
Jne disadvantages of an agreement which he had 
co 
no part in concluding, Dissatisfaction with the 
1>,? 
4 Jnan section of the convention began to creep into Russian 
press commentaries. As the Golos Pravdy remarked:-
As regards Afghanistan, this part of the agreement 
has not existed either in fact or in a legal sense, 
The carrying out of mutual obligations with reference 
to Afghanistan was (very far-sightedly on the part 
of the English) made conditional on the signature of 
the Amir 1 which has hitherto not been given, Thereby 
many of the fine phrases and wishes expressed by 
Russian and British diplomacy have been brought to 
nought •••• There are no frontier commissioners; in a 
word, there is absolutely nothing - all has proved to 
be thin air,l20 
While the Russian Foreign Ministry might not have been 
prepared to agree with the Golos Pravdy that the Amir's 
ratification had been insisted on by the British in order to 
deny Russia the benefits of the convention, they had certainly 
become convinced by 1912 that .the terms of that agreement were 
in need of some modification, 
Changes were at the same time taking place in the British 
attitude towards their Russian rivals. Grey and his colleagues 
were naturally unwilling to admit that their convention with 
the Tsarist government was of no value, but its worth was 
difficult to prove in the central Asian context, The Afghan 
section of the convention remained largely inoperative, the 
Persian section had done little to reduce Anglo-Russian 
120. F,D., S .External May 1910; Enclosure in No,284, 
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121 
rivalry in Iran, and (as will be seen) the agreement 
regarding Tibet was soon believed to need some re-adjustment. 
They had therefore to prove that the real effect of the 
convention could be seen in Europe and not in Asia. The 
Anglo-Russian convention became something which had not 
originally been intended an Anglo-Russian entente in the 
fuller sense, This change of attitude was probably hastened 
by contemporary developments on the European diplomatic stage 
- the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis of 1908 and the German inter-
vention in Morocco in 1911 - which brought British policy 
into collision with that of Germany and, in the former case, 
into line with that of the Tsarist government. 
The idea that Russian friendship was worth cultivating 
122 gradually seeped back to Calcutta, Lord Hardinge, who 
succeeded Minto as Viceroy in November 1910, had played an 
important part in the arrangement of the 1907 convention, 
and could look back on a lifetime of service to the Foreign 
Office, He was disinclined to accept the theory that the 
Russian army kept its sights set firmly and permanently on 
India, and was more likely than his predecessor to favour 
1 . f I d. d f b d t ·th R · 123 a po 1cy o n 1an e ence ase on agreemen Wl uss1a. 
121. As the Foreign Secretary himself later admitted, 
(Grey, Twenty-Five Years, Vol,I, pp,166-7l), 
122, Delhi was of course to become the capital of British 
India in 1912. 
123, See the speech made by Hardinge before his assumption 
of the Viceroyalty, quoted by Keppel, op,cit,,p,J9• Dr 
Alastair Lamb believes that "More than any other individual 
Hardinge deserves to be considered as the initiator of the 
Anglo-Russian negotiations which opened at St.Petersburg in 
1906 11 , (op,cit., Vol.I, Chapter 5), 
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After l9lO, there was little chance that the makers of 
Indian foreign policy would ignore the Russian Foreign 
Ministry in the way that Minto and his colleagues would have 
liked to. The mere existence of the Anglo-Russian convention, 
besides Hardinge's presence in Calcutta, helped to ensure this, 
The change of Viceroys, however, did not immediately 
incline the Government of India towards a conciliatory atti-
tude to Russian complaints about the ineffectiveness of the 
Afghan section of the convention, Only if they had serious 
reason for seeking Russian good will in some other context 
were they willing to lend a sympathetic ear to such protests, 
Just such a case arose in the autumn of l9l2 1 and could be 
traced to contemporary British fears about the future status 
of Tibet, The Indian government were at this period anxious 
to secure Russian agreement to a revision of Article III of 
the "arrangement concerning Tibet" which obliged both 
Britain and Russia "not to send Representatives to Lhasa 11 1 l
24 
l24, The Chinese revolution of l9ll had created a virtual 
power vacuum in Tibet as well as in Mongolia, and the British 
were anxious to prevent it from being filled by any power 
which could be considered inimical to themselves, or whose 
presence in Lhasa could lead to complications with other states 
neighbouring India, Grey explained to Sazonov in September 
l9l2 that the British had reason to fear an invasion of Tibet 
by the Chinese republican government, and that this would 
probably cause war between the Chinese and Nepalese, who had 
designs on Tibetan territory which conflicted with those of 
China. The British were making diplomatic representations at 
Peking in an attempt to persuade the Chinese to drop their plans, 
but even if their efforts succeeded, the problem of the Tibetan 
power vacuum would remain, and a British representative in 
Lhasa might well become necessary, (F.D.,External B Mar.l9lJ, 
No.SS· The problem is fu~ly explained by Lamb, op,cit., 
Vol.II, parts 2 and J). 
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but they realised that the Tsarist government was unlikely 
to grant its favours free of charge, and that some acceptable 
guid pro guo would have to be found, 
Sazonov decided to ask for some modification of the 
Afghan section of the convention as the price of his benevo-
lence over Tibet, During the September of 1912 he visited 
England to discuss with Grey problems arising from the 
125 Persian agreement, and seized the opportunity to introduce 
the topic of Afghanistan. In a memorandum which he presented 
to Grey at Balmoral on 24 September he noted that the Amir 
had hitherto declined to accept the 1907 convention, and 
maintained that "this state of affairs presents many grax-e 
disadvantages for Russia" , 126 
Of the "disadvantages" from which Sazonov claimed that 
his government suffered, some were of relatively minor import-
ance, Their existence was more damaging to Russian prestige 
than to definable Russian interests, 127 and could be overcome 
by some formula which granted Russia concessions more apparent 
than real. The restrictions on Russian trade with Afghanistan 
which resulted from the lack of any recognised means of 
settling commercial disputes with Afghans was mentioned by 
Sazonov, who was evidently unwilling to accept Izvolsky's 
125, See G, & T,, Vol,IX; PP•749-72, 
126, ~., Vol,IX, No,803: section (9), 
127, As Sazonov admitted, "Such a state of affairs prejudices 
the prestige of Russia in central Asia", (Ibid,) 
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contention that the Russo-Afghan trade was unimportant.128 
The Russian Foreign Minister further emphasised the damage 
to Russian agriculture resulting from the ravages of locusts, 
and the ineffectiveness of any eradication campaign which 
did not cover territory on the Afghan side of the frontier. 
He pointed to the presence of Turkish officers in Kabu1, 129 
and the reorganisation and rearmament of the Afghan army as 
developments dangerous to Britain as well as Russia, and 
presumably expected the British to do something to halt 
Habibullahls activities in this direction, 
There were other minor causes of Russian complaint 
which, while ignored by Sazonov, were expatiated on by other 
Russian officials on various occasions, There were a number 
of Russian subjects held in Afghan prisons without trial,lJO 
and the Tsarist authorities were also worried by the impossib-
ility of extraditing Russian criminals who had fled to 
Afghanistan, Attacks by Afghan bandits on Russian frontier 
posts were another source of Russo-Afghan friction for which 
the Russians were unable to gain redress from the Amir,lJl 
while Russian medical authorities were anxious to enter 
Afghanistan in order to prevent a supposed plague in that 
128, See su12ra, p. 109. 
129. See su12ra, P• 41. 
lJO, F .,.D., S,F,Sep.l914, Nos,7-7.5• 
lJl. F .D., S.F,Jun,l914, Nos,l-,5, 
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country from spreading to Russian territory,1 3 2 
By far the most important Russian grievance, however, 
and one which Sazonov mentioned during his conversations with 
Grey, concerned water rights on two rivers flowing out of 
Afghanistan into Russian Transcaspia, the Hari Rud133 and the 
Murghab, The Tsar had recently purchased large estates in 
the Merv oasis, and important irrigation works had then been 
134 
constructed on the Murghab, The success of these projects 
was however prejudiced by the fact that the flow of the 
Murghab and Hari Rud had declined; the Russians maintained 
that this was attributable to increased irrigation on the 
Afghan side, They demanded the appointment of a joint Russo-
Afghan commission for investigation of the problem, and were 
anxious on other scores that the Amir should be persuaded to 
act in the spirit of Article III of the convention, even if 
he persisted in withholding his formal approval of the 1907 
agreement. 
Grey and the Secretary of State for India Lord Crewe135 
were anxious that the Government of India should show some 
consideration for the complaints raised by Sazonov, The 
Foreign Secretary believed that the British "must urge the 
132, F,D., S,F,May 1913; Note to No.5. 
133· Known on the Russian side of the frontier as the 
Tejend, The Afghan name will here be used, 
134• See Pahlen, op,cit., p.146. 
135• Crewe succeeded Morley at the India Office in 
November 1910. 
Ameer to instruct his officials on the frontier to come to 
a fair agreement with the Russian officials about irrigation 
136 
and locusts", while Crewe asked Hardinge to cooperate 
in "giving effect in substance, if not in name, to Article 
III of the Anglo-Russian Convention" ,l37 Crewe's anxiety 
was more than partly occasioned by the Russian reaction to 
his request for an alteration of the Tibetan section of the 
convention, Sasonov refused to accept Grey's suggestion that 
Russia should be allowed rights in Mongolia equivalent to 
those which the British wished to enjoy in Tibet as a guid 
pro guo for the revision of the 1907 agreement, 138 and was 
equally unmoved by Grey•s attempts to create an artificial 
bargaining point by demanding a British consulate in Tashkent~39 
The Russian Foreign Minister instead struck firmly for 
concessions in Afghan:istan, and hinted that "if we [the 
British] were able to give material assistance in smoothing 
things with Afghanistan, he would be able to face opinion 
in Russia more easily in connection with other questions",140 
136. G, & T,,Vol,IX, Minute to No,803, section (9)• 
137• F,D,, S,F,May 1913, No.5, 
138, For the very good reason that Russia already enjoyed 
considerable influence in Mongolia, and had no reason to seek 
British permission for a fait accomtli, Nor was Mongolia 
mentioned in the 1907 convention, See Lamb, op.cit., Vol. 
II, Chapter 21, section 3), 
139• See G, & T,, Vol,IX, No,809, section (2), 
140, F,D. 1 External B Mar.l913, No,56, 
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The Indian government firmly refused to take the hint. 
McMahon141 declined to believe that the Russians were seriously 
concerned with the problems of irrigation, trade and pest 
control in which they claimed such interest, and maintained 
that they had raised these issues "with the ulterior motive 
of forcing our hands in regard to the Afghan portion of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention in particular and to Afghanistan in 
142 general" , The Russian complaints were unjustified, and 
the Indian government would not accept a trumped-up charge 
about Afghanistan as the price of Russian acquiescence in 
an alteration of the status guo in Tibet, There was nothing 
to prove that Russian trade with Afghanistan was subject to 
restriction: statistics indicated that it was on the increase, 
and that it was hampered more by vexatious transit dues in 
the Russian "native state" of Bokhara than in Afghanistan,143 
The Amir was most unlikely to allow Russian officers an entree 
to Afghanistan for purposes of 
there was no evidence to prove 
locust extermination, and 
llj.4 
the seriousness of the pest, 
141. Now Foreign Secretary to the Indian government. 
142, F,D,, S.F.May 1913, Note to No.1. 
14J, Ibid,, Note to No,5, 
144, Indian counter-claims on this score were to be amply 
justified, In the November of 1914, after renewed Russian 
protests on this subject, Hardinge wrote to Habibullah to 
explain the problem, and to offer the services of an Indian 
expert who would assist in locust extermination in Afghanistan, 
(F ,D,, S ,F ,Apr ,1915, No ,15), The Amir fs reply was, as McMahon 
remarked, "exactly what was to be expected",(~., Note to 
No.18), Habibullah stated that he knew nothing of locusts in 
/(144} 
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The dangers arising from the employment of Turkish military 
instruotors in Kabul had been greatly over-estimated by the 
Russians, and the British could in any case do nothing to 
enforce their dismissal; the Government of India was similarly 
unable to stop the export of arms to Afghanistan,145 Nor did 
the other Russian complaints have any validity; there was no 
evidence of plague in Afghanistan, and it was out of the 
question that Russian medical missions should be allowed into 
the country. The Amir denied the stories of attacks on 
(144) 
Afghanistan, but that he would instruct his governors in the 
northern :~;rovinces to make enquiries."But I write to say [he 
continuedj ••• that should locusts have already appeared or 
hereafter appear in the territory of the God-granted Govern-
ment of Afghanistan, the Afghan subjects of that place will, 
in the first instance, pray to AlmightvGod for their extermin-
ation, and secondly they will use their best endeavours in 
their own way to destroy them as far as possible,,,, The 
officials of the Russian Government should not violate the 
frontier and enter the territory of the God-granted Government 
of Afghanistan on the pretext of killing locusts", (Ibid,, No, 
18), The Foreign Department naturally agreed with the Amir 
that divine intervention was infinitely preferable to that of 
the Russian government; Habibullah!s letter was forwarded to 
London and nothing more was heard of the matter. 
145. F.D., S,F,May 1913 1 Note to No,5, Curzon had of course 
been able to stop the import of arms into Afghanistan, but the 
Indian government would probably have repeated in 1912 Curzonfs 
claim that the "Durand agreement", on which Afghan rights in 
this respect were based, had lapsed after 'Abdur Rahman's 
death, The signature of the Dane treaty had however re-
obliged the Indian government to "raise no objection to the 
purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war", (in 
the words of the "Durand agreement", See Appendix 4, paragraph 
7). They were therefore unable to meet Russian requests 
unless they broke existing agreements with the Amir, 
148 
Russian frontier posts, 146 and of Russian prisoners being 
held in Kabul without trial,147 The extradition of criminals 
from Afghanistan was impossible, since Habibullah would 
"insist on an extradition treaty on his own lines, and these 
are lines which the British Government cannot possibly 
148 
contemplate", 
The Indian government felt no difficulty in refuting 
each of these relatively minor Russian complaints since they 
themselves faced similar problems along the Anglo-Afghan 
border, and had long recognised the futility of attempting 
to improve the situation. Thanks to topographical conditions, 
the same could not be said of the Russian claims regarding 
irrigation rights, but this was no reason for accepting them 
without question. The problem had been fully examined by 
the Anglo-Russian commission which had demarcated the frontier 
between Russia and Afghanistan in 1884-85, and Russian and 
Afghan rights to the waters of the Murghab and Hari Rud had 
then been defined by an Anglo-Russian protocol of December 
1885, which stated that "the want of water, no matter from 
what cause it arose, in the canals which flow into Russian 
territory, shall not justify claims on the part of Russia",149 
146; F,D,, S,F,Jun,l914, No.4, 
147, F.D,, S,F,Sep,l914, Note to No,54, 
148. ~·• Note to No.lJ, 
149. Protocol No,4 of 14-20 December 1885, 
Mar,l887, No,l2). 
(F,D,,S,F, 
149 
This decision corresponded to locql custom, under which 
cultivators inhabiting the upper reaches of a river had first 
claim on its waters, A joint Anglo-Russian commission had 
investigated water rights in the Kushk area in 1893, and a 
settlement of outstanding points of dispute had then been 
achieved ,l50 The Russian governor of Ashkhabad had complained 
to the governor of Herat in 1903 about the diminution of the 
water levels of the Murghab and Hari Rud, but enquiries 
addressed to Habibullah by the Indian government had elicited 
the explanation that this decline was due to low precipitation 
in the catchment areas of these rivers, and not to diversion 
of their waters by the Afghans, There was no reason to 
suppose that there had been any extension of irrigation in 
north-western Afghanistan of recent years, and there was 
nothing which could allow the British to prevent such exten-
sion even if they had wanted to, 1 51 While McMahon and his 
colleagues probably realised that the irrigation question 
was of more importance than some of the other issues which 
Sazonov had raised, they were unwilling to listen to Russian 
complaints about the shortage of water in the Murghab and 
Hari Rud, 
150, See R .S. Rastogi, "The Kushk and Oxus Canal Dispute", 
Journal of Indian History, Vol.XLI, pp.595-606, 
151, F,D, 1 S,F,May 1913, Note to No,l, 
13. Renewed Anglo-Russian negotiations: their failure 
and its causes, 1914. 
150 
Changes in the Tibetan situation forced the Indian govern-
ment to reconsider this decision in the summer of 1914. The 
threat of a Chinese invasion of Tibet which they had claimed 
to fear in 1912 had effectively disappeared by the next year, 
but the danger of intervention by some other power still 
. d 152 rema1ne • It had been rendered more serious by the fact 
that the Russians had consolidated their position in Mongolia, 
and that the Mongolian government was said to have signed 
agreements with the Tibetans as well as with Russia,l53 It 
seemed likely that the theatre of Anglo-Russian rivalry would 
be transferred from Afghanistan to Tibet, British representa-
tion in Lhasa was considered all the more necessary, and 
Russian objections harder to ignore,1 5 4 
[124. 
152, As Grey had predicted it would, See supra, P• 14l,footnote 
153. Sazonov denied the validity of the Mongol-Tibetan 
agreement, (Lamb, op.cit., Vol,II, Chapter 21, section 3). 
154. In 1913 the Indian government decided to arrange a tri-
partite convention between themselves, the Chinese and the 
Tibetans, providing for British representation at Lhasa, and 
to consult the Russian government only after they had secured 
Tibetan and Chinese assent to the British programme. Repre-
sentatives of the Peking and Lhasa governments accordingly 
foregathered in Simla in October 1913 for discussions with 
Foreign Departme~officials. The talks broke down the follow-
ing April, thanks to the refusal of the Chinese government to 
accept the alignment of the Sino-Tibetan boundary which had 
been suggested by McMahon, The Indian authorities then decided 
to cut China out of all future discussions on Tibet, and to 
negotiate with the Tibetans on a bilateral level. They 
realised however that it would be impossible to postpone 
indefinitely the alteration of the 1907 convention which a new 
Indo-Tibetan treaty would involve. It might be possible to 
exclude China from negotiations about Tibet, but it was 
impossible to exclude Russia, (See ~·• Vol.II, Chapter 24) • 
151 
Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador in St,Petersburg, 
began talks on this subject with the Russian Foreign Ministry 
in June 1914. It soon became clear that Sazonov was not 
really worried by the new British "forward policy" in Tibet. 
Buchanan thought that he was not seriously worried about 
Afghanistan either, but, like his predecessor Izvolsky, he 
was concerned to prevent his countrymen from attacking him 
for having disregarded Russian interests. His aim, in fact, 
was to produce some modification of the convention which 
involved no loss of Russian face. This was to be accompanied 
by a number of secret clauses which would remove most of the 
force of the published agreement.155 For all these secret 
concessions Sazonov naturally required a guid pro guo, and 
thus re-introduced the topic of Afghanistan which he had 
ignored since the autumn of 1912. He now suggested that the 
Tsarist government should be accorded the right to send a 
Muslim representative to Herat as a guarantee of the protect-
ion of Russian interests in north-west Afghanistan, 
155. Sazonov explained that he was willing to amend the 
"arrangement concerning Tibet" of 1907 by replacing the 
original and complete ban on foreign representation in Lhasa 
with a clause stating that the British would not be allowed 
to send an envoy to the Tibetan capital without Russian 
permission, together with a secret clause to the effect that 
such permission would be freely granted, Britain and Russia 
would agree publicly not to seek concessions in Tibet without 
mutual agreement, but the Russian government would give a 
secret promise to press for no concessions on the part of 
their own subjects, and to oppose none which the British 
might require. (ill£., Vol,II, Chapter 25) , 
152 
Grey was so certain that Sazonovts proposals would 
never be accepted by the Indian government that he avoided 
forwarding them to Delhi,156 His expectations were well 
based to the extent that nothing hadlappened since 1912 to 
convince the British in India. of the innocence of Russian 
intentions in Afghanistan, The impending construction of a 
railway to Termez had recently been announced 1 l57 and the 
Russian authorities had collected materials in the same town 
158 for the construction of a bridge across the Oxus, The 
Foreign Department were unlikely to give way before what 
they regarded as a Russian "forward policy" along the Afghan 
frontier, 
It was only the increasing seriousness of the Tibetan 
problem that made the Foreign Department think twice about 
their earlier refusal to listen to Russian complaints about 
Afghanistan, The Chinese threat to Tibet of 1912 had now 
become a Russian one, and only the most rabid Sinophobe could 
have maintained in 1914 that Russian hegemony in Tibet was 
less dangerous to India than Chinese, Convinced by now that 
the Russians would not accept a free hand in Mongolia as a 
guid pro guo for acceptance of British demands in Tibet, the 
156, As is evident from a survey of the Foreign Department 
recordse 
157. F.D,, External B May 1914, Nos.106-07. The line was 
built during the first world war by Austrian prisoners, 
See infra, p.195. 
158, F.D., External B Apr.1914, Note to No,J74. 
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Government of India were forced to reconsider some of the 
fundamentals of their Afghan policy, 
After Buchanan•s refusal to accept his proposal for the 
establishment of a Russian agency in Herat, Sazonov made 
suggestions of a more innocent type. The British, he pro-
posed: should promise that they would "not support any 
application by British subjects for irrigation works, railways 
or preferential rights for commercial or industrial enterprises 
in Northern Afghanistan",159 The Indian authorities must 
have realised that the formal wording of this proposal involved 
a concession to Russia of very doubtful value. The British 
were conceding nothing by refusing to support applications 
for commercial or industrial rights in northern Afghanistan, 
because they never supported applications for concessions 
in any part of the Amir's kingdom. No non-official European 
was permitted to cross the Indo-Afghan boundary unless he was 
an employee of the Amir; the Afghan government never granted 
commercial concessions to foreigners, and there was little 
in Afghanistan to attract the foreign investor, British-
Indian subjects were permitted free access to Afghanistan, 
but they were mostly petty merchants whose activities it 
would be impossible to restrict. The clause was designed 
principally to convince the Russian public that some quid 
159• Quoted in Lamb, op.cit., Vol,II, Chapter 25, 
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pro guo had been granted by Britain, The Indian authorities 
accepted the initial Russian formula with only one change, 
which involved a preliminary declaration that "The Imperial 
Russian Government affirms afresh its adherence to the 
principle that Afghanistan remains outside the sphere of 
Russian political influence",160 
Further examination of the problem, however, began to 
convince those concerned that all was not as easy as it 
seemed, The Amir had rigidly refused to give his formal 
assent to the 1907 convention, and it was unlikely that he 
would accept any addition to it; however harmless its wording, 
The likelihood of his opposition was still further increased 
when the British began to consider what Sazonov meant by 
"northern Afghanistan", It would be unsafe to leave the area 
undefined; on the other hand, any definition of a line dividing 
"northern" from "southern" Afghanistan would strengthen 
Afghan fears that their country was to be partitioned, Such 
a definition would have to be kept secret, and the published 
clause itself would need to be discussed with the Amir before 
the British could give their assent to it, This programme 
was hardly acceptable to Sazonov, who was principally 
concerned to impress the Russian public with his firmness, 
160, F,D,, S,F,Oct,l914, Enclosure No,l, in No,82, This 
declaration hardly accorded with some of the implications of 
the rest of the proposed clause - unless the word "political" 
had some special significance in this context, 
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and gained nothing towards this end if the definition of 
"northern Afghanistan" remained unpublished,161 
Nor was the task of defining "northern Afghanistan" an 
easy one, The British proposed a dividing line which left 
the eastern end of the Russo-Afghan frontier at Ishkashim; 
passed along the northern glacis of the Hindu Kush range 1 and 
then followed the crest of the Paropamisus mountains north of 
the Hari Rud valley to the trijunction of the Afghan, Russian 
and Persian frontiers at Zulfikar,162 Such a line was 
unacceptable to Sazonov, who could hardly forget that the 
complaints he had voiced in 1912 principally concerned the 
waters of the Hari Rud, The division proposed by Britain 
excluded from "northern Afghanistan" the whole of the Hari 
Rud valley, and, as Sazonov claimed:-
the Hari Rud being one of the most important arteries, 
from the point of view of the irrigation of the 
cultivated lands in the Province of Transcaspia, the 
Imperial Government attaches the greatest importance 
to the equitable division of the water of this river 
between the two countries, and would like to be certain 
that any irrigation works in Afghan territory would 
not entail the diminution of the quantity of water in 
the lower part of this river,l6J 
The British were anxious for strategic reasons to exclude 
the city of Herat from the area defined as "northern 
161, Lamb, op.cit,, Vol,II, Chapter 25, 
162, F,D,, S,F,Oct,19l4 1 Note to No.79• 
in puce on the map appearing as Appendix 
This line is shown 
J4. 
163, F,D,, S,F,Oct,l9l4 1 Enclosure No,2 in No,82, 
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Afghanistan", and refused to give way on this point, 
Buchanan suggested to Grey that he should separate the 
questions of irrigation and other commercial concessions, 
by promising not to support applications by British subjects 
for irrigation rights on the Hari Rud (or such other rivers 
as Sazonov might name) and by undertaking not to apply for 
concessions of other types in that part of the country which 
the Government of India had defined as "northern Afghanistan", 
As Buchanan pointed out:-
By treating the question of irrigation works 
separately, without any definition of the area in 
which they are situated, we get over the difficulty 
of having to make a special arrangement about the 
Hari Rud as lying outside the area which we wish to 
ascribe to the term "Northern Afghanistan",164 
Although Buchanants sensible proposals were taken up on 
a later occasion, 165 they were either ignored or rejected by 
his superiors on this one, and the Anglo-Russian disagreement 
about the definition of "northern Afghanistan" effectively 
prevented the acceptance by Russia of the alterations to the 
1907 convention which the British proposed, The St,Petersburg 
discussions petered out in the middle of June 1914; McMahon 
initialled an agreement with the Tibetans on J July which, 
while it provided for the temporary visit to Lhasa of the 
166 British agent at Gyantse, was unaccepted by both the 
164. 
165. 
166, 
Ibid,, No ,82, 
See infra, p • 167. 
See Lamb, op,cit., Vol.II, Appendix 17, Article VIII, 
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Russian and Chinese governments as well as the India Office;6 7 
The whole problem was forgotten; and for obvious reasons, 
during the following August, 
14. The significance of the 1914 discussions, 
Judged from this distance in time, the Anglo-Russian 
negotiations of 1914 have an element of the absurd. Men like 
McMahon who had spent a lifetime in India continued to argue 
over diplomatic niceties in central Asia while the whole 
fabric of international politics on which they based their 
assumptions was in imminent danger of collapse, They negotia-
ted with Russia about commercial rights in a country with no 
European entrepreneurs and few commercial possibilities. 
The abortive Tibet convention gathered dust in the archives 
for almost forty years until the communist Chinese invasion 
of Tibet rescued it from a deserved oblivion, 
No intelligent and honest man could have negotiated the 
proposed emendation to the Anglo-Russian agreement on Afghani-
stan without admitting its absurdity. Sazonov, Grey, Buchanan 
and McMahon were certainly intelligent, but honest only in 
private. Both sides took the proposed clause about commercial 
rights in Afghanistan seriously for a reason which they 
dared not announce in public for fear of the Afghan reaction, 
That reason was explained succinctly by the Indian commander-
167, Ibid,, Vol,II, Chapter 25 • 
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in-chief General Sir Beauchamp Duff when he admitted that:-
Standing by itself, a mere self denying declaration 
that we will not support any concessions for British 
subjects in Northern Afghanistan has practically no 
military bearing, but it seems possible that it may be 
used against us in the future as a basis for the 
division of Afghanistan into Russian and Indian spheres 
of influence or even eventually of partition. Thus it 
becomes necessary to point out the military danger of 
allowing to Russia any claim, however shadowy, to a 
certain part of the crest of the Hindu Kush,l68 
The same point was put in gentler fashion by the Indian 
government,'s deputy Foreign Secretary Hamilton Grant, and 
amply explains the Foreign Department's reluctance to include 
Herat within "northern Afghanistan":-
It is essential to exclude Herat and its neighbourhood 
[Grant wrote] [since] ••• it might prove practically 
embarrassing to us in the future, We cannot foresee 
the future. But in the event of a general break up in 
Afghanistan, we might require to construct railways 
on the Herat side for strategic reasons, In any case 
it would be a mistake to accept a self-denying ordinance 
as regards Herat,l69 
It is likely that a similar view was taken on the Russian 
side, While the internal minutes of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry are not available for inspection, the wording of 
Sazonov,'s formal proposals to Buchanan is nevertheless instruc-
tive. Sazonov had originally proposed that Britain should not 
support claims by British sub,jects in northern Afghanistan; 
when stating his reasons for wishing to see the Hari Rud 
included within that area, however, he mentioned his 
168, F,D,, S.F.Oct,l9l4, Note to No,79• 
169. ~· 
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objections to "any irrigation works within Afghan territory"~70 
Here was an indication that the activities of Afghans in 
the north of their country, as well as those of the mythical 
British entrepreneurs; were to be placed under Russian control, 
and that Russia aimed to exercise in the area the sort of 
hegemony which she already enjoyed in Persia, 
The very fact that the Government of India had by l9l4 
considered even the vague possibility of a partition of 
Afghanistan represented a revolutionary change of the attitudes 
of 1905, When the first world war broke out the convention 
of 1907 was almost seven years old. This experience had done 
little to convince the Foreign Department that that agreement 
was an effective one, but it had done much to alter their 
attitude towards an understanding with the northern power, 
Forced by their concern for Tibet to search for something 
with the appearance of a concession to Russia 7 they drew a 
line across Afghanistan which ten years earlier they would 
have considered unthinkable; Had the power politics of 
central Asia been allowed to develop in a vacuum, uninfluenced 
by the upheavals of European war, the British might well have 
partitioned Afghanistan with Russia, As it was, the long run 
effect of the 1914 discussions was a purely negative one, 
As an American scholar has written:- "With the conclusion 
of the entente in 1907 the Afghan question ceased to be an 
170, See supra, P• 155. 
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important factor in the relations of Great Britain and 
Russia",171 The present writer would dispute this contention 
that the Afghan problem ceased to be important to the great 
powers as from 1907: but would admit that it had begun to 
look much less important by 1914. The British and Russians 
spent much of the next eight years wondering about its import-
ance, and finally decided in the negative. But the fact that 
the British had revised their earlier belief that the mainte-
nance of a pro-British but independent Afghanistan was an 
axiom of Indian foreign policy meant that whatever settlement 
was eventually achieved, it was likely to be very different 
from that of 1880, 
The significance of this new situation was not lost on 
the Afghans themselves, While they knew nothing of the 
discussions of 1914 they had suspected ever since 1908 that 
an Anglo-Russian partition of their country was a live 
possibility,172 The news of the convention effectively 
crystallised Afghan opposition to the system of British 
control of their country's foreign relations, and altered 
Afghan attitudes towards the British agreements with ~Abdur 
Rahman much as it altered those of the Government of India, 
During his discussions with Dane of 1904-05 Habibullah had 
not questioned Britaints right to direct his country.1s 
171, Habberton, op.cit,, p,82, 
172, See supra 1 P•lJ2. 
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foreign policy, but once the events of 1907 and after had 
demonstrated that his acquiescence on this point could allow 
his neighbours to settle their differences without reference 
to himself, the Amir began to change his mind, When the 
opportunity to play off Britain and Russia against a third 
power presented itself, as it did in 1915, he seized it 
with alacrity. The nature of this opportunity can be 
explained only by reference to the events described in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AFGHANISTAN IN THE GREAT WAR 
1. Renewed Anglo-Russian negotiations on Afghanistan: 
1915. 
During the opening months of the great war it must 
have seemed unlikely that Afghanistan, remote and isolated 
as she was, would be swept into the struggle which now 
engaged her two powerful neighbours, or that her position 
in the world would be much affected by its outcome. Soon 
after the declaration of hostilities Amir Habibullah had 
informed the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, of his intention 
to maintain an attiutde of strict neutrality and in the 
early stages of the war internal opposition to his policy 
does not appear to have been very great. Even as the con-
flict wore on those in Afghanistan who read the news from 
abroad were struck with a sense of the country's isolation; 
as Jewett wrote: "this seems to be about the only quiet, 
peaceful and well-governed country 
Nevertheless, the relatively small 
1 left on the globe now." 
group of Afghan intell-
ectuals wrote of and discussed the great events taking 
place beyond their borders and with the break-up of the 
old empires of Europe and the middle east, they began to 
press their claim for the complete independence of their 
country. More important still was the effect of the 
war on the attitudes of the great powers, on which 
Afghanistan's position in the world largely depended. In 
the early years of the war Britain and Russia began to 
discuss the advantages they hoped to reap from victory, 
and the definition of British and Russian "spheres of 
influence" in Afghanistan almost became one of them; later 
events, the visit of a Turko-German mission to Kabul, and 
1, Jewett, op, cit,, P• 291. 
163 
above all the Russian revolution, forced allied policy 
into the opposite direction, and the conditions were 
created for British acceptance of Afghan demands for the 
cancellation of the agreements by which Britain had pre-
viously controlled the foreign affairs of Afghanistan, 
As has been noted, the Anglo-Russian convention had 
done something to undermine the basis of the system of 
British control, by debarring Russia from forming an 
alliance with the Amir directed against British India, The 
negotiations for the Tibet convention of 1914, by posing 
the possibility of an Anglo-Russian partition of Afghani-
stan as an alternative to an Anglo-Afghanmliance, had 
gone one step further in the same direction. The pro-
posals of 1914 rewarose in 1915, but in changed circumstances 
and in an indirect manner. A brief discussion of early 
allied plans for a post-war settlement is necessary by 
way of explanation. 
None of the combatants in the middle eastern theatre 
Germany, Turkey, Russia and Britain - had entered the 
struggle with any clear idea of their war aims. It was 
not until early 1915, when the British were formulating 
their plans for an attack on the straits, that the dis-
position of the territories of the Ottoman empire in the 
event o:f an allied victory began to be discussed. A 
surprisingly short exchange of correspondence between 
London and Petrograd resulted in the Constantinople agree-
ment, which allotted the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, 
Constantinople itself, southern Thrace and part of the 
Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus to the Russian empire. The 
Russian proposals on this subject had been accepted by 
Grey on 12 March 1915, 2 only eight days after they had 
2, Die Internationalen Beziehun en im Zeitalter des 
Imperialismus, , Vol, VII l , 
No. 352. 
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first been put in concrete form by Sazonov, 3 In informing 
Sazonov of the British acquiescence, Grey pointed out that 
the agreement "involves a complete reversal of the policy 
of His Majesty's Government and is in direct opposition 
to the opinions and sentiments at one time universally 
held in England and which have still by no means died out." 4 
Some British authorities evidently regarded this great 
sacrifice to Russian interests as a golden opportunity to 
obtain concessions from the Tsarist government which 
would secure for the British a dominating position in 
each of the areas of Anglo-Russian rivalry further east 
- in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, British acquiescence 
in Russian control of the straits was also expected to 
alter the basis of Russia's attitude towards the British 
power in Asia, in a way that the 1907 convention had not.5 
At the same time the India Office doubted the advisability 
of pressing Russia for a definite agreement on the allot~ 
ment of the spoils of war when the issue of that war was 
still in doubt. 6 In acceding to the Russian demand for 
Constantinople, therefore, Grey emphasised that he was 
"unable to make any definite proposal on any point of the 
British desiderata", but indicated that among the British 
cocmter-demands was the transfer to the British zone of 
the n~al zone in Persia which had been established by 
the convention of 1907. 
While Sazonov was anxious to emphasise his govern~ 
mentis gratitude for what he must have realised was a very 
great concession by Britain in the straits, he was not 
prepared to wait until after the end of the war for a 
J, Un Livre Noir, Vol,III, pp.l22w2J, 
4, I.B., Vol, VI (1), No, 352, 
5. See India Office Records, Political and External Files, 
(hereinafter "P,E.F. 11 ), 1912, Vol. LXXXII, and F.D., S.W. 
Mar, 1917, No. 568. 
6. P,E,F, 1912, Vol, LXXXII p 2 
' . . 
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general moratorium on Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, as 
some authorities in London had hoped. The Russian govern-
ment, while willing to transfer to Britain the bulk of the 
netural Persian zone, wished to include a part of it, 
which included an area near the junction of the Russian, 
Persian and Afghan frontiers near Zulfikar, within its own 
"sphere of influence 11 • 7 Sazonov further took advantage 
of the Russian concessions to British interests in 
Persia to press for the assertion by Britain of her lack 
of interest in northern Afghanistan which had been dis-
cussed the previous year in connection with the abortive 
Tibet convention, 8 
Soon after the delivery of Sazonovts memorandum of 
4 March the London Foreign Office and the India Office 
had begun to prepare a formula to deal with northern 
Afghanistan which would meet Russian demands and still 
prove acceptable to the Indian government, The problems 
inherent in this task were obvious, On the one hand, 
Britain had to give an undertaking not to support 
commercial, and in particular irrigational activities in 
northern Afghanistan by British subjects, and to give it 
in a form sufficiently definite to convince Russia that 
7. I,B., Vol, VII(l), No, 400. The Russian claim to 
Zulfikar is mentioned specifically because control of 
that area by Russia might have affected Russian relations 
with Afghanistan. In 1918, after the publication by the 
Bolshevik government of the wartime Anglo-Russian corres-
pondence, the Siraj-ul-Akhbar (Vol.VI, No,ll) printed 
the following abstract of Sazonov 1 s request:-
"Afghanistan. It is desired that the place known 
as Zulfikar with its surrounding territory should be in-
cluded in the Russian sphere of influence," 
This abstract carries the implication that the allies 
intended to create in Afghan terri tory a Russian 11 sphere of 
inf:luence 11 similar to that which the great powers had 
created in Persia, From the slight evidence to hand, this 
implication does not seem altogether correct, and it 
appears more likely that Sazonov meant to refer to "its 
surrounding territory" within Persia. /(8) 
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Britain was leaving herself no loopholes by confining 
herself to imprecise generalities, This resurrected the 
problem presented by the Russian demand for the inclusion 
of the Hari Rud within the area defined as "northern 
Afghanistan" which had bogged down the 1914 discussions 
even after they had been rendered pointless by the 
Chinese refusal to sign the Tibet convention, On the 
other hand it was realised that, should news of the Anglo-
Russian discussions ever reach Amir Habibullah 1 s ears, it 
would almost certainly have disastrous effects upon his 
attitude of friendly neutrality. The effect in Kabul of 
the publication of the 1907 convention had been bad 
enough, and greater fears had been held in 1914 about the 
possibility of Habibullah's hearing of the proposed dis-
claimer of British interest in northern Afghanistan which 
had then been discussed, because it carried the implica~ 
tion that the great powers were planning to partition 
the Amir 1 s kingdom. The consequences of the re~opening 
of the question in wartime, when Habibullah was believed 
to be hard put to it to control those elements within his 
country who were hostile to the allies, was rightly ex-
pected to be still worse, The India Office realised, 
moreover, that even if Britain and her allies gained a 
sweeping victory over the central powers, there was a 
powerful moral argument against treating Afghanistan in 
what was, to say the least, an offhand manner. Britain 
claimed she had gone to war in 1914 to protect a small, 
neutral country in Europe, and she could hardly exploit 
her victory at the expense of a small, neutral country in 
Asia. 
The Government of India had been asked for their 
opinions on the Russian proposals at an early stage of the 
(8} I,B,, Vol. VII (l), Nos. 369 and 400. 
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negotiations, and the Delhi authorities had of course 
raised all these objections to a complete acceptance of 
the formula proposed by Russia, 9 The Viceroy, Lord 
Hardinge, had additionally emphasised the futility of 
making any arrangements about "commercial rights" in a 
country where all foreign entrepreneurs were rigorously 
lO 
excluded by the local government. It was largely on 
the advice of the Indian government that the problem re-
presented by the Russian demand that the Hari Rud be 
included in the zone of "northern Afghanistan", which 
had led to the failure of the Anglo-Russian negotiations 
of l9l4, was tackled in l9l5 along the lines which 
Buchanan had suggested during the previous year, but which 
had not been put to the Russian government in the course 
f th l · t · t · ll Th . . l f th. o e ear 1er nego 1a 10ns, e pr1nc1p e o lS 
second approach was that "northern Afghanista.ri' should be 
defined in terms of certain rivers, in the waters of 
which Russia claimed she was specially interested, rather 
than as a territorial zone the definition of which had 
raised so many difficulties during the previous discussions, 
The British undertaking was thus limited to the irrigation 
question, and did not offer any of the concessions to 
Russia in the fields of railway construction and general 
commerce which Sazonov had requested, 
The engagement which Britain offered to Sazonov in 
the summer of l9l5 was. therefore a very guarded one, It 
required Russia to re-affirm that Afghanistan lay outside 
her "sphere of influence" and stated that the British 
government would be willing to do its best to secure 
9. P,E.F. l9l2, Vol. LXXXII, Appendix B, Nos, l and 2, 
lO. Ibid., No, 2. 
ll. F,D,, S.F, Oct. l9l4, No, 82 and Note to No. 79. 
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Afghan agreement to the appointment, after the war, of a 
technical commission "to ascertain hydrographic conditions 
and irrigg.tional needs in these limitrophe regions," The 
British formula added that the commission thus established 
would not be permitted to question the Afghan water rights 
which had been laid down by the boundary commission of 
1884-85, and concluded by stressing that Afghanistan and 
Russia were both free to accept or to reject the hydro-
logical commission's findings, as they sawfit. 12 
It was only with difficulty that the Indian 
government accepted this proposal, limited as it was, 
Their agreHment to it was based "on the distinct under-
standing that it is to be absolutely secret until some 
time after the conclusion of the war, If the Amir were 
given reason to think now that we were arranging with 
Russia to interfere as soon as the war was over with 
internal irrigation arrangements in Afghanistan his 
liveliest suspicions would be aroused, and it is quite 
possible that this might induce him to give way to surround-
ing influences and abandon his attitude of neutrality." 
The Indian authorities emphasised that under the terms 
of the British formula the Amir was still free to reject 
the proposed commission, and expected that he would 
almost certainly do so if Afghan interests were in any 
way damaged by its decisions. The Government of India may 
have hoped to use the Amir 1 s refusal to cooperate as a 
reason fc·r denying Russia the advantagess she was to be 
promised in this wartime agreement. They were prepared 
to accept the formula proposed only 11 in order ••.•• to 
silence Russian demands for the present,"lJ 
12, See Appendix 7• 
lJ. P.E.F. 1912, Vol. LXXXII, Appendix B, No. 4. 
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The unavailability of the Foreign Office records 
makes it impossible to trace the progress of the 1915 
negotiations beyond this point, In 1918 the Bolshevik 
government published correspondence from the Tsarist 
archives relating to the Constantinople agreement, 14 and 
some contemporary commentators seem to have assumed that 
the concessions in northern Afghanistan which Russia had 
requested had actually been agreed to by the British 
government. This was denied by the India Office. The 
Under-Secretary of State for India, Lord Islington, 
admitted in early 1918 that the Russian government had 
asked for the transfer of Zulfikar to the Russian "sphere 
of influence" in Persia, but he claimed that 11 The proposal, 
had it been carried out, would not have affected Afghan 
territorial interests" and that "His Majesty's Government 
never found occasion to reply to the Russian Memorandum 
nor were the propsals contained therein discussed between 
the two Governments. 111 5 He conceded that Sazonov had 
"also suggested the proper settlement of certain proposals 
for improving the irrigation of Russian territory adjoin~ 
ing Afghanistan which had been made by the Russian 
16 Government before the war". He added, however, that 
"These proposals never came to a head and could not have 
been carried into effect without the Amir's consent. No 
proposal which affected the territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan has been made either in the memorandum or 
elsewhere." 
14. See The Times, 25.11.1917, and Manchester Guardian, 
22.2.1918. 
15. F.D., S.F. Oct. 1920, Nos,l064-1126, Notes p.90. If 
Islington referred to the Sazonov memorandum of 4 March 
1915, then his claim was obviously false, since that mem-
orandum formed the basis of the Constantinople agreement, 
which was both discussed and assented to. His statement 
implies that it was the status of Zulfikar which was never 
discussed by the two governments. 
/(16) 
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It is not difficult to imagine why the Russian 
Foreign Ministry should have rejected the British formula 
on northern Afghanistan, as they presumably did, The 
India Office realised that the Tsarist government might 
object to the limitation of the British undertaking to 
irrigational arrangements, when they had originally 
demanded a general disclaimer of British interest in all 
commercial activities in northern Afghanistan. The 
British may also have realised that their insistence on 
Amir Habibullah's right to refuse to cooperate in the 
formation of the proposed commission was hardly likely to 
make the scheme ,,very attractive to the Russian authorities. 
It seems possible that, in the final event, the Russian 
government regarded the control of the straits which 
they had already been offered as a suitable guid pro quo 
for the transfer of the Persian neutral zone to Britain, 
and that the discussion of Russian claims in northern 
Afghanistan was effectively dropped after the failure of 
the Dardanelles campaign in December 1915, 17 
(16) ~· Islington's claim was not strictly correct. 
Sazonov 1 s memorandum, as Islington here mentioned, pro-
posed that the question of northern Afghanistan be re-
opened "in the spirit of the wishes expressed by the 
Imperial Government in the course of the pourparlers of 
the previous year". It will be remembered that the 
Russian proposals of 1914 related to commercial activllies 
in general, and it was the British who restricted them 
to the irrigation question, and that only in 1915, 
17. Strength is added to this conclusion by the fact 
that the published Russian archives contain no further 
mention of Anglo-Russian negotiations over northern 
Afghanistan, although further references to the general 
Afghan situation do occur, 
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Whatever the final outcome of such discussions as 
may have taken place, the nature of the engagement 
Britain undertook illustrated the important changes which 
the great war had brought in the general field of Anglo-
Afghan relations, In 1907 Nicolson 1 s original proposal 
that the Amir 1 s consent would be required before the 
British and Russian plenipotentiaries could sign the 
Anglo-Russian convention had eventually been overridden, 
and the signed convention had been submitted to the Amir 
as a fait accompli. The Kabul government's amour propre 
had been injured, but the fact that the Amir had objected 
to the convention had not prevented the Russian govern-
ment from accepting it. In 1914, again, the Indian 
government had proposed to inform the Amir of the clauses 
of the Tibet convention which referred to Afghanistan 
before they were published, but their approach was intended 
as an explanation of an agreement already reached, not as 
an invitation to discuss that agreement or to alter it to 
meet Afghan objections. No policy had been framed to 
deal with possible disapproval from the Afghan side, 
and there was no very obvious way in which opposition 
from Kabul, however violent, could have affected the 
agreement which the great powers were to have reached. 
In 1915, however, the possibility of a wave of Muslim 
fellow-feeling sweeping the supposedly fanatical Afghans 
into the great war on the Turkish side had enhanced 
immensely the value to British India of a friendly 
Afghanistan. The Indian army was too preoccupied elseN 
where to deal effectively with the uprisings on the north-
west frontier which Habibullah could easily have produced 
if he had become suspicious of British intentions. The 
Indian government's principal concern, through most of 
the war, was to keep the Amir in a favourable frame o.f 
mind by a mixture of bribes and flattery, and any 
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suspicion on his part that the allies meant to expJoit 
victory at his expense would have more than destroyed the 
good impression which the Government of India meant to 
create. The limitation of the British proposals of 1915 
to the irrigation question was largely due to the need 
to avoid the definition of a line dividing "northern" 
from "southern" Afghanistan, which was expected to arouse 
fears of partition on Habibullah 1 s part; the fact that it 
avoided the problem created by the Russian demand for the 
inclusion of Hari Rud in "northern Afghanistan" was 
simply an :incidental advantage, Moreover, the proposals of 
1915 were made far more dependent on the consent and co~ 
operation of the Afghan government than the convention of 
1907 or the proposed agreement of 1914, It was clear 
that Afghanistan was the gainer from the involvement of her 
neighbours in the great war; the next four years were to 
bring further proof of the importance of this situation. 
2. Turko-German aims and Afghan reactions. 
From the allied point of view, the most immediately 
disturbing feature of this new state of affairs was the 
active intervention of the central powers in Persia and 
Afghanistan. In Persia, Turkish and German agents 
worked for an internal revolution which would prepare the 
way for a Perso-German alliance; in Afghanistan they 
attempted to persuade the existing government to undertake 
a war against Britain and Russia, There is no space or 
intention here to enter into the story of these operations 
in their full detail, 18 Suffice it to say that the exe-
cution of this programme was seriously hampered by Turko-
Garman rivalry, and that, by 1915, by virtue of their 
superior military and :financial resources, the Germans 
18. German activities in Persia are in any case very 
well covered by Dr. Ulrich Gehrke's Persien in der 
deutschen Orientpolitik (2 vols.). 
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were able to exercise a general control over the opera-
tion. Scrutiny of the German Foreign Office records 
would also suggest that, because of the Germans' general 
lack of knowledge and experience of conditions in Persia 
and Afghanistan, many executive mistakes were made and the 
aims of various operations were often ill-defined. There 
were several missions, organised by Germany and Turkey 
separately, and in conjunction, which had as their aim 
the forging of a link between the central powers and 
Afghanistan. Only two need concern us here, since they 
were the only ones which succeeded in reaching their 
desti.nation. 
Of these the first seems to have been a relatively 
small-scale undertaking planned and executed in its 
entirety from the Turkish side. The Turkish commander 
Enver Pasha had suggested the opening of contacwwith 
Amir Habibullah, of whose power and devotion to the pan-
Islamic cause he seems to have held somewhat exaggerated 
notions, even before Turkey entered the great war at the 
end of October 1914. 1 9 A Turkish agent was subsequently 
despatched to Afghanistan through the Turkish embassy 
in Tehran. He was to present a ceremonial sword to the 
Amir, as a symbol of the ,iehad which Turkey had proclaimed, 
together with letters from the Sultan, in the hope of 
winning over Habibullah to the Turkish side through a 
sense of religious community. 20 The Turkish emissary 
1L9.' Gehrke, op. cit,, Vol. I, p. 23. See the German 
Foreign Office records, series 11 Unternehmungen und 
Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere Feinde in Afghanistan und 
Persien", Vol,I, These were consulted in microfilm form, 
as held by the Public Record Office, London; reel GFM 
14/139, frames 449-56. (References to this series will 
hereinafter appear in abbreviated form. The above re-
ference would b~come "Unternehmungen, Vol,I: GFM 14/139, 
F. 449-56.) 
20. W.-o. von Hentig, Ins verschlossene Land, p.ll, and 
Unternehmungen, Vol.I Wangenheim to German Foreign Office, 
(hereinafter "A,A."), 30,8.14: GFM 14/139 F,473• 
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penetrated only as far as Herat, from where he appears 
to have had some exchange of correspondence with the 
Am . 21 J.r, 
The second mission was itself composed of two 
groups who had originally been sent separately by 
different authorities. The first section of this second 
expedition had been planned initially by Enver Pasha in 
the August of 1914, and was intended as a principally 
Turkish operation to which a limited number of German 
officers were to be attached, 22 Its aims were ill~defined, 
but probably incJ.uded the general promotion of unrest 
and the spreading of pan~Islamic propaganda in Persia 
and Afghanistan, By the time the joint expedition reached 
Baghdad in February 1915 leadership of the German par~ 
ticipants had devolved upon Oberleutnant Oskar von 
Niedermayer, an enterprising Bavarian geologist who was 
the only member of the expedition with first-hand know-
ledge of the appFoaches to Afghanistan through eastern 
Persia. Rauf Bey, formerly recognised as leader of the 
"Turkish Afghanistan-Expedition", told Niedermayer in 
Baghdad that the Turkish expedition had been abandoned, 2J 
Niedermayer refused to accept this as the final word on 
central powers activities in Afghanistan, and in March 
21. There seems to be some doubt about when this 
exchange took place. . Hentig ( op, cit., p~· ll) would seem 
to place .it around the beginning of 1915, On the other 
hand, the A.A. archives contain a telegram dated October 
1915, in which the recent return of the emissary is des .. 
cribed, (Unternehmungen, Vol~' XXII, Turkish ambassador 
in Tehran to Turkish Foreign Ministry, 14,10,15: GFM 14/141, 
F.J95-96). Unternehmungen,Vol,' IX, Wangenheim to A,A,, 
26.2,15: GFM 14/140, F,J56 indicates that the emissary 
left Constantinople in December 1914, and there is nothing 
to contradict this. 
22. Gehrke, op. cit., Vol.I, p.2J. 
23. 0, von Niedermayer, Unter der Glutsonne Irans, p.26. 
The writer is much indebted to Dr. Richard Niedermayer 
for the gift of a copy of his father's book, 
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he proceeded to Persia as leader of a German expedition, 
to which a few Turkish officers were attached in a 
supporting capacity, German and Turkish roles had thus 
been effectively reversed within a few months,' 
For all the discussions which the despatch of 
Niedermayer 1 s mission had involved, there seems to have 
been no clear decision as to the nature of his duties 
in Afghanistan, While Niedermayer was still in Baghdad 
in February 1915, however, the German Foreign Office 
decided on the despatch of a second group, of a more 
specifically diplomatic character, which was intended 
to join Niedermayer's party in an advance to Afghanistan. 24 
The initiative for this new programme appears to have 
come from Raja Mahendra Pratap, one of several Indians 
of the "Indian Revolutionary Committee" who were at that 
time in Berlin, and who had proposed to the Foreign 
Office that he be sent as head of a mission to Afghanistan, 
which was to include his colleague Maulawi Barkatullah, 
"a few German and Turkish officers", and a guard of 
Indian soldiers, volunteers from German prison camps. 25 
Pratap requested a letter of introduction from the German 
Foreign Ministry to Amir Habibullah, as well as letters 
from the German government to the rulers of the princely 
states of India, calling upon them to rise against the 
British and promising unspecified German support, The 
aim, optimistic as it was, was to draw the Amir into 
action against the British, and to produce a revolution 
in India in the joint interests of the central powers and 
the Indian revolutionary committee. The requested letters 
24. Gehrke, op, cit., Vol., I, PP•' 146-47. 
25. Unternehmun en, Vol., VIII, Memo by Pratap, 20.2,15: 
GFM 14 1'.<0, F.29 -97• 
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26 
were duly produced by the German government, but the 
Berlin Foreign Office was evidently unwilling to play 
the limited part in the operation to which the Indian 
committee had putatively assigned it, As chief repre-
sentative of Germany and leader of the mission t~ey 
appointed Dr,' Werner-Otto von Hentig, a career diplomat 
who had been Legationssekret~r (third secretary) at the 
German embassy in Tehran before the outbreak of war.~ 27 
Hentig was intructed to open diplomatic contact with the 
Amir, and to support Pratap in his work of promoting 
revolution in India, 28 Hentig, Pratap and Barkatullah 
left Berlin towards the end"of April 1915, 2 9 
Although Hentig and Niedermayer haddfferent duties, 
it was as' a result of physical ne cess;i. ty as much as any-
thing else that the two German parties, with their Turkish, 
Indian and Austrian followers, met near Tabas in central 
Persia, in July 1915, and proceeded to Afghanistan as a 
single group. 30 The British made no move to prevent 
their passage into Afgha:t:istan until about the same time; 
partly perhaps, because they did not believe that the 
26, See Appendix 8, Copies of the letters are preserved 
in the A,A, volume "Entwtlrfen von allerhtlchst. Handschreiben 
an den Emir von Af hanistan und an indische Ftlrsten", 
GFM 14 142, F.l74 et seg. , The letter to the Maharajah 
of Nepal went so far as to claim that Habibullah had al-
ready "placed himself on the side of Germany, Austria-, -
Hungary and Turkey, and drawn sword to hurl the enemies 
of India to the ground", an event which the German Foreign 
Office could not possibily have predicted when the letter 
was written and which certainly failed to eventuate. 
(Ibid., F,l89). None of the letters to the Indian princes 
appear to have reached their intended recipients, 
27, See his autobiography, Mein Leben eine Dienstreise, 
pp.21-88, 
28, See Appendix 9. 
29, Hentig, Ins verschlossene Land, pp,ll-:}.2, and ~ 
Leben, p, 98, 
JO, Niedermayer, op. cit,, P• 88, 
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presence of a German mission in Kabul would make any sub-
stantial difference to the situation there. As Hamilton 
Grant, deputy Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 
had remarked in November 191~: "If the Amir is with us, 
they will not be welcome and will be sent back, If he is 
against us, the fat will already be in the fire,"3l To 
the British authorities' disbelief in the effective im-
portance of the mission was added their unwillingness to 
infringe Persian neutrality by the direct military inter-
vention on Persian soil which the arrest of the German 
parties would have involved. They were prepared to leave 
this task to Russian forces based on Meshed, in the ex-
pectation, justified in the event, that the Persian 
government would fail to prevent the passage of the 
mission through their territory. Although the Indian 
Foreign Department had by July 1915 swung round to the 
opinion that "It is •••• of greatest importance that no 
German party should be permitted to enter Afghanistan",32 
the India Office still insisted that 11 in no circumstances" 
were British troops to operate in eastern Persia, 33 It 
was not until the very end of July that the Indian 
government sent a small force north-west from Robat, on 
the Indo-Persian frontier, By then, as the Foreign 
Department admitted to the Amir, it was too late to stop 
the He:ritig-Niedermayer party, which was correctly pre-
dicted to cross the Afghan-Persian border near Birjand, 34 
As it was, the German mission reached Afghan territory 
on 21 August, 3 5 and, after an enthusiastic reception in 
Herat, crossed the Hazarajat to arrive in Kabul at the 
end of September. 36 
31. F.D., S-eW. Nov. 1915, Note to No, 
32. F .D., s.w. Jan. 1916, No, 48. 
33· Ibid. , No, 62. 
34. F.D;., SeW • Feb, 1916, No. 10. 
35· Unternehrnungen, Vol, XXIV, report 
of 21,8.15: GFM 14/141, F.430. 
221. 
from Niedermayer 
/(36). 
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The Amir watched closely the approach of the German 
mission and the British reaction to it. His attitude was 
compounded of his natural desire to gain as much as 
possible for himself an.d his country from this new situa-
tion, his annoyance at the conclusion of the 1907 conven-
tion and his probably genuine feeling of friendship for 
the British officials whom he had met during his visit 
to India. He could hardly forget that many Afghans were 
less anglophilic than himself. Two powerful groups 
opposed his generally cautious attitude - the Pashtun 
chieftains of the Anglo-Afghan frontier and the educated 
Kabulis whom his own modernisation programme had produced, 
We have seen that the Amir refused to support the Mahsud 
tribesmen who rose against the British in 1917,37 This 
policy of restraint was undertaken only after the Amir 
had carefully sounded the reactions of the tribesmen to 
his declaration of neutrality. In February 1916, during 
the German mission's stay in Kabul, he summoned to the 
capital a large number of tribal representatives, 38 to 
whom he delivered a lengthy harangue emphasising his 
determination to maintain Afghanistan's neutrality so long 
(36) Hentig, Ins verschlossene Land, P• 77. Accounts of 
the mission's reception in Herat vary according to the 
source, British or German, 
37• See supra,p,87, 
38. Siraj-ul-Akhbar, Vol. v, No.l2. This assembly may 
be compared to the modern Loya Jirgah, a mass assembly of . 
representatives from all over the country, elected accord-
ing to no regularised system which, until the constitution 
of 1965 formalised its status, was called at irregular 
intervals between 1924 and 1965 to discuss issues of 
special national importance, The writer considered in-
cluding a discussion of the status and powers of the Loya 
Jirgah in chapter I of his thesis, but abandoned the idea 
because he found it very di:t'ficult to give the definitions 
involved, and because the incident mentioned above re-
presents the sole occasion in.Habibullah 1 s reign when an 
assembly resembling the Loya Jirgah was called, The term 
is not generally used in tll'Lil contex!; in contemporary 
sources. 
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as circumstances permitted, 39 In the event, the meeting 
served only as a means of publicising Habibullah's views, 
but Habibullah evidently expected that if the delegates 
were strongly opposed to them they would make their objec-
tions known to the assembly. No voices of dissent were 
publicly raised, and this must have fortified the Amir 
with the knowledge that his refusal to declare jehad 
against the British had not placed his throne in immediate 
danger, Nasrullah 1 s opposition to his brother remained 
the principal obstacle to the general acceptance by the 
tribesmen of Habibullah 1 s cautious policy, 
Malli~ud Tarzi was more open in his espousal of a 
policy which conflicted with that of the Amir. In August 
1914 Sira,i ... ul-Akhbar welcomed Afghanistan's neutrality, 
but emphasised the dangers of the Anglo-Russian alliance 
which, Tarzi maintained "will give rise to apprehensions 
about our very existence," 40 There is no evidence that 
Tarzi then knew anything about the Constantinople agree-
ment or its implications, but he had correctly guessed 
a contemporary trend in allied policy. The entry of 
Turkey into the war changed his latent mistrust of British 
intentions into open advocacy of a Turko-Afghan alliance, 
By the winter of 1915-16 articles attacking the British 
frequently appeared in the pages of Sira,i~ul-Akhbar, 
and the news of the Arab revolt later gave rise to 
fears that the British had induced the Sharif to surren-
der tothe allies the holy places of Arabia. 41 
The Viceroy's government attempted to prevent 
39· Ibid., Vol, V, No, 16. 
40. ~·, Vol, IV, No, 2. 
41. Ibid., Vol. V, No. 22. 
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the circulation of the paper in India, and instructed 
Habibullah to forbid the publication of anti-British 
articles; 42 the Amir assured the Viceroy that Tarzi had 
been warned to adopt a more :noderate tone and (according 
to the British agent) had one issue burned in toto 
before distribution. 43 It was not until the end of 
l9l7, however, that Tarzi abandoned his strong pro-
Turkish stand, and by then he had become more interested 
in the probable tc3rms of the post-war settlement and 
44 its effects on Afghanista.n, 
Habibullah tried to avoid insulting the British, but 
he was equally anxious to receive Turkish and German 
approaches in a reasonable friendly spirit. The basis 
of his policy had be<>Cl <expressed in the reply he had 
sent to the Turkish emissary who had reaGhed Herat: 
In this great wa.r, in whic'1 all the European 
powers are i~Tvolv•3d, [there is J no final res·tJ.lt. 
I am waiting for a good opportunity, and it is 
well possible that wwh [an opportunity J may 
occur. I am making all necessary preparations. 
As soon as a good opportunity offers, I will 
naturally fulfil my Islamic duty. I will not 
allow myse.lf to be cursed throughout the 
Muslim world,45 
To the British he naturally exhibited··· less enthusiasm for 
the central powers, explaining his neutrality in terms of 
loyalty to the Indian government rather than politi.cal 
opport:.:misra. 1varned by Lord Hardinge of the appraoch of 
the German party, ru"d advised by the Viceroy to disarm 
and intern his visitors until the end of the war, he 
replied that the German mission: 
42, F.D., S,F, Oct. 1920, Nos. 1064 and 1067. 
4J, IbiQ.; No. l070 and Nos. l064-ll26, Notes p. 2J, 
44. See infra, pp,20J-04, 
45, Unternehmungen, Vol, XXII, Turkish ambassador in 
Tehran to Turkish Foreign Ministry, 4.10.15: GFM l4/l4l, 
F.J95• 
can in no way interfere with the neutrality 
of Afghanistan, since full instructions have 
been issTted by me., Should t:he parties in 
quest_Lon enter Afghanistan they will be 
disarmed at once. I assure Your Excellency 
and the Great British Government of the 
neutrality of Afghanistan during the peeddTt 
war,46 
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Later, after the mission had arrived in Herat, he explained 
to the Indian government that: 
the Governor of Herat "'ill, please God, send 
them to me, as directed. When they arrive 
in my presence they will of course give vent 
to the feelings and ideas concealed and re-
posed in their minds, and I shall understand 
and know what they have to say and what their 
intentions are. In any circumstances and in 
any case Yotlr Excellency may rest assured 
that ••••• the entry of this party into the 
territory of t~1e sab.lime God .... granted Gover:lment 
of Afghanistan and the revea_lr.1<3_:lt of what :i·< 
in their minds tv:Lll, God willing, have no 
detrimental effect whatev·e.r on the attitude of 
neutrality of the sublime God-granted Govern-
ment of Afghanistan,47 
J. Repercussions on British policy. 
In admitting to the Viceroy that he did :noi; 3Jttce•ul 
to dismiss the German miss_icnl unheard 1 Habil:r:1l.l<l~J. 
effe<>tlvely pointed out that in the circumstances the 
British were virtually powerless to enforce their mono-
poly of Afghanistan's foreign relat:tons. That monopoly 
had been accepted in principle since 1880, but it had 
never been tested in practice for the simple reason 
that since that time no third power had seriously tried 
to break it by the despatch of a diplomatic mission to 
Kabul, The only way in which Britain could enforce her 
46. F.D., S.W, Feb, 1916, No. 67, Postscript in 
Habibullah 1 s own hand. 
47. Ibid., No. 235. 
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treatyrights, in the last resort, was to launch an open 
military invasion of the country, and this was an opera-
tion which the British were unable to undertake in 1915 
since their troops were already heavily committed in the 
48 
middle eastern theatre of the great war. The British 
were further hemmed in by their determination to prevent 
their Russian allies from using the German intervention 
ia Afghanistan as an exc·;..1se for interventio~'l fr~_n the 
aorth. The Russian consul-general in India later told 
his government in the summer of 1915 that: 
I have come to the conclusion that the Govern-
ment of India are doing their utmost to avoid 
the possibility of a collision with Afghanistan, 
not so much because the latter is in herself 
formidable, but because they do not ''"'tnt to 
admit Russia to a settlement of the Afghan 
questio::-1, which would be inevitable if 
Afghanistan broke her neutrality.49 
Unable to hold any effective threat of invasion over 
the Amir 1 s head, the British were reduced to their control, 
such as it was, over his purse. Curzon has usedhis 
ability to withhold the annual subsidy paid to the Amir 
in an attempt to bring Habibullah to heel during the 
discussion of the renewal of his father's undertakings. 
It was in the nature of the changed circumstances of 1915 
that while Curzon had expressed his displeasure by with-
drawing the subsidy, Hardinge had to offer an increase 
48. The Russian consul-general in Delhi reported to his 
Foreign Ministry at the end of 1914: 11 In private conversa-
tions with military men here I have been told with 
absolute frankness that an offensive war against Afghani-
stan is at present imposs:Lble., •• only a very insignificant 
proportion of the garrison of India is still here," 
Collection of secret documents extracted from the Archives 
of the former Ministr for Forei Affairs, (Russian Blue 
Book, No.l6. See also supra, p,85, 
49, I':>icl., No, 4l. 
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in the annual payment to Kabul in his bid to secure a 
favourable attitude on the Amir's part,5° The stick had 
had to be exchanged for the carrot. Hardinge's offer 
came about almost by chance. In a letter of August 1914 
in which he thanked the Amir for his assurru1ces of 
neutrality, the Viceroy told Habibullah "I have caused 
,,,, •• these assurances to be brought to the notice of 
His Majesty the King-Emperor, who will warmly appreciate 
the attitude which Your Majesty has adopted, 11 5l Hardinge 
perhaps expected that British gratitude could be left at 
that, but the Amir was evidently unsatisfied with a mere 
expression of goodwill, After informing the Viceroy of 
the arrival of the German party at Herat, he added: "I 
shall be very grateful if Your Excellency will hereafter 
intimate and communicate, for my information and for 
strengthening the relations of friendship between the two 
Governments, the mall!ler in which His Majesty's apprecia-
tion is made manifest,"5Z To the Secretary of State for 
India, Hardinge explained "I made the statement referred 
to in order to make his promises more binding upon him, 
as I know how very highly Amir values the personal regard 
of the King~Emperor, 11 5J The Foreign Department had 
50. It is in any case doubtful that withdrawal of his 
subsidy would have made any difference to Habibullah 1 s 
attitude in the 1915-16 period, Although it is not al-
together clear that the Government of India had taken 
this fact into account, the unclaimed balance of the 
Amir's subsidy amounted by 1918 to over Rs.44, 39,000 the 
equivalent of over two years' payments. It seems that 
in spite of Habibullah's rumoured profligacy, he had no 
need to draw on the British subsidy to meet regular re-
quirements, and had the Indian government withheld pay-
ment he could probably have survived without it. (See 
F.D,, S,F, Oct 1920, Nos, 705-806, Notes P• J9.) 
51, F.D., S,W, Feb. 1916, No, 129. 
52, Ibid., No. 2J5, 
53· ~.,No, 245. 
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meanwhile to draft a suitable letter to be sent to Kabul 
from King George V, The draft evidently obtained the 
King's assent during September, and the signed letter was 
handed to an Afghan delegation, sent specially to the 
frontier to receive it, at the end of that month,5 4 The 
Indian government realised, however, that the King's 
expression of gratitude and goodwill would count for 
little against the attractive offers which the German 
party were expected to make for adherence to their side, 
and some kind of financial concession was therefore con-
sidered necessary. After some discussion as to whether 
the British offer should take the form of a lump sum,55or 
of an increase in the annual subsidy, the latter course 
was eventually decided on, and the annual payment to 
Kabul was therefore increased by Rs.2 lakhs to Rs,20,5 
lakhs as from the autumn of 1915.56 In a conversation 
with the British Agent in Kabul, Amir Habibullah professed 
to regard this :increase as "very below the value due to 
the appreciation made, as if it is no appreciation at all",57 
and, perhaps as an expression of his dissatisfaction, he 
never claimed the increase, or indeed any part of the sub-
sidy, until soon before his death in 1919, The Amirrrain-
tained according to a somewhat far-fetched argument that 
the maintenance of his neutrality cost far more than the 
British were prepared to offer him,58 a rationalism of 
his natural desire to benefit to the maximum from the in-
creased importance which the German intervention in his 
country had brought him, 
54, The text of King George~ letter appears as Appendix lO, 
55. F.D., S,W, Mar, 1916, Note to 188. It appears that the 
British gave Habibullah a further lump sum grant of Rs.l 
crore in July 1918, (F.D,, F,B, Aug, 1920, No,lJ6), Unfor-
tunately, the correspondence relating to this payment is 
untraceable, 
56. See Appendix ll, 
57. F,D,, S.W, May 1916, Note to No, 245. 
/(58) 
4. The German mission in Kabul: October 1915-May 1916, 
Had the British been more fUlly informed on the 
German position in Af'g~1anistan they might have been even 
less liberal with the Amir. Although Hentig had been 
directed to arrange an alliance ("Verbindung")59 with the 
Kabul government, he seems to have been given no instruc-
tions about the nature of the association with the Amir 
which the German government proposed, nor was he told what 
help Germany was prepared to give Habibullah in the event 
of his joining the central powers in a war against the 
British in India. 60 It is evident that the desire for 
(58) The Amir never gave details of the increased costs 
which the maintenance of his neutrality had involved, and 
it would be difficult to imagine what they were. There 
was a steep rise in ordinary commodity prices in Afghani-
stan durinG' the war, but this was not the result of 
Afghanistan's neutral.i ty, and would indeed have been more 
pronounced had she become a belligerent. (For details 
on the rise in living costs during the war see Jewett, 
op. cit., PP• 280 and Jll). 
The Amirmay have referred to his dissatisfaction with 
the increase in the subsidy whioh he had received, when 
herequested King George to "fUrther my interests" with 
the Indian government. (See Appendix 12), 
59· See Appendix 9. Hentigls instructions read in the 
original German, and in part, as follows:- "Euer Hochwohl-
geboren beauftrage ish hierdurch sich nach Kabul zu 
begeben urn eine Verbindung mit dem Emir von Afghanistan 
herzustellen •••• " The word 11 Verbindung" could be inter-
preted either as "alliance•, in the stricter sense, or 
as 11 contact'', in the looser one. 
A letter from Zimmermawwhich constituted Hentig 1 s 
instructions strikes one as a curiously vague document. 
It would seem likely that Hentig regarded it principally 
as a vindication of his clain t,·, l<,adership of the whole 
Hentig-Niedermayer expedition, but it is notable that it 
contains no mention of' Niedermayer or his .;_)<-=trty, or any 
indication as to whether Niedermayer's group was recog-
nised as part of the 11 E.xpedi·t;l.tJ:;"l 11 " 
60, Bethmann Hollweg 1 s letter to the Amir stated simply 
that Hentig was to inform Habibullah of the present state 
of the war, and reveal the nature of the future relations 
between the central powers and Afghanistan which the German 
govermnent hoped to establish. See Appendix 8,' 
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some more concrete sort of agreement, in which Germany 
was to assume obligations of assistance to Afghanistan in 
the event of the Amir 1 s making preparations for military 
intervention against the British, came from the Afghan 
side, Hentig reported in late January 1916 that at the 
end of the preceding month, after some preliminary dis-
cussions with the Amir, Nasrullah Khan had asked him 
whether he was empowered to sign a treaty on behalf of 
Germany. Hentig explained that he was not, but added 
that he was ready to draw up a draft treaty, promising 
military and financial help from Germany "as far as 
possible at this moment" in return for immediate 
military preparations by the Afghan @Vernment, He 
further offered to support Afghan territorial claims at 
the peace conference 
victory in the world 
to be held in the event of German 
61 
war. Hentig must have realised 
that the rapidly extending allied occupation of' eastern 
Persia made it almost impossible ±'or the central powers 
to send to Afghanistan anything more than token assist-
ance, but Amir Habibullah pressed ahead with the formula-
tion of a draft treaty in which Germany was to undertake 
heavy obligations to Afghanistan in return ±'or a pro-
gramme of military improvement by the Afghan authorities. 62 
Although Hentig admitted that the Amir 1 s draft was "even 
61. Unternehmungen, Vol, XXVII, Hentig to A,A,, 24.1.16: 
GFM 14/141, F.5J2, It appears that this despatch, to-
gether with the draft treaty which was contained in it, 
did not reach the Turkish headquarters in Baghdad until 
July 1916. In Persia the German agent Griesinger noted 
in his diary that this report described the situation as 
"brilliant" a comment which hardly accorded with the 
±'acts. (w. Griesinger, German Intrigues in Persia, p.J8). 
62. See Appendix 13. It is to be noted that by the terms 
of the draft treaty which he drew up, the Amir accepted 
no definite undertaking to joint the war on the German 
side. The German obligation to recognise Afghan inde-
pendence and to extend military and economic aid to 
Afghanistan was to be unconditional; (see clauses 2 and 4). 
The Afghans accepted no definite counter-obligation to 
/(62) 
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more impossible" than that which he had himself proposed, 
and that it had been presented 11 in spite of all conceiv"' 
able protests" on his part, he and Niedermayer neverthe-
less signed the draft treaty with the remark that they 
recommendeditm the German government and that they hoped 
that it would be accepted. 63 It seems likely that the 
German party reaJ_-l.sed that Afghanistan's eagerness to 
enter the war had been greatly overrated in Constantinople 
and Berlin, but they signed the draft in order to convince 
the Amir and his advisers of their goodwill. By stating 
explicit and separate arrangements for the final conclusion 
64 
of a treaty, they made it clear that the German govern-
ment could not be regard,ed as having, accepted the Amir' s 
draft. 
The draft treaty, for all its unreality and incon-
sistency, is interesting principally as an Afghan state-
ment of an ideal programme and indicates the breadth of 
Afghan aims in a way which had never been revealed to 
the Indian government. It was the first document in 
which the Amir openly stated his desire for "complete 
independence and political freedom 11 , 65 in other words, 
for the abolition of the British control of Afghanistan's 
foreign relations which had been the principal factor in 
Indo-Russian relations since 1880, and which before the 
( 62) enter the war or even to undertake l-he necessary 
miJ.itary and "political" preparations; (see ciause 6: -
"If Afghanistan enters the war or undertake3 immediate 
prepn.:<,~ations in the mil_--; Lary and internal pqlitical 
fields, the German government" .... etc,) The British did 
not become aware of this draft treaty, andtlm fact that 
it had been signed, until January 1918, (F,D., S,F, Oct. 
1920, Note to No, 706), 
63. Unternehmungen, Vol.XXVII, Hentig to A.A., 24.1,16: 
GFM 14/141, F. 5J2, 
64. See Appendix lJ, clauses 7 and 10, Paradoxically 
enough, Hentig was supposed to represent Afghanistan 
rather than his own government in the negotiations at 
Tehran which Amir Habibullah envisaged, 
65. See ibid, clause 2, 
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war the Government of India had regarded as so secure. 
In the draft the Amir allowed himself to expound his plans 
for territorial aggrandisement, for the return of "lost and 
conquered territories", (presumably those lost to Russia 
as well as to India), and thus initiated the irridentist 
policy which was pursued by his post-war successors with 
great enthusiasm, It was evidently the visit of the 
German mission which fired the Amir with the idea of 
seeking representation at the peace conference at the 
conclusion of the great war, It was a scheme which he 
was to press on the British, once the allied victory had 
66 been secured, just as he had pressed it on Hentig 
and Niedermayer in the hope of a German victory. Nor, 
of course, did he neglect the opportunity to demand 
massive military and economic aid from Germany, however 
slight the probability of its materialising, The Anglo~ 
Russian rivalry from which the Amirs had once benefited 
had been temporarily suppressed, but its place was 
effectively taken by an Anglo-German war, 
While Hentig was undertaking the negotiation of the 
draft treaty, Niedermayer directed a brief programme of 
military reorganisation and modernisation with other 
members of his party, and aided in some cases by a 
detachment of Austrian officers and men who had escaped 
to Afghanistan from Russian prison camps in central 
66, There is evidence, (principally that of Sir Percy 
Sykes, History of Afghanistan, Vol, II, p. 265), that 
Habibullah wrote to the Viceroy "in the spring of 1916 11 
requesting representation at the peace conference; in 
other words, that he made such a proposal to the British 
very soon after he had secured assent to it from the 
Germans. The writer believes that the original of this 
letter is probably in a volume of correspondence on 
Afghan affairs in the Foreign Department records, which 
he was unfortunately unable to locate in the National 
Archives of India. 
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Asia. 67 He soon began to realise, however, that his 
work was pointless without a definite undertaking by 
the Amir to enter the war, and that the Russian advance 
through central Persia, and in particular the flight of 
68 
the central powers legations from Tehran in November 1915, 
made it very unlikely that the central powers would be 
able to bring sufficient troops and supplies into Afghani~ 
stan to induce the Amir to join their side, or to provoke 
a coup d 1 etat by those elements who were in favour of 
jehad. In spite of the objections of Nasrullah Khan, 
and other important members of the royal family, who were 
anxious to retain the services of the mission in case 
there was a turn in the tide of war against the allies, 
Niedermayer and Hentig, with most of the members of their 
expedition, left Kabul on 21 May 1916,69 Niedermayer 
passed in disguise through Russian Turkistan and allied-
occupied Persia to reach Kermanshah in October 1916: 
Hentig struck eastwards to the Pamirs, crossed China 
and the United States, and arrived in Germany in June 1917.7° 
67, Niedermayer, op, cit,, PP• 161 and l66w67, and Emil 
Rybitschka, In gottgegeben Afghanistan als G&ste des 
Amirs, pp. 47-56. Rybitschka was himself one of the 
Austrian ex-prisoners who had escaped to Kabul; his re-
collections are of much:i:nterest. There were about 20 
Austrian refugees in Kabul at the time of Rybitschka 1 s 
arrival in December 1915, (ibid., P• 40), and their 
numbers later rose to over so:-(F,D,, S,W, Dec, 1917, 
Nos,l~l99, Notes P• 72). 
68, See Wipert von BlUcher, Zeitenwende in Iran, PP• 
J5-J6. 
69. Niedermayer, op. cit., PP• 172-74. 
70. Their adventurous journeys are described in Nieder-
mayer, op. cit., pp. l74-Jl4, and Hentig, Ins verschlossene 
~. p. 88 to end. 
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Maulawi Barkatullah and Mahendra Pratap, whose influence 
during the course of the negotiations with the Amir 
appears to have been slight, remained in Kabul, together 
with Kasim Bey, a Turkish officer who had been attached 
to Hentig 1 s mission, The Austrian Captain Schreiner was 
left as chief representative of Germany in Kabu1, 71 
together with a German and Austrian detachment in Herat 
who continued to be the cause of some concern to the 
British. 
5• Afghan attempts to maintain contact with the central 
powers. 
The departure of Niedermayer and Hentig did not mean 
the end,,of the central powers' activities in Afghanistan, 
or the end of contacts between the Afghan government and 
Britain's enemies, Nasrullah Khan had, throughout the 
period of the mission's sojourn in Kabul, shown himself 
far more anxious to accede to the Germans' suggestions 
than his brother Habibullah. In the hope of dissuading 
Hentig from leaving Kabul in May 1916 he had told him 
that "the Amir had shortly before obtained from the 
Viceroy complete recognition of his internal and external 
sovereignty", a claim which Hentig naturally disbelieved 
in view of the lack of supporting evidence, 72 He further 
71. Unternehmungen9 Vol, XXX, report by Hentig, June 1917: 
GFM 14/142, F.2. Hentig stated that he had conferred full 
powers of attorney on Schreiner,( 11 Vertretungsvollmacht 11 ), 
though it seems doubtful that this was supposed to include 
the power of concluding a treaty with the Afghan governw 
ment. Amir Amanullah attempted to treat Schreiner as the 
official diplomatic representative of Germany after the 
treaty of Rawalpindi, in October 1919. (Rybitschka, ~ 
cit,, PP• 213-14). 
72. Unternehmungen, Vol. XXX, report by Hentig, June 1917: 
GFM 14/142, F.J. Nasrullah's claim may represent the ori-
gin of the idea, repeated by Mary B. Watkins, (op. cit., 
p.57) that "The Amir made a secret agreement with Britain 
under which the British would relinquish control of Afghan 
foreign policy at the war 1 s end," This is a belief un~ 
supported by any evidence in the Indian government archives, 
or anywhere else to which access is obtainable. 
attempted to secure plenipotentiary powers for Hentig 
from the Reichskanzler Bethmann Hollweg, "in the hope 
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that the friendship of the two governments of Afghanistan 
and the imperial German government may be transferred 
from the plan to the reality,u 7 3 Nasrullah was obviously 
determined to obtain the consent of the German govern-
ment tothe Afghan draft treaty by having Hentig sign 
the treaty as the plenipotentiary representative of the 
Emperor and he accordingly entrusted the letter containing 
his proposals to Hentig himself, who telegraphed it to 
Berlin on his arrival in Peking in October 1916. 74 
Needless to say, the German Foreign Office failed to 
accede to Nasrullah Khan's request, and Hentig continued 
on his journey to his homeland, without making any 
further contact with the Kabul government. 
The fact that there was still a party in Kabul 
which was determined not to allow the possibility of a 
connection with the central powers to drop was further 
evidencedin December 1916 by the arrival at the Turkish 
lines in Kermanshah of 'Abdul Majid Khan, a near relation 
of the Amir and former Hakim (district governor) of 
Shiberghan. 75 He presented German authorities in Kerman-
shah with a lengthy memorandum, which stressed the 
important part Afghanistan could play in a renewed 
Turko~German offensive in the east, suggested a junction 
of the forces of Afghanistan and the central powers in 
Persia, and predictable requested German military aid to 
Afghanistan. 76 His reception in Constantinople was guarded, 
73• See Appendix 14. 
74. Unternehmungen, Vol, XXVII, A.A. to Political Section, 
General Staff, 17.10.16: GFM 14/141, F.575, The letter 
is that given in Appendix 14, 
75, Ibid,, Vol, XXVIII, Nadolny to German embassy 
Constantinople, 9.12.16: GFM 14/141, F,6J5. 
76. Ibid,,, Vol, XXVII, Nadolny to German embassy 
Constantinople, 14,12,16: GFM 14/141, F,6J6-J8, 
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principally because he could produce no credentials from 
the Amir, and hence could not be regarded as a full 
diplomatic representative of the Afghan government,?? 
The Germans had in any case decided by that stage that 
"The plan to persuade the Amir to undertake an active 
advance against India or Russian Turkistan seems •••• 
temporarily out of the question 11 , 78 and were instead 
preparing a new "Friendship Treaty" with Afghanistan 
which was to recognise her independence and arrange for 
the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations, 
without touching on her participation in the war or any 
of the territorial and economic advantages which the Amir 
had pressed for in the draft presented by Hentig,79 
1Abdul Majid left Constantinople in April 1917 without 
having gained anything towards the realisation of his 
objectives except the knowledge that they were impractic-
80 
able, His visit to the Turkish capital is important 
simply as an indication that in some Afghan circles81 the 
desire for some arrangement with Germany was still 
strong, and that the conventional British interpretation 
of Afghan policy during the war years, in which an 
enthusiastic Germany presses her favours on a reluctant 
Afghanistan may be in need of some revision, 
77, Ibid,, Vol. XXIX, Kfthlmann to A.A., 7.J,l7: 
GFM 14/141, F.698. 
78, Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, A.A. memorandum, 7.12.16: 
GFM 14/141, F.6Jl. 
79. See ibid., Vol, XXVIII, A.A. to German embassy 
Constantinople, 24.10.16: GFM 14/141, F.594~97· This 
"Friendship Treaty" should obviously not be confused with 
that given in Appendix lJ, 
80, ~., Vol. XXIX, KUhlmann to A.A., 28,4.17: GFM 14/141, 
Fo772o 
81, Vagueness is necessary at this point because it is 
not at all clear who in Af'ghanistan was responsible for 
the despatch of 'Abdul Majid, Niedermayer believed that 
the Amir had sent him to report on possibilities in 
Persia resulting from the Turkish advance to Hamadan in 
/(81) 
These attempts to renew links with Afghanistan 
were meanwhile matched by attempts by Nasrullah Khan, and 
other members of the royal family who shared his views on 
the desirability of jehad, to achieve on the spot some of 
the aims which the German mission had pursued. It seems 
possible that Niedermayer, convinced of the hopelessness 
of trying to reach his objectives by open means, had 
considered bypassing the Amir 1 s objections by engineering 
a coup d'etat at the Afghan court, or possibily by appeaJ.-
ing directly to the tribesmen of the Indo-Afghan frontier, 
on whom the task of 
82 largely devolve, 
after his departure. 
fighting an Anglo....Afghan war would 
Both these schemes were reconsidered 
In the June of 1916, one Hairi Bey, 
a Turkish officer brought to Afghanistan as an instructor 
at the Sirajiyah military college, escaped with the 
connivance of Nasrullah Khan to the "independent" Afridi 
territory on the British side of the Durand line. He and 
his companions there announced themselves as a vanguard 
of a Turkish army, and began to enlist Afridi deserters 
from the Indian army for the forthcoming struggle. 83 Plans 
had been made for co-operation and support from the 
Austrians in Kabul in the event of success among the Afridi~~ 
The scheme failed principally because Habibullah opposed 
(81) the summer of 1917. (Ibid,, Vol.XXIX, Ktl.hlmann to 
A.A., 28,J,l7: GFM 14/141, F.707), Mr. 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi 
told the writer that he beLLcwed 'Abdul Majid undertook 
his mission entirely on his own initiative, and that he 
was not generally well regarded in Afghanistan. 
82, Sir Percy Sykes writes: "The scheme for a coup d 1 etat 
was considered, but was found to be impracticable". (2l2.!. 
cit,, Vol.II, p, 258), The wd.ter has been unable to find 
;:u:re c.t documentary evidence of this. However, the German 
mission did have contact with some of the nomads who re-
gularly crossed the Indo-Afghan border. possibly with the 
intention of playing for support in that quarter. (Informa-
tion from Dr. von Hentig. The incident is mentioned by 
Niedermayer, op. cit., p. 171.) 
8J, F.D., S.F. Apr.l9l7, Note to No.lOJ, 
84. Rybitschka, op,cit., p. 73, 
causing offence to the British, and because the Turks 
were unable to prove the claims of mili.tary support which 
they had made to the tribesme:-:t. With the discove:cy of 
the p.lot, the rift between Habibullah and his brother 
widened once more. The Turks lingered in Tirah until 
forced by the dissatisfied Afrid:i.s to return to AJ:'gha:n 
territory in November 1917. 85 It was of course fortunate 
for the British that Hairi Bny and his coJEpa:dons did rot 
strike contact with tLe rebellious Mahsuds in the spring 
of 1917. 86 
During the summer of the same year the Austrian 
officers discussed plans with Nasrullah Khan for the 
liberation of 47,000 Austrian and German prisoners-of-war 
in Russian camps in central Asia, 87 This considerable 
85. F.D,, S.F, Jan, 1918, No. 70. 
86. See supra,pp.85-87.Niedermayer relates that he and 
his companions met many of the tribal delegates summoned 
to Kabul for the jirgahheld by Habibullah to announce his 
continued neutrality. (See supra, p,:J78)~1We made contact 
with them and planted seeds in their hearts which bore no 
little fruit in the succeeding period. The Mohmands, 
Mahsuds aYLd Afridis took our lessons well to heart". 
(Niedermayer, op. cit,, p, 166), There seems to be no 
evidence, however, that Turkish or German agents played 
any direct part in the Mahsud disturbances. 
The story of an Afridi delegation who visited Kabul in 
the autumn of 1916 bears recounting. The visitors "were 
taken by night to the palace into a small room where they 
were received by a very fat man who spoke to them in 
Persian through an interpreter. The Afridis believed him 
to be a 1 babu' [clerk] and spoke quite freely with him. 
He asked what they could tell him about the Turks in Tirah 
and they replied that the Turks in Tirah had been sent 
there by the Amir, but that the latter was not sending 
them enough money for any hope of success with the Afridis, 
The 'babu' then replied through the interpreter that the 
Turks had not been sent by the Amir, upon which~ey re-
joined that they did not mean Amir Habibullah but Amir 
Nasrulla, which remark was very badly received, 11 The "babu" 
was of course Habibullah himself, who was never fluent in 
Pashtu, and had grown corpulent in his middle age, (F,D,, 
S.F. Apr. 1917, Note to No, 155.) 
/(87) 
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force was to be brought to Afghanistan, armed, and used 
by Nasrullah to depose his brother, or at any rate to 
force the country into war against the British. Many of 
the prisoners were lodged close to the Afghan frontier, 
along the river Oxus, where they were employed in build-
ing a railway, and Rybitschka had already prepared for a 
journey there to engineer their escape when the plan was 
revealed to Habibullah, Rybitschka relates that the dis-
covery of this plan resulted in a further estrangement 
between the Amir and his brother, together with restric-
tions on the movements of the Austrians, Thus failed 
what appears to have been the only concerted attempt to 
bring about German aims by means of a coup d'etat at 
88 Kabul, 
6. The Russian revolution and its effects in central 
Asia. 
All these local schemes and conflicts, though 
naturally the source of considerable concern to the 
(87) This figure is derived from Unternehmungen, Vol.XIV, 
Wangenheim to A,A., lJ.5,16: GFM 14/140, F.701. Sir 
Percy Sykes cites a figure of 110,000 for 1917, (History 
of Persia, Vol,II, p. 487). 
88. Rybitschka, op. cit., PP• 76-78. 
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Indian government, were dwarfed in their effects upon 
the future by events 
of 1916, following a 
on a much larger stage. In the July 
decision by the Russian authorities 
to take the unprecedented step of conscripting the Muslim 
inhabitants of the empire, a rebellion broke out among 
the Uzbeks of Jizak, near Samarkand, The outbreak coinw 
cided with risings of a more serious character by 
Kirghiz in the valleys of Semirechie and the eastern 
foothills of Ferghana, and, still further to the north 
and east, among the nomads of the Kazakh steppe, 89 
Peace was not restored in Kazakhstan until February 1917. 
The native rebellions of 1916 were of course but whispers 
o.f' a far greater storm to come; 90 a storm which, by 
temporarily liquidating the power of the Petrograd 
government in central Asia, was to alter the situation 
of Russia's Asian neighbours at its very roots, The 
change, as far as central Asia was concerned, began with 
the March revolution of 1917, and was intensified, not 
initiated, by that of the follovling November. The Tsar's 
89. See F.D., S.F. Feb. 1917, Nos. J-48, The Russian 
consul-general in India believed of the central Asian up-
l·isings that "Their roots were fixed in Afghanistan and 
were undoubtedly left intact." (Russian Blue Book, No,72.) 
There is very little evidence to support this belief. 
90, This is not to suggest that the forces which provoked 
the central Asian rebellions of 1916 produced also the 
March and October revolutions of 1917, The two movements 
were in fact of a very different character; the revolts of 
1916 were the result of native dissatisfaction with 
Russian rule, and were concerned principally with local 
issues, whereas the changes in Russian central Asia of 
1917 were obviously the effect of upheavals in Petrograd 
itself, The Moslem population of central Asia played only 
a passive part in the March and November revolutions. 
abdication of 15 March was succeeded by the formation in 
Tashkent of a new provincial administration in which 
workers' and soldiers' committees participated, but the 
provisional government was never strong in Turkistan, 91 
and although the October revolution saw the establishment 
of a pro-Bolshevik government in Tashkent, 92 the upheavals 
in Russia of l9l7 meant substantially that the central 
government exercised little or no control over the central 
Asian provinces. The Tashkent Soviet was cut off from 
European Russia by the anti-Bolshevik revolt of the 
Cossack General Dutov in the southern Urals, and was to 
remain thus isolated until late l9l9; on the central 
Asian scene it competed until February l9l8 with the 
rightist "Provisional Government of the Autonomous Peoples 
of Turkistan" in Kokand, and later with the white regime 
in Ashkhabad, while the Amirate of Bokhara became 
virtually independent. In Persia, the Russian occupation 
forces which had previously held the country as far 
south as Isfahan, began to disintegrate in the autumn of 
1917, and Russian military strength in the area thus 
ceased to exist many months before the treaty of Brest-
Litovsk of March 1918 officially removed its raison d 1 etre. 
The events of l9l7 meant the abandonment of Russian 
plans for the partition of Afghanistan, and the further 
dismemberment of Persia, which had been foreseen during 
91. F.D., S.F. Aug. l9l7, Note to No,2J. The provisional 
government's administration in Tashkent was ousted for a 
brief period in September by a combination of the Tashkent 
Soviet and local left Socialist Revolutionaries; a dress 
rehearsal,as it were, for the Petrograd revolution of 
October 1917. 
92. The Tashkent Soviet government was not in fact Bol-
shevik, but composed substantially of those elements 
which had participated in the abortive September coup, 
in which the left Socialist Revolutionaries predominated, 
(s.A, Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 2Jl). 
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the Anglo-Russian negotiations of 1915. The Russian 
consul-general in India had urged as late as February 
1917 that the allies should partition Afghanistan between 
them at the end of the war, in order "to destroy this 
breeding ground of all sedition and agitation". He had 
added:- "What will be the particular lines of such an 
agreement, which alone is capable of removing all mis-
understandings in the Middle East between the two great 
Empires, the immediate future will show", 93 but it seems 
doubtful that he expected "the immediate future" to show 
that such a scheme"was to be altogether unworkable, and 
that within a year the new government in Petrograd would 
have far more pressing problems with which to concern 
itself than the proposed agreement on Afghanistan. The 
military necessities of the situation were of course re-
inforced by the ideological stand of the Bolshevik 
government. Innnediately after the October revolution the 
first Soviet had issued a "Declaration of the Rights of 
the Peoples of Russia", in which the minority nationalities 
of the former Tsarist empire were stated to be free to 
secede from the new state. This was succeeded in December 
1917 by a general exhortation to the peoples of the east 
94 to fight for independence against the imperial powers, 
Perhaps as a recognition of theconcurrence of Soviet 
views with those claimed by the central powers during 
their activities in Persia and Afghanistan, the 
signatories of the Brest-Litovsk treaty declared that:-
93• Russian Blue Book, No, 72. 
94. L.B. Teplinskii, in Nezavisimyi Afghanistan, p. 6, It 
is to be noted that a modern Soviet writer believes that 
Germany had ambitions in central Asia as imperialistic 
as those of Britain and Tsarist Russia, and regards the 
German expedition to Afghan~an, and the claim made by the 
central powers that they were fighting for the liberation 
of the east, as part of a gigantic fraud. (Sovremenyi 
Afghanistan p. 258.) The Brest-Litovsk treaty is not 
mentioned in this context. 
In view of the fact that Persia and Afghanistan 
are free and independent States, the contracting 
parties obligate themselves to respect the 
political and economic independence and the 
territorial integrity of these States.95 
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The British authorities in India were slow to 
appreciate the importance of these profound (if only 
temporary) changes in the power structure of central 
Asia, or to re-assess their policy in the light of them. 
Their intelligence services reported to them the con-
stantly changing pattern of central Asian politics, but 
the British were naturally too pre-occupied by the 
immediate task of defeating Germany to determine a new 
and definite policy in the unfamiliar situation which now 
presented itself, a situation which they had no reason to 
suppose might not continue indefinitely,96 Their immed-
iate concern was to prevent arenewed Turko-German advance 
across the area of northern Persia which had been 
evacuated by the Russians, supposedly aimed at capuring 
the oil-fields of Russian Azerbaijan and the cotton 
stocks of Turkistan, and, perhaps, at renewed activity 
in Afghan:iS;an, 97 It soon became evident, however, that 
the mission of Genera}. Dunsterville to Baku, launched in 
February 1918, and the British intervention in Trans-
caspia, which commenced the following summer, were more 
concerned to defend the white regimes in those areas 
95• Article VII ofthe Treaty of Brest Litovsk, (3 March 
1918.) J,W, Wheeler~Bennett, Brest-Litovsk. The Forgotten 
Peace, P• 407. 
96. Sir Percy Sykes heads a chapter on the collapse of 
Russian power in Persia with a quotation from the Faerie 
Queene: ... "I begin/To treade an endless trace, withouten 
guyde/Or good direction how to enter in,/Or how to issue 
forth in waies untryde,/In perils strange, in labours 
long and wide," (op. cit,, Vol. II, p. 485,) Lines which 
as well described the situation of the Delhi government 
at that time as that of the historian, 
97. There is no evidence in the German archives that 
action as far east as Transcaspia and Afghanistan was 
seriously intended by the central powers. 
than to prepare to face a Turko-German advance which 
was becoming increasingly unlikely. It was at this 
point that two broad alternatives of policy became 
apparent, though no firm and permanent decision was 
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made :in favour of either of them, and the British position 
suffered thereby, 
Though few realised it, the withdrawal of Russian 
power from central Asia re-opened the nineteenth 
century conflict between the proponents of a "forward 
policy" of Indian defence and those in favour of the 
"static" approach, though on a broader canvass than 
that it had occupied fifty years before, A "forward 
policy", in the new terms, involved the establishment 
of independent, anti-Soviet states along Afghanistan's 
northern frontier, in Transcaspia, and in the Caucasus, 
and the reconstruction of Iran as a British satellite.98 
It would seem that there was even discussion of a plan 
to bring Afghanistan into a large-scale struggle against 
the Bolsheviks. 9 9 Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary 
after the close of the Paris peace conference, was to 
98, As was, perhaps, envisaged by the abortive Anglo-
Persian agreement of 1919. In 1919, as in 1907, Britain 
bound herself to "respect absolutely the integrity and 
independence of Persia", but to anti~Bri tish (and this 
included many Persian) observers, this statement simply 
begged the question. (See Sykes, op. cit., Vol.II, pp.520-
22, G. Lenczowskj_, Russia and the West in Iran, pp.45-47, 
and Sir Clarmont Skrine, op. cit,, pp. 56-67.) 
99, The writer would naturally have dealt with this pro-
posal in a more thorough way if he had more than very 
scanty information about it. The sole evidence for its 
existence is. a sentence in an office note by the Indian 
Deputy Foreign Secretary Denys Bray, of 22 January 1919, 
who remarks that "great pressure was brought on us from 
home at so late a stage as June l9l8 to make some depc_rt-
ure (not precisely defined) from our traditional policy 
by an offensive alliance with Afghanistan," (F,D,, S,F, 
Oct,l920, Note to No.706). The volume of correspondence 
to which Bray refers is unfortunatel; untraceable in the 
files of the National Archives of India, It seems almost 
certain that the Government of India, who t,.rore anxious 
/(99) 
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become one of the principal advocates of intervention, 
but the new "forward policy" enjoyed a enVIer reception 
in Delhi, where the Forei.gn Department was anxious to 
.1 
cut a progressive figure in the middle east, and where 
the Foreign Secretary, Hamilton Grant, complained of the 
interventionist policy that "we are muddling along in the 
same old hand to mouth reactionary rut. 11100 The British-
Indian opponents of an expansionist programme in central 
Asia realised, perhaps, that it would be difficult to 
maintain the forces necessary to implement it once tJe 
European war was over and war-weariness set in. They 
may also have under-estimated the Bolsheviks' powers of 
recovery. They favoured withdrawal from the points of 
vantage which Britain had secured during the struggle 
with Germany and Turkey, a withdrawal which would grant 
Persia and Afghanistan full indep,3ndence in deed as well 
as in word, and which was in idrilogical harmony with 
President Wilson's plans for the new world to be con-
structed after the war, In this sense, the situation 
which had obtained on several occasions during the nine-
teenth century, when the Indian authorities had espoused 
a "forward policy" in defiance of London, had been neatly 
(99) to withdraw from active intervention in central Asia, 
did not allow themselves to be coerced into such a scheme 
by the London authorities. 
100. F.D., s.w. Sep., 1918, Nos.l-158, Appendix to Notes 
II. It would appear from this volume that in October 1917, 
in a note to the Persian government, Germany foresaw 
Rus,sian withdrawal from the war, and offered to re caJ.l all 
her .forces from Persia i:f Bri C:oa.in would do the same. The 
Indian Foreign Department urged acceptance of this scheme, 
but was eventually overridden by the London Foreign Of:fice. 
This quotation should not be taken to imply that the ser-
vants of the Government of India were universally inspired 
by sentiments of this kind, There was in fact a distinct 
difference of opinion between "progressives"and "react-
ionaries" among the British in India at this time. It was 
a conflict of which the stormy controversy over Brig.-
General Dyer's action at Amritsar in April 1919 is per-
haps the best known example, 
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reversed., 
7, Habibullah seizes an o_pportuni_ty, and the British 
reconsider their policy, 
Few people in Afghanistan followed closely the 
rapidly changing political pattern north of their borders, 
athough there seems to have been a general awareness in 
Kabul that Russian central Asia was in turmoil, and that 
the power of the new Russian government to undertake 
any military operations against Afghanistan was very 
greatly reduced, In the August of 1917 the Russian 
military authorities in Transcaspia had complained that 
"Even the most intelligent Afghan officials seem unable 
to grasp the true significance of the Russian revolution 
and the manner in which it will affect Russo~fghan 
relations. 11101 Later,towards the end of 1918, an embassy 
of the Amir of Bokhara visited Kabul, 102 and a clearer 
appreciation of the fact that Afghanistan might help to 
fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the old 
regime in central Asia probably arose; there was even talk 
of a matrimonial alliance between the Afghanand Bokharan 
royal families, lOJ When ci vi]_ war erupted in Russian 
central Asia in 1918, Afghans of a more conservative temp-
erament saw j_t; not as a clash between Marxism and liberal-
ism, but as a battle waged between Europeans (i.e., the 
Bolsheviks), and Asians, the latter being represented by 
tho old-style Amiratos of Khiva and Bokhara. 104 Those of 
a more modernist turn of mind may have regarded tho 
101, F.D,, S,W, Aug. 1918, Notes P• 77, 
102. Ibid., S.F, Oct, 1920 1 Note to No.706, There is 
very lillie information on the activities of this mission 
to Habibullah's court. 
lOJ, Ibid., Notes, P• J, 
104. Such an attitude is typi:ficd by passages in tho 
fantastic series of letters which Sardar 'Abdul Quddus 
wrote to Henry Dobbs, at that time Agent to the Governor-
General in Baluchistan, during tho course of tho third 
/(104) 
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Russian revolution as the dawn of a new era for Asiatic 
countries hitherto controlled by the imperial powers, as 
modern Soviet writers claim, 105 but the Afghan modernist 
par exce1lence, Mahrnud Tarzi, published relatively little 
about contemporary Russian politics in his newspaper 
11Siraj-ul...Akhbar 11 , and when in 1921 an Afghan diplomat 
on tour in Europe was asked by a press reporter whether 
the spirit of t;le Russian revolution had affected his 
country, he 11 emphasised the fact that poli ticaJ.ly the 
revolution had no influence at all 11 • 106 His remark was 
probably correct to the extent that very few Afghans were 
affected by the ideology of the revolution, but the 
fact that the events of 1917 had finally disrupted the 
settlement of 1907, leaving Afghanistan free to win con-
cessions from the British by threatening alliance with 
Russia, was generally, if imprecisoly, realised. By the 
close of the great war Mahrnud Tarzi had revised his pre-
viously pro-Turkish opinions, and concluded that 
Afghanistan had benefited by her neutrality, since she had 
avoided the losses of material and manpower which the 
belligerents o.f both sides had sustained.l07 At the same 
time Tarzi maintained that Habibullah' s outwardJ.y friendly 
attitude towards the British demanded recognition by 
the Government of India, and that something more than a 
(104) Afghan war, See documentary Appendix to F.D .• , S.F. 
Aug. 1919, Nos, 201-422. 
105. ~., Teplinskii, op, cit., p. 7, 
106. The diplomat in question was Muhammad Wali Khan, 
formerly Afghan ambassador in Moscow, and generally of a 
pronounced pro-Soviet turn of mind, (F.D., 2(A)-F 1923, 
Enclosure in No, 265.) 
107. Siraj-ul-Akhhih, Vol.VII, No.4. 
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gift of cash and munitions was required. 108 A Foreign 
Department official correctly surmised that "that some-
thing is complete independence and territorial retro-
. ,.109 
cess1ons. The Amir was as anxious as Tarzi for a 
reward for his services, and as cognisant of the fact 
that post-war conditions would make '.1is demands difficult 
to ignore. He believed that the allies' search for 
ideologically acceptable war aims, and the influence of 
President Wilson as well as of Lenin, made it possible 
that after the great war Afghanistan might gain complete 
independence by peaceful means, provided the Afghan 
case could be put before a world tribunal, The Amir 
evidently considered that the peace conference of 
Versailles represented just sueL an opportunity to remove 
his cause from the obscurity to which the British control 
of his foreign relations, and his country's geographical 
remoteness, had hitherto confined 
HabibullELh 1 s demand for representation at the 
Versailles conference thus served a specific political 
purpose, besides gratifying his self-esteem. He embodied 
his request in a letter sent to the Viceroy at the be..;-irm-
ing of February 1919. 110 At no ;;;oint did he de;na:nd 
directly that the British should annul the agreements by 
which they had exclusive control of Afghanistan's foreign 
relations; instead, he echoed an earlier claim of Mal~ud 
Tarzi that Afghanistan had always regarded herself as 
lll inde,pc,ndent, and asked for confirmation of this from 
the Versailles peace conference, In this way he avoided 
108. Ibid., Vol.VII, No.19, 
109. F,D,, S,F, Oct, 1920, Nos, 1064-1126, Notes p.94. 
llO. His letter appears as Appendix 15. 
lll, Siraj-ul-Akhbar, Vol. VII, No. 13. 
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the loss of face involved in a direct demand for inde-
pendence. By asking the British to appear in Paris on 
his behalf, he tried to force them to reveal their 
attitude towards the future status of Afghanistan, and 
by threatening to send his own delegation if they refused, 
he prevented them from letting the matter drop quietly, 
The burden of the Amir 1 s message, that he wished 
to annul the agreements by which his father had granted 
control of Afghanistan's foreign policy to the British, 
came as no great surprise to the Indian Foreign Depart-
ment, who had received prior warning from their Agent 
in Kabul that something of the kind was likely. 112 
The fact that, shortly before sending his letter of 
2 February, the Amir had demanded 1)ayment of the lump sum 
grant of Rs.l crore which the British had earlier made 
him, besides Rs.l7 lakhs of the hitherto unclaimed 
balance of his subsidy, was further taken as a sign that 
he might be preparing to try conclusions with the British 
in case his demands for independence were not met. 11J In 
the reply which the Foreign Department drafted they 
pointed out that Afghanistan, as an ex-neutral, was unen-
titled to representation at Versailles, 114 They further 
affected to believe that the Amir required confirmation 
of the continuing validity of 'Abdur Rahman's undertak-
ings rather than confirmation of their cancellation, but 
a lengthy note written at the time by the deputy Foreign 
Secretary Denys Bray reveals that Habibullah's letter 
had in fact provoked a thorough re-appraisal of the 
basis of the Indian government1' s policy towards Afghanistai\:~5 
112, 
llJ. 
114. 
115. 
F,D,, S.F, Oct. 1920, Nos, 705-806, Notes pp,l-J, 
Ibid,, Note to No, 706. See also supra, p,lSJ,footnote 
6 [50. See Appendix 1 • 
F.D., S.F. Oct, 1920, Note to No, 706, 
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Denys Bray claimed that "it is not for diplomatic 
reasons alone that we propose to affect in our reply 
perplexity as t.o the Amir 1 s precise meaning. His letter 
is cryptic in reality," Contemporary Persian style was 
admittedly flowery and circumlocutory in the extreme, 
but the Foreign Department had, after all, ample 
experience of correspondence with the Amir, and were well 
trained at interpreting it. That Bray had a fairly 
clear idea of the Amir's real wishes was disclosed by 
the fact that he filled several pages with a discussion 
of them, His note questions the fundamentals of the 
Government of India's previous Afghan policy, and indeed, 
it seems possible that if the further discussion which 
the Viceroy was to suggest in his reply to the Amir 
had ever come about, Afghanistan might have obtained the 
full independence which she claimed without resort to 
war. 
Our control of Afghanistan's foreign relations 
[Bray wrote] has for so long been the fundamental 
principle of our Afghan policy that it requires 
an effort of mind to conceive of our ever will-
ingly consenting to any diminution of it. 
Possibly it may prove essential that it should 
continue to dominate our policy. But the present 
is so different from the past, and the future 
seems so likely to be so much more different 
still, that the time has come for us to scrutinise 
our traditional policy anew. 
Bray was prepared to recognise the value of the 
British control of Afghanistan's foreign relations during 
the period of Russian expansion in central Asia during 
the nineteenth century, and admitted that "our Afghan 
policy has issued so triumphantly from the crucial test 
of war, that the burden of proof lies heavily on the man 
who would adumbrate even the mere possibility of a change 
in it." Yet, as he correctly pointed out, the British 
had received treaty promises of Russian non-interference 
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in Afghanistan in 1907, and to this extent the old 
arrangements had lost their raison d'etre. Habibullah's 
neutrality during the war was due as much to natural 
fear of combined Anglo-Russian operations against 
Afghanistan as to his treaty obligations to the British, 
and his dealings with the German mission had i.n any 
case questioned the sincerity with which he was prepared 
to carry them out. The amicable relations which the 
British enjoyed with him between 1907 and his death 
owed as much to the personal friendships which the Amir 
had made on his visit to India as to the terms of the 
"memorandum of obligation". 
"I confess to a mistrust" Bray continued 11 of a 
blind insistence on the retention of ancient engagements 
which we are no longer prepared in the last resort to 
enforce." There were two ways in which Britain herselr 
was now unprepared to implement the agreements of 1880. 
She was unwilling, or unable, to enforc'' the restrictions 
which she had formally placed on the Amir's independence, 
as the visit of the German mission, as well as that of the 
Bokharan del·agation, had showr1. She was unprepared also 
to fUlfil her promise to 'Abdur Rahman, repeated to his 
son, to repel any aggression on his frontiers, and the 
possibility of continuing chaos in Russian central Asia 
which Bray predicted made him think it unlikely that she 
would ne8d to do so, At the same time, the formal 
British control of Afghanistan's foreign relations remain-
ed as an insult to his amour propre which brought the 
Indian government into conflict with the progressive ele-
ments in Afghanistan with which it seems likely that 
they were .anxious to identify themselves, and made it 
diffic<lt for the Amir to convince his poeple of British 
good intentions. 
The Government of India, Bray believed, required 
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only two things of Afghanistan; her internal independence, 
which prevented the direct foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan, which Britain was as unanxiOU3to undertake 
herself as she was anxious to prevent others from under-
taking, and her friendship, on which the peace of the 
north-west frontier often depended, He made two proposals 
which he believed could secure these objects. 
The first required a new treaty with Afghanistan 
"which did not totidem verbis stiF:clate cor our absolute 
control of her foreign politics", a "general Treaty of 
Alliance, guaranteeing Afghanistan's independence so long 
as she entered into no Engagements directly or indirectly 
prejudicial to our interests," The British subsidy to 
Kabul could well continue as "a tremendous asset in our 
dealings wi ~;h the North-West Frontier tribes", although 
its nature might have to be camouflaged in order to 
salve Afghan pride, as Bray realised. He concluded that 
such a treaty, "even in the event of a resurrection of 
Czardom, would adequately safeguard our interests with-
out the insertion of a stipulation which reduces 
Afghanistan to something like a British Protectorate, 11 
Bray proposed also that the Indian government 
should accede to Habibullahls request for representation 
at Versailles, The British had been unable to prevent 
the appearance there of a delegation from another ex-
neutral power, Persia, "though our Persian record is in 
some respects dubious enough for publicity to be incon-
venient, But in Afghanistan our recent record and future 
aims are so honourable that we have nothing to fear from 
publicity." If the new treaty with Afghanistan could 
be confirmed by the League of Nations, moreover, foreign 
suspicions of Britain's "imperialism" in her treatment 
of Afghanistan could be laid to rest. 116 
ll6, Bray remarked of Afghanistan that 11 the Peace Confer-
ence seems unlikely to view with the same tolerance as 
/(ll6) 
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It is not possible to assume that Bray's proposals 
would have received the automatic support of all his 
colleagues in India, or of the London government, In 
view of his attitude at the Rawalpindi conference, 117 
it seems likely that the L'ldian Foreign Secretary, 
Hamilton Grant, wo·.:cld 1.1ave been prepared to accept them, 
The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, had predicted at the end 
of January 1919 that the Amir would demand "political 
freedom" in the near future, and Chelmsford does not 
appear to have been prepared to adopt an attitude of 
118 flat refusal to this request. The opposition to Bray's 
Afghanistan would probably scheme for a new treaty with 
have come from London, where the Secretary of State for 
India, Edwin Montagu, believed that an offer of the 
Garter, and a letter from King George, would be adequate 
thanks for Habibullah's wartime neutrality: an approach 
which, apart from its extraordinary parsimony, reveals 
that the India Office was still thi:lking in terms of 
largesse to a faithful servant, rather than of re-appraisal 
(116) ourselves either her olcl-<world despotism or her 
policy of the closed door," and believed it possible 
that under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, (then in draft), Afghanistan would be adjudged 
one of the··,, countries "not yet a':Jle to stand by them-
selves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world", 
and of which control "should be entrusted to that 
advanced nation who, by reason of its resources, experience 
or geographical position can best undertake this respons-
ibility", "-to wit Great Britain". It is a curious 
reflection on the idealisu of 1919 ·chat Afghan:istan 1 s first 
venture onto the European diplomatic scene might have 
ended by placing her under a League; of Nations mandate, a 
position 1iVOI-:'se tha::1 -that w~·L.Lc~'l S;'H-0 already occupied. 
(The wording of this clause was modified in the final form 
of the League Covenant, which was in any case later stated 
to apply only to former territories of the central powers. 
See C. Howard-Ellis, The Origin, Structure and.W:orking 
of the Lea{iTle of Nations, pp, 493-94.) 
117. See infra, p.262, 
118, F,D,, S.F. Oct. 1920, Nos. 705-806 1 Notes P• 2, 
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of the basis of British policy towards Arghanistan in 
the light of changed post-war conditions,ll9 
For all this, it is evident from the Viceroy's 
proposed reply to Habibullah that the Indian government 
were prepared to leave the door open for further dis-
cussion of the issues which the Amir had raised, and, 
while refusing the Afghan request for representation at 
Versailles, were not unwilling to allow Afghanistan free 
diplomatic intercourse with the other nations of the world, 
in return for adequate assurances of non-cooperation in 
R · d . I d" 12° F th l t· ussJ..an es1gns on n 1a. ur er specu a J...O:n as to 
the possible outcome of the discussions Chelmsford 
suggested in his draft reply would be interesting, but 
unfruitful! such speculation was still proceeding in 
Delhi when news reached India that the Amir had been 
murdered at Laghman in the early morning of 20 February. 
Attention was focussed on the resultant political turmoils 
within Afghanistan, leaving alaost forgotten the events 
of the last few days· of Habibullah's reign, and the 
momentous changes in Afghanistan's international status 
which they had so nearly brought about, 
119, I"bid. Monta€,"11 even had his doubts about the offer 
of the Garter, as he believed that King George would be 
opposcJd "on principle" to granting it in Habibullah' s 
case. 
120. Such as they may have been at this period, 
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CHAPTER V 
A "WONDERFUL MYSTEHY" AND ITS AFTERMATH: 1919 
l. The death of Habibullah and the brief struggle for 
the succession: February 1919. 
Three days after the murder of Amir Habibu~lah on 
20 February 1919, the British Agent at the Amir 1 s 
court wrote:- "The motive for the crime is as uncertain 
as the identity of the murderer. But how it was 
possible to murder such an important personage, surrowld-
ed as his bed was by guards, is a wondecful my,stery which 
l it is useless to discuss at present," It is an unfort-
unate fact t·:cnt, unless some new and definite information 
comes to light, the identity of the assassin and his 
precise motive is still almost as much a "wonderful myst-
ery" as it was so soon after the event. 
Habibullah was, as usual, resident in Jalalabad for 
the win~er of 1918-19 1 and the most important members of 
his court had travellod with him to the winter capital. 
A few days before his deat:c1 he had decided on a week' s 
hunting trip in the Laghman valley, a few miles to the 
north-west of Jalalabad, He was accompanied on this 
expedition by his ~~rother Nasrullah Khan, his eldest son 
'Inayatullah Khan, his Sipah Salar (commander-in~chief) 
Nadir Khan, and other members of the Yahya Khel family. 2 
Customary and eJ.aborate arrangements were made for the 
Amir'ssafety during the night. 3 At about} a.m. on the 
1. F.D., S,F, Jun. 1919, Enclosure in No. }8, 
2. Ibid. (Report of the British Agent in Kabul, who 
was a~lal~bad at the time,) The Amir's Envoy in 
India maintained that 1Inayatullah and Nas~Allah were in 
Jalalabad on the night of the Amir 1 s death, but it must 
be remembered that the Envoy was forced tn observe these 
events from a considerable distance. (~., Note to 
No.}2,) 
.J, ~·• Note to No,86. 
212 
morning of 20 February, however, Nadir Khan and,,other 
officers of the royal guard were awa.kened by a general 
commotion, and it was found that t::1e Amir had been kiLLed. 
during his sleep by single shot through the 4 a ear. 
Although it seems highly probable that one of t',cte 
personal servants who slept within the Amir 1 s tent 
fired tlw fatal shot, the ultimate responsibility for 
Habibullah 1 s assassination is far more difficult to 
determine, The quest:iTct lG one that is dis cussed in 
Afghanistan to this day, but the diS'' >ss Lon is pointless 
to the extent that, whoever plotted to murder the Amir, 
the plot misfired. Habibullah 1 s death was foll•YN'ed by 
what could have beeome a dangerous interregnum, in 
which the succession to the throne was seriously in 
doubt. Even if the identity of the Amir 1 s murderer was 
today known with certainty, such knowledge would make 
little difference to a historica,l analysis of the events 
which followed his death.5 
As soon as Habibullah 1 s death had been established, 
the news was telephoned from Laghman to Jalalabad, and 
thence to Kabul, where Amanullah Khan had been installed 
as governor during his father's absence, Hayatullah Jan, 
who had been sent to succeed his brother as governo t' of:' 
Kabul some days previously, was ordered by Nasrullah to 
remain at Nimla, a small town some 25 miles west of 
6 Jalalabad, where he had i'all•'n sick on his way to Kabul. 
4. The \vriter has been privileged to d.i''"·lSS these 
events with H.R,H. Marshal Slctah Wali Khan, from whom 
his information j_c; drawn, 
5· Although lack of certain knowledge in 1919 was of 
considerable importance in tht> brief struggle for power 
between Nasrullah and his nephew Amanullah. 
6. F.D., S.F, Jun. 1919, Enclosure in No. JS. 
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Nasrullah Khan was determined to use this opportunity 
to secure his own ascent to the throne, and his first 
concern was to combine the news of his brother's death 
with that of his own accession. He had first to fulfil 
the form of "election" to the throne of Afghanistan, 
then bury his brother and announce the fait accompli to 
the provincial governors and the Government of India, in 
order to secure their recognition, Accordingly, on the 
afternoon of 20 February, he summoned a darbar of all the 
important personages who could be brought to Jalalabad at 
such short notice, They included 'Inayatullah Khan and 
other members of the royal family, together with leading 
mullas and local religious dignitaries, who announced that 
a new Amir must be proclaimed before Habibullah's body 
could be interred. At the close of the proceedings all 
present offered formal allegiance to Nasrullah as their 
A . 7 new m1r, 
The mullas' pronouncement that the late Amir could 
be buried only by his elected successor was an important 
one for Nasrullah, who naturally wanted his own succession 
to be recognised as quickly as possible. Habibullah was 
interred in the golf-course in front of the Siraj-ul-
'Imarat, the palace he had built in Jalalabad, at sunset 
on the day of his death. 8 A further and larger darbar 
was held the following morning, at which large parties 
of the local population were presented to Nasrullah Khan, 
and at which 'Inayatullah Khan, who had now succeeded to 
- . .. - 9 Nasrullah 1 s former position of Na 1 ib~us~Saltanah, pro-
mised to Nasrullah: "I will serve you as loyally and 
7 , Ibid, , No. 18. 
8, ~·, Enclosure in No,J8, 
9. See supra, p.22. 
obediently, sir, 
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10 as I served the late Amir, my father," 
The proceedings were terminated by the mid~day prayer, at 
which Nasrullah 1 s name appeared in the khutbah, a formal 
recognition of his accession, 11 Realising, perhaps, 
that his continued failure to initiate serious enquiries 
into Habibullah's murder might earn him the disloyalty 
of the troops in Jalalabad, Nasrullah raised the soldier's 
pay from Rs.S Kabull to Rs.ll per month, and despatched 
farmans announcing his accession to the provincial 
governors, He had written also to the Viceroy to inform 
him of the events o:f 20 February and had added:~ "I 
hope that the friendship and friendly intercourse between 
the Exalted Governments of Afghanistan and Great Britain 
will be daily strengthened and increased by the efforts 
12 
and endeavours of this friend and Your Excellency," 
10, ~· 1 Inayatullah Khan's part in the contest be-
tween Nasrullah and Amanullah was an entirely passive 
one, Although his support of Nasrullah at Jalalabad 
caused inffiial suspicions on Amanullah 1 s part, he soon 
demonstrated his loyalty to Amanullah after the latter's 
accession, and was restored to favour, The British had 
formerly regarded 'Inayatullah as a powerful and ambitious 
prince, but it now seems clear that at no stage in his 
life did he haw serious designs on the throne, and pro~ 
bably accepted it only with reluctance after Amanullah's 
abdication in January 1929. (Private information,) 
ll. The khutbah is a sermon delivered by the khatlb 
(preacher) at the commencement of the Friday prayer. It 
includes prayers for the sovereign, who must be mentioned 
by name, Failure to do so would constitute a formal 
declaration of rebellion. 
12. F.D,, S.F. Jun. 1919, No. 18, The fact that 
Nasrullah lost no time in informing the Government of 
India of his accession was described by the Viceroy as 
"very satisfactory", and compared favourably with the 
attitude of Habibullah immediately after 1Abdur Rahman's 
death. (Ibid., No, 26.) 
Nasrullah remained in control of Jalalabad for about 
a week, and was generally recognised as the ruler of 
Afghanistan during that period, His failure to investi-
gate the origins of Habibullah's murder while he had the 
opportunity to do so, or even to show much concern about 
the matter, is an almost incomprehensible one. When the 
British Agent asked him whom he suspected of the crime, 
Nasrullah replied, in an offhand manner, "some faithless 
infidel or other", and left it at that, 13 Nasrullah's 
failure to act in this matter was to cost him his throne. 
Although there is less first-hand information on 
events in Kabul than in Jalalabad, it seems clear that, 
soon after the news of Habibullah 1 s death reached the 
capital, AmanuTiah summoned to him all the most important 
officials who were immediately available. They included 
the now aging 'Abdul Quddus Khan, together with Ghulam 
Haidar Khan and Muhammad Sarwar Khan, the officers in 
charge of the Kabul garrison and treasury respectively. 
After a three hours' consultation with these senior 
officials, Amanullah "summoned all civil and military 
officers in Kabul to whom he announced that Habibulla 
had been murdered by Nasrulla who had proclaimed himself 
Amir. Nasrulla was a traitor and Amanulla would avenge 
his father," Amanullah subsequently announced that all 
troops who promised to support him would 
Kabuli per month, with immediate payment 
receive Rs,20 
14 
of arrears. 
The adherence of the Afghan army to his cause was 
Amanullah's chief weapon in the brief struggle for power 
which now ensued, A few days after Nasrullah 1 s accession 
news of Amanullah's repudiation of his uncle's claim to 
13. Ibid., Enclosure in No,JS, 
14, Ibid., No, 51. 
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the throne reached the troops at Jalalabad, and discon-
rent at Nasrullah's rule broke to the surface, Nasrullah 1 s 
political power had always rested on the support he 
commanded among the Pashtun tribal leaders and mullas 
on both sides of the Durand line, and he was evidently 
unprepared to meet the opposition of the regular governw 
ment personnel, of the army and the civil administration, 
whose favours he had never cultivated, By 25 February he 
had received certain news of Amanullah's attitude, but 
in a letter to the Viceroy he deprecated its importance, 
He explained that 11 Sardar Amanullah Khan, Ain-ud...,Daula, 
who was at Kabul, has, owing to his youth, been persuaded 
by certain interested persons to deviate from the path of 
obedience and submission to me", but maintained that 
Amanullah would soon be brought to his senses, and that 
he would then recognise his uncle's claim to the throne. 1 5 
Less than a week later Nasrullah was forced to reverse 
his position, and to explain to Afghan government officers 
in 
as 
India that he had been forced to yield to Amanullah 
"the King for the time being11 • 16 The opposition to his 
rule of the Jalalabad garrison, together with Amanullah's 
control of the arsenal and treasury in Kabul, had forced 
Nasrullah to abandon the throne within a very short 
space of time, On 24 February he had called for a parade 
of all troops in Jalalabad, and all seemed to augur well, 
but the same evening a fanman from Amanullah arrived in 
the Jalalabad barracks informing the soldiers of Amanullahts 
own claims to the throne, chiding them for their failure 
to arrest Habibullah 1 s murderers, and extending the offer 
of Rs,20 per month to all who would support him, Nadir 
15, Ibid, , No. 61, 
16, Ibid,, No, 84. 
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Khan, presumably forced by his presence in Jalalabad to 
support Nasrullah, did his best to maintain the loyalty 
of the troops, but his efforts were of no avail against 
Amanullah's attractive financial offers, The next day a 
"secret meeting" of officers and men determined to 
announce their opposition to Nasrullah's rule, and to 
arrest Nadir Khan and the Yahya 
part in Habibullahts murder. 17 
Khel for their supposed 
By 27 February,, after a 
brief period of uncertainty in Jalalabad, Nasrullah was 
forced to write to Amanullah to tender his formal abdica~ 
tion, He had evidently been compelled into submission 
by the realisation that, while Amanullah could exert 
immediate pressure on his rival through his command of 
the regular forces, the principal treasury of the country, 
and modern means of communication, the tribal lashkars, 
on which Nasrullah himself depended, could not be 
mobilised at sufficiently short notice. 
Nasrullah accompanied his letter to Amanullah of 
27 February with an announcement of his abdication to 
the leading darbaris to whom he had proclaimed his 
accession only one week before. On Friday 28 the 
khutbah was read in Amanullah's name in Jalalabad, and 
during the following week Nasrullah Khan, together with 
1 Inayatullah Khan and the Yahya Khel, were brought to 
K b l f . . t th 18 T b . I d. a u or 1mpr1sonmen ere. o o servers 1n n 1a, 
Amanullah1 s victory had the appearance of completeness. 
17, Ibid,, Note to No,l08, Habibullahls Finance 
Minister, Mirza Muhammad Hussein, was to be arrested at 
the same time, On the day of the arrests (26 February), 
the A 1 lya Hazrat, Amanullah 1 s mother, was sent by 
Nasrullah Khan to reason with her son in Kabul, Needless 
to say, she announced her support of 
as soon as she reached the capital, 
18. Ibid,, Note to No,86, 
Amanullah 1 s cla.i.ms 
(Ibid,, Note to No,llJ,) 
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2, Amanullah: his opinions and character, 
Amanullah Khan, who was twenty~six years old at the 
time of his accession, 1 9 was described by Sir Henry Dobbs, 
a later Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, as 
"probably the most interesting and complex character in 
his dominions", 20 He was Habibullah 1 s son by Sarwar 
Saltana, the A 1 lya Hazrat 21 or Siraj .. ul .. Khatin, a lady of 
the Barakzai house whose power had always been reckoned 
as considerable, and whose important connections had 
been held to represent a significant factor in her son's 
bloodless victory over Nasrullah. 22 During his father's 
lifetime Amanullah's importance had generally been over-
shadowed by that of his brother, 1 Inayatu:llah Khan, and 
for this reason his character and opinions were not 
widely known. During the early months of his reign he 
revealed himself as an energetic ruler, determined to 
attend faithfully to the business of government and the 
complaints of his subjects in a way which endeared him 
to the people at large, and which was contrasted favour-
abiy with the lassitude and inattention of which his 
father had been accused, As we have seen, Habibullah had 
been anxious to introduce the appurtenances of modernisa-
tion to his country, and had eventually become convinced 
of the need to secure complete independence from the 
British, but he had not allowed the "modernist" party to 
infringe his autocratic powers, Amanullah, however, had 
been closely associated with the "modernists", and was an 
19. Ibid,, Note to No, 35. Sir Percy Sykes (History of 
Afghanistan, Vol, II, p. 267) quotes Amanullah 1 s age as 
twenty~nine, but this seems to be an overestimate, 
20. F,D,, 224.,.F, l92J, P• 7 • 
21. "Her Majesty". "Sira,j-ul-Khati.n" means "Light of the 
Noble Ladies". 
22. Particularly through 
of Qandahar at the time, 
that the speed with which 
her brother, who was governor 
It is the writer's contention 
the counter-coup against 
/(22) 
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intimate friend of Mahmud Tarzi, their chief representa-
tive; his commitment to the aim of a modernised and 
completely independent Afghanistan was thus deeper than 
that of his father, the child of an older generation. 
He pursued it with a seriousness which was to produce 
an atmosphere at court markedly different from that of 
Habibullah 1 s reign; as Dobbs wrote:- "The prevailing 
atmosphere of the Court and of all Kabul is one of 
utilitarian priggishness. The cry is 1 no useless mouths, 
Everyonenust work for his country. 11123 Even during 
the early years of his reign there was evidence that 
Amanullah was prepared to carry his modernist policy to 
the exWeme of open opposition to the more reactionary 
elements among the clergy, an attitude which he undoubtedly 
shared with his father, but which Habibullah had only 
betrayed occasionally and in passing remarks, 24 
Amanullah's pursuit of these aims was however 
hampered by his mercurial temperament. Like his father, 
he was capable of adopting some project of national 
advancement with great energy and enthusiasm, only to 
abandon it later when some other interest engaged his 
attention, Habibullah 1 s magpie-like brain, with its 
surprisingly deep grasp of such a wide range of disparate 
subjects, from mechanics to archaeology, was not fully in-
herited by his son, but Amanullah was always completely 
unpredictable and impulsive, capable of adopting one 
policy one day, and then, with no apparent loss of sincer-
ity, of pursuing the opposite the next, The friends of 
one year could become the bitter enemies of the next, a 
(22) Nasrullah was carried out prevented any effective 
intervention by the provincial governors, who had barely 
received the first news of Habibullah 1 s death by the 
time that Nasrullah had abdicated. It is suggested that 
the importance of the A 1 lya Hazrat's family connections 
was therefore, and in the final analysis, relatively slight. 
23. F.D., 224-F, 1923, p. 9. 
24. F.D,, 2(B)-F, 1923, Note to No.J85, 
characteristic which was as unnerving to the foreign 
diplomats who had business with the Amir as it was 
frustrating to those who wished to proceed with the 
internal reconstruction and modernisation of Afghanistan 
in a methodi.cal manner. It made negotiation with the 
young monarch extremely difficult, for those who worked 
with him could forecast his reactions only when a very 
restricted range of subjects was at issue. On one point 
alone was the Amir completely firm; that his country must 
gain and retain complete independence, and that its 
prestige must at all times be fully maintained, For the 
rest, he was prepared to subscribe to any creed or policy 
which offered to increase his country's bargaining power 
in the world: pro-Bolshevism at one moment, anti-
Bolshevism the next: support of religious orthodoxy as a 
rallying-point against foreign influence at one moment, 
opposition to the religious hierarchy who stood in the 
way of internal reforms the next. Dobbs remarked as 
early as 1921 that "His one idea is to key the whole 
nation up to a pitch of strenuous and efficient discipline, 
and then to launch it in the quarter which gives him the 
greatest hope of success.•• 25 As the 1920 1 s progressed, 
Amanullah was further fired by his determination to rival 
the achievements of Reza Shah Pahlevi I in Iran and 
AtatU~k in Turkey, themselves products of the same genera-
tion of Islamic thought, which witnessed the gradual 
decline of pan-Islamic ideals of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and the appearance of the 
25. F,D,, 224~F, 1923, P• 9. 
221 
nationalist theories of the inter-war period. 26 
J, Amanullah's initial problems, March-April 1919. 
Amanullah Khan's plans were limited during the open-
ing weeks of his reign by the practical realities of the 
situation produced by Nasrullah Khan's formal capitulation, 
Nasrullah had been forced to concede the throne to his 
nephew "for the time being11 , 27 but Amanullah could not be 
certain that his uncle's submission was permanent, or 
that the Pashtun tribes might not mobilise in Nasrullah's 
favour. His first concern was to vindicate his claim 
that his uncle had been responsible for Habibullah's 
death by conducting an enquiry and "triaH' to prove his 
point. As we have already seen, the ¥ahya Khel had 
been among those arrested by the troops at Jalalabad, but 
Amanullah had evidently decided that he could not afford 
to sacrifice this talented and well connected family 
since he depended on many of its members for the 
of several important military and administrative 
staffing 
28 posts. 
26. A full discussion of this metamorphosis would be out 
of place in this thesis, which must restrict itself in 
space to just one of the countries in which it took place, 
and in time to the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. Professor Muhammad Habib discusses some of the 
issues involved in his article "Recent Political Trends 
in the Middle East. Pan-Islamism to Nationalism". (India 
Quarterly, Vol.I), 
27. See supra, p.216. 
28. Nadir Khan was of course Sip~ Salar at the time of 
Habibullah's death, while Suleiman Khan and Hashim Khan 
were Na 1 ib-ul-Hukumat (provincial governor), and Na 1 ib 
Salar (provincial military commander) respectively in the 
province of Herat. Hashim Khan was later to become 
Amanullah's Governor of Mashragi (Jalalabad)~province, The 
young Amir also appointed Shah Mahmud Khan hakim (district 
governor) of Khost, while Shah Wali Khan remained as h~im 
of Gardiz until the visit of the British mission under 
Sir Henry Dobbs of 1921, when he became second-in-
command of the Afghan delegation. (See Shah Wali Khan, 
op • cit • , p • 28 • ) 
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At a darbar held in Kabulon 13 April, which amounted to a 
public but carefully pre-arranged trial of Nasrullah's 
party, the Yahya Khel were stated to be completely free 
of blame, and Nadir Khan "was admired greatly for the 
secret help and the messages he sent from Jalalabad to 
the new Amir at Kabul during the Amirship of Nasrullah 
Khan 11 , 29 Amanullah had clearly determined to hold 
Nasrullah responsible for Habibullah 1 s death; discussion 
arose among the darbaris as to whether Nasrullah should be 
executed for the crime, but the new Amir had evidently 
decided not to risk provoking a revolt in his uncle's 
favour by the Pashtun tribes, 30 and he succeeded in 
persuading the darbar to accept the imposition of a 
sentence of life-imprisonment. The fact that Nasrullah 
had failed to investigate the circumstances of Habibullah 1 s 
murder was regarded as clear proof of his guilt, and 
several of the personal servants of Habibullah, who were 
alleged to have been accomplices of Nasrullah in his crime, 
received lengthy prison sentences, The only death sent-
ence imposed by the darbar was that passed on Karnil 
29. F.D,, S.F. Jun. 1919, No.l54. This claim is a curious 
one, in that it is not mentioned by Nadir Khan's biographer, 
Burhan~ud-Din Kushkaki, (op. cit.), nor by Marshal Shah 
Wali Khan, It is also surprising that Amanullru1 did not 
hold this public trial of Habibullah's assassins until over 
a month after Nasrullah's arrest. 
The British Agent in Kabul, who attended the darbar in 
question, believed that all the evidence brought before it 
had been carefully prepared by Amanullah, and pointed 
out that none of the accused were allowed to give evidence 
in their own defence, Rybitschka also describes the pro-
ceedings; (op. cit., pp.l44-46). 
JO, Or so the British Agent believed, The fact that his 
life had been spared did not, in the event, prevent 
Nasrullah's supporters from reacting to the darbar in a 
hostile manner, Nasrullah died in prison some months 
later. 
'Ali Reza, whose father had been commander of the 
Jalalabad garrison at the time of Habibullah's death, 
and who had himself been one of the officers of the royal 
guard.Jl Amanullah evidently believed that Nasrullah's 
conviction had finally settled the question of the 
succession, and he closed the darbar with a lengthy 
speech emphasising this point. 
Some description must be given of the governmental 
changes introduced by Amanullah during the opening weeks 
of his reign, and of the support which the new Amir 
received among his countrymen during the same period, if 
his decision to open war on British India so soon after 
his accession is to be satisfactorily explained, During 
the month which followed Nasrullah 1 s abdication, Amanullah 
restaffed certain of the provincial capitals with his 
supporters, 32 and reconstructed the Majli<3-i-Shura(privy 
council), so as to include in it those who favoured his 
cause. Among the more important of his supporters were 
'Abdul Quddtts, Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Dlwan Narinjan Das, 33 
Saleh Muhammad Khan (later appointed Sipah Salar), and 
Mahmud Tarzi. The flexible and relatively informal 
nature of the Shura enabled Amanullah to reintroduce the 
Yahya Khel into the ruling circles of Kabul once their 
Jl, According to Rybitschka (op, cit., p. 145), 1Ali 
Reza was in command of the Amir 1 s guard on the night of 
the murder. The British Agent in Kabul described him as 
"Orderly Officer" to Habibullah, (F.D., S,F, Jun,l919, 
Note to No,l47.) 
32. ~., Note to No, 97. 
JJ. Later Amanullah1 s Mustofl-ul-Mamalik (Finance 
Minister), and a delegate to the Rawalpindi and Mussoorie 
conferences. The Dlwan's family had been resident in 
Afghanistan since the 17th century, and had a long 
history of service in the financial departments of 
various Muslim monarchs, both Mogul and Afghan, (See 
The Pioneer (Lucknow), 21.4.1920). 
non-complicity in the murder of Habibullah had been 
announced, 34 Towards the end of March the members of 
224 
the Shura were created "ministers" of the various depart-
ments of government w an attempt to give the council at 
least the appearance of a "cabinet" organised along 
western lines,35 Only in the case of the Foreign Ministry 
did this reorganisation involve any substantial recon-
struction of the machinery of government, Under Tarzi.'s 
direction, the Nazirat-i-Kharijah36 (Foreign Ministry), 
was organised according to a regularised pattern, with 
specific duties and spheres of competence, qualities 
which the other central departments of government appear 
to have lacked, 37 Nor did the formal reorganisation of 
the ShUra involve any permanent transfer of authority 
from the monarch to the bureaucracy, for the ultimate 
power of decision still rested with the Amir. 38 
34, Nadir Khan was not re-appointed Sipii:h Salar until 
after thethird Afghan war, (Shah Wali Khan, op, cit,, p.28.) 
35. F,D,, S.F. Jun. 1919, Note to No,l26, 
36. British observers believed that Amanullah's use of 
the word "Nazirat." (in imitation of the Sovietsi who used 
the term as a translation of their "Commissary")• was a 
clear indication of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The 
title was in any case soon changed to the more usual 
11 WazEirat". 
37. Tarzi was appointed Naz:i.r (and later Wazir) ~ 
Kharijah, It was to the Foreign Ministry that many of 
the small group of young Afghan intellect,ctals attached 
themselves, and the Ministry retained a strong connection 
with the journalistic life of Afghanistan. 'Abdul Hadi 
Dawi Khan, an official of the Fore.tgn Ministry and later 
first Afghan ambassador in London, was for a time editor 
of the Aman-i-Afghan, successor to the Siraj-ul....Akhbar, 
and the opinions of the Afghan press were generally 
recognised as those o.f the Foreign Ministry. 
38, Or so Sir Henry Dobbs believed. (F.D,, 224-F, 1923, 
pp.6-7.) 
Although he had succeeded in securing the support 
of many of the most important figures at court, and at 
least the nominal allegiance of Nasrullah Khan, Amanullah's 
position was still far from secure even two months after 
his accession. The Kabul and Jalalabad garrisons believed 
that the findings of the judicial darbar of 13 April 
were both unjust and politically motivated, and Amanullah 
could hardly forget that it was ultimately the troops in 
these two cities who had done most to place him on the 
throne, and that they might well be as capable of 
removing him from it if they saw fit, The troops mainM 
tained that the acquittal of the Yahya Khel was unreason-
able, and that Amanullah himself and the A 1 lya Hazrat 
had had a hand in Habibullah 1 s death, They were joined 
by some of the Pashtun chieftains and mullas who had 
been Nasrulla£1ls traditional supporters, Sir George Roos-
Keppel, Chief Commissioner of the North~West Front:i_,,r 
Province, reported in late April 1919 that "Mullas in 
Ningrahar [the area round Jalalabad] are working up 
feeling against Amanulla and it looks as if he may have 
serious tro-uble later on", 39 Once tb.e findings of the 
judicial darbar had become known, the British Agent in 
Kabul became even more worried by the possibility of 
outbreaks of violence directed against the young Amir, 
particularly 
Habibullah's 
by the Kabul 
40 
mother, as 
and Jalalabad garrisons. 
well as Nasrullah' s own :family, 
were said to be preparing for a direct appeal to the 
troops, and the British Agent feared that "there will 
undoubtedly be fatal rioting in the Army", "which is 
reported at Kabul, Jalalabad and elsewhere to have been 
39· F,D,, S,F, Jun. 1919, Note to No, 152, 
40, Asal, a slave girl of 'Abdur Rahman's from Samarqand, 
She must have been a very old lady by this time, 
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thoroughly dissatisfied at the decisions [of the darbar]"~l 
The possibility of disturbances caused the Amir to order 
a dispersal of his troops towards the eastern provinces 
about the end of April. Such a dispersal served the twin 
purposes of removing the garrisons from Kabul and Jalala-
bad, where they were capable of bringing the most 
immediate pressure to bear on his government, and of pre-
venting the hostility of the Pashtun tribes from reaching 
active proportions. 42 The stage was set for a far more 
fundamental diversion: an attack on British India, 
supposedly to force its government to recognise the 
claims of the eomplete independence of Afghanistan which 
Amanullah had made since the beginning of his reign, 
The progress of Anglo....Afghan relations during the brief 
period of the reis~ of Nasrullah and the early months of 
that of his nephew deserves some attention at this 
point. 
4. The Indian government's reaetion to events in 
Afghanistan, February....April l9l9, 
The Government of India passed through one of the 
most criticaJ. phases or their relations wi~h Afghanistan 
during the last weeks of February l9l9, They had 
found themselves on the threshold of revolutionary 
developments even before Habibullah's death. The future 
was already uncertain, but the atmosphere of uncertainty 
and danger was still further increased by the accession 
of Nasrullah, whose attitude towards the British had 
always been hostile. They were unwiJ.lin,o; to accede to 
Nasrullah' s request :for their recognition of his accessi<Yel 
4l, F,D,, S.F, Jun. l9l9, Note to No, l54B, 
42. F,D., S,F, Jul. l919, Note to No, l. 
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(a request implied in his letter of 20 February), 4J and 
were fortunately saved :from this dilemma by the news of 
Amanullah' s accession, whicl1. reached India before a reply 
to Nasrullai::1 had been prepared, At the same time 
Amanullah's opposition to his uncle promised catastrophic 
consequences. A civil war could well have resultedrj and 
the British feared that the Bolsheviks might intervene, 
and that the Government of India would be forced to take 
counter-measures for which they were ill-prepared, 44 
The news that Amanullah had been generally accepted as 
Amir by the end o:[' February, and that Nasrullah had 
abandoned his own c.laims, must have been rece:LvHd tn 
India with some relief, Not that the Indian authorities 
had any clear idea of Amanullah's policies or of his 
attitude towards themselves; the most important aspect 
of Amanullah's accession was simply that Afghanistan had 
a ruler, and that the c:Lvil war which had been threatened 
appeared to have been averted, 
Once they could be certain that a prolonged contest 
for the Afghan throne was unlikely, the Government of 
India co··.1ld return their attention to the problem repre-
sented by the Afghan demand for the cancellation of the 
British control of Afghanistan's foreign relations. 
It was a demand implied by Amanullah in hj.s very first 
letter to the Viceroy, written on J March 1919, in which 
he announced his accession and the acceptance of his rule 
by the other members of the royal fam:Ll~r a ... :vl the Jalalabad 
garrison. In writing to the Viceroy, Amarmllah committed 
himself no further than the statement that "our independent 
and free Government o:f Afghanistan considers itself ready 
and prepared" to conclude a new agreement with the British 
4J, 
44. 
Mar, 
See supra, p, 214. 
The problem is discussed in F,D,, Dep, F,, 
1919, Nos. 5~8, 
(Secret), 
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45 goverrunent, but in contemporar:;r proclamations 
Amanullah was a good deal more specific in his demands, 
declaring openly that "the Gove""~unent of Afghanistan 
should be internally and externally independent and free, 
that is to say, that all rights of government that are 
possessed by other inde>pendent Powers of the world sho~,!ld 
be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan". 46 The 
Foreign Department of the Government of India realised 
that if Amanullah's request for a new treaty between 
Afghanistan and Britain were refused, "we have slender 
ground to stand on; we can urge no breach of faith, for 
we have ourselves always maintained that the treaties 
with the Amir were personal and not dynastic, and a new 
Amir is therefore at fulJ. liberty to refuse to ratify 
treaties made with his predecessors". 47 Curzon's insist-
ence on the claim that the British agreements with 'Abdur 
Rahman had to be re.~;lGgotiated with his successor had 
come home to roost. 
At the same time the British did not regard 
Amanullah 1 s accession and his declarations ocf independ·· 
ence as critically d<mgerous to themselves. Ha.'Uilton 
Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Indian~ government, had 
decided in 1915 that in the event of Habibullah's death 
"we should have no immediate reason to anticipate any 
formidable hostilities against India" and that "even were 
Amanullah Khan to lead such a conspiracy [against his 
father] he would have the bulk of the royal family against 
him and the result would be such internecine strife as 
would preclude the possibility of Afghanistan seriously 
45, See Appendix 17, 
46, Parliamentary Papers ("Papers regarding Hostilities 
with Afghanistan, 1919 11 , see bibliography), No, 2, 
47, F.D,, S,F, Oct. 1920, Note to No. 720, 
229 
threatening India as a united whole, 1148 In March 1919 
the Indian government still clung to this belief, main-
taining that the 11Amir will have his work cut out for a 
year or two in Afghanistan, and is not like.ly to think 
much of foreign politics beyond bidding for the support 
of Government, ., 49 They proposed to .reply to Amanullal1 
in a nonwcommittal way, forcing the newAmi.r to state 
his demands openly, but recognising that he might require 
some new sort of treao/relationship with themselves, 
They believed that if Amanullah publicly repudiated the 
old agreements, as he had every right to do, they should 
accept his repudiation with good grace. They were pre-
pared to wait until the Afghan government's shortage of 
funds, which they believed inevitable in view of the 
massive increases in the pay of the army, drove the Amir 
to seek for some new agreement, which was expected to 
take the 
death. 5° 
form suggested by Denys Bray before Habibullah's 
As Bray remarked on 26 April, "my ideas remain, 
mutatis mutandis, much the same as those which governed 
my note of 22nd February", 51 with the important difference 
that his views were now definitely accepted by the 
Government of India as a whole, 52 As it was, the reply 
to Amanullah which was finally despatched on 15 April on 
48. F,D,, Dep, F., (Secret), Mar. 1919, Nos. 5-8, Notes 
PP• 27 and 28, The idea that Habibullah might be ove.r-
t:li.rown by Amanullah was not generally discussed before 
1919, and this is one of the very few references to such 
a belief, 
49, F,D,, S,F, Jan, 1919, Note to No, 86, 
50, Ibid,, No, 124, See supra, pp,206-08. 
51• F.D., S.F, Oct, 1920, Note to No, 720. 
52, As is proved by the fact that they were expressed in 
an undated draft letter from the Viceroy to the Secretary 
of State for India, (Ibid.) It seems likely that this 
letter was never despatched because the third Afghan war 
broke out while it was still awaiting the Viceroy's 
signature. 
the basis of the Secretary of State Edwin Montagu's 
amendments, revealed too little of whctt the Indian govern-
ment might be prepared to concede, making it not unreason-
able for Amanullah to claim, as he did, that his request 
for a new treaty with the British had been firmly refused, 
The Viceroy had originally proposed to tell Amanullah 
that 11 it seems possible that the Government o.f Afghanistan 
may have in view some supplementary agreement or treaty 
which it is desirous of concluding with the British 
Government", 5 J but Montagu secured acceptance of the 
far more guarded statement: 11 it seems possible that the 
commercial requirements of Afghanistan are thought to 
call for some agreement with the British Government. 11 5 4 
A far more serious error made by the Government of India 
in their reply to Amanullah was their pretended assumption 
that the British agreements with 1 Abdur Rahman were still 
in force, a claim which they realised could not be upheld, 
and which created the impression that Amanullah's request 
that they be cancelled had been peremptorily rejected,55 
The British were not prepared to make an open declaration 
of their real policy to Amanullah, principally because 
they believed that time was on their side, and that the 
need to obtain a new subsidy from the Government of India 
would eventually force the Amir to re-approcwh the 
British authorities in a more chastened state of mind 
than that which he had adopted at the beginning of his 
reign. Above all, the British doubted that any important 
change in the existing state of Anglo-Afghan relations, 
in particular an Anglo-Afghan war, could intervene so 
53. F.D., S,F, Jun. 1919, No. 124, 
54. See Appendix 18. 
55. As Montagu pointed out (F,D., S.F. Jun. 1919, No,lJ2). 
Unfortunately, his reservations on this point had no 
effect on the Government of India's reply to Amanullah, 
')'ll 
,;;,.j J. 
soon after Amanullal1' s accession. They noted Amanullah' s 
dispersal of the Kabul and Jalalabad garrisons towards 
the Indo~fghan frontier at the end of April, but Roos-
Keppel, who reported them from Peshawar, rejected the 
notion that these disposition presaged an attack on 
India, pointing out that the harvest in Afghanistffi 
had been a very good one "and this alone is enough to 
negative any idea of offensive action eit'J.er on the part 
o:f Afghan people or Government",56 Nor did the British 
Agent in Kabul treat seriously the belief, admittedly 
popular among the tribesmen of the frontier, that these 
troop movements were preparatory to an attack on the 
British; he believed that they were necessitated by 
popular reaction to the judicial darhar of 13 April, 57 
Tbe Viceroy told the Secretary of State on 2 May that 
Roos~Keppel 1 s interpretation of the Afghan troop movements 
"is inherently the probable one", and thus rejected the 
rumoured news that an invasion of India was intended.5S 
The situation at the beginning of May in fact offered 
little logical basis for the conclusion that an attack 
across the north-west frontier was at all likely. 
Amanullah had claimed that his government was no longer 
bound by 1Abdur Rahman's "memorandum of obligation" with 
the British but the Government of India had realised 
that they had no legal grocmds for insisting on the 
contrary, they were prepared to negotiate with the Amir 
on this basis if he showed willingness to enter into such 
56. F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1919, No. 1, 
57, Ibid., Note to No. 1, See supra, p.222, 
58, Parliamentary Papers, No. 6. 
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negotiations, 5 9 and they did not be.lieve that their 
letter of 15 April failed to reveal this fact, It was 
realised that Amanullah's position within Afghanistan 
was now less secure than it had appeared to be at the 
beginning of March, but there was no reason to suppose 
that discontent at Amanullah 1 s rule could not be contained 
by the troop movements which he had undertaken, The 
publication of the Rowlatt Act, designed to prevent in the 
post-war period the disturbances which had occasionally 
broken out in India during the war years, had produced a 
critical outbreak of violence in the Punjab and at 
scattered points throughout northern and western India 
during April, but these disturbances had been largely 
suppressed by the end of that month, and there ~ no 
evidence that at that time60 the authorities seriously 
feared that the Amir might take' advantage of unrest in 
India to launch an invasion of Indian territory. 
5. Amanullah decides to go to war: possible explanations, 
The reasons for Amanullah 1 s decision to bro~den the 
scope of the troop movements into eastern Afghanistan by 
undertaking an attack on India are still difficult to 
assess. Something has already been said about Amanulla.h 1 s 
impulsive character, and his tendency to make decisions 
of great consequence almost on the spur of the moment, 
The news of the Punjab rebellion may wel.l. have helped 
the young Amir to believe that resistance by the native 
population of India would be slight, and that a similar 
59• A willingness which Amanullah never demon$rated 
(even if he may have felt) in so far as he did not reply 
to the Viceroy's letter o.f 15 April until 10 May, i, e., 
after the third Afghan war had broken out, 
60, I.e., at the end of April. The point is of some 
importance in the context of the contemporary history of 
India, and is discussed in Appendix 24. 
situation 
partially 
was unlikely 
. t•f'· d 61 JUS J. J.e ,. 
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to recur. His hopes were only 
and the single organised scheme 
of' insurrection which he projected, the capture of 
Peshawar city by rebellious mobs commanded and presumably 
financed by the Afghan postmaster in Peshawar, 62 which 
was planned for 15 May, was known to the British, and 
scotched when the city was sealed off' and the postmaster 
and his staff' arrested on 8 May. 63 
Several explanations for Amanullah 1 s decision to 
attack India have been offered, besides his assumed wish 
to exploit the Punjab disturbances. A modern educated 
Afghan would almost certainly claim that his country 
went to war in 1919 in order to vindicate her claim to 
61. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieut.~Governor of' the Punjab, 
later maintained that "Instead of' being welcomed by 
mutinous troops and a rebellious population, as they [the 
Afghans] had been led to expect, they found a well-
equipped army of two hundred thousand men barring their 
way, supported by the loyal millions of the rural Punjab," 
(India as I Knew It, p. 273.) It cannot, however, be 
claimed that there was no active sympathy for the Afghans 
among the natives of' India during the third Afghan war, 
The Khaibar Rifles had to be disbanded after mass deser-
tions by the men of this locally-recruited frontier force 
(Parliamentary Papers, No, 19), while in Waziristan 11,000 
out of' the 11,600 men of' the South Waziristan Militia 
deserted (B. de Wattsville, op, cit., P• 55), desertions 
which forced the British to evacuate forward areas of' 
Waziristan, and which J.ef't an atmosphere of intransigence 
among the Mahsuds and Wazirs which was to involve 
British forces in renewed operations in 1920, 
62. F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1919, No, 174. The existence of' an 
Afghan Post Of'f'lce in Peshawar, technically necessitated 
by Afghanistan's non-membership of' the Universal Postal 
Union, had often been a source of' irritation to the 
flritish, since the Afghan government naturally used it as 
a centre for espionage and intelligence work. It was 
abandoned after the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921. (See 
Appendix Jl, Article X,) 
6), Parliamentary Papers, No. 14, 
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complete independence, but, as has been seen, it is 
difficult to maintain that the door to further discussion 
of Afghanistan's future status had been definitely closed 
by the British, and only just possible to claim that 
Amanullah believed it had. Amanullah 1 s failure to 
continue his correspondence on this subject with the 
Government of India, and his failure to mention it in 
the extensive propaganda which he distributed to the 
Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand line, 64 do not 
support the view that he initiated the war with the 
British with the specific aim of gaining independence for 
his country. 
Several British commentators later believed that 
Amanullah's decision to attack British India was the 
result of "Bolshevik" instigation (whether of the Moscow 
government or of the virtually independent Tashkent 
Soviet is usually unstated). 65 There is no clear evidence 
64. Amanullah 1 s appeals to the frontier tribesmen aroused 
much anger in British circles, and several of them were 
published in the Parliamentary Papers (~., Nos, 8, 16, 
and 23), presumably in order to prove Afghan bad faith. 
It is, however, difficult to understand why Amanullah 1 s 
propaganda should have been considered so especially 
heinous. There can have been few wars in modern times 
in which one side has not attempted to incite the citizens 
of the other to rebellion. The British themselves printed 
a proclamation "to the brave and honest people of 
Afghanistan" in which they advised their readers to neglect 
the order of "this inexperienced youth [Amanullah], false 
to the memory of his martyred father, false to the inter-
ests of his country, false to the dictates of the Holy 
Koran". (F.D., S.F. Jul. 1919, Enclosure in No. 4J,) This 
proclamation was distributed in eastern Afghanistan by 
aeroplane, but naturally remained unpublished in the 
Parliamentary Papers, One can see little difference be-
tween Afghan and British propaganda activities during 
the war of 1919, except that the former were more extensive, 
and more successful. 
65. See, ~·• F.D., S.F. Jul. 1919, No. 8J. 
235 
to support this belief although it is of course true that 
the Tashkent Soviet welcomed the Anglo...A:fghan war once it 
had broken out. Amanullah and Mahmud Tarzi wrote to 
Lenin on 7 April to announce their desire to strike up 
friendly contact with the Russian government, but they 
received no reply until the end of May. 66 At no point 
in this correspondence is the Anglo-Afghan war referred 
to, and, as the Viceroy pointed out to Edwin Montagu, 
"there is nothing to show that Amir received any promise 
of Bols:'1evik support before embarking on his aggressive 
action. It seems doubtful whether he has received such 
promise since. 1167 One is driven to the conclusion, con-
curred in by many contemporary British observersPBthat 
the Amir resolved to attack India almost on impulse, 
attracted by the recently disturbed state of the Punjab, 
and propelle•l by fears of a coun-Elr-revolution against 
himself unless an engaging diversion could be arranged, 
and that he had n.o such scheme in mind until after the 
middle of April, The fact that the bulk of his army 
had already been moved to the eastern provinces for inter-
nal reasons, allowed him to carry out this plan with the 
minimum of special preparation, 
6. The outbreak and progress of Anglo-Afghan hostilities, 
May~June 1919, 
Amanullah evid<lntly decided to test British reactions 
to his impending attack by making his first aggressive 
move through Zar Shah, a weJ_l-known bandit of the Khaibar, 
who was acting under semi-official orders on J May when 
he held up a caravan proceeding to Landi Khana, just east 
of th_e Anglo-Afghan frontier ·~ a frontier which was in 
66. Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR (hereinafter "Soviet 
Documents"), Vol. II, No, 116, with addendum, See also 
Parliamentary Papers, No. J4. 
67, F.D., S,F, Aug. 1919, Enclosure in No, 296. 
68, See, ~·, Parliamentary Papers, No, 10, 
236 
any case disputed at that point. 6 9 Zar Shah distributed 
a farmem of Amanullah which complained of the injustices 
of the Rowlatt Act, and wh.ich announced that the newly 
appointed S.ipan Salar, Saleh Muhammad Khan, would shortly 
visit the frontier area, 70 A darbar was meanwhile held 
in Kabul at which Amanullah further emphasised the ini-
quities of the British in India and the middle east, 
and called upon his listeners to prepare for jehad,7l 
The Indian government decided to assume that Zar Shah 
was not acting on official orders, and that the farman he. 
69. The dispute over the Anglo-Afghan boundary in the 
Khaibar had been a source of friction between local 
officers on both sides for many years. Correspondence in 
1898 between Lord Elgin, at that time Viceroy, and 'Abdnr 
Rahman, had failed to produce a final set Llement, a"ld the 
boundary at this point remained undemarcated until after 
the treaty of Rawalpindi of August 1919, when the frontier 
was fixed at Tor Kham, and the Afghan claim to Landi Khana 
(about 2-Jm. to the east of Tor Kham), was overridden. 
(F.D., S.F, Oct, 1919, No, 127.) _For earlier correspond-
ence on this topic, see F.D., s.r., Sep, 1908, Nos. 14-
lJJ,) 
Roos-Keppe.l believed that Zar Shah's attack was simply 
another move in this long standing dispute, and held that 
11 it wo·.:ld seem unwise to risk precipitating hostilities" 
on this issue, (F,D,, S,F, Jul. 1919, Note to No, 5.) 
70, Parliamentary Papers, No,· 8. 
71. Many Afghans seem to have been convinced at the time 
that the British had seized the Holy Places inArabia, 
and the issue remained as important a rallying-point for 
Muslim opponents of British policy as it had during the 
first world war, The allied occupation of Constantinople 
and part o.f Asiatic Turkey raised further antipathies, 
The question was to remain asa major obstacle to the 
development of friendly Anglo ... A:'ghan relations until 
Mustafa Kemal abolished the Khilafat in March 1924, One 
gains the impression that several members of the Govern• 
ment of India objected to the Lloyd George cabinet's 
policy of partition of the Ottoman empir·9, precisely 
because of the bad effect it had on Muslim opinion in 
India and in the Middle East in general, 
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had distributed was a forgery; they immediately addressed 
Amanullah in this sense, aad asked him for a public denial 
of the farman 1 s authenticity. 72 By the time this 
message had reached Kabul however, it was clear that 
Saleh Muhammad Khan was determined on open hostilities, 
The new Sipah SaJ.ar dismissed Zar Shah in disgrace for 
his failure to adopt a more aggressive attitude in the 
Khaibar, and correctly accused him of being in secret 
correspondence wLth the British; 73 at the same time (on 
4 May), he entered the village of Bagh, at the western 
end of the Khaibar, and thus occupied an indLspc:tably 
British position with regular Afghan forces ,7 4 Reports 
meanwhi.le reached Peshawa7.' :that Nadir Khan, who had been 
appointed commander of Afghan forces in Khost, had 
entered Gardiz wi.th 7,000 regulars, and that he and his 
brothers Shah Wali Khan ar1d Shah Mahmud Khan were 
collecting tribal forces for an attack on British pos:i tions 
in north Waziristan and the Kurram valley?5 'Abdul Quddus 
Khan received his last military appointment as commander 
of forces in Qandahar and the important Afghan frontier 
post of Spin Baldak. 76 Even at this stage, however, the 
British were still hoping for a negotiated withdrawal of 
the Afghan troops, which would avoid open hostilities; 
Roos .. Keppel 1~rote to the Sarhaddar77 of Dakka on 4 May, 
pointing outfue encroachment of Afghan troops on British 
72. Ibid., No, ll. 
73· F.D., S.F, Jul, l9l9, No, 26, 
74. Ibid,, Note to No, 39· 
7 5, Ibid,, No, 28, See also Shah Wali Khan, op, cit,, 
pp,8-l8, and Kushkaki, op. cit,, pp. 102-105. 
76. Kushkaki, op. cit., P• lOO, 
77. Local cfrontier officer. (The title is sometimes 
rendered as "Sarhang".) Dakka is the Afghan village 
nearest to the Anglo...Afghan frontier in the Khaihar, 
2'lx v \) 
territory, "possibly by error", and requesting prompt 
withdrawa1. 78 It was not until 6 May that the British, 
realising that an undeclared war wae; inevitable, ordered 
general mobilisation; it was thus that British India 
entered into her third war 1qi th Afghanistan within 
eighty years - a war which, unlike either of its pre-
decessors, had been caused by direct Afghan incursions 
into British territory. 
A purely military history o.f the war cannot be 
attempted here, and the story has in any case been we.ll 
described by the soldiers of both sides.79 Essentially, 
the conflict developed as three distinct campaigns, al.l 
of relatively short duration, ar1d separated in time as 
well as in space. An initial campaign in the Khaibar 
resulted in the virtually complete defeat of the Afghan 
80 forces at Dakka by 17 May. An Afghan counter-attack, 
led by Nadir Khan, then developed in north Waziristan, 
78. Parliamentary Papers, No& 9· 
79, The two published unofficial eye-witness accounts of 
the war are those of Lieut,-General G,N, Molesworth, 
Afghanis tan J.9l9, and Marshal Shah WaJ.i Khan, op. cit, , 
pp.5-28, General Molesworth deals most fully with the 
operations in the Khaibar and Dakka areas in which he 
personalJ.y served; Shah WaJ.i Khan similarly concentrates 
his attention on the activities of his brothers Nadir 
Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan, and of himsel:f, in the Kurram, 
Thal and Wana areas respectively. Both give much informa-
tion not contained in The Third Afghar1 1:'J:ar. 1919, Official 
Account. Kushkaki, op. cit., PP• l02-4J, also deaJ.s 
with Nadir Khan's activities in some detail, and repro-
duces important correspondence between Amanullah and 
Nadir Khan, Rybitschka, op. cit,, PP• 147-60, provides 
·the point of view of a forei.gner resident in Afghanistan 
at the time, who came near to pJ.aying an active part in 
operations on the Afghan side. 
80, Seo Mo.lesworth, op, cit., PP• Jl-70, 
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in the course of which the British fort of Thal was in 
grave danger 
27 May and 2 
of capture by the Afghan forces between 
81 June. More serious still was the whole-
sale desertion of the :neE of the locally-raised Waziri-
starL Militias in the fourth week of May, which resulted 
in punitive campaigns by British forces until the 
82 February of 1920. Almost unrelated to either of these 
campaigns was the British advance into Afghan territory 
from the Quetta area, and the consequent capture on 
27 May of the Afghan fort at Spin BaldaJ<, some six miles 
north-west of the Indo~fghan frontier at New Chaman. 8 3 
The Afghan advance :tnto Chi tral between 12 and 23 May 
and the minor operations in this area following the de-
feat of the main Afghan striking force, which continued 
long after a cease-fire had been declared on other fronts, 
may be held to represent a fourth campaign, though of 
entirely local importance. 84 
In strictly military terms, the i.snne can hardly have 
been in doubt, Although weariness after five years of 
war had weakened British morale, and the contemporaneous 
post-war demobilisation had to some extent disarranged 
the British military machine, British and Indian forces 
available nevertheless totalled about 340,000 men, 8 5 
81. Ibid,, PP• 110-30, Kushkaki, op. cit., PP• 123·•25 and 
Shah Wali Khan, op. cit., PP• 20-21. 
82. Shah Wali Khan, op, cit. , pp. J.6·-l9 and Molesworth, 
op. cit., pp. 155-7 2. See also supra, p. 233 footnote 61. 
83. Molesworth, op. cit., pp. 140-54. 
84. Ibid., PP• 131~39•' 
85, Si.1c Percy Sykes (History of Afghanista:n, Vol,II, 
p.27l) quotes this as the total o:f British forces 
engaged "north of the Indus", Should this read "west of 
the Indus", or "north of the mouth of the Indus"'? 
supported by an air arm w:'1ic;~ their enemy lacked. The 
Amir could command a regular force of only about 46,000, 
deficient in training~ and especially so in modern arms 
and transport equipment. The irregular tribal _Lashkars, 
as British strategists realised, still represente•l the 
real rnili tary strength o.f Afghanistan, but they could 
be mobilised only at their own volition, and they were 
86 likely to turn against either side, even the Afghan, 
if it proved the weaker, They wer"' or most value as 
guerilla fighters within territory already occupied by 
an enemy, Had political factors been excluded, and had 
the precedent of the two previm::s Afghan wars been 
followed, the British would before long have occupied 
the principal centres of Afghanistan, their victory lim-
ited only to the extent to which they could guard their 
lines of communications in a hostile and desolate country. 
That they did not do so in 1919 was a measure of the 
precedence of political over military considerations, 
7. War ~ims and an armistice: divisions of opinio·.'l 
in both camps, 
It wa.s one of' the c-:trious features of the third 
Afghan war that correspondence between the two governments 
involved was broken off for barely a fortnight; 87 a 
slightly less curious one, perhaps, that there was 
seriou'S disagreement betweC\:c" different parties on each 
side as to the extent to which the conflict should be 
86, The aerial bombardment of Afghan military installa-
tions at Jalalabad on 17 May was for instance followed 
by large scale incursions of tribesmen in search of loot, 
(F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1919, Note to No;225~) 
87. Roos-Keppel's final letter to the Sarhaddar of Dakka 
demanding the withdrawal of the Afghan troops from Bagh 
was sent on 4 May. (Parliamentary Papers, No, 9,) Saleh 
Muhammad Khru,ts first appeal for a cease-fire appears to 
have arrived at the British lines on 16 May, (~;, 
No, 17,) 
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prolonged, The British had entered the wax' with no 
clear aim in view except to eject the Afghan army from 
British territory; this very limited objective was subw 
sequently expanded to include the infliction of as heavy 
defeat as possible on the Afghan forces, on Afghan soil, 
but no definite decision had been made as to the advisab~ 
ility of a permanent occupation of Afghanistan, or parts 
thereof, It has been seen that on the Afghan side the war 
had been launched with many and ill-defined mot:Lves,' 
The fact that the Afghan forces had been severely defeated 
on one fro:ci;, but had attained an unexpected degree of 
success on another, was to add to the confusion by pro .. 
ducing different opinions among the Afghan commanders on 
the question of suing for an armistice, 
Within a few days of the commencement of the conflict, 
the Kabul authorities demonstrated their anxiety to end it, 
The British Agent in Kabul, who remained at his post through-
out the Anglo..Afghan war, reported that on 10 May88 "I 
had three hours 1 straight and frank talk with Minister 
[presumably Mahmud Tarzi]. The Minister, who was 
88, There is some doubt about the date of this encounter, 
which may have taken place at any time between 10 and 13 
May, The messag-e in which the Agent reported this conver-
sation was one of three found by the British on about 18 
May on the body of a dead Afghan runner who had been 
employed by the Agent to carry his correspondence to the 
British lines, (F.D., S,F, Jul. 1919, No; 224~) It is 
noteworthy that these three messages originallyformed 
part o:f a telegram dated 1.9 May, from the Viceroy to the 
Secretary o:f State, which was published in the Parliament ... 
ary Papers as No, 23, For some reason, however, the 
transcripts of the Agent's reports were excluded from 
the published version of this telegram, The extent to 
which the original documents bearing on the third Afghan 
war were altered before presentation to Parliament is 
discussed in Appendix 25. 
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terrified at the reported results of the aerial bombard-
ment in which Saleh Muhammad Sipah Salar was wounded 
and 25 men were killed, 8 9 admitted his ignorance of 
practical politics, acknowledged the gross mistakes 
committed by Amir and in repentant mood asked me to save 
situation, guide him and e:nter into certain preliminary 
understandings." The Agent adYised Tarzi to approach 
the Government of India for an immediate cease~fire, and 
although the Agent's request for an interview to discuss 
this proposal 1vi th Amanullah was eventually refused, 90 
Saleh Muhammad Khan found himself forced on 16 May to 
write to the British Political Agent in the Khaibar to 
explain that he had been ordered by Amanullah 11 to suspend 
war (thus unlawfully begun by your side) until further 
orders",9l The British refuted the Sipah Salar's claim 
that they bore entire responsibility for the outbreak o:f 
war, and they pointed out to him that any request for an 
armistice should be addressed to the Viceroy through the 
British commander, General Sir Charles Munro, 92 On 21 May 
the Amir' s Envoy in India, 1Abdur Rahman, 93 accordingly 
wrote to the Indian government requesting a meeting to 
. 94 
arrange for a prompt cease·-fire. The Delhi authorities 
89, A refere:ctce to the R,A,F, bombing attack on the 
Afghan ca:np at Dakka of lO May. (F,D,, S.F, Jul. 1919, 
No. 100,) The British believed, probably correctly, 
that aerial bombardment had a considerable effect in 
weakening Afghan morale. 
90. ~·, No. 224. 
91. Parliamentary Papers, No~ 20. 
92. ~· 
93. Unlike his Indian counterpart in Kabul, 'Abdur 
Rahman had r.eturned to his homeland after the outbreak of 
hostib.ties, 
94, Ibid,, No, 29. 
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continued to maintain that the Afghan approaches could 
not be regarded as official, and that tAbdur Rahman had 
no credentials and could thus be repudj_a ted by the Amir ;9 5 
their attitude remained unaltered even when 'Abdur 
Ralunan visited the British lines with the Sarhaddar of 
Dakka, Karnil 'Ahmad Ali, on 23 May, 96 and they did not 
call off their own operations until after 28 May when 
an official request for an armistice was received from 
the Amir, Amanullah maintained that his forces had been 
sent to the eastern provinces to prevent unrest in India 
from spread:Lng to Afghanistan, and that his Sj_pah Salar 
had occupied British territory in error, but his letter 
of 28 May also enclosed copies of his orders to the 
Afghan commanders to cease hostilities, 97 The Indian 
government replied to this message on J June; they 
explained that they were willing to accept an armistice 
only on condition that the Afghan troops were withdrawn 
twenty miles from the existing British lines, and that 
the Amir ceased his appeals to tribesmen on both sides of 
the Anglo-Afghan frontier to rise against the British. 98 
Although hostilities between the regular forces of both 
sides had effectively ceased as from J June, 99 it was 
9 5, Ibid. , No, JO. 
96. Ibid., No, JJ. 
97, See ibid., Nos, 48 and 49. It is evide:rc.t from the 
second of these documents that by this time Saleh Muhammad 
Khan had been replace;d as commander of the "Eastern Side" 
(~., of the forces in the Jalalabad or Mashragi pro-
vince?) by Do.o:t Muhammad Khan. 
98, Ibid., No, 51. This letter was not despatched from 
the British lines until 6 June. 
99. Sir Percy Sykes (op. cit,, Vol,II, p. 280) writes 
that "the signing of the armistice on June J officially 
ended the war", and Lieut.-General Molesworth would 
appear to follow him in stating (op. cit., P•' 121) that 
"On June J the armistice was signed", The writer has been 
unable to find any reference in the British documents, 
published or unpublished, to any armistice or cease-fire 
/(99) 
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only after lengthyand sometimes acrimonious correspond-
lOO ence between the Indian and A:fghan governments that the 
Amir agreed, on l8 July, 
to arrive at a •selected 
to despatch a "peace delegation" 
lOl place" on 24 of the same month. 
In the meantime a sharp con:flict of opinion had developed 
in the British camp on the question of extending the 
British advance further into Afghanistan, and the eventual 
terms of peace to be imposed on the Amir. There was a 
dissension of a similar kind runor"g the Afghan leaders, 
It is evident that Amanullahl s eag·erness to end the 
war so soon after it had broken out was not shared by 
Nadir Khan, who, in view of the poor state of communica-
tions between Khost and the Afghan capital, was less under 
the immediate control of the Amir than Sa1.eh Muhammad 
Khan and his successor, There was a time element also in 
the conflict between Nadir Khan and Amanullah, As we 
have seen, the Afghan forces facing the Khaibur had been 
defeated by l7 May; Nadir Khan did not begin to leave his 
base at Matun until 23 May, to appear before the British 
fort at Thal two days later,'102 The British withdrawal 
(99) agreement having been signed on that date, The 
Viceroyls letter to Amanullah setting down the conditions 
on which an armistice wa.s to be offered (Parliamentary 
Papers, No. 5l, see supra, footnote 98) was however written 
on J June, and this is presumably the event referred to 
by Sykes and Molesworth, It was on 2 June that Nadir 
Khan informed the British commander at Thal, Brig,-General 
Dyer, that the Amir had ordered him to cease fire, and 
British operations against regular Afghan forces were sus-
pendedas from the following day. (Molesworth, op;: cit,, 
pp.l20-2l.) 
lOO, See Parliamentary Papers, Nos~ 52, 55, 56, 59 and 60. 
lOl, ~., No, 60. The place eventually selected was 
Rawalpindi, 
102. Shar1 Wali Khan, op. cit,, PP• 20-21, and Molesworth, 
op. cit,, PP• ll4;.l5. 
from forwa.r·d posts in Waziristan took place still later, 
between 26 May and J June. 103 By the end of May, when 
the Amir's orders for a cease .. fire arrived from Kabul, 
Nadir Khan still occupied a position of strength which he 
bel.ieved should be exploi ted,.104 He reacted sharply to 
AmanullaJ1 1 s anxiety to end the war at any cost, and it 
appears that it was Nadir Khan's objection to the with~ 
drawal which the British demanded which forced Amanullah 
into the trucule~t attitude which he adopted on this 
point in the correspondence he had wi.th the Indian 
government during June and July.'l05 It would seem that 
Amanullah had E;ven been prepared to offer terri to rial 
concessions to the British in order to assure their con~ 
sent to an armistice, and that Nadir Khan succeeded at 
least in persuading him to abru1don this policy, 106 
Nevertheless, Amanullah's approach to the question of 
peace terms with the British remained fundamentally 
different from that of Nadir Khan. The Amir had been 
deeply affected by the British success at Bagh and Dakka, 
and probably believed that there was little to prevent 
the Brttish from continuing their advance to Jalalabad and 
Kabul if they desired. Nadir Khan had been equally 
lOJ, Molesworth, op, cit., pp. 155-58 and Shah Wali 
Khan, op. cit,, PP• 16-19. 
104, Kushkaki, op;cit,, p,lJl, Sir William Barton dis-
putes Kushkaki 1 s claim that Nadir Khan believed a further 
advance into Waziristan possible when he relates: ... "as 
he [Nadir Khan] told a British officer several years 
later, his one j.dea was to avoid bringing his troops into 
collision with the British-Indian troops as he knew they 
would be scattered like chaff," (India's North-West 
Frontier, P• 77.) Kushkaki, however, brings contempor~ 
ary documentary evidence to bear, which Barton does not, 
105,' See the correspondence between Amanullah and Nadir 
Khan reproduced by Kushkaki, op, cit, , facing pp ,· 138 .. 39, 
l40~4l and l42~4J, 
106, Ibid,, facing P• lJS, 
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affected by his own success at Thal, and that o:f his 
brother Shah Wali Khan in Waziristan, and regarded 
Ama:nullah'.s capitulation as a Dolchstoss by the 
Amanullal1-Tarzi faction with whom he had never been on 
very good terms. The result was to create difficulties 
f'or the British in the immensely prolonged series of' 
Anglo-Af'ghan negotiations which followed the third 
Afghan war, f'or conditions which might be accepted by 
Amanullah or his nominees were likely to be rejected 
if they passed under Nadir Khan's scrutiny. In this 
sense Afghanistan 1 s relations with her powerful neighbour 
were deeply affected by her internal political situation. 
The differences of' opinion within the British camp 
were of' a comparable nature, During May several 
British officials seem to have supposed that their army 
would f'ollow up its victory at Bagh and Dakka by advanc-
ing on Jalalabad and Kabul, and that Amanullah would 
then be replaced as Amir by some other candidate more 
amenable to the British; in other wo:cds, that the pattern 
of' the two previO'lS Afghan wars would be repeated, Henry 
Dobbs even prepared a memorandUlll discussing the merits 
of the various candidates f'or whom his government might 
select a new Amir, l07 but Sir Hamilton Grant remarked 
of' these plans that "I doubt whether we shall ever 
come to king-making again in Afghanistan", 108 and it 
seems f'airly clear that, in the Delhi Foreign Department 
at any rate, there was little enthusiasm f'or the scheme 
which Dobbs envisaged. Nevertheless the military 
authorities favoured an advance f'rom Dakka to Jalalabad, 
107, Dobbs was Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchi~ 
stan at the time. (Y',D,, S.F, Jul. 1919, Note to No,225.) 
108, ~· 
217 '1. 
preparatory to an autumn campaign aimed at Kabul, A 
second force was to strike north•west from Chaman to 
Qandahar, The Government of India maintained in mid"' 
May that "no difficulty is anticipated in reaching 
Jalalabad m1d maintaining ourselves there",l09 but the 
plan received an initially cool reception from the 
London government. The Secretary of State rejected at 
first the Viceroy's claim that an adv~~ce to Jalalabad 
would prevent otribal rebellions behind the main British 
lines: 110 in Montagct' s view, the confl:Lct had not "gone 
beyond a frontier trouble", and he pointed out that a 
full-scale British invasion of Afghanistan would have a 
very harmful effect on British relations with other 
Muslim countries, which, as he admitted, were "already 
resentful and suspicious of British designs and likely 
to become further embittered when the terms of settle-
Ill 
ment with Turkey are known", Montagu's reply, which 
reached India on 17 May, seems to have forced the Indian 
government to redefine their terms; they now explained 
that an advance beyond Ja.lalabad would probably be unnec-
essary, and that they had no designs on Afghan independence, 
They claimed tLat the sole purpose of the advance they 
advocated was to secure from the Afghans a mo:r'e sincere 
109, F.D., S.F. Aug, 1919, No. 11, 
110, The Indian government had admitted that "increasing 
unrest and chance o:f' disturbance exists", but contended 
that "this will best be met br the news of Jalalabad 
being occupied by us , 11 (Ibid.) The argument does not 
appear altogether convincing. During the :first A:f'ghan war, 
for instance, the British suffered severely from tribal 
rebel.lions precisely a:f'.ter they had occupied the principal 
centres o:f' the country, 
lll. Ibid,, No, 15. Montagu re:f'erred to the allied 
decisionto sanction the partition of Asiatic Turkey, 
request for peace than that which they had ~lready 
l'" received from Saleh Muhammad Khan, ·"'" It was not until 
23 May that the India Office accepted these explanations,llJ 
and by then the value of Montagu 1 s concurrence had evap-
orated, Before the necessary preparations for an advance 
ll4 to Jalalabad could be completed, the Amir had sued 
for peace in a manner which the Government of India re-
garded as sinceniy meant, and had thus removed the only 
reason for a further advance which the London government 
were prepared to accept as valid, Among the higher 
British military commanders there may also have been some 
re .. thinking of the original proposals: Nadir Khan's 
unexpected appearance before Thal had forced the British 
strategists to turn their attention further south,· the 
problems of supplying the proposed garrison at Jalalabad 
had begun to be realined, ]_l5 while the increasingly hot 
climate of late May and early June had also to be born in 
mind, 116 Nevertheless, and j_n the lower echelons of the 
112. Ibid,, No, 20, 
llJ, Ibid,, No. 66. 
See supra, p.242. 
114. As Lieut,-General Molesworth relates, British 
forces received orders to be "ready to move" by 29 May, 
(op. cit,, p. 79•') It will be remembered that Amanullahfs 
orders to his commanders to cease fire were dated 28 May. 
(Parliamentary Papers, No. 48. See supra, p.24J. 
115, Molesworth, op. cit,, PP• 79-80, 
116. J,L, "!affey (at that time posted as "Chief Political 
Officer, North-West Frontier Field Force") told Sir 
Hamilton Grant at the end of May that on climatological 
grounds alone, "Amanullah's communication has been a 
great relief to meli" (F.D., S.F. Oct, 1920, Nos, 705-806, 
Notes P• 24.) However, Maffey1 s opinion does not seem 
to have been shared by all the British-Indian army 
officers, 
2 9 
British-Indian army in particular, it seems that there 
was some feeling that the Indian government's acceptance 
of Amanullah's request for an armistice had robbed the 
soldiers of a prospective but resounding victory. 117 
This state of mind was perhaps less prevalent in the 
British than in the Afghan army, where it had the power-
ful support of Nadir Khan, but the similarity is still 
fairly striking, and was to help create dissensions on 
the British side as to the terms of a post-war settlement, 
just as it did on the Afghan. 118 
8. The British approach to a peace settlement; June -
July 1919. 
During the stress of the Anglo-Afghan war, the 
Indian government had not decided whether Amanullah's 
attack called for an alteration of the not unfavourable 
attitude towards Afghan national aspirations which they 
had adopted during the last weeks of Habibullah's reign 
and the first two months of that of his son. Many British 
civil officers did not believe that it had, but recog-
nised that it might be difficult to allow Afghanistan 
formal control of her own foreign relations, in view of 
the opposition of military commanders who naturally believed 
117. Lieut.-General Molesworth writes of his own regi-
ment, the Somerset Light Infantry: "As we bore the motto 
'Jellalabad 1 on our badges, we were all agog to go and 
visit the place where the Regiment had earned the title 
of the 'Illustrious Garrison' in 1842. But on 29th May 
-to our disappointment- the order was cancelled". (Qp. 
cit. , p. 7 9. ) 
118. Some of the soldiers on .both sides seem to have 
believed that they had been sold out by the politicians. 
Such situations seldom have a happy effect in the post-
war period: witness the attitude of the German army dur-
ing the 1920s. 
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that their victory at Dakka entitled Britain to a 
punitive peace, and in view of the probable opinions of 
a highly conservative British Foreign Secretary. 119 
J.L. Maffey120 suggested that Amanullah should be allowed 
to conduct his own foreign affairs, but he believed that 
official mention of this in a formal treaty should be 
avoided, in the hope that the concession would pass 
unnoticed in London, As he wrote to Grant: "Foreign 
relations. Avoid all reference thereto, I should think, 
Curzon e Co. might not like it, but I think we should be 
wise to leave it alone." He added: "Durand, at any 
rate •• ,,made it quite clear that the sole reason for 
maintaining this control [i,e., the British control of 
Afghanistan's foreign affairs] was because we guaranteed 
to help the Amir against foreign aggression, Surely we 
do not want to renew any such guarantee in these very 
difficult days. And, if the guarantee, does not the 
control go too? 11121 Maffeyls views were shared by the 
t h 1 122 h . Foreign Depar ment as a w o e, but w en the Government 
of India prepared the draft of a new treaty with 
Afghanistan123 (and they were able to do so only after 
) 124 lengthy correspondence with the Secretary o:f State 1 
they were forced to concede several points to the 
military authorities, who were unwilling to let slip an 
119. Lord Curzon, 
120, See supra, p.248, footnote 116. 
121, F.D., S.F. Oct. 1920 1 Nos. 705w806, Notes P• 24. 
122. See ibid,, Notes pp. 27-32, in which Sir Hamilton 
Grant repeats the arguments in favour of a new relation-
ship with Afghanistan which Denys Bray had first voiced 
before Habibullah 1 s death. 
l2J, Reproduced as Appendix 20. This draft formed the 
basis of the Rawalpindi negotiations. 
124. See, ~·· F,D,, s.F. Aug. 1919, Nos. 190, 277 and 
295. 
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opportunity of strengthening their strategic position 
on the north~west frontier, Lieut.-General Kirkpatrick, 
Chief of the Indi.an army's General Staff, had proposed 
large-scale annexations of Afghan terri tory, includ:i.ng the 
occupation of land west of Khaibar so as to allow a 
future attacking force room for manoeuvre in the Jalalabad 
plain, as well as the annexation o.f Khost and of a size-
able strip of Afghan terri tory from .j.ust north of Chaman~2 5 
The Viceroy eventually agreed that the British draft 
treaty should include the stipulation that British troops 
should remain in the positions they occupied in June 
until "they [the British] have guarantees that Amir is 
contrite for the past and on his part anxious to regain 
126 the friendship of the British Government". The Indian 
government was however forced to admit that such a prov-
ision was unlikely to be acceptable to the Amir, and that 
they would prefer to substitute for this stipulation 
another providing for unilateral British demarcation of 
the undemarcated Khaibar frontier, rather than re-open 
hostilities with Afghanistan on this issue, 127 
Central to the new settlement with Afghanistan 
proposed by the Government of India was the decision to 
effect it in two stages. A preliminary treaty to re-
establish peace with the Amir was to be followed by a 
six months' "probationary period", during which the 
Afghan government could demonstrate their frie:e1dliness and 
their willingness to conclude a more permanent agreement, 
A second treaty would define Afghanistan's new relation-
ship with Britain, and, perhaps, would formally grant 
125. F.D., S.F, Oct. 1920, Nos, 705-806, Notes p. JO, 
126. See Appendix 20, Articles 4 and 5· 
127. See ibid, 
252 
full independence to the Kabul government. It is evi-
dent that the Government o.f India's espousal of the 
"probationary period" theory flowed out o:f the belief 
they had expressed at the beginning of Amanullah's reign 
that in the fullness o:f t:ime &.11 would be theirs, that 
experience o:f the hard realities o:f life in a strife-
torn world would soon force the Amir to turn to the 
British for advice and financial assistance. 128 
At the same time, the proofs o:f Afghan good behav-
iour ,,6ich the British reqnired during the "probationary 
period" were stern ones, and hardly likely to recommend 
themselves to the young and ambitious Amir, or his 
advisers, The Amir was to eject all "Bolshevik Missions, 
and Bolshevik, German and other :foreign agents 11 , 129 
and was also to expel Maulawi Barkatullah, Obeiduli.a::1, 
Mahendra Pratap and other Indian revolutionaries who 
had :first visited Kabul with the wartime German mission, 
and who still remained there.·130 The Amir was to 
128, See supra, pp.228-29. 
129, The Austrian internees in Kabul could hardly be 
regarded as "German agents"; in fact Rybitschka's comrade 
Schreiner rejected proposals later made by Amanullah 
that he be considered an official representative of the 
German government, (See supra, P• 190, and Rybitschka, 
op. cit., p. 21J,) 
lJO, See Appendix 20, paragraphs (1) and (J), and supra, p. 
17 5. 
Obeidullah and Mahendra Pratap were important principally 
because the British thought they were; their real influence 
in Afghan politics was negligible, which is why they have 
received only passing attention in these pages. Pratap 
had formed in Kabul a "Provisional Government of India", 
designed to take over :from the British after a successful 
Afghan attack on India; manifestos were issued in its 
name, and one o:f these was found at Thal in May 1919 
(Parliamentary Papers, No. 23). This attracted the 
attention o:f the British authorities, but there is no 
evidence that Obeidullah or Pratap played any part in 
instigating the third Afghan war, Most Indian "revolut-
ionary" activities during the great war and the succeeding 
/(lJO) 
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cease his attempts (mostly conducted through Nadir Khan 
and his brothers) to raise the frontier tribes against 
the British after peace had been declared, and was to 
improve the status of the British Agent in Kabul, in 
return for "A corresponding improvement in powers and 
position of Afghan Envoy with Government o:f India,"l3l 
Most important of the British demands, however, was the 
stipulation that during the "probationary period" the 
British monopoly of Afghanistants foreign relations should 
be retained. 132 In effect, the British government in-
sisted that to demonstrate that he was worthy of complete 
independence, Amanullah should be prepared to sacrifice 
that independence for the six months following the 
signature of the proposed "preliminary" treaty, without 
being given any indication that :l.f he behaved well it 
would eventually be restored to him, 
Whatever criticisms may be made of the Government 
of India 1 s draft treaty, it was at least the product of 
the intense re-appraisal of their reations with AfghaniM 
stan which the Indian Foreign Department had been under-
taking since February 1919, modified to some extent to 
meet the wishes of other Departments. That no such re~ 
appraisal had taken place in London was clearly demonstrated 
by the arrival in India, on 
Office's counter-draft, 133 
7 July, of the India 
134 The Secretary of State 
(130) period impress one principally by their hopeless lack 
of realism and effective planning, and the activities of 
the Indians in Kabul were no exception. (Several of those 
concerned realised this sooner or late: see, ~·• 
M,N, Roy, Memoirs, pp.237~8.) 
131. See Appendix 20, paragraphs ( 4) , ( 5) and ( 6) , 
132 •' Ibid,, paragraph ( 2), 
133· Reproduced as Appendix 19, 
134. Or rather, the authors of this counter-draft, One 
suspects, in view of Maffey!s remark above quoted (supra, 
p.250,) that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, 
may have played a part in devising it, 
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had evidently chosen to ignore the arguments in favour 
of a new relationship with Afghanistan which the Govern-
ment of India had expounded; the treaty he proposed -.ras 
substantially a reproduction of the British agreements 
with tAbdur Rahman which Curzon had demanded be repeated 
with Habibullah in 1904•05. In some respects it was still 
less attractive, for the balances of Habibullahts subsidy 
were to be declared forfeited, as a punishment for 
Amanullah's attack on India, and were not to be renewed 
until after the satisfactory conclusion of the "proba-
tionary period11 ; 135 there is no evidence that the treaty 
it was intended to conclude at the end of this period 
was to offer any concessions to Afghanistan, other thar, 
this, It was evident that the Government of India faced 
a formidable task if it was to persuade the British 
government in London, let alone that of the Amir, that 
its proposed settlement with Afghanistan was a suitable 
one. 
Differe'~ces between the Indian government and the 
India Office on this point were not overcome for several 
yearse Or~ 10 July the Viceroy repeated the now familiar 
argumeats against the renewal of the agreements with 
Afghanistan in their old form, 136 to receive the somewhat 
ambiguous reply, 137 that whilH the London authoritie.s 
were prepared to accept the two-stage settlement with the 
Amir which Grant had first proposed, they understood 
that "if preliminary Treaty is refused by Amir you are 
135, Appendix 19, clauses (6) and (8). 
136. F,D., S,F, Sep. 1919, No, 16. 
137. Ambiguous because the India Office did not explain 
which "preliminary Treaty" they referred to. (:Cbid, 1 
No, 50.) The Government of India exploited this ambiguity 
by assuming that the India Office had approved of their 
draft, 
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prepared for the immediate resumpQon of hostilities 
which you contemplate as inevitable sequel". The 
"preliminary Treaty" was thus, in the eyes of the India 
O.f'fice, to be put to the Amir as an ultimatum, on which 
no discussion was to be allowed: at the same time, the 
London government failed to make clear what stipulations 
they wanted that "preliminary Treaty" to contain, or 
whether their draft of 7 July still stood, It was 
evident, however, that there was a still more fcmdamental 
disagreement between the London and Delhi authorities on 
the terms of the final treaty. Montagu stated quite 
bluntly that "I should be sorry if anything was said or 
done to indicate that we contemplate a substantial 
chartge in our political relations with Afghanistan or 
that we can view with indifference a repudiation of 
obligations hitherto acknowledged."lJS The Secretary 
of State and his advisers clearly foresaw a final treaty 
which would di.f'fer little .from the old settlement con-
cluded with 'Abdur Rahman, while the Indian government 
were fully prepared, ~~d in fact anxious, to provide .for 
a new one o.f' a very different character, which, while 
allowing the Foreign Department to act as the Arnir 1 s 
"principal advisers" in foreign affairl3, would not insist 
on the strict control of his foreign relations by 
Britain, and would not saddle India with the recognisably 
dif.f'icult task of defending the northern frontiers of 
Afghanistan. Grant realised that this difference of 
views existed, and that "His Majesty's Government regard 
as all-important the retention of our control in some form 
lJS. Ibid, 
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or another139 of the Amir 1 s foreign relations". For 
himself, he could only add that "We shall of course do 
our best to secure this 11 , 140 but this was very different 
from saying that he would secure it, or indeed that he 
thought it ought to be secured, All that the Indian 
government had obtained was India Office approval to the 
principle of a two-.stage settlement, and it was in these 
conditions, with no real unanimity on the British side 
as to the nature of the final treaty with Afghanistan, 
that, on 24 July, the Afghan delegates to the Rawalpindi 
conference arrived in India. 
9• Afghan attitudes: June....July l9l9. 
The period between the cessation of general 
hostilities on 3 June and the opening of the Rawalpindi 
negotiations on 26 July witnessed a sustained effort by 
the Afghan government to keep alive the spirit of tribal 
unrest which had been generated by the war itself, In a 
sense, Amanullah 1 s first problem had remained unsolved; 
the war with the British had temporarily distracted the 
attention of Nasrullah 1 s supporters, but the Amir!s army 
had achieved no brilliant success, and in this way his 
position was, if anything, weaker than ever. Nadir Khan's 
opposition to his policy of peace with the British was 
yet another difficulty to be overcome, In the event, 
l39• The italics are the present writer's, since he does 
not believe that Montagu would have accepted such a loose 
definition of the "control" over Afghanistan which he 
wished to secure. Grant presumably believed that the 
final treaty which the Government of India proposed could 
be described as providing for 11 control in some form or 
another" over Afghanistan's foreign relations, and was 
trying to stretch the definition of the Secretary o.f 
State's proposals so as to cover this. 
l40. Ibid., Note to No, 57. 
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he skilfully managed to surmount both obstacles by in-
structing Nadir Khan and his brothers to remain in the 
eastern provinces, 141 where they spread the word that the 
cease-fire was merely a device to gain time, and that a 
renewed attack would be mounted against the British 
"after the 1 Id", 142 Attacks by tribesmen on British .. 
Indian troops and installations continued, while much of 
western Waziristan was still in Afghan hands, and parties 
of tribesmen constantly crossed the Durand line for ,jirgahs 
in Afghan territory, Yet, like the British, Amanullah 
had merely postponed his problems, and :not solved them 
finally. The need to support Nadir Khan's defiant 
attitude towards the Indian government143 forced the 
Amir to instruct his delegates at Rawalpindi to press 
for territorial concessions in Waziristan, and indeed 
throughout the belt of "independent" tribal territory, 144 
which were as unacceptable to the Government of India 
as the London government's draft treaty was to the Afghans, 
Nadir Khan's activities in the frontier areas were to add 
still further similarities to the approach of both the 
Indian and Afghan governments. His success in keeping 
high the anti-British feelings of the frontier tribesmen 
gradually convinced the Afghan government that it would 
be wise to postpone a final settlement with the British 
as long as possible, in the hope that continued trouble on 
the frontier would force the Government of India to concede 
wer more favourable terms. If, moreover, some degree of 
141, Shah Wali Khan, op. cit,, PP• 25w26, 
142, F,D., S,F, Au~, 1919, No, 376. The 'id referred to 
is presumably the 1Id-ul-fitr (marking the end of Ramaziin) 
of 1337 A.H. This would have oc.curred on 30 June, 1919, 
143. An attitude which Amanullah himself began to share, 
as time we:r:t on. 
144. See F,D,, S.F, Sep. 1919, No, 168, 
Russo-Afghan understanding could be arrived at before a 
final and permanent treaty with the British was signed, 
the price of Afghan friendship would be raised still 
higher, In this way, both the Kabul and Delhi governments 
came to believe that time would play into their hands, 
Neither party was prepared to regard the Rawalpindi 
negotiations as the final word on future Anglo-Afghan 
relations. 145 
LO. The opening of the Rawa.lpindi conference and the 
Afghan demands, 
Amanullah's choice of delegates to the Rawalpindi 
conference caused some surprise in Indian government 
circles, None of them were very directly related to the 
Amir himself, nor did any of the de.legates wield any very 
great power in the politics o.f' Kabul. Nadir Khan and 
Mahmud Tarzi were conspicuous by their absence, The 
majority of the Afghan delegates had previous connections 
with India and were considered personally well-disposed 
towards the British. 'Ali Ahmad Khan, the chief Afghan 
representative, had been educated at Murree, and had 
visited India on several occasions since; be had beeil 
recognised as a supporter o.f' Habibullah in his policy 
of friendship with the British, and had been a trusted 
servant of the former Amir, His principal fault was a 
tendency to overrate his own importance, and, hence the 
importance of' the Rawalpindi negotiations to the Afghan 
145· That the British were not is evident from the 
correspondence between the Delhi and London governments 
above quoted. Mr. 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi explained to the 
writer that the Afghan government adopted a similar 
attitude at the time. 
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146 government. Sir Hamilton Grant, as Foreign Secretary 
to the Indian government, headed the British delegation, 
and the task of putting the British case to the Afghan 
representatives rested almost entirely on his shoulders.147 
It would be impossible here to present a full 
account of the proceedings of the Rawalpindi conference, 
which lasted for two weeks (from 26 July to 8 August), Much 
was said that was not strictly relevant, and the same 
ground was often covered more than once. By 29 July, 
however, Grar"t had formed a fairly clear and correct im-
pression of the Afghan demands; as he wrote: "(l) The 
Afghans will not agree in any circumstances to the old 
arrangement regarding their external relations, (2) They 
are anxious for a reward for past services, preferably 
money. (J) They may propose some astounding readjustment 
of the frontier so as to give them our more troublesome 
tribes." 148 The Viceroy, however, believed that "More 
146. The large Afghan delegation included two former 
Afghan envoys in India ( 1 Abd~l 1Aziz Khan and 'Abdur Rahman 
Khan), and two Afghan officials of Indian descent (Diwan 
Narinjan Das and the Punjabi lecturer 'Abdul Ghani, 
recently released from the confinement he had undergone 
since the plot against Habibullah of 1909), Among the 
other delegates, Muhammad Rafiq Khan was a member of one 
of several Afghan families who, like the Yahya Khel, had 
been brought up in India. (See Parliamentary Papers, 
No,55, F.D., S,F, Aug. 1919, Note to No, 27, ar1d supra, p. 40.) 
147. The other members of the British delegation were:-
H,L. Maffey, returnedto his post as Private Secretary 
to the Viceroy; Brig.-General Moberly, of the Ind.ian 
General Staff; and Nawab Sir Mir Shams Shah and Sir 
Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi, representatives of the Muslim and 
Sikh communities of India, (See Parliamentary Papers, No, 
60,) In general, the part played by the subsidiary members 
of the British delegation in the proceedings of the con-
ference was less than that performed by their equivalents 
on the Afghan side. 
148. F,D,, S,F, Sep. 1919, No, lJJ, Grant's prediction 
was fulfilled on 4 August, when 'Ali Ahmad Khan demanded 
that "Whole tribal territory shall be made over to Afghani-
stan, who will run it on lines that will save British 
/(148) 
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afghano, demands were pitched high at the outset, and 
possibily were meant to be boiled down in the end to 
complete independence,plus cash"; 149 EL!3 a statement of 
1Ali Ahmad Khan's aims, this was reasonably correct, and 
did not greatly exceed the limits laid down by the 
Government of India in determining the outline of their 
final settlement with Afghanistan. Grant forced the 
Afghan delegates to relinquish the more extravagant of 
their demands by presenting the draft treaty prepared 
by the Indian government as an ultimatum, The Persian 
translation of this draft was handed to 1Ali Ahmad 
Khan and his colleagues at the third session of the 
conference, on 31 July, when Grant announced bluntly that 
"i:t must be decided forthwith whether it is to be peace 
or war"; he added that he was authorised to fix a time 
limit for the acceptance of the British draft,l50 and 
that his government were fully prepared to re-open 
hostilities if it was not accepted.l5l This approach 
seems to have unnerved 'Ali Ahmad Khan, who was forced 
to adrr.it on 4 August that his delegation accepted Grant's 
draft 11 in principle". He suggested 
modifications to any of the British 
no more than minor 
152 proposals, except 
on one point; he demanded a written assurance from the 
(148) Government all the troubles they have had in this 
quarter, Ai'ghan Government shall be given half the amount 
at present expended by Bri ti_sh Government on the C<Lltrol 
of tribes,;" (~., No, 168,) 
149. Ibid,, No, 153. 
150. After some discussion with the Afghan delegates, 
this was eventually fixed as 16 August. 
151, Ibid,, No, 149. Grant's threat was not bluff; in 
reporting the incident he informed the Indian government 
that "all military preparations should continue as hither .. 
to". (Ibid.) Plans for the continuation of the war had 
been prepared by the Army Department, and had evidently 
been accepted by the Viceroy and the Government of India 
as a whole, (See ibid,, No, 73,) 
152. Although it should be said that the extensive 
/(152) 
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Indian government "as regards independence of our 
foreign relations. This might form either separate 
article of treaty or be conveyed in separate letter. I 
attach greatest importance to this~' I realise that it 
is implied in treaty, but neither Afghan Government nor 
Afghan people will be content without some assurance on 
this subject." 153 
1Ali Ahmad's proposal struck hard at the weakest 
point in the Indian government's draft. They had con-
sciously decided to avoid any formal statement of Afghani-
stan's future status in the treaty to be presented to 
the Afghan delegates, leaving 1Ali Ahmad free to infer 
that Afghanistan's freedom to conduct her own foreign 
affairs 11 is implied in.treaty". The Afghan delegation now 
demanded a formal statement of the British attitude, 
a situation which the Government of India may have anlici-
pated, but to meet which they had formulated no concerted 
policy, Their original insistence that during the 
"probationary period" the British control of Afghanistan's 
foreign relations should be retained1 54 was clearly incon-
sistent with the Foreign Department's real aims for a 
final settlement, and Grant was thusfaced with a serious 
problem. If he granted in the preliminary treaty a 
concession he had intended to withhold until the final one, 
he would be forced to reconstruct the principles of 
his own stated programme, If, on the other hand, he 
refused 'Ali Ahmad Khan's request for a formal statement 
(152) territorial and financial demands which the Afghan 
delegation had at first suggested were not dropped 
finally; they were postponed, for discussion at the re-
newed negotiations which were expected to follow the 
"probationary period", 
153. F,D,, S.F, Sep,' 1919, No, 168, 
154. See Appendix 20, paragraph (2), 
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of Afghanistan's complete independence, he risked a 
renewal of hostilities designed to wring from Afghanistan 
conditions which his own department had long rejected as 
useless. Gra~nt himself was clearly prepared to present 
'Ali Al~ad with the assurance he required; he explained 
to the acting Foreign Secretary to the Indian government, 
Denys Bray, that 1Ali Ahmad Khan had told him privately 
that the Afghan government "had no wish whatever to 
use freedom thus acquired in any way detrimental to us; 
that if he remained in office he would do his best to 
induce Amir to consult us freely in this matter and he 
was sure that we would not have any cause for complaint",l55 
11. The British reaction and the signature of the 
treaty of Rawalpindi; August 1919. 
It should be fairly evident that the Government of 
India, while generally approving of Grant's desire to 
give the Afghan delegation a formal assurance that the 
Amir was now free to conduct his own foreign relations, 
were farfrom certain that the London authorities would 
approve o.f' such a step, Grant admitted that "I have said 
already to Ali Ahmad in writing that Treaty contains no 
suggestion of interference in external relations and for 
this I accept full responsibility. I have therefore 
···. 156 practically committed Government •'" The Foreign 
Department was also very anxious to present the Afghan 
delegates with some sort of reply on this vitally import-
ant point as soon as possible, since it was feared that 
if delay occurred 'Ali Ahmad Khan would use it to refer 
back to his government many of the points of the British 
draft which had already been discussed and agreed to •' 
155• F,D,, S.F, Sep. 1919, No, 168, 
156, Ibid~, No, 176, 
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On 4 August the Viceroy had telegraphed to the Secretary 
of State the text of a letter formally stating Afghani"' 
stan's complete independence which Grant proposed to give 
to tAli Ahmad Khan, 1 57 In asking for the London govern-
ment's approval of the step Grant advocated, Lord 
Chelmsford emphasised that "Afghan:is';an would only con .. 
sent to our formal control of her foreign relations after 
crushing defeat 11 ,l5B and effectively admitted that vbile 
the Government of India had been willing to re-open 
hostilities if the Afghan delegation had rejected the 
British draft treaty in toto, they were not prepared to 
inflict the "crushing defeat" necessary to :restore 
British control of Afghan foreign policy, By the morning 
of 6 August no reply to this message had reached India 
from London; Bray informed Grant of this, but told him 
that "If,.,;it is a question of signature of Treaty by 
Delegates now, or of reference to Kabul with grave risks 
inherent in delay, then you are authorised to give 
assurance desired regarding external relations,~,, l59 In 
this way the Government of India committed the India 
Office much as Grant had already committed the Government 
of India, and it was extremely fortunate that Montagu's 
approval in principle of Grant's recommendations arrived 
on the afternoon of 6 August. Montagu's telegram must 
have provoked profound relief, and perhaps surpcise, in 
India, since it represented something of a reversal of 
the India Office's previous attitude, 160 One gains the 
impression, in view of subsequent developments, that 
Montagu's consent to the Government of India's policy 
157. See Appendix 21. 
158. F.D. t s.F. Sep. 1919, No·~-: 165; 
159. ~;, No, 177. 
160. F.D., s.F. Sep,' 1919, No~·.: 179. 
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had been given without prior consultation with Lord 
Curzon and the London Foreign Office, and that it was 
based on the understanding that in the final treaty to 
be signed with Afghanistan the British control of the 
Amir 1 s foreign relations was to be regained, There was 
still a fundamental difference of opinion on the British 
side on the question of Afghan independence, and this 
fact further increased the difficulties of those entrusted 
with the negotiation of a settlement with the Amj.rl s 
161 government. 
Once the conference had overcome the cardinal pro-
blem represented by the Afghan demand for full independ-
ent status, the delegates had little more to discuss other 
than the wording of the "supplementary letter" stating 
Afghanistan's complete independence, which Grant was to 
present to 'Ali Ahmad Khan, and the applicability of the 
Government of India's proposed Article 5, which related 
to the British withdrawal from Afghan territory, 162 'Ali 
Ahmad Khan had originally maintained that a "supplement-
ary letter" Grant proposed should be incorporated as an 
additional Article in the treaty, but eventually agreed 
to drop this demand, in return for the deletion of a 
sentence in Grant's letter explaining that the Amir's 
conduct of his foreign relations would constitute an 
161. The publication of the Rawalpindi. treaty, and sub-
sequent agreements with Afghanistan, provoked a minor 
outburst of public criticism in India as well as in England, 
Many servants of the Indian government probably agreed 
with Sir Michael O'Dwyer when he characterised these agree-
ments as "the resumption of our old-time attitude of 
fawning on the Afghans. This feeling culminated in the 
Treaty of 1921, which weakly condoned the treacherous 
Afghan aggression of May, 1919"• (Op, cit., p, 118,) Sir 
William Barton believed that the Rawalpindi. treaty showed 
that "The spirit which had made the empire was lacking," 
(op. cit,, P• 142.) 
162. See Appendix 20, 
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important test of his good behaviour during the 
"probationary period11 ,l6 J The Afghan delegates similarly 
agreed to accept the Government of India's second 
version of Article 5,l64 after Grant had given them a 
verbal assurance that there was no intention of using 
ex parte demarcation by Britain of the Khaibar as a 
"pretext for land-grabbing or indefinite retention of 
our troops on Afghan soil",l65 It was thus in an atmos-
phere of compromise and relative amity that, on 8 August, 
Grant and 1Ali Ahmad Khan set their signatures to what 
had now become the treaty of Rawalpindi,l66 
l6J. F,D., S,F, Sep. l9l9, No, l85 and S.F. Oct, l9l9, 
No. 24. See also Appendices 2l and 23. It is probable 
that the Government of India were anxious that Grant's 
assurance should be given as a "supplementary letter", 
and not as an Article within the body of the treaty, 
because they believed that this would attract less atten~ 
tion to it. They later attempted to prevent it from 
being published in the Parliamentary Papers, but were 
overridden in this matter by the India Office, (F.D., 
F.B. Sep • l9l9, Nos, 92-lOl, Notes P• 2l.) 
164, See Appendix 20. 
l65. F,D,, S.F. Sep, l9l9, No, 168, The British-Indian 
troops were finally withdrawn from Afghan territory dur-
ing the first two weeks of September l9l9 (Molesworth, 
op. cit., pp.9J-95); the Khaibar had been demarcat2d by 
J ,L, Maffey at the end of August. The Afghan Jarnil 
Ghulam Nabi attended the demarcation as an observer. [note 69 
(F.D,, S.F. Oct. l9l9, No, l27. See also supra, p.2J6,foot-
l66. It should be noted, however, that suspicions on 
the Afghan side were still so strong that 1Ali Ahmad 
Khan suggested that only his own signature, and that of 
Grant, should appear on the treaty. Grant readily agreed, 
11As it was obvious that Ali Ahmad was afraid that some of 
his party might make difficulties about signing," (F.D., 
S.F. Sep. l9l9, No, l85.) To this extent the Rawalpindi 
treaty was accepted on 'Ali Ahmad's own responsibility, 
rather than on that of the Afghan delegation as a whole, 
The treaty is reproduced as Appendix 22, 
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12. Results and expectations; 
Although the treaty had brought a formal end to 
the third Afghan war, and had settled at least some of the 
animosities aroused by that conflict, there were many 
problems which still remained to be solved, As has been 
seen, the terms of the final treaty with Afghanistan were 
still disputed on the British side, In Afghanistan also 
there was little unanimity on future policy, and many 
unrealistic assessments of future possibilities, In 
Kabul 'Ali Arunad Khan presented the Rawalpindi treaty as 
a personal diplomatic triumph, in which "Promises of a 
large increase in the British subsidy had been obtained", 
<tnd he claimed that "The Frontier tribes were included in 
fue settlement which was exactly as the Amir had demanded,,l67 
The British definition of the conditions they required the 
Amir to fulfil if he was to demonstrate his goodwill during 
the "probationary period", and the Persian translation of 
the minutes of the conference, copies of which were 
handed to tAli Ahmad Khan towards the end of the proceed-
ings, were probably withheld from the Amir 1 s eyes, since 
they did not put the chief Afghan delegate's performance 
in asfavourable a light as he would have wished, 168 As a 
result, and during the course of later Anglo-Afghan 
negotiations, several British-Indian authorities began to 
wonder whether the Rawalpindi treaty had really settled 
anything at all. 
There seems little doubt that Grant, who was 
succeeded as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India 
by Henry Dobbs in the September of 1919, 169 was sincere 
167. F.D,, S,F, Oct, 1919, Note to No, 155, 
168. This was later suspected by the Indian Foreign 
Department, 
169. When Grant became Chief Commissioner of the North-
West Frontier Province, 
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in his belief that once the "probationary period" had 
elapsed, shortage of funds and the realisation of his 
own inexperience in international diplomacy would induce 
the Amir to re-approach the Indian government for a re-
newal of the old subsidy, and that Afghanistan would then 
"lean on us again as her advisers in foreign affairs, 
and more truly and wholeheartedly than in the past,"l70 
Grant had little fear that the Russian government would 
make any attractive counter-offers,' He did not expect 
that the Soviets would approach Afghanistan on a govern-
ment-to-government basis, and preferred to believe that 
they would concentrate instead on provoking a revolution 
within that country. As he remarked:- "we have, I believe, 
little or nothing to fear from Bolshevik influence in 
Afghanistan unless the whole fabric of Government in 
Afghanistan collapses and Bolshevism finds its 
opportunity there in chaos as elsewhere,n 171 Nor did 
Grant believe that any other powers ~ Turkey or any of 
the European nations ~ would show any interest in the 
Amir's kingdom, and in this sense he probably regarded 
Afghanistan's newly won independence as little more than 
a formalll¥• The history of the next twelve months was to 
show that h~ confidence was not altogether well founded, 
170, F,D,, F,B, Oct. 1919, No, lJ8, 
171. Ibid, 
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THE "NICETIES OF DIPLOMACY": 1919-20 
1. Soviet-Afghan relations, 1919-20: fundamental 
attitudes and problems, 
The confidence of the Delhi government in their own 
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ability to reconstruct the old British control of Afghani-
stants foreign relations on newer and sounder lines was 
matched by the Amir•s determination to create the threat 
of a Russo-Afghan entente, It was a threat which his 
father and grandfather had consciously chosen to lay aside, 
but one which Amanullah's government could now exploit 
without serious fear that the story of the first and second 
Afghan wars would be triplicated, or that suspicions of a 
Russo-Afghan alliance would induce the British to attempt a 
full-scale conquest of Afghanistan, At the same time, the 
development of diplomatic and other contacts with the 
Soviet authorities was to show that the problems of arranging 
an understanding between the Afghan and Russian governments 
were both serious and complex, They were caused by the 
different and conflicting aims of both parties 1 and by the 
complicated and extremely fluid political situation in 
Russian central Asia at that time, Amanullah's real aims 
in working for an entente with Russia, and the counter-
interests of the Soviet government, deserve attention, for 
they were little discussed at the time 1 and have remained 
269 
unexamined since. 
The .Amir 1 s attitude towards the Soviet government 
was governed by the many and sometimes unrelated advantages 
which he hoped to gain from an agreement with the Soviets. 
His principal interest was to exploit the possibility of 
an arrangement with Russia to bid up the terms of a 
final agreement with the British, to force the Government 
of India to grant Afghanistan financial and military 
assistance which they had previously been unwilling to 
concede except in return for the formal control of Afghani-
stan's foreign relations by Britain, A Russo-Afghan treaty 
providing for aid from Russia in the form of arms and money 
could help achieve this aim; were it to include a guarantee 
of Russian help in the event of British aggression on 
Afghanistan, its value would be still further enhanced, 
At the same time, the breakdown of the power of the central 
government in Russian central Asia held out the prospect 
of Afghan territorial expansion at Russian expense, The 
periodic decay of strong government in the subcontinent 
had for centuries tempted the Afghans to invade the plains 
of northern India, and it required no great effort of mind 
to conceive of a similar advance into the plains of central 
A . 1 Slae .Amanullah sought from the Soviet government a 
1. The similarity is not of course complete, The Afghans' 
expansionist bias leant naturally towards the south and 
east, principally because Afghanistan's most important 
/(1) 
realignment of the Russo-Afghan frontier which would 
return to Afghanistan some of the territory she claimed 
to have lost to Russia during the nineteenth century, He 
was anxious also to strengthen the now almost independent 
Amirate of Bokhara, whose frontiers joined those of 
Afghanistan along the Oxus as far east as the Wakhan 
valley, and whose territory thus covered all the approaches 
from Russia to Afghanistan except the Transcaspian route 
through Krasnovodsk and Merv to Herat, He may have planned 
to create in Bokhara a buffer between Afghanistan and 
Russia, just as Britain had interposed the "client kingdom" 
of Afghanistan between her own territories and those of 
the Tsarist empire. To this extent, Amanullah designed 
to work against the Soviets as well as with them; against 
them in the sense that he was anxious to prevent the 
Moscow government from inheriting the frontiers of the 
Tsars - with them in the sense that he welcomed their stand 
against the imperialist powers. 
Viewed from Kabul, the question of relations with the 
Soviet government was one of great importance; viewed from 
Moscow, it represented but one of many problems which beset 
(l) 
reservoir of military talent, the lashkars of the Pashtun 
tribesmen, dwelt along the Anglo-Afghan frontier, and could 
not easily be mobilised for a campaign across the Oxus, It 
was this fact, together with the troop dispositions towards 
the eastern provinces which he had already made, which 
probably induced Amanullah to attack India rather than 
Russia in May 1919, 
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the young republic. Nevertheless, the Soviet Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs, ~eaded from 1918 to 1930 by G,V, 
Chicherin, seems by late 1919 to have formed a fairly clear 
idea of Soviet interests in Afghanistan, Chief among them 
was the opportunity which a Russo-Afghan entente presented 
for Soviet activities against the British in India. While 
the Soviet authorities were unwilling to offer the Amir 
unlimited aid in the event of a renewed Anglo-Afghan war, 
they were anxious to establish consulates in the eastern 
provinces from which they could supply arms to the Pashtun 
tribesmen, and to arrange for the transport of those arms 
across Afghanistan, In default of the full realisation of 
this objective, the consulates thus established could act 
as important centres for the distribution of propaganda 
directed against the British. It seems unlikely that the 
Soviet government sought any more extensive penetration 
of Afghanistan than this, for theY were probably as unready 
as their later Tsarist predecessors to attempt the military 
conquest of the country, 
Soviet policy towards Afghanistan was less influenced 
by Soviet ideological commitments than some Afghan and 
British observers supposed. During the early years of the 
revolution it seemed possible that the Bolsheviks were to 
abandon a conventional foreign policy, executed through 
the normal channels of diplomacy, in favour of a programme 
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of revolution throughout the capitalist world. In the 
case of Afghanistan however, the decision to adhere to 
the Marxist textbook was a difficult one to make, for the 
Amir<s kingdom was patently at a pre-capitalist stage of 
social and economic development, and the lack of an urban 
proletariat reduced to vanishing point the chances of an 
internal Bolshevik revolution, It \vas partly as a result 
of these economic factors, and partly also because Amanullah 
himself first approached the Soviet government at an 
official level, that the Soviets never made any concerted 
attempt to engineer a revolution within Afghanistan, but 
instead treated the existing government as a revolutionary 
power, In spite of this, the fear that the Soviet 
government was bound by its ideology to destroy the social 
equilibrium in Afghanistan probably antagonised Afghans of 
a more conservative temperament, and certainly helped to 
delude Sir Hamilton Grant into thinking that a Bolshevik-
Afghan entente was out of the question, The ideological 
issue was not fully settled until the summer of 1921, when 
the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs explained to 
their ambassador in Kabul that "We cannot, and we must not, 
approach Afghanistan with the standards which are appropriate 
for the economically developed countries", and that 
Amanullah 's government should be recognised as a socially 
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progressive force, whose policies should be encouraged 
since they helped to bring Afghanistan into the modern 
industrialised world. Only after the stage of "enlightened 
absolutism" had been passed could the foundations of a 
socialist Afghanistan be laid,2 
The development of Soviet-Afghan relations during 
l9l9-20 was deeply affected by the confused state of Russian 
central Asia at that time,3 The territory of the Bolshevik 
4 
regime in Tashkent was connected to European Russia by two 
important railway routes constructed during Tsarist days. 
The first led north to Orenburg (Chkalov), and thence across 
the plains of the upper Volga to Moscow; the second ran 
west to the Caspian at Krasnovodsk, whence sea routes led 
to Baku, in Russian Azarbaijan, and to Astrakhan, at the 
mouth of the Volga. From the beginning of July l9l8 until 
mid-September l9l9, white rebels under Kolchak blocked the 
northern route at Orenburg, while the Transcaspian railway 
was controlled by the Menshevik government of Ashkhabad 
2, Soviet Documents, Vol.IV, No.ll2, See infra, P• 400. 
J. See supra, pp. l9 5 ff, 
4, The Tashkent Soviet controlled effectively only the 
area around the city, This region was federated to the 
R,S,F,S.R, as the "Turkestan Autonomous Republic" in April 
l9l8, (Zenkovsky, op.cit,, p,2J9). In practice, however, 
the Tashkent regime remained independent of Moscow until 
November l9l9, (See infra, p. 282). 
274 
until February l92o, 5 The fact that the Moscow government 
was physically unable to send supplies to central Asia, 
even if it could have afforded them, meant that until l920 
Soviet-Afghan relations were beset with an air on unreality. 
During the third Afghan war and after Lenin could declare 
his sympathy for the "independent Afghan people, who are 
heroically defending their liberty against foreign 
6 
oppressors", but he could do little else while there was 
no open road from the Russo-Afghan frontier to European 
Russia, and while the Soviet government was still fighting 
for survival against the Polish invasion from the west and 
the white armies to the south and east. On the central 
Asian scene the Tashkent Soviet was still too weak to absorb 
the Amir of Bokhara's extensive kingdom or the territory 
of the Ashkhabad rebels, while further east cossacks and 
red partisans still struggled for control of the Semirechie 
5~ "Menshevik" is a description more convenient than 
accurate, It would be difficult to attach a simple 
descriptive label to the Ashkhabad "Executive Committee" 
which; like the Tashkent Soviet, was composed principally 
of left Social Revolutionaries rather than Bolsheviks, 
but which was nevertheless bitterly opposed to the Tashkent 
regime, British-Indian forces had been withdrawn from 
Transcaspia, where they had supported the government of 
Ashkhabad against that of Tashkent, in February l9l9· 
(See supra, P. 199, and C ,H. Ellis, The British "Intervention" 
in Trartscaspia, pp,l45-62), 
6, Soviet Documents, Vol,II 1 No.ll6, (Part of a letter 
from Lenin to Amanullah of 27 May l9l9. See infra,p. 27 5) • 
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province. So long as this confused state of affairs lasted 
there could be no "Russo-Afghan relations" in the strict 
and simple sense; instead, Amir Amanullah's government 
found themselves forced to deal with a whole multiplicity 
of "Russian governments", none of which, including that of 
the Bolsheviks, could be assumed to be of any permanence, 
2, Amanullah«s initial approaches to Russia and their 
results; April-October 1919. 
Amanullah first approached the Moscow government early 
in April 1919, when he addressed a letter to Lenin from 
himself and Tarzi in which he announced his own accession 
to the throne and his desire to strike up friendly and 
permanent relations with the Soviets, 7 His message produced 
8 
a reply from Lenin and Kalinin towards the end of May, 
The Soviet leaders welcomed Amanullah's desire for friend-
ship and suggested an exchange of diplomatic representa-
tives,9 Chicherin also seized the opportunity to inform 
Mahmud Tarzi that the R,S,F,S,R, was anxious "to help those 
nations which are struggling for independence", 10 though 
he did not explain how his government intended to do this. 
7• His letter does not appear to have reached Moscow 
until mid-May 1919, (Soviet Documents, Vol,II, No,ll6, 
Addendum, and Parliamentary Papers, No,J4), 
8, At that time a member of the central committee of 
the Russian Communist Party, 
9· Soviet Documents, Vol,II, No,ll6, 
10. ~., Vol,II, No,lJ2, 
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At the same time Amanullah prepared a diplomatic mission 
under Jarnil Muhammad Wali Khan which left Kabul for Moscow 
. 1 Ma 11 ln ear y Y• The Afghan mission was met near the Russo-
Afghan frontier by Bravin, an official of the Moscow 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and travelled with him 
to Tashkent on 4 June~ but the severance of railway 
communications with European Russia then forced the 
12 delegates to remain in Tashkent for several months. 
From an interview with the Afghan ambassador printed by the 
Tashkent Izvestiya on 6 June, it seems fairly clear that 
Amanullah had originally intended that the mission should 
serve the principal purpose of representing Afghanistan at 
the Versailles peace conference, and that he believed that 
this representation would be arranged through the Soviet 
government, Asked by his interviewer whether his visit to 
Soviet territory could be considered "as an expression of 
the desire of the Afghan people for a fraternal alliance 
with Soviet Russia", Muhammad Wali Khan could only reply 
"It is possible", lJ but it is probable that once he 
realised that his stay in Tashkent would necessarily be 
11. See Parliamentary Papers,No,4, in which Muhammad Wali 
Khan is erroneously described by the British Agent in 
Kabul as "Afghan Safir [ambassador] to Bokhara", 
12, F.D,, S, External Aug,l920 1 Enclosure in No.25J, p.lO, 
See also Soviet Documents, Vol.II, No.lJ2, 
13, F.D.,S.External Aug,1920 1 Enclosure in No,25J, p.l4, 
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a prolonged one, and that the western powers were unlLkely 
to accept Soviet requests for Afghan representation at the 
. 14 Versallles conference, Muhammad Wali Khan decided that 
his time would be most profitably spent in examining the 
terms on which a general agreement between the Afghan and 
Soviet governments could be arranged, 
The Afghan ambassadorfs first concern was to press for 
arms and territorial concessions from the Tashkent Soviet, 
The Moscow Commissariat had instructed the Tashkent 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Bogoyavlensky, to explain 
to the Afghan mission that the breakdown of communications 
between Moscow and Tashkent meant that any armaments to be 
given to Afghanistan would have to be drawn from the stores 
of the Tashkent government, Although the authorities in 
Moscow were willing to consider the possibility of 
financial assistance to the Afghan government, their 
readiness to accept such undertakings would depend on the 
willingness of the Afghans to send volunteers to join the 
red army in its struggle with the white Admiral Kolchak,l5 
Chicherin had effectively thrown the burden of aiding 
Afghanistan onto the Tashkent Soviet, but the latter had 
14. See Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, 
Vol,I 1 pp.l57-6J, 
15. F,D., S,F,Feb,l920, No.98. Bogoyavlensky was further 
instructed to "communicate to us the points of the agreement 
projected by the Afghans but refrain from signing it at 
the present", (~.) 
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themselves no arms to spare for Amanullah, who was now 
on the point of negotiating a peace with the British, It 
seems likely also that some members of the Soviet were 
unwilling to supply arms to Afghanistan because they feared 
that the Afghan government might use them to attack Russian 
t •t 16 err:t ory. 
While the negotiations in Tashkent continued in this 
somewhat inconclusive vein, attention was attracted to 
Kabul, to which a Bolshevik diplomatic mission was now 
proceeding. After escorting his Afghan guests to Tashkent 
in early June, Bravin turned south and west to Herat, to 
arrive in Kabul on 21 August,1 7 He was received by the Amir 
five days later, but reported to Tashkent that his reception 
was "pompous but without cordiality", and that his conversa-
tion with Amanullah was "without interest",18 Bravin had 
evidently arrived at an inopportune moment, for the treaty 
of Rawalpindi had been but recently signed, and 'Ali Ahmad 
Khan's anglophile influence was temporarily high, Fairly 
soon after his arrival in Kabul, however, Bravin received 
explicit instructions from his government on the subjects 
16, F,D,, S, External Aug.l920, Enclosure in No,25J, p.lO. 
17, It is not certain that Bravin possessed full plenipo-
tentiary powers on behalf of the Soviet government, A 
contemporary Soviet press communique explained that he was 
"an official representative of the Peoples' Commisariat 
for Foreign Affairs", (Soviet Documents, Vol,II, No,lJ2), 
18. F,D,, S,External Aug,l920 1 Enclosure in No.25J 1 polO, 
278 
he was to examine during his stay in the Afghan capital. 
They included "The wishes of Afghanistan £2. our co-operation", 
(cooperation, presumably, against the British), and the 
chances of raising a rebellion against the Indian govern-
ment on the Anglo-Afghan frontier. 19 For his own part 
Amanullah pressed for the cession to Afghanistan of the 
Panjdeh oasis, 20 and probably sought military and financial 
help from the Soviet ambassador. Although Bravin recommended 
to the Tashkent Commissariat that Amanullah's request for 
21 . Panjdeh be acceded to, lt seems unlikely that the Soviet 
ambassador succeeded in reaching firm agreement with the 
Afghan government on any of the points at issue. Soon after 
Bravin's arrival, Amanullah had warned him that he was 
forbidden to undertake propaganda activities in Afghanistan 
and it was probably on this account that, as the Tashkent 
Soviet reported to Moscow in September, Bravin was held 
almost as a prisoner in his own house in Kabul, 22 It was 
19. F,D,, S.F. Feb,l920, Note to No,29. 
20, As Bravin reported to Tashkent on 7 October, (F.D., s. 
External Aug,l920, Enclosure in No,25J, p.lO), It will be 
remembered that Panjdeh had been claimed by the Afghan 
government during the period 1884-85, shortly before the 
demarcation of the Russo-Afghan frontier between the Hari 
Rud and the Oxus by an Anglo-Russian commission, which 
assigned the area to Russia. See infra, p~ 283-85. 
21, F.D., S.External Aug,l920 1 Enclosure in No,25J, p.lQ, 
22. Ibid, In this respect Bravin's position was no worse 
than~ of the British Agent. It was said that the Soviet 
ambassador had applied to Amanullah for permission to send 
Bolshevik agents to India, but that this request had been 
refused by the Amir, (F ,D, ,F .B. (Confidential), No.r,l920,No ,Jl), 
28 
in these conditions, with no specific areas of agreement 
established between the two governments concerned, that 
the Kabul negotiations rested at the end of 1919, 
Discussions in Moscow between Soviet leaders. and 
Afghan representatives had meanwhile produced a rather more 
definite commitment on some of the Afghan demands by the 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Once the railway route 
through Orenburg had been re-opened in October 1919, 
Muhammad Wali Khan left Tashkent for the Soviet capital, 
to be received by Lenin and the Collegium of the Commissariat 
on 12 and 14 October. Warm expressions of sympathy were 
exchanged, and the Afghan ambassador expressed his confident 
belief that "the hour when the entire world would see that 
European imperialism had no place in the East was near at 
hand", 23 It is evident, however, that more concrete 
discussions on the terms of a possible Soviet-Afghan agree-
ment must subsequently have taken place, On 27 November 
Lenin stated in a letter to Amanullah that the Soviet 
government "instructs its embassy in Afghanistan to engage 
in discussions with the government of the Afghan people with 
a view to the conclusion of trade and other agreements, the 
purpose of which is not only the buttressing of good 
2J, Soviet Documents, Vol,II, No,l7l. See also the 
report reproduced by X,J, Eudin and R.C. North, Soviet 
Russia and the East, p.lSJ. 
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neighbourly relations in the best interests of both nations, 
but [also to wage] together with Afghanistan the joint 
struggle against the most rapacious imperialistic government 
on earth - Great Britain", Lenin noted that Muhammad Wali 
Khan had expressed his interest in concluding a "treaty of 
friendship" with the Soviet government and that he wished 
to secure military aid from the R,S,F.S,R, and the cession 
to Afghanistan of areas along the Russo-Afghan frontier, 
He assured the Amir that "'The Workers• and Peasants' 
Government is inclined to grant such assistance on the 
widest scale to the Afghan nation, and, what is more, to 
repair the injustice done by the former Government of the 
Russian Czars' ,,, by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier 
so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the 
. 24 
expense of RussJ..a 11 • 
J, The arrival of Suritz in Kabul, and the difficulties 
he encountered; December 1919-April 1920, 
The "embassy in Afghanistan" to which Lenin referred 
was not that of Bravin, The re-opening of communications 
with Moscow in the autumn of 1919 brought to Tashkent a 
special Turkistan Commission of the central government 
24, Quoted by Fischer, op.cit,, Vol.I, p,286, Unfortunate-
ly Fischer does not translate verbatim Lenin's definition 
of the frontier "adjustments" which the Soviet government 
proposed; the words "by adjusting , , • Russia" are 
Fischer's, not Lenin's, 
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determined to make a clean sweep of the Tashkent Soviet.25 
The old ruling committee, with its entirely European and 
predominantly left Social Revolutionary membership, was 
replaced by a new government in which native Uzbek communists 
played a leading role, The end of the Tashkent government's 
isolation meant the end also of its autonomy, and steps 
were simultaneously taken to despatch a new embassy to 
Afghanistan under Jakob Suritz, Suritz evidently enjoyed 
a higher status in the Soviet hierarchy than his predecessor 
26 Bravin; as a former secretary of the all-Russian Central 
Committee of the Soviets and later Soviet chargg d'affaires 
in Copenhagen, 2 7 he could bring his experience of the 
power structure of the Soviet regime and of the R.S.F,S.R,ts 
relations with the western powers to bear on his task in 
25, It was correctly claimed, inter alia, that the members 
of the Soviet had antagonised the local population by their 
autocratic behaviour, and had paid insufficient attention 
to the demands of the Muslim peoples of the area. See 
Zenkovsky, op.cit., pp,2J8-48, and W.H, Chamberlin, ~ 
Russian Revolution, Vol,II, p.420. 
26, Bravin was naturally displaced as Soviet ambassador 
in Kabul by Suritz's arrival, During the early months of 
l920 he left the Soviet service and became an Afghan citizen, 
He was murdered by two Afghan villagers in Ghazni in January 
l92l, (See Aman-i-Afgh~n, Vol.I,No,J6), Mr 'Abdul Hadi Dawi 
Khan, who investigated the incident on behalf of the Afghan 
Foreign Ministry, told the writer that the murder arose out 
of a private quarrel, and not as a result of Soviet instiga-
tion, as some people believed, 
27, F.D., S,F, Nov,l920, No,l02, 
283 
Afghanistan. The new Soviet ambassador arrived in Kabul 
on 26 December 1919,28 
The renewed interest of the Moscow government in their 
central Asian dominions brought to light a problem in 
Russo-Afghan relationswhich was to make Suritz's task no 
easier, The Afghan demand for the realignment of the Russo-
Afghan frontier, which had formed the subject of some of 
Bravin 1s discussions in Kabul as well as those of Muhammad 
Wali Khan in Moscow, was part of a fairly definite series 
of territorial claims which the Afghan government had formu-
lated, Amir Amanullah and his advisers maintained that the 
coercion of the imperialist powers, Britain and Tsarist 
Russia, had forced 'Abdur Rahman to abandon the claims he 
had made to Panjdeh during the period 1884-85, and that the 
28. Maj,-General Malleson, commander of the British Military 
Mission in Meshed, and thus of the British operations in 
Transcaspia between July l9l8 and the succeeding March, 
attempted to capture Suritz and his party while they were on 
their way to Afghanistan through the agency of Turkoman 
tribesmen who had aligned themselves with the British. The 
attack on the Soviet mission was planned to take place at 
Yulatan, some 35m. south-west of Merv, but, fortunately for 
the future of Anglo-Soviet relations, the presence of Afghan 
garrisons in the vicinity (see infra, p.285), made it 
impossible to carry out Malleson's plans, (F,D., S.F,Nov, 
1920, No.57)• The scheme appears to have been undertaken 
on Malleson 1 s own initiative. 
Malleson reported that while Suritz was in Herat, he discussed 
some outstanding frontier problems with the governor of the 
province, an interview of which Malleson became acquainted 
by purchasing the contents of the governor's waste-paper 
basket. Included therein, ironically enough, was a warning 
by Suritz about the efficiency of the British intelligence 
service. (~., No,l02), 
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balance should be righted in the new post-imperialist age, 
Of more practical importance was the fact that throughout 
most of 1919 there was no effective government in control 
of the Murghab valley as far as Merv, and that the area was 
thus open to Afghan incursions. The frontier between the 
Hari Rud and the Oxus claimed by the Afghan government in 
the years 1919-21 corresponded fairly closely to the Afghan 
claims of 1884-85, It was to leave the Persian boundary at 
Sarakhs 1 some 70m, north of the existing point of departure 
at Zulfikar, and was to cross the Murghab at Imam Baba, to 
reach the Oxus at Bosaga, 29 Such a frontier would have 
given Afghanistan control of the railway approaches to Merv 
and the territory of the nomadic Turkoman tribes whose 
peregrinations took them across the existing Russo-Afghan 
boundary,30 The Soviet government was not prepared at this 
stage to insist on the maintenance of the frontier of 1887, 31 
29, Which for the present purposes may be considered 
identical with Khaja Salar or Kham-i-Ab, which was the 
previously accepted point of junction of the Russo-Afghan 
frontier and the Oxus. The Afghan claim line of 1919-21 is 
marked in yellow, and that of 1884-85 in green, on the map 
reproduced infra as Appendix 34, 
30, F.D., External B,Aug.l920; No,323, The territory claim-
ed by the Afghan government in 1919-21 was in fact slightly 
more extensive than that which they had demanded in 1884-85 1 
as will be seen by a glance at the map (Appendix 34). The 
frontier proposed by 'Abdur Rahman on the earlier occasion 
left the Persian boundary at Sher Tapa, about 27m. south of 
Sarakhs, and passed just south of Imam Baba (marked on some 
maps as "Hazrat Imam") to continue to Khaja Salar, 
31, The year in which the final protocols defining the 
Russo-Afghan boundary between the Hari Rud and the Oxus were 
signed by the British and Russian representatives. 
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but proposed instead a compromise settlement providing for 
a boundary running from Pul-i-Khatun to Sari Yazi, and 
thence to Bosaga,32 At the same time, and much as they had 
in 1884-85 1 the local Afghan authorities decided to exploit 
the existing power vacuum in the area by despatching 
"consuls", troops and other officers into what had hitherto 
been recognised as Russian territory, in order to establish 
Afghan administrative and taxation rights, and to canvass 
the support of the local population, During the summer of 
1919 Amanullah appointed an Afghan consul in Merv, who was 
subsequently reinforced by the despatch of 500 officers and 
men to this isolated oasis ,33 The Amir's officials acted 
on the assumption that the area was already theirs, and began 
recruiting local Turkoman tribesmen for their army, encour-
aging the Turkomans to oppose the Bolshevik regime of 
Tashkent and to opt for Afghanistan in the event of the 
settlement of the dispute by plebiscite, 
There was a simultaneous Afghan interest in the Amirate 
of Bokhara, which was formerly incorporated in the Tsarist 
empire as an "indirect rule" state, in which a Russian 
"Diplomatic Agent" supervised relations with the directly 
administered areas of Russian Turkistan and the general 
conduct of the Amir of Bokhara's government, without assuming 
32, Marked as a blue line in Appendix 34, 
33· F.D., S,F,Feb.l920 1 No,l57 and External B, Dec.1920 
(Secret) No.24, Notes p.96, 
responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the 
Amirate,34 The attitude of the Amir of Bok:hara, Sa(Ld Alim 
Khan, was fiercely autocratic and conservative, and a 
liberal manifesto he had issued soon after the March revolu-
tion of 1917 remained unimplemented; but a modernist "Young 
Bokhara Party" had nevertheless arisen, and the Tashkent 
government had evidently decided in 1918 that Soviet support 
of the Young Bok:haransf cause offered the best pretext for 
Bolshevik intervention, Such intervention was expected to 
end the virtual independence which Bok:hara had enjoyed 
since the spring of 1917, The Tashkent Soviet had however 
seriously overestimated the strength of native opposition 
to the Amirts rule, and the Bolshevik forces which appeared 
before Bokhara in March 1918 were forced to retire; a 
treaty was later signed on 25 March in which the "complete 
independence" of Bok:hara was guaranteed,35 The retreat of 
the Soviet troops was the signal for a general massacre of 
the Russian population of Bok:hara, and it became evident 
that what the Bolsheviks had hoped to present as a contest 
between liberalism and autocracy had degenerated into a 
crude struggle between Russians and native Muslims, Maj.-
General Malleson had earlier proposed that the British 
J4. See Pahlen, op,cit., pp.71-72• The system bears 
comparison with that used by the British in the "native 
states" of India, 
35. F,D,, S.External Aug.1920, Enclosure in No,25J 1 pp.ll-12. 
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assume the task of strengthening Bokhara against the 
Soviets as a first line of defence against the Bolshevik 
activities in India which he seems to have predicted,3 6 but 
the British withdrawal from Transcaspia in the spring of 
1919 allowed the Afghan government to carry out some of the 
plans which the British had decided to abandon, A Bokharan 
delegation had been in attendance at Kabul since the final 
year of Habibullah's reign, 37 and appears to have remained 
there for several years: the link between the two Islamic 
monarchies was further strengthened during the summer of 
1919 by the appointment of 'Abdul Shukur Khan as first 
Afghan consul in Bokhara.38 The consul was later joined by 
an Afghan military mission which set about the reorganisa-
tion and training of the Amir of Bokhara's forces, accompan-
ied by a certain number of Afghan troops with badly needed 
artillery,39 Although there is no evidence that a definitive 
36, A,H, Babakhojaev, Afghanistan's war for independence 
in 1919 1 pp.2-3, Professor Babakhojaev bases part of his 
study on some interesting correspondence between Malleson 
and the Amir of Bokhara which was not traceable in the 
Government of India archives, See also Ellis, op.cit., PP• 
141-43, The case for a "Central Asian Muslim Confederation", 
to include Bokhara and Afghanistan, and to be supported 
against the Bolsheviks by the British, is put by Sardar Ikbal 
Ali Shah in his article "Britain and the Middle East", 
(United Service Magazine, Jan,1920, pp.279-85). 
37• See supra, P•202. 
38, F.D., F,B, (Confidential) Nov,l920, No,31, 
39, Information from Mr 'Abdul Hadi Dawi Khan, who was later 
Afghan consul in Bokhara. In December 1919 four battalions 
of infantry were reported to have left Mainmanah for Bokhara 
"with guns" , (F ,D,, External B (Secret) Dec .1920, No .24, 
Notes p.96), The strength of the Amir of Bokhara's forces 
was estimated at 30,000 men, badly equipped and led, (F,D., 
S,External Aug,l920, Enclosure in No,253, p.ll). 
288 
treaty was ever arranged between Amanullah and Sa*Id Alim 
Khan, the Bokharan Amir was able to explain to Maj,-General 
Malleson that "the coming of Afghanistan to Turkestan and 
Bokhara is solely for the purpose of bringing Turkestan 
Muhammadans together and for establishing relations with 
Bokhara and their object is to take action against the 
Bolsheviks when the time comes", Malleson decided in January 
1920 that "Bokhara and Afghanistan are arranging some sort 
of re-insurance agreement, should the Bolsheviks play either 
false", 40 and it was believed that a bargain of this nature 
41 
swnmer. had actually been struck by the following 
Afghan activities in Russian central Asia were not 
confined to Merv and Bokhara. An Afghan consulate had been 
opened in Tashkent in August 1919, 42 and the consul was 
generally anxious to emphasise that Afghan and Bolshevik 
political aims were identica1.4 J Further east, however, and 
beyond the limits which the Tashkent Soviet effectively 
controlled, Afghan agents were active in supporting the 
cause of the Basmachi revolt in Ferghana which had carried 
on resistance to the Bolsheviks after the suppression at 
40, F,D., S,F,Nov,1920 1 No.26l, 
41. F,D,, External B. Aug,l920 1 No.J2J, 
42, F,D, 1 S,F. Feb,l920, Note to No,lJ7• 
4J, Ibid., Note to No,160 1 and F,D., External B, (Secr~Dec.1920, No,24, Notes p.82. 
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Kokand of the "Provisional Government of the Autonomous 
Peoples of Turkistan" in February 1918.44 Muhammad Amin 
Bey, the original leader of the Basmachis was forced to 
cease his campaign against the Bolsheviks in January 1920, 
due to dissension within his own ranks, but the struggle 
was continued by his former lieutenant Shir Muhammad into 
1921, A party of Afghan volunteers fought with the new 
Basmachi leader in the mountains along the Russo-Chinese 
frontier, while Afghan agents attempted to increase the 
influence of Amanullah's government in the territory of 
the rebels. 45 In this way the Afghan government matched 
their anti-Soviet efforts in Merv and Bokhara with a 
campaign of penetration in Ferghana, and thus almost through-
out the length of the Russo-Afghan frontier, leading some 
Government of India commentators to suppose that Amir 
Amanullah was a=ious to construct an Islamic ce.ntral Asian 
confederacy, opposed to the Bolsheviks and dominated by 
Afghanistan.46 It was evident that this programme hardly 
accorded with the sentiments of warm friendship towards the 
Soviet government which Amanullah had officially expressed, 
and that the chances of a Soviet-Afghan agreement were 
44. See supra, P•l97. 
45, F,D., External B, Aug,l920, No.J2J, 
46, See F,D,, F.B,Sep,l920, No,98. 
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seriously reduced by the Amir's ambitions of territorial 
aggrandisement in central Asia. 
Suritz took over the discussions with the Afghan 
government where his predecessor Bravin had left off in 
January 1920, but in view of the many local conflicts between 
the Afghan and Soviet authorities which had now arisen, it 
was not altogether surprising that little real progress 
towards the negotiation of a formal treaty was made for 
several months, Perturbed by Afghan penetration along the 
Murghab valley, 47 and exploiting the new freedom of movement 
they derived from the defeat of the white government of 
48 Ashkhabad, the Bolsheviks moved troops to Merv to counter 
the Afghan detachment there, and forced the Afghan consul 
to announce in late January 1920 that Afghan forces would 
be withdrawn from the area. 49 The end of overt Afghan 
military intervention in the Murghab valley did not however 
bring an end to friction between Russians and Afghans along 
their common frontier, and thus did little to relieve 
Suritz's difficulties in Kabul. The problem which Bravin 
had encountered remained; the Bolshevik ambassador had still 
to press Amanullah for permission to send arms and money 
47. See supra, p.285. 
48, Red forces entered Krasnovodsk, the last stronghold 
of the independent government of Transcaspia, in February 
1920. 
49. F.D., External B, Dec,l920, No,24, Notes p,lll. 
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across Afghanistan to the tribes of the Anglo-Afghan border, 
while the Amir maintained his refusal to allow this in the 
absence of firm assurances of Russian help in the event of 
another attack on Afghanistan by the British, Afghan demands 
for military and financial assistance remained effectively 
unanswered, nor was any acceptable solution reached to the 
boundary dispute in the Murghab region.50 It was not until 
the end of April 1920 that Suritz obtained permission from 
his own government to lay before the Amir a series of 
definite proposals, as a draft of a permanent Soviet-Afghan 
settlement, Suritz was authorized to state that a Soviet 
51 
subsidy, of unspecified amount, was to be granted annually 
to the Amir, together with arms and military instructors. 
In return, Soviet consulates were to be opened in cities 
near the Anglo-Afghan frontier, and arms were to be distri-
buted to the Pashtun tribesmen on the British side of the 
Durand line,52 It is not certain that the Bolshevik 
government offered to join Afghanistan in a war with the 
British, and very unlikely that they demanded control of 
Afghanistan*s foreign relations as a quid pro guo for their 
subsidy, Discussion of the Soviet draft continued in Kabul 
throughout the summer of 1920 without any very definite 
conclusion being reached. 
50, F,D.,External B,Aug,l920,No,J2J, and S,F, 1Nov.l920, 
Note to No,291. 
5l. Unspecified in any of the sources available to the 
writer. 
52. F.D., External B. Aug.l920, No.J2J, 
e I 20 ') 
<..J 4,.. 
4. British countermoves: the decision to convene 
a conference at Mussoorie 1 and the problems involved, 
September 1919 - May 1920. 
Suritz 1 s anxiety in May 1920 to present the Amir and 
his councillors with a definite statement of Soviet desiderata 
resulted principally from his fear that the Government of 
India might be able to make contemporaneous and more attract-
ive offers which would draw Afghanistan back into the British 
orbit, For it was on 7 April that a second party of Afghan 
delegates appeared in India for renewed discussions with the 
British authorities. The background to this event, and the 
story of Anglo-Afghan relations between August 1919 and 
April 1920 1 require some examination, 
It will be remembered that Sir Hamilton Grant had 
signed the Rawalpindi treaty in the firm expectation that 
little would happen during the six months• "probationary 
period" which would prevent the British from regaining in 
an informal manner the supervision of Afghanistan's foreign 
relations which had been granted away at Rawalpindi. The 
unexpected prospect of a Soviet-Afghan .S!.!li~ presented 
by the events of late 1919 and early 1920 had not radically 
altered British plans, The Foreign Department continued 
to believe that it would eventually be possible to carry 
out Sir Hamilton Grant's suggestions for a new settlement 
with Afghanistan, though they were prepared to concede that 
it might be necessary to postpone it, The possibility that 
Afghanistan might become aligned with the R,S,F,S.R, was 
perturbing, but the Delhi authorities still believed that 
it could be prevented by their offering the Amir more 
attractive terms, which were more likely to be carried out 
than any which the Soviets proposed, From the British 
point of view, the principal obstacle to the proper execution 
of this policy was their own reluctance to negotiate a treaty 
with Afghanistan so long as the tribal rebellions which the 
war of l9l9 had provoked remained unsupressed, The "hot 
weather".5J of l920 was regarded by the Government of India 
as a very unfavourable season for the conclusion of a treaty 
with Afghanistan, mainly because, from the Pashtun tribesman's 
viewpoint, it was the best season for campaigning against 
the British, when British-Indian troops were least able to 
operate in the arid mountains of the Anglo-Afghan border. 
The Indian government thus decided to delay negotiating a 
new agreement with Afghanistan, but they feared that Suritz 
might be able to exploit this delay be encouraging the Amir 
to adopt an anti-British attitude, The fact that Grant had 
stipulated that renewed discussions with Afghan representa-
tives should take place six months after the signature of 
the Rawalpindi treaty suggested a solution to this problem, 
Purely exploratory talks with an Afghan delegation in India 
could be used to avoid an open break with Afghanistan during 
.53• April to June in north-west India, 
the hot weather, and to counter Soviet propaganda at the 
court of Kabul. It was thus that the conference of 
Mussoorie came about - a curious conference, in which the 
British had no object in view, except to gain time and 
impress the Afghan delegates with their friendliness. 
The task of arranging such a conference presented 
certain problems. To induce the Amir to send a delegation 
to India was not difficult; Amanullah was indeed anxious to 
accept any such invitation, since it gave Suritz the 
impression that Afghanistan was about to re-align herself 
with the British, and thus forced the Soviet ambassador to 
better his terms.54 The sternest opposition to the Govern-
ment of Indiats policy came, as so often, from L,ondon rather 
than from Kabul, When correspondence between the Delhi and 
London governments on the suggested conference began in 
January 1920, Edwin Montagu was able to point out to Lord 
Chelmsford that the preconditions for the renewal of Anglo-
Afghan negotiations stipulated by Sir Hamilton Grant at 
Rawalpindi had not been fulfilled. 55 The Amir had failed 
to demonstrate his friendliness in the manner the Government 
of India had required; 56 the Indian revolutionary leaders 
54, In this way, Amanullah used the visit of an Afghan 
mission to India as a bargaining point with the Soviets, 
just as he used Suritzts presence in Kabul as a bargaining 
point with the British, 
55• See supra, Pp. 251-53. 
56, F,D,, S,F,Oct, 1920 1 No,J39• 
had not been ejected from Afghanistan, 5 7 and the Afghan 
government had continued to encourage the spirit of resist-
ance to the British of the Pashtuns of the "independent" 
tribal territory. Indeed, Amanullah had persisted in the 
claim made by 1Ali Ahmad Khan at Rawalpindi that the 
Government of India "must return to Afghanistan all terri-
tory seized in previous wars" 58 in spite of 'Ali Ahmad<s 
signature on the Rawalpindi treaty, with its stipulation 
that "The Afghan Government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier 
accepted by the late Amir",59 
57• Though several of them had 
for Russian territory; Mahendra 
in Kagan (Bokhara) at the time, 
Enclosure in No.25J 1 p.6), 
In this respect Amanullah<s 
left of their own accord 
Pratap 1 for instance, was (F,D,,S,External Aug,l920, 
58, F,D,, S,F.Oct.l920, Note to No.J29, This rather vague 
territorial claim was later described by Amanullah as 
follows:- "I mean the tribes and sections in general who 
are called Afghans, and who by reason of colour, language, 
manners, customs, religion and creed are historically con-
nected with each other", (~., No,J5J)• This area was 
characterised by the British as "Afghanistan irridenta" and 
would probably be referred to as "Pashtunistan" by the modern 
Afghan government. To the extent that it was held to include 
all the territory inhabited by Pashtu/Pakhtu speakers, it 
was rather more extensive than that claimed by *Ali Ahmad 
Khan at Rawalpindi, (It will be remembered that 1.Ali Ahmad 
had proposed that "whole tribal territory shall be made over 
to Afghanistan"; (F,D,, S,F.Sep,l919 1 No,l68), If this 
referred to the unadministered "independent" tribal territory, 
then it did not include the whole of the area inhabited by 
Pashtuns, many of whom lived in the directly administered 
areas of the North-West Frontier Province). 
59• See Appendix 22, Article 5• The fact that the Amir 
appeared to have gone back on the pledged word of his repre-
sentative at Rawalpindi was regarded by the British as 
typical of the problems of negotiating with the Afghan govern-
ment. It flowed essentially from the differences of opinion 
within the ruling circles of Kabul referred to supra, pp.256-
58. 
286 
policy towards the British mirrored that which he had 
adopted towards the Bolsheviks; rebellions along Afghanistan's 
frontiers to both north and east were to be exploited for 
the benefit of the Amir. 60 
There were other factors in the situation which made 
Montagu believe that it would be unwise to negotiate with 
the Amir's government, Amanullahts expressed concern for 
the favourable treatment of Turkey, about which he had 
61 
written several letters to King George V and L,ord Chelmsford, 
had not helped to improve the attitude of the London govern-
ment towards the Amir; his concern was regarded as meddlesome, 
and insincere to the extent that his direct approaches to 
the King broke the rule, supported by the India Office as 
fiercely as by the Government of India, that Afghanistan's 
relations with Britain must be conducted through the 
Viceroy rather than through the London Foreign Office. 62 
60. With the sole difference that whereas the area in India 
claimed by the Amir was defined (and ill-defined) in terms 
of the racial affiliations of its inhabitants, Afghanistan 
irridenta in Russian territory was bounded by a line on the 
map. The difference was a natural one, for by no stretch 
of the imagination could the Muslim inhabitants of Russian 
central Asia be called "Afghans". 
61, F,D,, S,F,Oct.1920, Nos,346 and 357• 
62. Montagu did not believe that Grant•s declaration that 
Afghanistan was "officially free and independent in its 
internal and external affuirs", (see Appendix 23) entitled 
the Amir to send an ambassador to London to work through the 
Foreign Office like the ambassadors of other states. He was 
prepared to concede that, in the final treaty to be signed 
with Afghanistan, the Amir might be permitted to send an 
ambassador to London, but even then the India Office was 
unwilling to abandon to the Foreign Office its powers in the 
field of Anglo-Afghan relations. (See infra, P• 376). 
29 
Further fuel was added to the flames by the presence of 
Afghan agents among the Mahsuds and Wazirs during the 
suppression of the Waziristan rebellion in the January and 
February of 1920. 63 But in the event, the Government of 
India were able to overcome the objections of the Secretary 
of State only by forcing the issue. Montagu had told the 
Viceroy on 7 January 1920 that he disapproved of inviting 
Amanullah to take part in a conference in Ind:La, and 
explained that "However plain it is made to Amir that 
invitation is quite distinct from Mission contemplated in 
64 Article 4 of Treaty, I would be afraid to see in it a 
departure from policy of Treaty which he will ascribe to 
fear and not to magnanimity". 6 .5 The Indian Foreign Depart-
ment appear however to have acted on the assumption that 
Montagu was not opposed outright to the arrangement of a 
conference with delegates nominated by the Amir, and that 
his objections were confined solely to the proposal that 
63, See supra, p.2J9.Afghan intervention in Waziristan 
during this period was not in fact of great importance. 
The rebels had the loan of two Afghan guns for a short 
time (H, de Watteville 1 op.cit,, pp.142-44) but the Amir 
was careful not to encourage parties of Mahsuds and Wazirs 
who visited Kabul, and instead advised them to come to terms 
with the Indian government, (~., p,67)• It appears that 
Amanullah adopted this policy precisely because he hoped 
that it would improve his chances of securing a favourable 
settlement with the British, 
64, I.e,, of the treaty of Rawalpindi, See supra 1 pp.251-2 and 
Appenfu 22, 
6,5. F.D., S,F. Oct,1920, No,JJ9· 
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Amanullah himself should be invited to India, 66 Accordingly, 
on 17 January, Lord Chelmsford wrote to Amanullah to express 
his disappointment at the Afghan government's failure to 
carry out the stipulations of Rawalpindi, adding nevertheless 
that a second Afghan delegation would not be turned away 
from the frontiers of India, 67 Ammanullah seized with 
alacrity this chance of increasing Suritz•s apprehensions 
about the possibility of an Anglo-Afghan entente, He told 
Chelmsford in a letter of 10 February that his negotiations 
with the Bolsheviks were forced on him by the proximity of 
the R.S.F.S.R, to Afghanistan, and by his concern for the 
well-being of the Muslims of Russian central Asia, adding 
that "It [the Afghan government] has, however, nothing to 
do with their Russian beliefs, religion and behaviour", 68 
He eagerly accepted the Viceroy<s implied invitation to 
re-open direct talks in India, for which he had already 
nominated an Afghan delegation, In this way Chelmsford was 
66, A proposal which the Government of India had never 
made to Amanullah, It seems not impossible: though not 
altogether logical, that Montagu's disapproval of the 
Indian government's policy was l~mited to this point, His 
letter of 7 January is rather ambiguous, 
67, F.D., S,F,Oct,l920, No.J4J, 
68, Ibid., No,J53• It is interesting that "Bolshevik" is 
here equ;;:ted with "Russian", and that it is the Muslims, 
and especially the Muslim Amirates of Bokhara and Khiva, 
who are seen as their opponents, This interpretation of 
the Russian civil war seems to have been a fairly common 
one in Afghanistan; see supra, P•202. 
able to present Montagu with an effective fait accompli; 
by the middle of February the proposed conference had been 
agreed to in Delhi and Kabul, and could hardly be abandoned 
to meet disapproval from London. 
Although the Indian government had arranged for the 
visit of an Afghan delegation to Mussoorie, and had long 
decided that the real purpose of the conference was to gain 
time and to "prepare a firm foundation on which a treaty of 
friendship can afterwards be erected", 69 no definite agenda 
for the conference had been decided on. In a sense this 
omission was hardly surprising; the experience of the Dane 
mission, if nothing else, should have been enough to 
convince successive Governments of India that it was unwise 
to approach the Amir or his representatives with a rigid 
series of demands. Again, it could be expected that the 
Afghan delegates would come to the conference table with a 
list of the questions they wished to have discussed, and 
there was no reason for disallowing them from initiating 
the proceedings in this way, nor reason to fear the lengthy 
discussions which could be expected to result. As Henry 
Dobbs remarked: "The meeting will not be like Sir Hamilton 
Grant's at Rawalpindi, when the great object was to get 
the Afghans to sign something quickly. On the present 
69. F.D., S.F.Oct.l920, No.JJ8. 
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occasion it may turn out that delays are, if anything, 
70 to be welcomed". On the other hand, the British delegates 
to the conference could hardly be expected to discuss such 
proposals as might be made by the Afghan representatives 
without having decided what policy they were to adopt in 
return, The Government of India had determined "to impress 
on Afghan delegates that we sincerely wish to assist and 
befriend Afghanistan and respect her independence but that 
she has by her recent conduct made it extremely difficult 
for us to maintain friendly attitude" , 71 Dobbs had realised 
that it would not be easy to convince the Afghan delegation 
of the friendship of the Government of India unless he was 
authorised to inform them of the ways in which the British 
intended to assist the Amirfs government. The Viceroy had 
told Montagu of some of the concessions which were to be 
held out to attract the Amir into an agreement with Britain; 
they were to include the renewal of Habibullah's subsidy, 72 
and the payment of the unclaimed arrears thereof, arrange-
ments for Afghan consular representation in Bombay, Karachi 
and Peshawar, "some form of representation at St, Jamest 
provided this did not clash with present direct dealings 
70, ~·• Note to No,J58, 
71, Ibid., No,J65, 
72, At what rate was not stated, 
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between Viceroy and Amir", customs concessions, and the 
loan of Indian government officers for the development of 
Afghanistan's communications and irrigation systems.73 
The Secretary of State did not at this stage indicate 
whether he approved of the approach the Government of 
India advocated, nor did he comment on the proposed offers 
of assistance to the Amir, More serious was his failure 
to insist on a clear and concerted statement of the condi-
tions which .Amanullah was to fulfil in return for the 
financial and technical aid which the British offered, 
Grant maintained that .Amanullah should not be "pressed to 
break with the Bolsheviks - that, if we give him rope, will 
come of itself", 74 and that "We should anchor the Amir to 
a great extent by granting subsidy, which he would certainly 
accept on reasonable conditions", 75 Grant's views were 
shared by Dobbs, his successor in the Delhi Foreign Depart-
ment, and by the Indian government generally, who explained 
to the Secretary of State that they did not intend to demand 
that Amanullah expel the Bolshevik mission from Kabul in 
return for the renewal of Habibullah's subsidy, although 
73, ~·• No.J4l. 
74, He probably believed that the Afghan determination to 
support the independence of Bokhara and Khiva would force 
the .Amir to break off relations with the Soviet government. 
Like many other British observers, Grant was unable to 
envisage an entente between a professedly socialist and 
an orthodox Islamic government, 
75• ~., No,JJ4. 
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they would require Amanullah to undertake to prevent the 
Soviet government from using Afghanistan as a base for the 
promotion of revolution in India, 76 In this respect both 
Grant and the Foreign Department had modified the views 
they had expressed before and during the Rawalpindi 
conference, when they had demanded that Amanullah should 
"dismiss from his country all hostile foreigners, in 
particular Bolshevik Missions" 77 as a precondition of the 
signing of a final Anglo-Afghan treaty, It would appear, 
however, that this change of attitude had not been followed 
in London, for Montagu seems to have understood that the 
renewal of the subsidy was to be made dependent on the 
expulsion of the Soviet ambassador from Kabul. This funda-
mental misunderstanding remained as a serious obstacle to 
the expeditious conclusion of a new settlement with the 
. 78 AmLr. 
There was a further flaw in the British approach to 
the Mussoorie conference which went almost undetected until 
discussions with the Afghan delegates were well under way, 
The Government of India had firmly maintained that the 
purposes of the conference did not include the negotiation 
and signature of a final treaty with the Amir's government, 
76, ~., No,J65, 
77• See supra, P• 252. 
78. See infra,p. J24. 
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and they had emphasised this when they invited Amanullah 
to send his delegates to India. 79 Amanullah himself fully 
understood this point, recognising that the object of the 
conference was to remove "the misunderstandings which may 
be existing on both sides ••• with the object of concluding 
f . dl t t th . " So At th a r~en y rea y on some o er occas~on • e same 
time: the Indian government had decided that the friendship 
of the Amir could not be won unless some outline of the 
"friendly treaty" was given to the Afghan delegates at 
Mussoorie, There was no obvious way of preventing discussion 
of that outline unless it was presented as an ultimatum, 
and to do this would go far to destroy the amiability which 
the Delhi authorities meant to create, If discussion of the 
outline treaty did eventuate, there would be little to 
distinguish such discussion from the final negotiations 
which the Government of India intended to postpone to 
another time and place. This confusion was to create prob-
lems during the later stages of the conference which in turn 
produced recriminations between the chief representatives 
81 
of both sides and their respective governments. 
There had been some speculation in India as to the 
likely composition of the Afghan delegation to the Mussoorie 
79• F,D., S,F,Oct.l920, No.J4J. 
80. Ibid,, No,JSO, Italics supplied, 
81. See infra,pp,JJO-J2, 
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conference, for the personality of the chief Afghan 
representative was rightly expected to affect the confer-
ence's chances of success, as well as the nature of the 
82 British proposals. By the termsof their letter of 
invitation the Government of India had prevented Amanullah 
himself from appearing in India as leader of the Afghan 
. 8J deputa b .. on, and the Viceroy feared that "the head of the 
Afghan delegation is almost certain to be Nadir Khan who 
84 is a truculent person", As it was, Amanullah decided 
that Nadir Khan's talents could be employed most usefully 
in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, where he continued 
to foster the anti-British spirit of the Pashtun tribesmen, 
to create a constant reminder to the Indian government of 
the difficulties on their north-west frontier which the 
Amir was always capable of producing; in this respect 
Nadir Khan's role during the Mussoorie conference was much 
what it had been during the earlier discussions of 
Rawalpindi, 85 Somewhat to the Viceroy's surprise, Mahmud 
82, The Indian government regarded it as axiomatic that 
the personal character of the respective negotiators was 
of great importance in Oriental diplomacy. They were 
probably correct, The Rawalpindi conference, for instance, 
might well have ended differently if the Amir's choice had 
fallen on someone less anglophilic than 'Ali Ahmad Khan as 
chief Afghan representative, 
8J, See supra,p.JOJ, 
84, F,D, 1 S,F,Oct,l920, No,J54, 
85, Nadir Khan was particularly active in sponsoring meet-
ings of tribesmen from the British side of the Durand line; 
(see, ~·• ibid., Note to No.J68), The Itihad-i-Mashragi, 
a newspaper published in Jalalabad under his auspices was 
another powerful instrument of propaganda, 
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Tarzi was nominated as chief Afghan representative in 
Nadir Khan's stead. The Foreign Department could not regard 
his appointment as an altogether favourable augury for the 
success of the conference, for his hostility to the British, 
which had frequently been expressed in the pages of the 
Sira,j-ul-Akhbar was very well known. On the other hand, 
Tarzi•s talents as a political theoretician, his education 
and his keen desire to secure the economic and social 
progress as well as the complete independence of his country, 
made him a man who was surprisingly approachable to the 
British officials whom he encountered. For the sake of his 
own reputation, if nothing else, he was determined to 
secure the success of the conference, Tarzi_1 s colleagues 
in the Afghan delegation included two ex-members of the 
Rawalpindi delegation, Diwan Narinjan Das and tAbdul Hadi 
. 86 Daw~ Khan, as well as his own son, 'Abdul Wahab, Another 
delegate who had also appeared at the Rawalpindi conference 
was Karnil Ghulam Muhammad, whose reputation as an old 
soldier, and his capacity for blunt speaking, made him very 
useful to Tarzi whenever a hard and uncompromising line had 
to be taken with the British representatives, 87 Of the 
86. 'Abdul Hadi had been appointed an Afghan representative 
at Rawalpindi, but had been unable to attend owing to ill-
ness. (See The Pioneer (Lucknow), 24.4.l920). 
87, Information from Mr 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi, 
composition of the British deputation there could be less 
speculation, for the Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
India, now Henry Dobbs, by tradition became the chief 
British delegate. Dobbs was assisted by S.E. Pears, an 
experienced official of the North-West Frontier Province, 
and Colonel Muspratt, as military representative. 88 
5, The opening of the Mussoorie conference, 
and preliminary discussions, 
During the opening week of the conference (17 to 24 
April), the discussions between the British and Afghan 
delegations assumed no definite shape. Dobbs believed that 
the Afghans were content for the time being to demonstrate 
the power they had over the Government of India, threatening 
retaliatory action by the Pashtun tribesmen and a possible 
Soviet-Afghan alliance in case their demands, as yet 
unspecified, were not met, 89 For his own part, Dobbs was 
anxious to steer the conversations away from the vexatious 
Afghan claims to the "independent" tribal territory, He 
realised that he would have to give an "uncompromising 
negative" to the request for the cession of Waziristan to 
88, See The Pioneer, 14,4,1920, As at Rawalpindi, the 
chief British representative was almost uniquely responsible 
for the presentation of the Government of India's case; on 
the Afghan side, the burden was more evenly spread, 
89. These were Dobbs' conclusions at the end of the 
Mussoorie conference, (F.D., S,F.Jan,l92l 1 No,lJ7)• His 
daily reports of the proceedings of the conference do not 
throw mugh light on these initial Mghan tactics, 
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Afghanistan which he expected Tarzi to make; he feared 
that the talks would then be broken off before discussion of 
other and more profitable issues could take place.90 The 
fundamental British desire to use the conference to gain 
time with Afghanistan made Dobbs very anxious to avoid an 
early end to the Mussoorie discussions; as he wrote:-
"The longer the Afghan delegation was kept down in India; 
the more likely it seemed to be that there would be a 
definite break with the Bolshevik emissaries in Kabul",9l 
He therefore attempted to turn the conversation to topics 
on which he felt able to give the Amir's representatives 
more reassuring replies. At thesecoodmeeting of the confer-
ence, held on 19 April, Tarzi expressed his fear that the 
non-inclusion of Sir Hamilton Grant's formal statement of 
Afghanistan's independence in the body of the treaty of 
Rawalpindi, and its relegation to the "supplementary letter", 
meant that the Government of India was not sincere in its 
stated desire to grant Afghanistan full independence,92 
He later pointed to the fact that the "supplementary letter" 
had not been published in India as another illustration 
of the same point,93 Dobbs seized on this issue as an 
90. F .D., S,F,Oct,l920 1 No.4.53· 
91· ~· 
' No,4l2, 92. ~·· 93· Ibid,, No,4lJ. 
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opportunity to emphasis British goodwill, explaining that 
the Afghan government was now at full liberty to fulfil 
*Abdur Rahman's ambition of sending a permanent ambassador 
to London, or to any other of the European capitals willing 
94 
to receive Afghan representatives, There were certain 
"weighty reasons", he claimed, for the non-publication of 
the "supplementary letter", but they did not in any way 
diminish its validity, or affect the Government of India's 
readiness to abide by the pledg~which Grant had given 
'Ali Ahmad,95 These arguments appear to have satisfied 
Tarzi and his colleagues, and Dobbs noted that the Afghan 
delegates were now "surprisingly apologetic" about their 
stand on the Waziristan issue. He believed that some 
progress had been made towards the creation of the friendly 
atmosphere which he desired,9 6 
94, ~·• No.4l2, Dobbs would have agreed with Montagu, 
however, (see supra, p.296 ) that Afghanistan's relations 
with Britain were far more important to the Indian than the 
London government, and that for this reason the day-to-day 
business of Anglo-Afghan relations should continue to be 
handled by the Delhi Foreign Department rather than by the 
London Foreign Office. It was evident that the Foreign 
Department was most unwilling to relinquish responsibility 
for the execution of British policy towards Afghanistan, 
which was one of the principal reasons for the existence 
of a Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, India 
had, after all, few other external problems of a major order 
at this time. 
95• ~., Nos.4l4 and 415. The most important of these 
"weighty reasons" was the known opposition of sections of 
the English and Indian press to the conciliatory attitude 
towards Afghanistan which the Government of India had 
adopted in l9l9• (See supra, P• 264, footnote l6l). 
96, F,D,, S.F.Oct.l920, No,42~. 
6, The suspension of the formal negotiations and 
subsequent Afghan proposals; April - June 1920, 
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This progress was halted by events outside the control 
of the delegates of either side. On 24 April news reached 
Rawalpindi that Afghan regulars had infringed the Anglo-
Afghan frontier near Chaman and had abducted a tribal head-
man from British territory, while further Afghan incursions 
were reported from Tandisar, in the Kurram valley. 97 From 
the Chitral valley to the north came news of an Afghan 
98 
attack on the frontier post of Lambabat, It is difficult 
to assess the reasons for these activities by the local 
Afghan authorities, Amanullah instructed Tarzi "to deny 
officially that Afghan Government has any connection with 
these disturbances", 99 and both the Amir and his Foreign 
Minister maintained throughout that the Afghan attacks were 
the work of local officers acting entirely on their own 
responsibility. Against this claim must be put the fact 
that they were almost simultaneous, and that 1Abdul Q,uddus 
and Nadir Khan, both very senior officials who should have 
been in reasonably close contact with Kabul, were believed 
to be implicated in the Chaman and Tandisar incidents 
t . 1 100 respec ~ve Y• Do<bbs believed that it was possible "That 
97· ~·· No .4JO, 98. ~·· No.4Jl. 
99· Ibid,, Note to No.4J4, 
100. ~· 
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Mabmud Tarzi <s personal enemies -· Sardar Abdul Q.uddus and 
Nadir Khan - are trying to queer his pitch and prevent 
negotiations being successful",lOl More serious in its 
implications was the possibility that the Afghan government 
were ordering advances into British territory as a prepara-
tion for a general ,jehad throughout the length of the 
Anglo-Afghan frontier, as some of the more suspicious 
. 102 British officers bel1eved, The most likely explanation 
of the Afghan action was the desire to demonstrate to the 
British the threat which Afghanistan held over India, in 
an attempt to force the Government of India to offer more 
generous terms to the Afghan delegates at Mussoorie, If 
this was the Amir's policy, then it was a gravely mistaken 
one, For the frontier incidents of April 1920 gave the 
British an opportunity which they may well have been waiting 
for; the Mussoorie discussions were broken off while a 
suitable explanation of his conduct was awaited from the 
Amir, Had the Afghan incursions been of a more serious 
nature, the Government of India might have been forced to 
ask Tarzi and his colleagues to return to Kabul, and one 
of the principal British objects in calling the Mussoorie 
conference would have been defeated, As it was, the British 
101. L£i£•• No,453· 
102, Such as LieutrColonel Sir Barmine Dew, at that 
time Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan, 
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were given the chance to postpone further formal sessions 
of the conference, and thus to gain useful time, maintaining 
contact with the Afghan delegation in the meantime by means 
of informal discussions, They were able to use the six 
weeks' suspension of the conference to complete their 
operations in Waziristan, and were thus able to oppose the 
Afghan claims to the area from a stronger position when the 
formal meetings of the conference were resumed on J June, 
The informal conversations which Dobbs and other 
members of the British delegation had with the Afghan 
representatives during the suspension of the conference were 
extremely valuable, for they allowed both sides to speak 
their minds without fear that what they said would become 
part of the verbatim record of the proceedings which was 
to be presented to their respective governments, On 24 
April Sir 'Abdul Qaiyum, 103 one of Dobbs' colleagues in the 
British delegation, visited the Afghan party to present 
104 Dobbs' formal notice of the suspension of the conference, 
lOJ. Formerly Political Agent, Khaibar, and a prominent 
figure in the government of the North-West Frontier Province. 
A pen-portrait of him appears in Sir Olaf Caroe's Xhe 
Pathans, pp.425-26, 
104, He found the Afghans in the act of adding their signa-
tures to a letter to Dobbs breaking off the talks on their 
own part, as a protest against the British operations in 
Waziristan. It is possible that they had heard that the 
British intended to suspend the conference; and wished to 
produce reasons for doing so more acceptable to themselves, 
Dobbs considered that "it is very lucky that my letter 
announcing suspension of conference got in first", (F,D., 
S.F.Oct.l920 3 No,4J4), 
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A long conversation on the general subject of Anglo-Afghan 
relations followed, in the course of which "Mahmud Tarzi 
told Sir Abdul Qaiyum that his colleague Ghulam Muhammad 
could explain in frank Afghan fashion the whole of their 
objects", that 'Abdul Qaiyum could then inform Dobbs of 
them, "and that there was really no need for further 
l05 
conferences", This Ghulam Muhammad proceeded to do:-
We do not understand the niceties of diplomacy 
and do not see the object of these long discussions. 
We wish to get to the point, The truth is this, 
We can still make a good bargain with the Bolsheviks; 
but we prefer to deal with Great Britain, because 
she is firmly established and an ancient State, and 
is also wealthier than the Bolsheviks. Moreover 
she is our friend and we would prefer to .turn towards 
her first. We can easily settle the question of 
our relations with the Bolsheviks and of our giving 
asylum to Indian seditionists, if we come to terms; 
but we want to know what will the British offer.us, 
If they will not offer us enough, we must turn to 
the Bolsheviks. There is still time to do so. But 
also we require Waziristan, The British Government 
must be tired of trying to restrain these tribes and 
we could keep them in much better order, We cannot 
possibly desert them since they rose against !8~ 
British and helped us and they are Musalmans, 
Dobbs wondered whether Ghulam Muhammad's continued 
insistence on the cession of Waziristan to Afghanistan was 
seriously intended, or whether it has been devised purely 
as a bargaining point with the British, S:ir 'Abdul Q,a.:i~'um 
l05. Ibid., No.45J• 
l06. Ibid, This cannot be regarded as a verbatim trans-
lation of Ghulam Muhammad's statement; as Sir 'Abdul Qaiyum 
made no word for word record of the conversation, 
told him that he was unable to give an opinion on this 
point, but Dobbs decided that "My own impression was that 
the question of the tribes was j'J.st part of the Afghan 
bluff which they did not intend to press to 107 extremes"., 
Subsequent informal conversations with Mahmud Tarzi did 
not convince Dobbs that his initial conclusions were 
mistaJ.cen; at a later unofficial meeting Tarzi abandoned 
his original demand that the "independent" tribal territory 
be ceded "o Afghanistan, and proposed instead that it should 
be re-formed as an independent buffer state, a suggestion 
which Dobbs described as "absurd" •108 Acting on his 
assumption that the Afghan claim to Waziristan was pure 
bluff, Dobbs told the Amirls Foreign Minister that it was 
"practically certain" that the Indian government would 
accept no revisions of the Anglo-Afghan frontier, and again 
attempted to turn the conversation to other topics.109 
Several other subjects for discussion had in fact been 
mtroduced by Ghulam Muhammad's blunt statement of the Afghan 
case, as well as in the course of other informal talks with 
the Afghan delegation during the suspension of the formal 
107. Ibid, As Dobbs was not present during 'Abdul 
Qaiyum•s informal discussions with the Afghan delegates 
he must have derived this impression from other encounters. 
108, Ibid, 1 No.462, Tarzi's proposal corresponds fairly 
closely with the stated programme of the modern Afghan 
government on the "Pashtllnistan" question, T':le Pakistani 
reaction parallels that of Henry Dobbs, 
109, Ibid,, No.476, 
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sessions of the conference, There were further complaints 
by the Afghans on the score of the harsh treatment of 
Turkey which was proposed by the allies at San Remo in April 
1920, but it was clear that Afghanistan could, by herself, 
do little to alter the combined decision of the powers of 
western Europe, and Dobbs was able to dismiss Tarzits 
objections by pointing out that allied policy had by now 
been finally settled.110 Ghulam Muhammad's candid admission 
that Afghanistan would be ready to abjure alignment with 
the Bolsheviks if the British offered her sufficiently 
favourable terms, and that, in Dobbs' words, "Afghanistan 
stands nakedly in the market place, ready to sell herself 
to the highest bidder",lll seemed to offer a more promising 
field for negotiation, Uncertain whether the London govern-
ment had authorised Dobbs to present the Afghan representa-
tives with the outline of a final treaty which the 
112 Government of India had previously proposed, Lord 
Chelmsford had telegraphed Montagu on JO April, to explain 
that he was anxious "to make ,,, definite preliminary 
110, Or so Dobbs thought. (~.,Nos.502 and 505, See 
also supra, p, 296 ) , Thanks to the suspension of the 
formal Anglo-Afghan negotiations in May Dobbs was able in 
June to present the Afghans with what he regarded as a 
fait accompli in Turkey as well as another in Waziristan, 
111. F,D,, S.F,Oct,l920, Note to No.J53· 
112, See supra,~JOl. 
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declaration of what we are prepared to offer as basis 
for futc1re negota tions for treaty of friendship',llJ The 
Viceroy's request was refused by Montagu in categorical 
fashion; he believed that the Afghan incursions across the 
Durand line indicated that the Amir was far from friendly 
to the British, and maintained that the topic of a renewed 
subsidy should not even be introduced :i.n conversations 
with the Afghan representatives "Until the Amir has given 
1 f f lt d d ' 't. " 114 Th I d. some rea proo o a ere ~spos~ ~on , e n ~an 
government's argument that the Afghans were unlikely to 
manifest the "altered tLLsposition" the Secretary of State 
desired unless Dobbs made some statement of the concessions 
which Britain was prepared to offer Afghanistan had evidently 
fallen on deaf ears. To induce Montagu to revoke his 
decision on this point was to require much further correspon-
dence between the Delhi and London governments. 
The task of persuasion was partly achieved by the 
policy of the Afghan delegates both before and after the 
resumption of the official sessions of the conference on 
7 June, In the course of informal conversations on 9 May 
Tarzi presented a rough outline of his government's aims 
in both internal and external affairs, and the part which 
llJ, F.D., S,F,Oct,l920 1 No.455• 
114. Ibid,, No,470• Montagu did not explain how the 
Amir was to "give some real proof of altered disposition", 
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he hoped Britain would play in their ful£Ument, He 
explained that the Amir was interested in supporting anti-
Bolshevik movements in Bokhara and Ferghana, "and [as Dobbs 
reported] if we would meet them by frontier concessions 
especially by giving them Waziristan, they wished to form 
an offens:tve and defensive alliance witll us against the 
Bolsheviks and to extricate Turcomans, Bukhara and Khiva 
from Russian influence", Tarzi added that the Afghan 
government would be willing in return to grant the British 
a monopoly for the development of the mineral and other 
resources of Afghanistan, and would accept financial and 
technical assistance from no other power. Reminded by 
Dobbs that the British would consider no alteration of the 
existing Anglo-Afghan frontier, Tarzi replied that "they 
were willing in that event to make a more restricted 
friendly arrangement which they feared might not be very 
lasting and would in their view be onJ.y a pis aller". 
While Afghanistan would be ready to prevent the Soviet 
government from using Afghanistan as a base for activities 
hostile to India, she would be forced to accept developmental 
aid from any nation which offered it, "and the nation which 
in such circumstances showed itself most liberal in assist-
ance would naturally be shown the most friendship".ll5 This 
31 
explanation of the two broad alternatives of settlement 
between Britain and Afghanistan was to be repeated on 
several occasions during the visit of Dobbs' mission to 
Kabul in l921, and remained fundamental to the approaches 
of both parties for many months to come. Of more immediate 
importance '"as the fact that the Afghan delegation had 
outlined the form of treaty they proposed to conclude with 
the British, making it difficult for Dobbs to abide by the 
Secretary of State's decision that no counter-proposals 
were to be made until the A.mir manifested an "altered 
disposition". This in turn strengthened the arguments of 
the Government of India that Montagu's decision should be 
revised., 
Dobbs' difficulties were further alleviated towards 
the end of May by the withdrawal of Afghan forces from 
Tandisar and Lambabat, and the settlement of the local 
disputes which had been the proximate cause of the suspension 
of the formal conference sessions on 24 April. To Tarzi's 
claim that the Afghan infringements of the Durand rrontier 
in the Kurram and Chitral valleys were not undertaken on 
n6 
official orders, Dobbs adopted an uncompromising stance, 
pointing out that "it was a set of very similar incidents, 
now characterised by the Afghan Government as misunderstandings 
ll6, See supra,p.J09. 
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by the Afghan officers of their orders, which produced 
the conflict of last year, and that there is a serious 
ll7 danger that a like result may now be produced", 'Abdul 
Hadi Dawi Khan had left Mussoorie with 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi on 
25 April, 118 for conversations with Nadir Khan in Jalalabad 
and by telephone with Amanullah in Kabul, in order to 
explain the stern British reaction to the Chaman, Tandisar 
and Lambabat incidents. He returned to Mussoorie on lJ 
May and repeated to Dobbs the now familiar claim that the 
incursions in question had not been ordered by the Amir, 
Amanullah, 'Abdul Hadi stated, was ready to order an 
instant withdrawal provided the British agreed to suspend 
their operations in Waziristan until the Mussoorie discuss-
ions had been satisfactorily concluded, He added that 
"they were not authorised to waive this point" 1 119 but it 
was evident that the British were firmly opposed to offering 
any concession on this score, and, after a message from 
Amanullah of 20 May announcing the withdrawl of Afghan 
troops from Lombabat and Tandisar, 120 Tarzi agreed on Jl May 
to resume the formal meetings of the conference without 
insisting on a British withdrawal from Waziristan,121 
117, F,D,, S,F,Oct,l920, No.453· 
ll8, ~., No,442, 
119, Ibid,, No.484, 
120, Ibid,, No.515. It appears that the Afghan forces 
occupying British territory near Chaman had already 
been withdrawn. 
121, ~·• No,545, 
?. The conference is formally re-opened; Dobbs 
and Tarzi agreed to sign a treaty on the snot, 
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After the re-opening of the conference on 7 June it 
soon became fairly clear that the Afghan Foreign Minister 
was anxious not to leave Mussoorie without concluding some 
definite and possibly final agreement with the British, a 
change of attitude for which Dobbs later suggested several 
reasons. Among them was Tarzi's fear that he might share 
the fate of 'Ali Ahmad lilian, whose return to Kabul after 
the Rawalpindi conference had been followed by his removal 
from the ruling circles at the Afghan capital, Tarzi was 
reported to have harangued his colleagues to the effect 
that "anyone attempting to come to India alone and trying 
to make a reasonable agreement is promptly supplanted at 
122 Kabul", and it was said that Nadir Khan was attempting 
to undermine Tarzi •-s influence dueing the latter's absence 
in India. One of the most remarkable features of the 
proceedings at Mussoorie had been the extent to which Tarzi, 
once feared by the British as one of their sternest 
opponents, had been converted to an apparent enthusiasm f'•>r 
alignment with the Indian government, and he was able to 
point out to Dobbs that if he were dis,nissed after returling 
to his country, the benefit of his personal conviction of 
the sincerity of British friendship would be lost.123 He 
122, F,D,, S,F,Jan.1921, No.15, 
123. ~·• No,26, 
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explained that he would be unable to maintain his position 
if he returned to Kabul empty-handed, and therefore 
suggested that the two delegations proceed forthwith to 
the conclusion of the final treaty mentioned in the instru-
ments of Rawalpindi. 
There were other factors which inclined Dobbs towards 
the same conclusion, During mid-June reports reached India 
that the definite proposals for an Afghan-Soviet entente 
which Suritz had been authorised to make at the end of 
. 124 Ap.l"ll had produced a measure of agreement between the 
Bolshevik ambassador and his Afghan hosts which had been 
unexpected when the Mussoorie conference had opened, The 
a ttentj.on of t'1e British reverted to the discussions at 
Kabul of which little had so far been said at Mussoorie. 
Although there is almost no first-hand documentation 
available on the progress of Suritz's negotiations during 
the April, May and June of 1920, 125 it is evident that the 
British understood by 16 June that Suritz had been permitted 
to make Afghanistan "gifts of the most substantial value", 
124, See supra, p.291. 
125, The published Soviet records for this period consist 
of a series of highly grandiloquent letters between Suritz 
and the Amir dealing with the gift of a radio transmitter 
to t'J.e Afghan government, Nothing is said about the real 
points at issue between the two governments. (Soviet 
Documents, Vol.II, No,J76 1 and Vol,III 1 No.66 and addendum), 
In fairness to the Soviet authorities it must be said that 
the British have published almost nothing about their con-
temporaneous negotiations with the Afghan government, 
"in fact nearly everything for which the Afghans have been 
asking", A,N.L, Cater, officiating as Foreign Secretary to 
the Indian government during Dobbs' absence at Mussoorie, 
remarked in some alarm: "It is clear that not a moment is 
to be lost in making our offers clear to the Afghan Govern-
ment if we are to outbid the Bolshevik Government, The 
only thing is that what we are prepared to give is of small 
value in comparison with the gifts of the BolshevL'<cs" ,l26 
Cater probably believed that the Soviet ambassador had now 
definitely stated .his readiness to meet the Afghan demands 
for territorial concessions in the Panjdeh oasis, and 
realised that the British were unable to reciprocate by 
ceding Waziristan to Afghanistan, There is no evidence to 
support Cater's interpretation of the current state of the 
Kabul negotiations, and it seems more likely that Suritz 
confined himself at the time to the offers which subsequently 
became part of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of l92l, These 
included a stipulation that neither party would enter into 
any agreement with a third power detrimental to the interests 
of tile other, and that the R,S,F,S,R, would be entitled to 
open five consulates in Afghanistan, including two near 
the Anglo-Afghan frontier at Qandahar and Ghazni 1 in return 
for reciprocal Afghan consular rights in Soviet territory, 
l26, F.D., S,F,Jan,l92l, Note to No.4l. 
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Suritz appears to have offered the Amir an annual subsidy 
and military and technical support which as yet remained 
unspecified, The independence of Bokhara and Khiva was to 
be recognised by both powers, but the Soviet ambassador 
seems to have been unwilling to offer any guarantee that 
his government would respect their undertaking on this 
. 127 J.ssue, The Soviet proposals on tl1e future of the 
Panjdeh oasis represented another attempt to save Afghan 
face in a manner which did not involve the R,S,F,S,R, in 
any real territorial loss, but the full extent of Soviet 
duplic:Lty on this score did not become apparent until October 
1920.128 Moreover, the British were not to know of this 
until later, and their fears that Suritz was in June 1920 
close to concluding a treaty with Afghanistan in which the 
Amir was offered very liberal terms were of great importance 
in the context of the later stages of the Mussoorie confer-
ence, since they helped to induce Dobbs to agree with Tarzi 
that a final Anglo-Afghan treaty should be concluded on the 
spot. 
Dobbs' conversion to Tarzi's viewpoint was not however 
immediate. His fear that a Soviet-Afghan entente was 
imminent was only enough to convince him that a renewed 
127, F,D,, 502-F 1923, No.l; p.6, 
128. See infra, pp.J52-53· 
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attempt should be made to overcome the Secretary of State's 
objections to the presentation to the Afghan delegates of 
an outline of the British proposals for a final treaty, 
and he was not initially prepared to accept Tarzi •.:s suggestion 
that the opportunity should be taken to negotiate that treaty 
and sign it at Mussoorie, The Government of India had 
already tried to persuade Montagu to allow them to present 
such an outline and had failed, but they now brought 
forward the new arguments suggested by Suritz's supposed 
success in Kabul, and asked the Secretary of State to 
"d h" d . . l29 recons1 er 1s ec1s1one Montagu's reply brought to 
light the wide gap which sti.ll separated tl.1.e Delhi and 
London governments in their approach to the general question 
of the future status of Afghanistan, He failed to state 
whether he was prepared to authorise Dobbs to lay before 
Tarzj_ a series of definite proposals, and the Government 
of India decided to allow themselves the benefit of the 
doubt by assuming that he was ready to give such authoris-
ation. More serious differences were however demonstrated 
by Montagu's contention that "Unless control of foreign 
relations is obtained in return grant of subsidy is open 
to objection" ,lJO This stipulation pointed up the fact 
l29. F,D,, S,F,Jan,l92l, No,4l, 
lJO, Ibid., No,49. 
that the Government of India and the India Office had 
never agreed before the Mussoorie conference on the condi-
tions to be demanded of Amanullah as a guid pro guo for 
the developmental assistance which the Indian government 
proposed to offer him,lJl The Secretary of State's former 
demand that Amanullah should break off all relations with 
the Soviet government had not been abandoned, and he now 
added to it the proposal that the old agreements with 'Abdur 
Rahman and Habibullah should be renewed, The Government of 
India had long decided to conquer Amanullah with kindness, 
believing that he would eventually become convinced of 
British friendship, and would, in Sir Hamilton Grant's words, 
be prepared to 11 lean on us again as his advisers in foreign 
. 132 
affa1.rs" -his advisers, but not his masters, The 
formal stipulation that Afghanistan's foreign relations 
should be under the exclusive control of Great Britain 
was not one which they were prepared to accept, as they 
explained to the Secretary of State.lJJ Montagu eventually 
agreed (and for the time bei:lg at any rate) that the 
proposal to renew the knir's subsidy should not be made 
dependent on his accepting British direction of his exter,lal 
lJl. See supra,pp.301-02, 
132. 
133. 
F.D., F,B,Dct,l919 1 No,138, 
F,D,, S,F,Jan,l921, No.56, 
See supra,p.267. 
relationsl34 but suggested instead that "a treaty and loan on 
the lines of the Anglo-Persian agreement" should be consid-
ered,lJ5 The Government of India knew in their turn that 
they would be unable to force on the Afghans the British mono-
poly of European activity in Afghanistan which the Foreign 
Office had tried to force on Persia by the still-born Anglo-
Persian treaty of l9l9 1 unless they agreed to the 
unacceptable Afghan demand for the cession of Waziristan,l3 6 
They seized on the fact that Montagu had abandoned 
his complete opposition to the presentation of draft 
lJ4, Ibid.,No.59• Montagu's telegram to the Viceroy 
announcing this decision was dated JO June l920, It seems 
just possible that his earlier refusal to consider a renewed 
subsidy, unless British control of Afghan foreign policy was 
secured as a guid pro guo, was based on the advice of Lord 
Curzon, and that his abandonment of this stand was made with-
out consultation with the Foreign Office, (For a previous 
incident of a similar kind, see supra, pp26J-6~. His 
concession in this respect was temporary to the extent that 
the London gov'ernment later acted on the assumption that the 
British monopoly of Afghanistan's foreign relations was to 
be regained in return for resumption of the subsidy payments, 
and that her complete independence had never been admitted 
in the first place, (See infra, PP• 374-75.) 
lJ5. F,D,, S,F.Jan,l92l, No,49. The Anglo-Persian agree-
ment provided for a loan from the British government of £7 
million which was to be used for the development of Persia 
by British advisers. Although it did not formally exclude 
the influence of other European powers from the Shah's 
kingdom, it was widely believed that by it the British "had 
turned Persia into a private preserve", (Sir Percy Sykes, 
History of Persia 1 Vol,II 1 p.522). The agreement was 
accepted by the Persian government in August l9l9 3 but it 
was never ratified by the Tehran Ma,jlis, and was officially 
repudiated by Reza Khan's government.in l92l, (See G, 
Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, pp.45-47 1 and 
supra, P •. 200, footnote 98.) 
lJ6, See supra, p.295. 
proposals to the Afghan delegation, and quietly rejected 
the alternative settlement he suggested, In this way, and 
with a reasonably clear conscj.ence, they were able to 
instruct Dobbs to lay before Tarzi the outline statement 
of policy which they had drafted several months earlier, 
For over a fortnight between 30 June and l3 July Dobbs 
delayed presenting the Afghan delegates with the Government 
of India's draft proposals, as he was now authorised to do. 
He preferred to allow Tarzi to take the initiative, to 
explain Afghan needs and intentions in a way which would give 
the British some idea of the acceptability of their own 
programme. By the beginning of the second week of July, 
however, events in Kabul began to convince him that the 
mere presentation of the British draft would not be enough, 
and to force him to agree with Tarzi that the two delegations 
should proceed forthwith to the negotiation and signature of 
a final treaty between their governments. On l3 July news 
(which subsequently proved false) reached India of the 
arrival in Kabul of the famous Turkish wartime leader Jemal 
Pasha.l37 For the British, who were now faced with the 
137• In the event Jemal did not arrive in Kabul until the 
end of October, 1920 (See infra, p, 358 ) , Jemal, one of the 
members of the Young Turk triumvirate which had governed 
Turkey during the first world war, had accompanied his 
colleague Enver Pasha to exile in Germany and Moscow after 
Turkey's defeat. Their departure was doubtless hastened by 
quarrels with Mustafa Kemal, whose star was now clearly in 
the ascendant. Jemal is described by the Indian revolution-
ary leader M,N, Roy as "a man of simple habits and pleasant 
manners", who lacked Enver Pasha's bombast, and his wide-
ranging, quixotic ambition, (M,N, Roy, op.cit., p.40l). 
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growing strength of the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia, 
Jemal's presumed presence in Kabul seemed to augur fatal 
138 
consequences. "Hitherto", Dobbs wrote, when he heard 
of the news, "it has been the wish of the Soviet Government 
to keep our frontier in disorder only, and not to involve 
Afghanistan. Now a wish to push Afghanistan into a war 
with us is definitely declared by them".l39 The logic of 
Dobbs' argument that the news of Jemal's visit to Kabul 
meant that the Soviet government "definitely" intended to 
attack India in alliance 'dth Afghanistan is difficult to 
follow, and Dobbs himself later revised some of his opinions 
on Jemal, with whom he had several friendly conversations 
during the visit of the British mission to Kabul in 1921.140 
Nevertheless he regarded Jemal's assumed arrival in the 
Afghan capital as a powerful reason for closing with the 
Afghan delegation in India before Turkish and Soviet 
influence in Afghanistan impelled the Amir into another war 
with the British. 
Discussions with Tarzi and his colleagues between l and 
lO July had helped to determine the nature of the agreement 
which Dobbs was now anxious to sign, TJ1.e conference 
138. Jemal's real political power was reduced by the very 
fact that he had broken with Mustafa Kemal, but Dobbs 
appears to have ignored this, 
139· F.D., S.F.Jan,l92l 1 No.86(a). 
140, See infra, P• 358. 
sessions had revealed that the Afghans were ready to 
spend large sums on the economic development of their 
country, and that they looked to the British to supply them 
with the financ.ial and technical assistance they needed. 
T:'ley expanded on their plans to build railways and telegraph 
lines in Afghanistan, to exploit the mineral wealth of their 
country and educate its citizens. Though he was by training, 
and perhaps by inclination, not fully competent to discuss 
all the technical problems which thus arose, Dobbs welcomed 
this opportunity to stave off discussion of the Afghan 
terri to rial demands '"hich he could not be certain had been 
abandoned.. British cooperation in the economic development 
of Afghanistan, he believed, "would bea.great solvent of 
ignorant hostility and fanaticism and would establish our 
influence permanently in the country" • The Government of 
India mi.c;"C1t find itself committed to the expenditure of 
large sums of money, but Dobbs believed that such expenditure 
would pay good political dividends. There was in any case 
a good chance that the schemes on which Tarzi was now 
enlarging so enthusiastically would never materialise, or 
"would go forward exceedingly slowly and with every kind of 
objection and obstruction. At the same time the power of 
being able to point to these paper aspirations would always 
delight impractical visionaries like Mahmud Tarzi and the 
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present Amir".141 Dobbs was certaL'> that the Government 
of India should not let slip this chance of declaring their 
support of Amanullah 1 s modernising programme, and he set 
to work to prepare a "Rough Draft Treaty" outlining British 
. t t· . th . h 142 Th d ~n·en ~ons ~n e econom~c sp ere, e raft, which 
Dobbs believed could be discussed and signed at Mussoorie 
without much difficulty, provided for the renewal of 
Habibullah 1 s subsidy of Rs.l8 lakhs per annum, and for the 
grant to the Afghan government of "material for the construe-
tion of rai.lways and factories and the erection of telegraph 
lines to such extent as may appear to them [the British 
gover,unent] feasible and reasonable" 1 143 together with the 
loan of technical advisers for their installation, Mining 
experts were to survey Afghanistan, and selected youths 
were to travel to England for their education, The Amir 
was to accept but one definite counter-obligation: he was 
to ensure that no citizen of or residents in Afghanistan 
undertook activities "which may tend to stir up strife or 
pcoduce enmity against the British Government within the 
l4l, F,D,, S,F,Jan,l92l, No,62, 
142. Dobbs' "Rough Draft Treaty" was subsequently re-
written as the "Mussoorie memorandum", (see Appendix 26), 
Though the two documents are in substance the same, they 
differ in terms of wording and arrangement. 
143, Nobody seriously discussed what tJ:1e factories >vere 
to produce or where the railways were to run. It was the 
general effect which concerned both the British and Afghan 
delegates. 
boundaries of India" 1 l
44 
and was to prevent his frontier 
officers from engaging in their time-honoured activity of 
encouraging the tribes of the "independent" territory to 
attack British installations. By this stipulation Dobbs 
hoped to prevent the one possibility which the Government 
of India most feared; the possibility that the Soviets 
might use Afghanistan as a base for promoting rebellion 
in Indcia,l45 
8, The Viceroy re,jects Dobbs• proposals, and the 
conference is concluded; July l920, 
There was little in the terms of Dobbs' "Rough Draft 
Treaty" to which the Viceroy and h:Ls advisers took exception. 
It did not in any case differ in principle from the outline 
settlement which the Government of India had proposed before 
the convening of the Mussoor:Le conference. They were 
however firmly opposed to Dobbs• plans to secure its signa-
ture at Mussoorie. The principal reason for Chelmsford's 
stand on this issue was probably expressed by Cater when 
he wrote on lJ July: "There is no need to hurry things, 
and if we do not rush into the arms of the Afghans, their 
own needs must make them come to us: it is far better that 
l44. See Append:ix 26, paragraph (J). The wording of 
Dobbs' "Rough Draft Treaty'' was in this case transferred 
direct to the 11 Mussoorie memorandum"" 
l45. See supra, p.J02. 
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they should be in the positi.on of suitors ;;hen it comes to 
the question of concluding a treaty than that we should be 
the offerers to th " 146 em • 
The Viceroy and his Council produced a variety of other 
arguments to justify their position, arguments which were 
perhaps individually weakened by their very multiplicity, 
Tarzi had assured Dobbs that he was fully authorised by 
the Amir "to conclude a definite Treaty of Friendship" 2
147 
but Chelmsford was inclined to doubt that this was the 
case. He believed that Tarzj_ rnj_ght be supplanted on his 
return to Kabul much as 'Ali Ahmad had been, and pointed 
out that Amanullah had sent his delegates to Mussoorie on 
the dj.s tj_nc t understanding that a final treaty was to be 
concluded at t t · 1 148 Th G t ano her J...lne and p ace, e overnnten of 
India had committed themselves to the same approach, and 
were unwilling to accept the plea that they should "consider 
whether in the present circumstances immediate expediency 
is loss . t t th • • f 1" II l49 J...mpor an an consJ...soency o po J...cy • Above 
all, the Viceroy's Council feared that if Tarzi returned 
to Kabul with a signed treaty with the British, it would 
146, F,D,, S,F,Jan,l921, Note to No,88, 
147. ~·• No,87, 
148, Ibid., No,90(a), See supra, p,JOJ, 
149. F,D,, S,F,Jan.l921; No,93, The words quoted were 
actually those of Sir Hamilton Grant, who supported Dobbs 
in his claim that a treaty with Afghanistan should be 
concluded immediately. 
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be comparatively easy for Suritz to bid up on it, and to 
offer more attractive terms which would nullify the infL1ence 
which the British expected to gain by the implementation of 
their own proposals. Chelmsford decided instead that Tarzi 
should be presented with an a_ide-m~moire stating the 
concessions Britain was prepared to offer the Afghan govern-
ment, as a basis for the conclusion of a final treaty at a 
later date,l50 Dobbs' proposed treaty was therefore to be 
presented to Tarzi as a "Note on the Proposals of the 
British and Afghan Governments discussed by the Delegates 
of the Two States at the Conference held at Mussoorie • • • 
as a Preliminary to Definite Negotiations for a Treaty of 
Friendship"; in other words, as a memorandtun whose terms 
could be altered if either side saw fit. 
Dobbs, as an obedj_ent servant of the Government of 
India, could do little to alter the Viceroy<s decision, 
although he frequently emphasised on·later occasions that 
he considered it mistaken, There was little also left for 
l50. Chelmsford's argument is not very easy to folLow, 
It would, after all, have been as easy for Suritz to bid 
up on the terms of an aide-m~moire as on the terms of a 
final treaty, On the other hand, it is true that the course 
Chelmsford advocated still allowed the British, in their 
turn, to overbid the Soviet government; a possibili_ty which 
would have been partly (though not completely) excluded 
if the final Anglo-Afghan treaty had been concluded at 
Mussoorie. 
This process of leap-frogging was of course nothing if not 
welcome to the Amir. Dobbs believed that it was unwelcome 
to Tarzi only to the extent that he looked forward to a 
triumphant re-entry to Kabul with a signed treaty in his 
pocket, 
the conference to discuss, for Tarzi himself had been 
ready to accept what was now the "Mussoorie memorandum" 
as the basis of a final treaty, and he could hardly reject 
it as a mere note of British views, Dobbs had only to close 
the conference and hand Tarzi the prepared aide-m~moire; it 
was thus on 25 July that the Mussoorie delegates foregathered 
for the last time, leaving Tarzi free to return to Kabul 
three days later, The chief delegates of both sides left 
Mussoorie disappointed men; Tarzi in particular was evidently 
l5l 
upset by his failure to return with a. signed agreement, 
For Dobbs, the ~uture was more secure; there was little 
chance of his losing his job as a result of the Mussoorie 
. 152 proceed~ngs, and he was at least able to claim that the 
l:i.m:i.ted objects of the conference had been fulfilled,lSJ 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the final weeks of the Mussoorie 
discussions continued to haunt him as a golden opportunity 
which had been mi.ssod, a fact of which he did not hesitate 
to remind his own government during the enormously protracted 
negotiations which he conducted in Kabul in 1921, 
151. A disappointment whicll he expressed a.t a banquet 
given to himself and his delegation on l9 July. !bid.,No.95• 
152. Not that Tarzi lost his, but he had feared that he 
might, See supra, p.Jl9. 
153• F.D., S,F,Jan,l92l, No,l37• 
9· The effects on British and Russian attitudes 
of the events of August 1919 - July 1920, 
r~ '1 _,1 
v · ... } -:·_! 
During the succeeding months argument over the ric;htness 
of Dobbst suggestions, of the advantages of allowing Suritz 
·to conclude his treaty first, or of stepping in to antici-
pate him, continued unabated in Indian government circles. 
But few of those concerned bothered seriously to examine 
the changes >-Jhich the twelve months f<)llowing the signature 
of the RawalpL1di treaty had brought to Afghanistan's 
relations with her neighbours, In a sense, the changes 
<;ere hard to seek; Afghanistan remained a nom:Lnally indepen-
dent state, but final treaties with Britain and the R.S.F.S,R, 
remained unconcluded. Nevertheless, the course of the 
discussions in Moscow, Kabul and Mussoorie had revealed 
that much had happened to alter the approach of the three 
parties concerned, 
The Soviet government had struck up relations with the 
Amir in the spring of 1919 in a burst of rosy euphoria. 
The Afghan war against the British was admired as a classic 
case of anti-imperialist rebellion, and the Soviets looked 
to Afghanistan as a centre from which revolution could be 
spread throughout the east. Amanullah himself was doubtless 
flattered by the a ttent:i.on of the "High-borc1. President of 
the great Russian republic", as he described Lenin, 154 and 
154. In his letter of 7 April 1919. 
Vol.II, No.ll6, addendum). 
(Soviet Documents, 
hoped to obtain from Russia arms and money which would 
further strengthen his position against the Britisl1, Yet 
the honeymoon period of Soviet-Afghan relations was of 
extremely short duration. The Afghans could not restrain 
their natural eagerness to increase their territory in 
central Asia during a period of Russian weakness; the 
Soviets came to recognise the Amir as a shrewd bargainer 
who was no more anxious than any of the other native auto-
crats of Asia to throw himself into another war with the 
British for tile greater glory of Marxist-Leninism, By the 
beginning of 1920 both sides must have realised that the 
way ahead was more difficult t!lan either had supposed, and 
that the terms of a Soviet-Afghan treaty would be little 
different in substance to those of an Anglo-Afghan agreement, 
and would be concerned with the same subjects - money, arms, 
frontiers, diplomatic representation and the prevention 
of intrigue with third parties. 
For the British, the changes in the situation brought 
by the events of August 1919 to August 1920 were no less 
fundamental, The possibility of a Soviet-Afghan entente 
was now a live one, and Sir Hamilton Grant•s prediction 
that Amanullall would never be able to strike up friendly 
relations with the Soviets was proved all too unfounded. 
Before the Mussoorie conference had opened, the Government 
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of India had still believed that the offer of an 18 lakhs 
subsidy and a certain amount of other assistance would 
eventually induce the Amir to abandon friendship with Moscow, 
It was one of the essential features of Dobbsf "Rough Draft 
Treaty" (though not one brought out at the time)l55 that a 
breakdown of Soviet-Afghan relations was not foreseen 
except as a fairly distant consequence of the Anglo-Afghan 
agreement which Dobbs suggested, As he told the Afghan 
delegation: 
We do not even ask you to cease relations with the 
Bolsheviks, if you wish to maintain them ,,, we 
only ask you to see that the Bolsheviks do not use 
you as a road for troubling us,,,, We do not ask 
you to entrust us with a monopoly of development, 
Call in Russians, French ••• men of all nations if 
you so desire, provided that you do not call them 
in a deliberate desire to use them to trouble us,l56 
In approving of the terms of what became the "Mussoorie 
memorandum", the Viceroy and his colleagues demonstrated 
that they approved of Dobbs' refusal to demand the complete 
exclusion of Soviet Russia from Afghanistan, and that they 
were prepared to do little to stop the Afghans from obtaining 
subsidies from both Britain and the R.S.F.S.R.1 57 The 
155, Probably because Dobbs himself made very little of 
it in his reports of the conference proceedings, 
156, F.D, 2 S,F,l92J, Note to No,6J8, (The Foreign Depart-
ment records were evidently in process of re-arrangement 
during 1923, and the system of filing documents by months 
appears to have been abandoned), 
157, They were not prepared to forbid the Amir to ask for 
a subsidy from the Soviet government (and they were in any 
case unable to prevent him from doing so) but they still 
believed that it was very unlikely that Suritz or his 
/(157) 
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policy of profitable neutralism, practised by the Afghau 
government to this day 2 was born in the complex series of 
discussions between the British, Russians and Afghans of 
1919-21. 
The negotiations of the years 1919-20 can be seen as 
manoeuvres in the spirit of the settlement of 1880, Direct 
agreement between the British and Russian governments was 
regarded as impossible, and each side attempted to build 
in Afghanistan a bulwark against the hostility of the other, 
Gradually, however, the Anglo-Soviet animosities aroused by 
the revolution of 1917 faded, and the two great powers began 
to foresee the possibility of peaceful co-existence, It 
was then that a direct Anglo-Russian agreement of the type 
represented by the convention of 1907 became part of a 
realisable programme, The task of achieving such an agree-
ment was that of the London Foreign Office, and not of the 
Government of India, who remained almost uninformed about 
the Foreign Office's activities, and continued to pursue 
their own aims in virtual ignorance of events in the wider 
arena of world diplomacy, This dualism of British policy 
was to prove one of the most striking features of events 
(157) 
successors would make any such offer, unless he secured 
the right to use Afghanistan as a base for operations 
against the British, In the latter event, the Government 
of India intended to withdraw their own offer of a subsidy, 
of the next eighteen months, even though it tended to 
become forgotten amidst t'::te extraordinary confusion 
produced by the unpredicted and unpredictable progress 
of the Kabul negotiations of 1921. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW SETTLEMENT: 1921 
1. The formulation and signature of the Anglo-Russian 
trade agreement: January 1920-March 1921. 
The eighteen months which followed the Mussoorie 
conference saw the treaty settlement of Afghanistan's 
relations with her northern and southern neighbours, and 
provided an answer to some of the questions which had 
been thrown up by the upheavals on the central Asian scene 
which accompanied the first world war and its aftermath, 
The precarious equilibrium of the pre-war years, which 
had been shattered by the German intervention in the 
middle east, by the Russian revolution and the British 
change of heart at the close of the great war, was restor-
ed a~ a new level. It need hardly be said that the 
establishment of the post-war equilibrium was the result 
of an extremely complicated series of manoeuvres and 
discussions between the three parties concerned ~ the 
governments of Afghanistan, Britain and Soviet Russia, 
What was less well-known at the time, and has remained 
undisclosed to this day, was the almost fortuitous way 
in which the new settlement was achieved, and the fact 
that another of a very different character was very nearly 
established. All these issues came to a head in the 
Anglo-Afghan discussions at Kabul which lasted for almost 
a year during 1920-21. These negotiations were in turn 
deeply influenced by events in other parts of the world 
in Europe as well as in Asia. 
The British decision of 1920 to approach the Bolshevik 
government at a direct level for a settlement of Anglo-
Russian rivalry in central Asia was almost unconnected 
J,10 
with the simultaneous attempts of the Government of India 
to arrive at an adjustment of Anglo-Afghan differences, 
An Anglo-Russian agreement which excluded Russia from 
Afghanistan could be considered as an alternative to an 
Anglo-Afghan alliance, but, as in 1907, the adoption of 
the former policy did not essentially flow from a distinct 
failure of the latter, The arrangement of an Anglo-
Russian agreement was, as formerly, the business of the 
London Foreign Office, by whom any engagements touching 
on Afghanistan were necessarily seen as part of a far 
wider complex of problems, involving the totality of 
British relations withfue Russian government, For the 
Government of India, a friendly Afghanistan was a sufficient 
end in itself, and the Viceroy and his colleagues were able 
to exert little influence on the course of direct negotia-
tions between London and Moscow. 
The factors which had inclined the great powers to~ 
wards a rapprochement in central Asia in 1907 had little 
to do with the current situation in Afghanistan itself, 
and this pattern was further repeated in 1920-21. The 
realisation in Moscow that a Bolshevik revolution within 
Afghanistan and other middle eastern countries could not 
1 be regarded as imminent has already been noted, but the 
failure of the Berlin rising of January 1919, the collapse 
of the Bavarian Soviet republic in the following May, and 
the down-fall of Bela Kun's socialist government of 
Hungary in August of the same year, were more important 
illustrations of the point that the promised world revolu-
tion was still far away, and that some accommodation with 
1. See supra,pp.272-7J.It should be said that there were 
differences of opinion in Soviet circles on this issue, 
No clear statement of policy was made by the Soviet 
government until June 1921. (See infra,~J99-400). 
the capitalist powers would be necessary, as an interim 
measure at the very least. Equally disturbing to the 
Soviet government was the embargo on trade with the 
R,S,F.s.R. which the western powers had instituted in 
January 1919; the Russian republic was becoming rapidly 
denuded of essential machinery and medical supplies, and 
increasingly ready to sacrifice principles as well as 
gold reserves in order to obtain them. 
Processes of a very similar kind were meanwhile at 
work to alter the original attitude of the western powers 
towards the Bolsheviks, which had of course been one of 
open hostility towards a government which had made a 
separate peace with Germany and overtly aimed at the 
overthrow of the existing social structure of Europe. By 
1920 the Bolshevik programme of red revolution in western 
Europe had failed, but so had the allied policy of inter-
vention in the Russian civil war, and at far greater cost 
to its originators. The effects of this failure were 
seen most clearly in England, where the Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, who may have doubted from the first 
the wisdom of his Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon's inter-
ventionist outlook, commented with app~oval in November 
1919 on the imminent withdrawal of British troops from 
Russian territory. 2 Lloyd George must also have realised 
that the allied blockade was a dangerous weapon which 
harmed British industrial interests as well as the Soviet 
economy, a fact which became increasingly obvious as a 
post-war recession set in in British industry during 1920, 
The first sign of a thaw in the frigid atmosphere of 
Soviet relations with the west came with the formal lifting 
of the ban on trade with Russia which was pronounced in 
2, In the passage of his speech at the Lord Mayor's 
banquet reproduced by Professor A.L.P. Dennis, The 
Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, P• 381, 
34.2 
Paris by the Supreme Council of the Allies in January 
1920, 3 At the same time Brttish and Soviet officials were 
meeting on the neutral ground of Copenhagen to begin 
tentative discussion of the possibilities of an Anglo-
Russian trade agreement. By the end of May 1920 the 
atmosphere had improved sufficiently to allow the visit 
to London of Leonid Krassin, Soviet Commissar for Trade 
and Industry. While the ostensible reasons for Krassin's 
visit were commercial, it was recognised that the purely 
political importance of any Anglo-Russian trade pact was 
considerable, and that it stemmed essentially from the 
British belief that any formal agreement with Krassin 
denoted de facto British recognition of the Soviet 
government. Curzon, who probably considered that the 
Bolsheviks needed an end to the economic blockade more 
than the British, was unwilling to give such recognition 
unless some guarantee of Soviet non-interference in 
India and the independent countries of the middle east was 
given in return. The Soviet power to foment rebellion 
in India, Afghanistan and Persia was regarded by the 
Foreign Secretary as the strongest card in the Russian 
hand, and emphasis was therefore laid on the British demand 
that Soviet propaganda activities in these countries 
should be abandoned. 
The British government's demands were formulated 
after a very brief correspondence with the Government of 
India. Chelmsford's involvement in the Anglo-Russian 
discussions was a curious one, for he had been told next 
to nothing of Krassin's visit to London, and his Foreign 
Secretary Henry Dobbs was at that moment engaged in 
J, The Council's decision did not prevent Britain and 
France from maintaining a de facto economic blockade on 
the R.S.F.S.R, after January 1920, Hence the need for a 
separate Anglo-Russian trade agreement, 
discussions with Tarzi which presupposed that direct 
agreement with Moscow on a satisfactory Anglo-Russian 
modus vivendi in central Asia was out of the question. 
Nevertheless the Viceroy did not hesitate to declare on 
7 June 1920 that "Any attempt at an entente with 
Afghanistan as against the Bolsheviks is entirely dis-
tasteful to us 11 ; 4 in other words, that a direct settle-
ment with the Russian government was preferable to any 
agreement which Dobbs might be able to negotiate with 
the Amir 1 s representatives, at Mussoorie or subsequently. 
Asked by Montagu at the end of May 1920 for the Government 
of India's "detailed proposals as to lines of agreement 
with Soviet Government regarding Afghanistan11 ,5 Chelmsford 
had emphasised the importance of' extracting from the 
Soviets a promise not to sign any treaty with Afghanistan 
which contained provisions harmful to the British, an 
undertaking which the Viceroy suggested that Britain 
should reciprocate, This was to be supported by an 
embargo on arms exports to Afghanistan by either Britain 
or Russia, and a clause forbidding the establishment of' 
British and Soviet consulates in the neighbourhood of 
the Russo-Afghan and Anglo-Afghan frontiers respectively. 
Both Britain and the R.S.F,S.R. were to be declared "free 
to afford any assistance that Afghanistan may require in 
the general development of the country", each side agree-. 
ing not 
without 
to construct railways in the Amir 1 s kingdom 
the consent of' the other, 6 
It is clear that by direct agreement with Russia 
Chelmsford hoped to remove at one stroke all the threats 
posed by a Soviet-Afghan alliance which had been troubling 
4, F.D., S.F. Dec. 1920, No. 17. 
5· Ibi~, No. 15, 
6. ~·• No, 16. 
the Indian Foreign Department ever since Suritz's arrival 
in Kabul. The Indian government knew of each of the con~ 
cessions which Suritz was attempting to secure from 
Amanullah: permission to supply arms to the Pashtun 
tribesmen for use against the British, and to establish 
Soviet consulates near the Durand line: permission to 
arrange for a general Soviet-Afghan coalition against 
British India, and to secure some degree of Soviet 
economic penetration in Afghanistan. To all these aims 
(except perhaps the last) they were naturally opposed, 
and were prepared to test the chances of their abandon-
ment by the terms of a formal treaty with Moscow. 
While Chelmsford was excluded from the Anglo-Russian 
discussions much as his predecessor Lord Minto had been, 
his attitude towards a rapprochement with the northern 
power was very different, 
It need not be said that Chelmsford's proposals 
had altered fundamentally the approach of the Government 
of India to the problem of Afghanistan. What is mystify-
ing about "Chern is the complete lack of any evidence of 
discussion of such a momentous change in Delhi, The non-
availability of the records of the London Foreign Office 
and India Office adds to the mystery by making it imposs-
ible to assess the reception they enjoyed in London, 
All that is certain7 is that Lloyd George proposed to 
Krassin on 1 July 1920 that Britain and the R,S,F.S.R. 
should agree to abstain from all "hostile acts and hostile 
propaganda" directed against one another, as one of the 
preconditions of the renewal of normal Anglo-Russian 
trade relations. There is no direct evidence to show 
that the expected Soviet-Afghan agreement was mentioned 
to Krassin in this context, but it seems reasonable to 
7. On the evidence of Louis Fisc'ler, op. cit. Vol.I, 
p. 26l. 
suppose that Soviet activities in Persia, Afghanistan 
and India lay uppermost in British minds when these pro-
posals were put to Krassin by Lloyd George. There was 
however an important difference between the agreement 
• 
suggested by Chelmsford, and the terms of Lloyd George's 
note to Krassin of l July. It was a difference which may 
have passed unnoticed by those concerned, The Viceroy 
had envisaged an agreement with the Soviet government, 
relating specifically to Afghanistan, which was to include 
a formal limitation of the extent to which each side could 
seek to exert influence in Kabul. Lloyd George's later 
statement of the British desiderata involved only a 
general, if world-wide, moratorium on British and 
Russian propaganda activities, and had nothing to say 
about the questions o.f' consulates and railway construction 
which had naturally preoccupied the Government of 
India. It would seem, in .fact, that the specific 
Anglo-soviet agreement on Afghanistan which had been 
suggested by Chelms.f'ord had been abandoned. It would be 
interesting to know why. One possibility is that Curzon 
doubted the value of any Russian promises, and preferred 
to reconstruct the old Anglo-A.f'ghan alliance as au alter-
native; another that LJ.oyd George, never an expert on 
or even much interested in central Asian affairs, simply 
neglected to bring up the Viceroy's suggestions during 
his solo conferences with Krassin. 
Whatever the processes which led up to its adoption, 
it is clear that the form o.f' agreement with Russia pro-
posed by Lloyd George, limited aEJ it was in the Afghan 
context by comparison with the suggestions of the Indian 
government, was not achieved without much delay and re-
negotiation, The Polish attack on the Ukraine of May 
1920, ac1d the S·:>viet counter-attack of the following 
August, temporarily re-established the old hostility 
3 
between the R.S.F.S.R. and the western powers, and it 
was not until the autumn of 1920, when their failure to 
capture Warsaw induced yet another change of heart in the 
Soviet government, that Krassin returned to London for 
further discussions with British officials. Lloyd George 
and his colleagues raised again their demands for the 
abandonment of Soviet propaganda campaigns directed 
against the British empire. 8 Their requests seem to 
haveanountered relatively little opposition from the 
Soviet side, and the Anglo-Russian trade agreement, signed 
on 16 March 1921, thus included a lengthy preamble in 
which the Soviet government bound themselves to abstain 
from all action, "especially in India and in the independ-
ent State of Afghanistan", likely to provoke the inhabit-
ants to revolt against the British empire.9 
In signing the agreement, Sir Robert Horne, President 
of the Board of Trade, handed Krassin a long letter 
specifying the Soviet activities in Afghanistan which the 
British considered detrimental to their interests. 10 
Horne drew attention to Suritz 1 s attempts to provide for 
the supply of arms to the tribesmen of the Anglo-Afghan 
frontier, and to Soviet support of the anti-British 
activities of the Turkish leader Jemal Pasha and Mahendra 
Pratap in Kabul, and of M.N. Roy in Tashkent. 11 He went 
on to discuss the Soviet-Afghan treaty which Suritz had 
been negotiating in Kabul. The British government, he 
admitted, "take no objection to the conclusion between the 
Soviet and Afghan Governments of treaty engagements pro-
viding in the usual way for neighbourly relations", But 
Soviet gifts to Afghanistan of money, arms and aeroplanes, 
8, See The Times, 27 January 1921, 
9. See Appendix 27. 
10. Reproduced in The Times, 17 March 1921. 
11, The British appear to have assumed that Pratap was stilJ. 
in Kabul at this time, but this does not now seem certain. 
3 :1 ,., '::! { 
while no different in kind from those which the British 
had offered to the Amir 1 s representatives at Mussoorie, 
were described by Horne as dangerous to British 
interests in India, and regarded as. inconsistent with 
the pledges which the Soviet government had given in 
the preamble to the trade agreement. The Soviet proposal 
to establish consulates in eastern Afghanistan for the 
dissemination of propaganda among the Pashtun tribesmen 
was characterised by Horne as "anti-British measures pure 
and simple," All these were activities "upon the cessa-
tion of which his Majesty's Government must insist as an 
essential corollary of the conclusion of any agreement 
between the two Governments." 
2. Significance and faults of_the trade agreement. 
In a sense, the preamble to the trade agreement, read 
in conjunction with Horne's letter to Krassin, represented 
the achievement of the programme of a direct agreement 
with Russia on Afghanistan which Chelmsford had suggested 
so many months before. Had Chelmsford's proposals been 
carried out in their entirety, there would have been no 
pressing need for a renewed Anglo~fghan treaty to do 
anything more than clear up the loose ends~ft by earlier 
Anglo~fghan negotiations. 12 The necessity to bribe 
Afghanistan over to friendship with the British, to 
induce the Amir to prevent the Bolsheviks from using 
Afghanistan as a base for anti-British activities, would 
have vanished overnight. The fact that Dobbs had to 
spend almost twelve months in Kabul negotiating just such 
a treaty between Britain and Afghanistan was an indication 
of two important aspects of the problem: firstly, that 
the Government of India, while responsible initially for 
12. Such as the arrangement of permanent diplomatic 
representation in Kabul, Delhi and London, 
the outline of the British desiderata to be laid before 
Krassin, still tended to follow its own path towards a 
settlement of the problem by agreement with the Amir: 13 
secondly, that the Anglo-Russian trade agreement could 
not be regarded as the fulfilment of the proposals 
originally made by Chelmsford. It will be remembered 
that the Viceroy had envisaged an "agreement with Soviet 
Government regarding Afghanistan" 14 and had outlined it 
in a fashion similar to that of the Anglo-Russian 
convention of 1907. An agreement in this form had already 
been lost when Lloyd George first put his proposals to 
Krassin in July 1920; by the terms of the trade agreement 
the Soviet government bound themselves only in a general 
manner to abstain from actions in Asia inimical to the 
British, and Horne's letter did not have the effective 
force of a specific Anglo-Russian treaty of the type of 
1907. It was thus that a curious situation resulted; a 
situation in which a direct Anglo-Russian agreement 
existed, but which waEJ :not regarded as having sufficient 
force to invalidate attempts to secure the alternative 
solution - separate agreements by Britain and Rttssia with 
the Amir, each an attempt to exclude the other from 
Afghanistan. The proof of the weakness of the Anglo~· 
Russian trade agreement in the Afghan context was the 
fact that when the British charged the Soviets with having 
lJ. A state of affairs which was largely the fault of the 
Foreign Office, who had never consulted the Indian gov-
ernment on the term:::; of the forthcoming trade agreement 
after the initial approaches of May 1920. Denys Bray, 
acting Foreign Secretary to the Gover.nment of India during 
Dobbs' <-losence in Kabul during 1921, believed that "We 
[the Indian government] have very serious grounds for 
complaint against His Majesty's Government" for not having 
discussed with the Viceroy the terms of Horne's letter to 
Krassin, and for having failed to keop the Government of 
India informed on the progress o:f the Anglo-Russian 
negotiations. (F,D., 2(A)-F 1923, Note to No. 92.) 
14. F,D,, S.F, Dec, 1920, No. 16, See su~E~•P•J4J. 
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broken its provisions in the autumn of 1921 they were 
unable to do anything effective to enforce their claims, 
which had not been mentioned specifically as clauses of 
that agreement. 1 5 The story of the British complaints 
on this issue is interlocked v;.Lth that of the respective 
efforts of Suritz and Dobbs to induce the Amir to accept 
a settlement favourable to one side or the other. 
q 
v 
J, The principal Russo-.Afghan differences are overcome, 
and a treaty is signed: August ~920~April 1921. 
For the Soviets, this programme was alr,9ady welJ. 
advanced at the end of August 1920, By then, Suritz 
seems to have achieved some measure of acceptance by the 
Afghans of the concessions for which he had been pressing 
since the previous spring; a promise by both Afghanistan 
and the R.S.F.S,R, that they would not enter into any 
agreements hostile to the other, and the Soviet right 
to establish consuJ.ates in eastern Afghanistan and to 
supply arms to the frontier tribes, 16 Help in cash and 
kind was to be given to the Afghan government in return, 
and the independence of Bokhara and Khiva was to be 
formally guaranteed, 
The progress Suritz appears to have made must have 
suffered a severe setback, however, when news reached 
Kabul in early September 1920 that Bokhara had fallen to 
an attack by the red army on .31-August. 17 For the 
Afghans, whose own troops had figured prominently in the 
defence of Bokhara, this plear evidence that the Soviet 
government was not prepared to relinquish the frontiers 
15. See infra, p.J67. 
16. It should be said that while Suritz apparently laid 
some stress on this last proposal during the earlier 
stages of the Soviet-Afghan negotiations, he seems to 
have soft-pedalled it once the prospects o.f the Anglo-
Russian trade agreement improved, 
/(17) 
of the Tsarist empire came as a bitter blow, and the 
appearance of the refugee Amir of Bokhara in Afghan 
territory in May 1921 brought home to the Afghans the 
correctness of their suspicions about earlier Bolshevik 
declarations that the Muslims of the former Russian 
empire were entitled to independence, 18 For Amanullah 
and his advisers, the fact that Amir Sa'id Al:Lm Khan's 
government was disliked by many o:f his subjects was of 
less importance than the fact that it had been rigidly 
Islamic and effectively ind•'i'endent of the Bolsheviks, 
The reaction of Suritz to Afghan demands that the 
independence of Bokhara be restored was to deny that it 
had ever been ~infringed. Faizullah Khojaev, the 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Bokharan Peoples' 
Soviet Republic, (as the Amirate became in September 1920), 1 9 
wrote to Tarzi on the 15 of that month to claim that the 
recent changes in Bokhara had been prompted entirely by 
internal discontent at the former Amir's rule, and that 
the people of Bokhara had "electe,l a C<e:Jublirnnform of 
government, being certain that through their elected 
representatives they will achieve complete independenc,;". 20 
Khojaev's cla.Lm that the Soviet capture of Bokhara repre-
sented a step towards Bokharan independence rather than 
away from it was one which the Afghans were unlikely to 
accept, and the situation ean hardly have been improved 
by the receipt in Kabul at the end of Se1:>tmaber 1920 of 
(~17) W,H, Chamberlin states that J,OOO Afghans had helped 
to defend the Amir of Bokhara's capital "with stubborn 
courage 11 • The figure is probab1~Y an over-estimate, 
(The Russian Revolution, Vol,II, p. 425. See also 
supra, p, 287. ) 
18. Such as those contained in Lenin's proclamation of 
2 November 1919, See supra,p.l98. 
19. Though not for long. The Soviet dominioiD>s tn central 
Asia were reorganised as the ethnographically.~based repub-
lics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and /(l9 )( 2o) 
detailed complaints from the Soviet government of Bokhara 
regarding the military help which Amanulla~'l clad lent to 
the Amir SatOLd Alim Khan and counter~revolutionary groups 
21 in Ferghana, The Bokharan Soviet authorities attempted 
to allow Amanullah. J. line of retreat from Bokhara which 
did not involve too serious a loss of Afghan face, by 
describing the Soviet..Afghan friction over the former 
Amirate as "misunderstandings which originated as re<3nlt 
of the actions of the former Afghan ambassador Abdul 
Shukur Khan", and by <3Xpressing the hope that these 
"misunderstandings" would be cleared up by the arrival of 
the new Afghan consul in Bokhara, tAbdul Hadi Da•ri Khan, 22 
The hint was never fully taken, and the overthrow of 
Bokharan independence remained as a running sore in 
Soviet-Afghan relations for many months to come, 
Animosities were aroused by the nationalisation of the 
goods of Afghan merchants trading in Bokhara, 23 and when 
in the spring of 1921 the anti-Bolshevik movement of 
the Basmachis gathered force, to be galvanised the 
following November by the appearance among the rebels 
of the Turkish wartime leader Enver Pasha, the day of full 
Afghan-Soviet reconciliation ove.;t' the status of Bokhara 
was still further postponed. 
In spite of the setback produced by the Bokharan 
episode, Tarzi. was able in December 1920 to tell Chicherin 
that Suritz and Afghan representatives had reached a 
"favourable conclusion 
~~d to forward a draft 
(19) Kirghizia in 1924. 
about our treaty of friendfl'lip", 
24 treaty to Moscow, Further 
(20) Soviet Docume~t~, Vol.III, No. 98, 
21, Ibi~, Vol, III, No, 101. 
22. Ibid,, Vol. III, No, 248. The term "misunderstand-
ings"--:u:s8d by the Afghans at Rawalpindi to describe the 
Anglo-Afghan war, was now adopted by the Bokharan govern-
ment to describe Afghan-Soviet disputes. /(23) (24) 
discussions in the Soviet capital betweox1 Muhammad Wali 
K:1.an and the Bolshevik authorities resulted in the eventual 
ratification of this treaty by the Soviet government on 
20 April 1921. 25 As ratified, the treaty contained the 
provision that the "High Contracting Parties accept the 
actual freedom and independence of Bokhara and Khiva, 
whatever may be the form of their government, in accord..,-
ance with the wishes of their peoples," 26 This ambiguous 
formula 27 can hardly have offered to the Afghans many 
immediate attractions, for it offered no guarantee that 
the Soviet government would fulfil their obligations in 
this respect, and included no definition of "independence" 
in the Bokharan context. One must assume that it was 
accepted in Kabul only after time had softened the blow 
of the Amir of Bokhara's ejection, or because the Soviets 
eventually offered Afghanistan more extensive military 
and financial aid than that originally proposed, 
The problem of Bokhara was one of several which 
Suritz had to overcome. The Afghan demand for the realw 
ignment of the Russo~fghan frontier between the Hari Rud 
and the Oxus had lost much of its force by the arrival of 
Soviet troops 
withdrawal of 
in Merv in January 1920 and the consequent 
. 28 Afghan detachments from the area, but 
the theoretical basis of the Afghan claim remained, By 
the terms of the treaty ratified in Moscow, the R.S.F.S,R. 
(23) Information from Mr. 'Abdul Hadi Dawi Khan. 
(24) Soviet Documents, Vol, III, addendum to No, 316. 
25. It seems likely that the ratified text differed from 
the draft sent from Kabul in December, Muhammad Wali 
Khan told Tarzi in March 1921 that the treaty had been 
ratified "with some modifications". (F,D,, 2(A)-F 1923 
No.56), It remained unratified by the Afghan government 
until the followingAugust, 
26. See Appendix 28, Article VIII, 
/(27) (28) 
agreed to "hand over to Afghanistan the frontier dis-
tricts which belonged to the latter in the last century, 
observing the principles of justice and self..,determination 
of the people inhabiting the same," The text added that 
a separate treaty would later be concluded by the two 
governments to define "The manner in which such self-
determination.,,,,.shall be expressed11 • 2 9 That no such 
treaty was ever concluded was hardly surprising, for the 
whole clause was self-contradictory, To declare first 
that "the frontier districts which belonged to the latter 
[Afghanistan] in the last century" (districts which were 
never defined in the treaty) were ceded to Afghanistan 
was clear enough, and a great concession to Afghan claims; 
but to lay down conditions implying that a plebiscite 
would be held in the area was to remove entirely the 
force which the first declaration might have had, The 
Afghan authorities must have realised that the Bolsheviks, 
as the de facto rulers of Panjdeh, would engineer a 
plebiscite in their favour, and one must assume that with 
no treaty yet concluded with the British, and with the 
prospect of a Soviet subsidy conditional upon the sig~ 
nature of a Soviet~fghan treaty, the Afghans eventually 
resigned themselves to the fact that Panjdeh was Russian, 
and would remain so. For the promise of a yearly payment 
of one million roubles in bullion, the free construction 
of a telegraph line between Herat, Qandahar and Kabul, 
and the loan of unspecified "technical and other 
specialists 11 , 30 Amanullah was forced to pay a fairly 
heavy price in prestige, 
(27) It was of course always open tothe Soviet government 
to claim that their form of government had been established 
in Bokhara 11 in accordance with the wishes of their peoples." 
(28) See supra,p.290. 
29, See Appendix 28, Article IX. 
JO. See Ibid,, "Supplementary Clause". 
Afghanistan's concern for the fate of the territory 
north of her borders was a serious enough stumbling-
block in the path of an Afghan-Soviet entente, but the 
Soviet concern for that of the intended revolution in 
India was to prove still more vexatious. It was part of 
a programme which the government in Moscow had effectively 
abandoned, but which was still pursued in Tashkent with 
some of the fervour of the earlier stages of the Bolshevik 
revolution. The establishment of Soviet consulates at 
Qandahar and Ghazni was of course considered central to 
the success of this programme,3l but for Tarzi and his 
colleagues, who realised that the "sole object of these 
Consulates was to stir up trouble in India", 32 and that 
their existence would make any satisfactory settlement 
with the British very difficult, the proposal was a 
difficult one to accept. The Afghans did their utmost 
to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining this, the principal 
concession demanded by the Soviet side: Muhammad Wali 
Khan accepted a clause in the Soviet-Afghan treaty provid-
ing for Russian consulates in Ghazni and Qandahar,33 but 
it seems that his government subsequently intended to 
prevent their use as centres of propaganda. 34 The fact 
that the British declined to believe that this would be 
possible35 was a major point at issue during Dobbs' 
negotiations in Kabul, and accounted more than partly 
for the delay in the ratification of the Soviet-Afghan 
3l. See supra, p.29l. 
32. As the Afghan Foreign Minister admitted to Dobbs in 
April l92l. (F.D., 2(A)-F l923, No.l5l). 
33· See Appendix 28, Article V. 
34. Or at least claimed to the Indian government that 
they would (F.D., S.F. l923, No. 678). 
35· See infra, pp.36l-62. 
treaty by Amanullah until August 1921. The story of the 
settlement of this problem is part of that of the final 
British attempts to secure a lasting agreement with the Amir, 
4, The British decision to send Dobbs t;o.Kabul 1~ 
the problems, involv~. 
Henry Dobbs' readiness to close the Mussoorie 
conference by signing such an agreement will be recalJ.ed, 
While the Viceroy and his Council had overridden Dobbs' 
plans in this respect, there was little in the arguments 
they used to prevent the Indian Foreign Secretary from 
proceeding forwith to Kabul to negotiate the treaty 
he proposed, Probably Dobbs himself, and certainly 
Mahmud Tarzi, believed that the closure of the conference 
wonld be followed almo.s t immedla teJ.y by final. c<egotia tioc1s 
on the basis o.f the "Mussoorie memorandum", 36 Yet it was 
not until the beginning of January l92:L, over five months 
after the conclusion of the Mussoorie discussions, that 
conferences were begun in Kabul between Dobbs and Afghan 
officials. The delay was J.argely due, as so often in Anglo-
Afghan relations, to the Government of India's obligation 
to discuss with the India Office the policy they were to 
adopt in negotiations with the Amir, Strictly speaking, 
the issue was already settled, for the 11 Mussoor.ie 
memorandum" represcJated a fairly clear statement of British 
intentions, a.Ctd it had been accepted in principlo by 
Montagu before its presentation to the Afghan delogation. 
Later correspondence between the Ind:Lan and London 
authori tios '1ad however revealed that the India Office 
took oxception to the possibility, expocted and aceepted 
by the Government o:f India though not specifically 
J6, While on his return jou:cnoy to Kabul, Tarzi announced 
at Tor Kham on 28 July 1920 that "ho would certainly re-
turn to India in a month or six weeks to settle the 
details of a treaty." (F.D,, S.F •. Jan. 1921, No, 132), 
mentioned in the "Mussoorie memorandum", that Afghani"" 
stan might conclude a treaty with R.S.F.S,R. of a type 
similar to that proposed by the British at Mussoorie; 
in other words, that the Amir was free to accept a subsidy 
from both Britain and Russia, 
The result of this fundamental conflict of opinions 
was a long and at points acrimonious debate between the 
Viceroy and Secretary of State which lasted until the 
moment of Dobbs' departure for Kabul at the end of 1920, 
and which left many points unsettled even then. The 
news of the presumed success of Suritz 1 s negotiations 
in Kabul in the late autumn of that year served to 
heighten the Secretary of State's fears that if the 
treaty outlined at Mussoorie were now signed Afghanistan 
would become the beneficiary of both the great power 
rivals, but the servant of the Soviets. Chelmsford 
correctly predicted that she would become the servant of 
neither, pointing out that Suritz had on 19 August reported 
to his government a statement by Tarzi to the effect 
that "Afghanistan has no wish to be made the arena for 
either British or Bolshevik propaganda, but desires to 
observe strict neuil.rali ty towards both". 37 Montagu only 
agreed to accept the despatch of Dobbs' mission to 
Afghanistan after he had received an assurance from 
Chelmsford that Dobbs would secure from he Afghan govern-
ment a complete statement of the terms of the Soviet-
Afghan treaty (a treaty which the British assumed had 
already been concluded),38 But the governments of 
London and Delhi had not decided whether the terms of 
that treaty, once revealed by the Afghans, would alter 
the nature of the British counter-proposals.· Montagu had 
37, F.D., S.F. 1923, No, 652. 
38. Ibid., No. 6 40. 
35 
maintained that if it should prove true that Afghanistan 
had concluded, or was about to conclude, a treaty with 
the R.S.F.S.R. providing for Soviet consulates in 
eastern Afghanistan and a Soviet subsidy to be paid to 
the Amir, the plans for an Anglo~fghan treaty envisaged 
in the "Mussoorie memorandum" should be abandoned,39 The 
Indian government believed that the news of Suritz's 
success in Kabul should not be allowed to alter the 
programme outlined at Mussoorie, and the two points of 
view were never reconciled, leaving Dobbs in an equivocal 
position in Kabul, in which he was naturally inclined to 
take the point of view of the Government of India40 
rather than that of the Secretary of State, The London 
authorities revealed that they regarded the Delhi Foreign 
Department's approach to the Amir as too liberal, and 
criticised a policy which involved "a series of concessions 
to Afghanistan without anything that public opinion will 
41 
really regard as commensurate return", but the fact 
that they were unable to suggest any alternative policy 
left the Government of India free to pursue its own pro-
gramme at the cost of fairly constant criticism from 
London. 
The period of delay which followed the Mussoorie 
conference was not without its effects on the readiness 
of the Afghan government to accept the Mussoorie pro-
posals. The Foreign Department believed, probably 
correctly, that the news from Bokhara of early September 
presented them with an unique opportunity to close with 
39· ~·, No, 651. 
40, Since he himself was largely responsible for formul-
ating it. (Ibid,, Note to No. 638), 
41, Ibid,, No, 697. Was "public opinion" really much 
inter;st;d in British policy towards Afghanistan at this 
period? One is inclined to doubt it, even though Curzon 
and the Conservative press may have been, 
the Amir while his disillusionment with the Bolsheviks 
lasted, Dobbs claimed at the beginning of 1922 that a 
mission should have been sent to Kabul in September 1920, 
and that the Afghans would then have been prepared 1~o 
throw their backs definitely at that crisis upon the 
Russians. 1142 Certainly the fact that Amanullah wrote 
to the Viceroy on 6 October to explain that he accepted 
the terms of the 11Mussoorie memorandum" except in a few 
points "which are considered to be trivial" and to invite 
Chelmsford to despatch a mission to Kabul for final 
discussions, 43 was a sign that Britain could have 
secured a favourable settlement with Afghanistan by 
prompt action in October 1920. Subsequent events reversed 
the flow of Afghan feeling: Jemal Pasha finally arrived 
in Kabul on JO October, and his presence naturally 
strengthened the hands of those Afghans who were opposed 
to alignment with the British, The despatch to Moscow 
of a draft Soviet-Afghan treaty meanwhile brought the 
possibilities of a favourable agreement with the 
R.S.F.S,R. closer to reality, Jemal was evidently able 
to persuade the Amir and some of his advisers that 
Mustafa Kenal 1 s struggle with the Greeks, and by 
implication with the British, heralded the beginning of 
another world war, 44 so that Dobbs believed that "there 
42. F,D,, 224-F 1923, P• J, 
4J. F.D., S.F. 1923, No. 6JJ, 
44. A theory which had been echoed by the Afghan press 
for several months. "Although peace ceremonies have been 
performed and a peace treaty has been signed", remarked 
the Aman-i-Afghan in July 1920 1 "nevertheless the two 
parties cannot be said to have ended the war; the Turks 
in particular have not made any advance towards peace ,,,, 
Today it is clear to all that a terrible agitation will 
originate from India and China and will spread to the 
extremities of Europe. It will be then that the final 
decision will come," (Vol, II, No, 15). 
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is little doubt that when the British Mission arrived 
in Kabul in January 1921, the Amir lr:wked forward to a 
plan for delaying his negotiations wj_ th the Bri :o Lsh 
until the European war, of the coming of which he was 
confident, should break out in the Spring, when he expected 
to obtain erwrmo·cts concessions out of our weakness, 1145 
Once again, delay by the Bd_tish had J.engthened the odds 
against the expeditious conclusj.on of a treaty favourable 
to themselves!) 
2.:._ .. ~ Dobbs begins negoti~ons in Kabul, and encoU!J.t"'r.J!. 
an initial crisis: January""LI\pril 1921, 
The Afghans' keen desire to dt>lay proceedlngs with 
the Indian government was evidenced soon after Dobbs' 
46 
arrival in Kabu.l on the last day of 1920. The Afghan 
tactic was to present a draft treaty providing for a 
plebiscite in the North-West Frontier Province to deter-
mine its :future attachment to either India o:P Afghanistan 
(a demand whic~'l may have been connected with Nadir Khan's 
presence at the conference table) supplemented by the 
paynw:ct to Afghanistan of Rs,4,36,00,000 11 as compensation 
for expenses incurred by late Amir on preservation of 
neutrality during European war", 47 Tarzi had 'n·j_dent.ly 
expected that discussion of this 
have known would be unaccc:ptable 
45. F,D,, 224-F 1923, P• 5• 
draft, which he must 
48 to Dobbs, would fully 
46. Dobbs telegraphed the Foreign Department from 
Peshawar on 28 December 1920. (F.D., S.F. 1923, No. 710). 
He would probably have arrived in Kabul on 31 December. 
Accompanying him in the British delegation were P.J,G, 
Pipon and J.G. Acheson, both officials o.f' the North-West 
Frontier Province, NawaJ:: Sir Mir Shams Shah, and Lieut.-
Colonel Muspratt. The Afghan government appointed no 
formally designated delegation, 
/;'7, Ibid., No. 767. 
48. Tarzi himsel.f' admitted that it was "exceedingly 
debatable", (!_bid,, No, 755). 
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occupy the conference until the treaty with the R.S.F.S,R. 
was ratified by the Soviet government, but Dobbs met 
the challenge by threatening on 2 February that if the 
Afghan draft was persisted in the talks would have to 
be abandoned forthwith, and by ordering transport for his 
return to India, 49 
Had Sir Henry Dobbs50 then known how often this 
manoeuvre would have to be repeated, he might have 
quailed at the task before him. Its initial use was 
successful to the extent that Tarzi eventually showed 
readiness51 to accept a somewhat meaningless compromise 
formula evolved by Dobbs to deal with the Pashtun pro-
blem. This stated that both sides were interested in 
the "betterment of the tribes of Afghan origin whose 
welfare has always been of close interest to the Afghan 
nation11 • 52 In return Tarzi demanded disclosure by 
Dobbs of the financial advantages Afghanistan could expect 
to reap from a treaty with the British; as the Afghan 
Foreign Minister put it: "Let us have less tact and more 
money". This led Sir Henry to produce a complete draft 
providing for the exclusion of all foreign consuls from 
eastern Afghanistan, and a subsidy of 18 lakbs per annum,53 
Negotiations on the basis of this draft were held up for 
several weeks by correspondence with Montagu, who pro~ 
fessed to be "somewhat alarmed by the course which dis-
cussions are apparently taking", 5Ll and who reiterated 
49. Ibid,, No, 799. 
50. He had received a K,C,I.E,, in the new year of 1921, 
51. On 15 February (F.D., 2(A)~F 1923, No, 2,) 
52, F.D., S.F, 1923, No. 809. 
53· F,D,, 2(A)-F 1923, No, 9· 
54. Ibid., No, 15, 
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his original stipulation that the provisions of the 
Soviet-Afghan treaty would have to be disclosed by Tarzi 
before Dobbs could present his own proposals. Denys 
Bray realised that Montagu 1 s objections flowed from the 
London government's reluctance to allow Afghanistan to 
conclude favourable agreements with both Britain and 
Russia: "The Secretary of State" he wrote "is always 
trying to get away from the fundamental fact that 
Afghanistan is now freed from our leading strings in her 
foreign affairs",55 Chelmsford agreed that "The India 
Office does its best to dish us", but added "that is 
one of our crosses 11 , 56 and instructed Dobbs to tell 
Amanullah, Nadir Khan and Tarzi all the British knew of 
the Soviet-Afghan treaty, in the hope of frightening 
the rest out of them, Sir Henry was however not informed 
of these orders until 7 March~when there was little 
point left in them. By then, the Russo•Afghan treaty 
had received the ratification of the Soviet government,57 
and Dobbs could only force alteration of it by inducing 
the Amir to refuse his own ratification. The Afghan 
government's purpose in attempting to delay conclusions 
with the British had been as well served by the Secretary 
of State as by Tarzi's tactics in his talks with Dobbs, 
Sir Henry's attempt to shock the Amir and his 
Foreign Minister into a full disclosure o:f the terms of 
the Soviet-Afghan treaty was in any case without full 
effect. It provoked assurances from Amanullah that 
there was nothing in his agreement with the R.S.F,S.R. 
injurious to British interests, but Dobbs could not believe 
55. ~., Note to No, JO, 
56. Ibid., Note to No. 4J, 
57. See supra, p. 352. 
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that these protestations were genuine.58 Tarzi then 
produced59 a revised draft treaty with Britain which he 
somewhat rashly described as "absolutely final". Pro-
vision for an annual subsidy was omitted from the draft, 
as Tarzi contented himself with a demand for a bl,eck 
grant of Rs.l,J6,oo,ooo payable at the time of signature. 
It included no clause excluding Russian consuls from 
eastern Afghanistan, but declared that Britain was free 
to open consulates in Qandahar, Herat and 11Turkistan11 , 
The Afghan draft further demanded an amnesty for the 
Pashtun tribes of the "independent territory" who had 
sided with the Afghans during the war of 1919. Dobbs 
predictably rejected this draft, which he considered 
6o 
"wholly unacceptable", 
6. Amanullah's "exclusive treaty" and the British reaction, 
It was at this point, after Dobbs had renewed his 
threats that persistence in their demands by the Afghans 
would produce an immediate breakdown of the negotiations, 
that a remarkable reversal of the Amir's attitude took 
place, Dobbs believed that private discussions he held 
with them on 10 April showed that Amanullah and Tarzi 
had been frightened into a 11moral collapse" by his 
intransigent attitude towards the two Afghan drafts~ The 
Amir and his Foreign Minister admitted that the two con-
sulates it was intended to allow Russia in eastern 
Afghanistan would serve principally as propaganda centres, 
and that they constituted the principal advantage wr~ch 
the Bolsheviks were to gain from their treaty with the 
Amir. 
58. 
59· 
60. 
Amanullah realised that their existence would 
F,D,, 2(A)-F 1923, No, 72, 
On 5 April. 
F,D., 2(A)-F 1923, No, 136. 
prejudice the chances of any agreement with the British, 
and explained that "I have tied myself up with the 
Russians because the British would not make friendship 
quickly enough, I am now in a mess. What am I to do?" 
11The Afghans" Dobbs added in reporting the conversation 
to Denys Bray 11 feel little shame in admitting duplicity 
but in such circumstances throw themselves on one's 
mercy11 • Tarzi had pointed out that while his government 
was prepared to sign with Dobbs a treaty excluding Soviet 
Russia from eastern Afghanistan, "our treaty with you 
will cost us very dear and we expect to be treated 
accordingly", 61 He hinted that Amanullah might be pre-
pared to reject the Soviet-Afghan treaty in toto if the 
British government offered Afghanistan substantial supplies 
of arms, cash and munitions, The R,S.F.S,R,, he claimed, 
would probably react by attacking Afghanistan, and a 
British promise to support the Amir against such attack 
would therefore be required, 62 
The settlement which Tarzi and Amanullah now 
suggested was one to which the Afghan Foreign Minister 
had alluded briefly at Mussoorie, but which had not been 
taken up on the earlier occasion. 6 J Known as the 
"exclusive treaty" in the verbal shorthand which the 
British were forced to use to refer to the variety of 
possible agreements with the Amir, it developed in the 
course of later discussions as a detailed draft in which 
the Afghan government was to declare that it had been 
forced by Russian policy to the conclusion that "political 
relations with that [i.e., the Soviet] Government are not 
61. Ibid., No, 159· 
62. Ibid., No, 151. 
6J. See SUJ2ra, p.J16. 
for the benefit of Afghanistan", and that all except 
commercial relations with Soviet Russia were to be 
64 
abandoned. Tarzi explained to Dobbs in early June that 
the break with the R.S.F,S,R, "will be engineered over 
Bolhlran and Khivan questions,'1165 The British were to 
inform the Amir 1 s government before operations against 
the tribes of India's north-west frontier were under-
taken, in return for a promise by the Afghans that 
their country would not be permitted to serve as a base 
for Indian revolutionaries, 66 Both parties were to under-
take not to enter into any agreement with a third power 
affecting the interests of the other "without previous 
exchange of views", an intended arrangement which was to 
raise as many problems as the not dissimilar one suggested 
by the Tsarist government during the negotiation of the 
Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. 67 The most problematic 
provision of the "exclusive" draft treaty t,ras the pro~ 
spective British obligation to support Afghanistan in the 
war with Soviet Russia which Tarzi claimed to fear. 
Irrespective of immediate Russian reactions to the ex~ 
pected expulsion of the Russian embassy from Kabul, the 
British were to guarantee the supply ~ large quantities 
of arms, ammunition and even aeroplanes to the Afghan 
government, supplemented by an annual subsidy of Rs,40 
lakhs, In the event of an "unprovoked attack by Russia 
on Afghan territory" they were to promise to support the 
Amir to an extent not specifically limited,68 
64, See Appendix 30, supplementary letter No. 2, The 
provisos contained in the penultimate sentence of this 
letter may be noted, together with the fact that the 
assurances it contained were not to appear in the body of 
the treaty. 
65, F.D., 2(A)•F 1923, No. 345. 
66. See Appendix JO Clauses XIII and XIV, The similarity 
between the latter and paragraph (3) of the 11 Mussoorie 
memorandum" will be recognised. 
/(67)(68) 
It is difficult to believe that Amanullah and his 
counsellors were prepared to regard their suggestion 
of this agreement, with its formal declaration that 
Russia would be excluded from Afghanistan, as any 
indication of a desire to return to the status guo of 
Habibullahls reign, or that they were, in Denys Bray's 
words, "ready to throw up the whole policy at which 
they have been aiming since the Pindi peace, i.e., the 
establishment of treaty relations with as many powers 
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as possible and above all with both the great Powers on 
their borders. 116 9 The new Viceroy Lord Reading believed 
that the "exclusive treaty1111would in effect be a reversion 
towards our old 
tions and would 
control of Afghanistan's foreign rela~ 
70 be regarded as such", but there was 
little in the terms of the "exclusive" draft to indicate 
that the Afghans regarded it in this light. More probably, 
they hoped to exploit it to gain quantities of arms and 
money which would not have been forthcoming in other 
circumstances, and to maintain in the meantime contacts 
with the R,S,F,S.R. disguised as "commercial relations", 
Failing this, the British arms could be used for a war of 
conquest in Russian central Asia (or even in the North~ 
West Frontier Province of India) for the territorial and 
moral aggrandisement of Afghanistan, 
In a sense the "exclusive treaty" represented for the 
British the fulfilment of an ideal programme. Russian 
(67) See Appendix JO to this Chapter, Clause XV, and 
supra,pp.1Zl-22.Governments can always "exchange views", 
but this does not mean that they guarantee to bear those 
of the other into account. 
(68) See Appendix JO, supplementary letter No.' J, and 
Clause XVI, 
69. F.D., 2(A)-F l923, Note to No, l5l. 
70, Ibid,, No. l94, 
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influence was to be excluded from Kabul, and the Amir's 
government was to become almost entirely dependent on 
Britain for financial and military support, While the 
formal independence of Afghanistan was not to be restrict~ 
ed in so many words, the British supervision of her 
foreign relations would, it was expected, be re-established 
in a new and effective manner, much as Grant had planned 
at Rawalpindi, The programme Tarzi and Amanullah now 
suggested was warmly welcomed by the Secretary of State,7l 
but the Delhi authorities exhibited much less enthusiasm 
towards it, The Foreign Department realised that the 
commitment to defend Afghanistan against "unprovoked 
attack" by the R.s.F.S.R., in conditions which allowed 
the Afghans to decide whether such attack was "provoked", 
was a commitment more serious than that which they had 
once given Habibullah, If Amanullah were to be given 
the arms supplies which he now requested, he might well 
use them to attack Russian territory, and then describe 
the Russian counter-attack as "unprovoked" aggression, 
Britain would become involved in a serious conflict with 
a major European power for the sake of good relations 
with a minor potentate in central Asia, There was the 
equal danger that the British arms might be turned against 
their donors for another war on the north-west frontier,7 2 
The Viceroy and his advisers thus preferred to ask the 
Lorrdon Foreign Office to press the Soviet government to 
withdraw its plans for the establishment of consulatescc 
in eastern Afghanistan, and thus, by enforcing the terms 
of the Anglo-Russian trade agreement, to rob the Afghans 
of the major threat which they were felt to hold over 
71. Ibid., No, 160b, 
72. It may be an indication of the extremely localised 
view of the Afghan problem which the Government of India 
tended to take that they reckoned the second danger 
greater than the first. See, ~·• ibid., No, J55· 
36 
British India, and avoid the necessity of concluding with 
the Amir an agreement as dangerous as that which he now 
suggested. 73 
The London government's reaction to this request 
proved that the terms of the trade agreement could not 
force the Bolsheviks to abandon their schemes for the 
penetration of eastern Afghanistan, and that the London 
authorities intended to do nothing to make them more 
effective. "His Majesty's Government" Montagu explained 
"have at present no reason to repose much faith in the 
Russian Government's bona fides", and seemed to have 
some reason (though on no stated grounds) to repose much 
more faith in the bona fides of a young and unpredictable 
Amir, He believed that the Soviet authorities would 
still attempt to penetrate eastern Afghanistan, 
irrespective of their treaty commitments. The "exclusive 
treaty", for all its dangers (dangers which Montagu 
'may have failed to realise) seemed to him a far more 
attractive method of excluding Russia from Afghanistan 
than the enforcement of the terms of the trade agreement,7 4 
So attractive, in fact, that hedid not attempt to ask 
Chicherin for a stated withdrawl of the "eastern con-
sulates"; the issue was not raised with the Soviet 
government until September 1921, and then only in an 
indirect manner which provoked no definite undertaking by 
the Bolsheviks.75 One is left with the impression that 
Montagu 1 s colleague Lord Curzon was so eager for the 
"exclusive treaty", which he believed would re-establish 
7 3. Ibid. , No. 156. 
74, Ibid., No, 160, 
75, F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, Nos. 281, 283 and 284, and Jane 
Legras, (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol.:t, 
pp.257-262. 
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Britain's pre-Rawalpindi control of Afghanistan's foreign 
affairs, that he deliberately discounted the chances of 
success of a direct approach to Russia, without making 
any effort to examine them. 
The Foreign Office's refusal to re-open with Russia 
the issues raised during the negotiation of the trade 
agreement was naturally received with dismay by the 
Indian government, 76 and was the subject of a long but 
fruitless argument between the authorities in London and 
Delhi, With the Foreign Office reluctant to cooperate 
in securing the alternative solution, however, the 
Foreign Department wer-e eventually forced to instruct 
Dobbs to negotiate for an "exclusive treaty" which they 
themselves regarded with much apprehension. As it turned 
out, the "exclusive treaty's" chances were more than 
partly destroyed77 by the delay which correspondence 
with London had involved. Dobbs later decided that by 
16 July when he received final and f'irm authority from 
Delhi to proceed with the negotiation of the "exclusive 
treaty", there was little time left for discussion 
before events in London and Moscow as well as in Kabul 
had worked to persuade the Amir that his earlier enthus~ 
iasm for a close alignment with the British was mis-
. d d 78 JU ge , 
76. As Denys Bray aptly put it: "Why make the Eastern 
Consulates figure so prominently in the indictment 
against the Soviet for their activities in Afghanistan 
the cessation of which was to be an essential corollary 
to the continuance of' the Trade Agreement, if His 
Majesty's Government do not mean to enforce their abandon-
ment". (Ibid., Note to No, 163), Dobbs eventually over-
came his initial fears about the "exclusive treaty", and 
became something of an advocate of the policy it repre-
sented, but he does not appear to have succeeded in 
persuading the Government of India as a whole to share 
his views. 
77, For the time being, at any rate, See infra,pp.J8J f'f. 
78. F.D., 224-F 1923, P• lJ, 
7. Reasons for the failure of the "exclusive treaty"; 
April-August 1921, 
In blaming the failure of the "exclusive treaty" on 
events beyond his control, Dobbs ignored several major 
defects in the agreement AmanuJ.lah had proposed -
defects whose existence did not always become obvious 
until discussions with the Afghans had brought them to 
light, The danger that Amanullah might exploit 
British liberality, either to attack British India or to 
drag her into an unwanted war with Russia, had already 
been recognised by the Foreign Department, and was the 
cause of a long and complicated Anglo-Afghan wrangle, 
in which Amanullah claimed the right to take delivery of 
the promised British war materiel before breaking with 
Moscow,79 while Dobbs demurred for fear that the Amir 
might double-cross the British by accepting their arms 
without ejecting Suritz. 80 The Clause XV of the draft 
"exclusivo treaty" produced a still more serious 
difference of views. "'he British had demanded that the 
terms of any agreement which the Afghans had concluded 
with a third party and which affected British interests 
shouJ.d be disclosed to Dobbs, and that an Anglo-Afghan 
"exchange of views" should precede any such agreement 
which might be concluded in the future. The Afghans 
79, Tarzi. claimed that Lf Amanu.llah rej38ted the Soviet-
Afghan treaty the R.S,F.s.R. would mobilise against 
Afghanistan within a matter of days. The bad state of 
Afghan communications would then mean that the promised 
British arms would arrive too late to mount an effective 
counter-attack (F,D., 2(A)-F 1923, No, 309). 
80, British fears on this score account for the 
complexity of the provisions contained in supplementary 
letter No, 3 of the "exclusive treaty". (See Appendix 
30.) The fact that the Afghan government were required to 
state in supplementary letter No, 2 that they had "no 
intention or desire to pursue a policy of aggression 
against the territories of the Russian Government" obviously 
begged the question. 
naturally demanded that this undertaking should be made 
reciprocal, but it was only eventually that the British 
realised that "on the face of it the suggestion is pre-
posterous. 11 "Could we" asked Denys Bray "expose the 
terms of our projected treaties with Turkey, King 
Hussain, Bin Saud, Japan, China and so forth to Afghan 
criticism? I cannot believe that His Majesty's Govern-
81 
ment would look on the formula," Reading pointed out 
that "Obviously the ideal from our point of view would 
be for Afghanistan's engagements to be retained as pro-
posed without our giving anything in return," 82 and 
suggested that Dobbs approach Tarzi with a draft clause 
stating that neither party had or would enter into any 
agreement with a third party harmful to the other, to-
gether with a secret "supplementary letter" from the 
Afghan government to the effect that no treaties with 
the R.S.F.S,R. or Turkey would be concluded by Afghani-
stan without prior consultation with the British. 83 The 
Viceroy proposed that Britain should be bound by no 
similar undertaking, and thus maintained that while a 
Soviet-Afghan treaty affected the interests of the British, 
an Anglo-Soviet treaty did not affect those of Afghani-
stan. This one-sided arrangement was of course unaccept-
able to the Afghans and the issue remained unsettled 
until the end of July,bywrnch time Tarzils enthusiasm for 
the "exclusive treaty" had evaporated. 
This second Afghan change of heart was, as Dobbs 
noted, attributable to several developments which were 
not of his own making. Among them was the receipt by the 
81. 
82. 
83. 
Noso 
F.D., 2(A)-F 1923, Note to No, 375, 
Ibid,, No. 400, 
See Appendix 30, Clause XV, and supplementary letters 
5 and 6. 
'{ '71' 
v ' 
British government of the text of a Turko-Afghan treaty 
which had been negotiated in Moscow by Muhammad Wali 
Khan and representatives of Mustafa Kemal 1 s nationalist 
government, and signed there on l March. 84 Although one 
of the articles of this treaty provided for the supply to 
Afghanistan of Turkish military instructors, 8 5 the rest 
of its text involved little more than a statement of the 
ideological identity of Afghan and Turkish policies. It 
was on this score that the British criticised it, for 
Dobbs was unconvinced by Tarzi's claim that "the treaty 
had been drawn up without authority from the Afghan 
[ J . 86 Government, and that it would need much emendat1on." 
In this way, the news of the Turko-Afghan treaty added 
to Jemal's presence in Kabul to suggest to the British 
that a Turko-Afghan-Soviet coalition against themselves 
was as strong a possibility as ever, and cooled Anglo-
Afghan relations to an extent which severely prejudiced 
the chances of the conclusion of an "exclusive treaty". 
The British recriminations which followed the sig-
nature of Muhammad Wali 1 s agreement with nationalist 
Turkey, and the problems thrown up by detailed dis-
cussion of the draft "exclusive treaty", had done much to 
destroy the cordial atmosphere on which the signature 
of an "exclusive" Anglo-Afghan agreement depended; it 
would seem that by the middle of June Tarzi had taken 
steps to destroy also its raison d 1 etre. He must have 
realised that Soviet persistence in the demand for 
84. The date is that given by Dr. Joseph Schwager in his 
Die Entwicklung Afghanistans als Staat und seine 
Zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, pp. 62 and 64. The text 
which appears in the Indian Foreign Department records 
(reproduced as Appendix 29) is undated. It would appear, 
however, that Dobbs did not become cognisant of its 
provisions until mid-June 1921. There is no information 
on the progress of the negotiations which led up to the 
conclusion of the treaty. 
85. See Appendix 29, Article 8. 
I (86) 
3 
consular representation in eastern Afghanistan 
effecti•,rely in.volved an "exclusive" ag~..,eement wi-b.h one 
side or the other. The British would offer Afghanistan 
little if Russian influence was allowed to penetrate up to 
the Indo....A.fghan frontier; if on the other hand, Arnanullal1 
leaped the hurdle of the "eastern consulates" by rejecting 
the Soviet....A.fghan treaty, Afghanistan would be forced to 
lean exclusively on Britain, a prospect which now seemed 
increasingly una ttr,Otcti ve. Only if the So1riet goverrunent 
could be persuaded J;o renounce interest in the "eastern 
consulates" could the dilemma be resolved, Assuming that 
the R.S.F,S.R. did not drop her offers o:f asGistance to 
Afghanistan together with her plans for consulates in Ghazni 
and Qandahar, the Amir would be free to negotiate treaty 
relations and aid agreements w,ith both great powers. 
There is nothing to show how this point was put to 
Suritz, or how Tarzi achieved his task of persuasion 
with the Soviet ambassador. All that is certain is that 
Suritz himself was not unwilling to give the disclaimer 
of interest in the "eastern consulates" which Tarzi de-
sired, but that the concurrence o:f his government was 
left an open question. On 28 June he wrote to Tarzi 
explaining that he recognised "tl'le difficulties which 
have befal],en [the J Afghan Government in the matter of 
[the] Consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni", and that his 
goverrunent would be informed of this immediately after 
the ratification by Amanullah of the Soviet-Afghan 
treaty. He added that he hoped that "my goverrunent 
will give earnest consideration to this matter1187 and, 
presumably, that they would abandon their demands :for 
consulates in eastern Afghanistan. Theso assurances were 
(86) F.D., 2(A)-F 1923, No. 422. It should be said that 
the treaty was in fact fully accepted, if not originally 
authorised, by the Amir, and that it remained unemended 
until 1928, 
87. Appendix 28, supplementary letlir No. 1. 
repeated by Raskolnikov, who succeeded Suritz as Soviet 
88 
ambassador in Kabul in August 1921, The Moscow 
authorities, so far as is known, never formally signified 
their assent to the requests of their successive ambassa-
dors, and merely instructed Raskolnikov to make clear 
to Tarzi that 11 my government will not have any intention 
of provoking or inciting in any manner social or political 
revolution in Afghanistan, 118 9 Raskolnikov 1 s declaration 
amounted to an assurance that such propaganda activities 
as might be undertaken from the "eastern consulates" or 
anywhere else would be directed against the Indian 
rather than the Afghan government, Nevertheless, the 
Soviets raised no stated objection when the Amir later 
signed with the British a treaty specifically excluding 
consular representation of any third power in eastern 
Afghanistan, and one can perhaps assume that Soviet 
compliance on this issue dates from the August of 1921, 
In this sense, the Afghan government secured at one stroke 
what the British Foreign Office had considered beyond its 
power, and thus altered the fundamentals of the Foreign 
Department's "Afghan problem", 
For the time being the Afghans kept to themselves 
the assurances they had received from Suritz and Raskol-
nikov - hoping, perhaps, that the British might still 
produce some acceptable version of the "exclusive treaty", 
and reluctant to reveal to the British that the bogey of 
the "eastern consulates" had begun to disappear, Such 
hopes as the Afghan Foreign Minister may have had that 
an "exclusive treaty" with the British would be worthwhile 
88, ~., supplementary letter No, 2, 
89. Soviet Documents, Vol..IV, 'No. 166. This assurance 
was probably prompted by the instructions Raskolnikov 
had received from Chicherin which are reproduced as 
Appendix 32, 
were however shattered by Muhammad Wali Khan's later 
experiences in Europe. 
Soon after the signature of the treaty with the 
Turkish nationalists Muhammad Wali had left Moscow for 
western Europe. He passed through Germany, where he 
received a guarded reception and arrived in Rome towards 
the end of June 1921. The Italian government, probably 
as much from motives of politeness as anything else, 
signed with him on 3 July a treaty providing for the 
exchange of Italian and Afghan diplomatic representatives,90 
Arrangements were also made for the visit of an Italian 
trade mission to Afghanistan. Although there was.nothing 
in the Afghan treaty with Italy which could be deemed 
injurious to British interests in central Asia, this, the 
first treaty which Amanullah's government had concluded 
with a western European power, was greeted by Lord Curzon 
with a storm of indignation, The treaty of Rawalpindi, 
he told de Martino, Italian ambassador in London "did not 
alter the broad fact that Afghanistan, by virtue of its 
position and history, lay within the sphere of British 
political influence. 11 9l The claim of Count Sforza, 
Italian Foreign Minister, that his Ministry had confirmed 
from the Foreign Office that Afghanistan was completely 
independent by virtue of the Rawalpindi treaty before 
concluding the agreement with Muhammad Wali Khan, 92 was 
not accepted by the ex-Viceroy as a reason for the 
institution of Italo-Afghan diplomatic relations. 
Worried that the Italian example might be followed 
elsewhere, Curzon hastily telegraphed another ex-Viceroy, 
Lord Hardinge, who was now installed as British ambassador 
in Paris, 11 I am a little anxious" he told him on 21 June 
90. See Schwager, op. cit., P• 62. 
91. F,D,, 2(B)-F 1923, No, 14. 
92. ~·, No. 16. 
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"about elaborate reception reported to have been given 
in Paris by President of Republic and Prime Minister 
to Afghan Mission,u93 Briand, the French Foreign Minister, 
was accordingly instructed to see that the Afghan party 
was cold shouldered in the French capital,9 4 while the 
United States ambassador in Paris was told to make sure 
that the American government accorded the Afghans a 
similarly cool reception. 9 5 It need not be said that the 
Afghan mission, who knew of the British reaction to 
their treaty with Italy, could not but notice their 
guarded treatment in other European capitals, and 
correctly guessed its source, 96 They reported their exp-
eriences in a letter to Tarzi, and Dobbs noted that 
Curzon 1 s attitude, which amounted in Afghan eyes to a 
unilateral abrogation by Britain of the Rawalpindi 
treaty, "amply accounted" for the Afghan suspicions of 
British motives which temporarily killed the "exclusive 
treaty" in July l92l, 97 Instructions to the British 
ambassador in Washington, delivered after protests from 
the India Office, that "you should avoid giving any pre-
cise definition of the international status of Afghanistan 
and it would be advisable to put nothing in writing", 
hardly succeeded in improving the bad impression which 
had been created in Europe.98 
93. Ibid., No. 26. The reception took place on l6 June, 
the date of the arr.ival in Paris of Muhammad Wali Khan 
and his colleagues, 
94, Ibid,, No, J6, 
95. Ibid,, Enclosures in No. 67. The Afghan mission 
carried out its planned visit to the United States in 
September l92l, 
96, Information from Mr. 1Abdul Wahab Tarzi, who 
accompanied the Afghan mission for part of its journey, 
97, F,D,, 2(B)-F l92J, No, ll2. 
98, Ibid., No, 96. The United States government signed 
no formal treaty with Afghanistan for the exchange of 
/(98) 
Before crossing the Atlantic Muhammad Wali Khan and 
his party naturally visited London, but their stay t':lere 
further increasc>d their suspicions that the British had 
serious arri~res pens~es about the independence of Afghani-
stan. It was in accordance with their previo·c<sly establish-
ed policy on this point99 that the Foreign Office decided 
that Muhammad Wali Khan's letter of credentials should be 
presented to King George through Montagu rather thar1 Curzon, 
but to the Afghans, who were fully aware that foreign em-
bassies conducted such business only through the Foreign 
Office, Curzon's decision came as a gratuitous insult, a 
sign that the British did not rank the ambassador of Afghani-
stan on a level with the d:Lplomatic representatives of other 
foreign powerk?0 When Lord Curzon did receive Muhammad Wali 
Khan on 17 August he cut the ambassador short when the 
latter attempted to turn the conversation to the contempor-
aneous negotiations at Kabul, and ·went on to claim that 
Muhammad Wali' s credentials C'>uld not be fully accepted un..-
til Dobbs' negotiations had been concluded, 101 While 
(98) diplomatic representatives until 1936, although the 
possibility of establishing an American consulate in Kabul 
was considered at the time of Muhammad ival:l Khan 1 s visit, 
99. See supra, p.296, footnote 62. 
100. It was not until 3 October 1921 that the Indian 
government raised the issue with the Secretary of State 
and on Dobbs' advice, urged that any future Afghan 
ambassador be accorded free access to the Foreign Office, 
Montagu replied that Curzon 1 s insistence on confining 
Afghan contacts to the Ind.ia Office "has been largely 
based on what it was supposed would be strong view of 
Government of India" and acceded to the Viceroy's request. 
(F.D., 2(B)~F 1923, Nos. 378 and 386). What had once 
appeared to be a serious problem was thus readily eliminated. 
'Abdnl Hadi Dawi Khan, Afghanistan's first permanent 
ambassador in London, nevertheless found that the India 
Office's voice in the conduct of British relations with 
his conntry was an important one during the 1920s, 
(Conversation with the writer). 
101. F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, No, 112. 
Curzon 1 s attitude may have been correct in a strict sense, 
the abrupt manner in which he expressed it worsened an al-
ready suspicious atmosphere. Hearing of Muhammad Wali's 
experiences in London, Tarzi told Dobbs on 27 August that 
they demonstrated the "unsatisfactory" nature of British 
tt ·t d t Af h · d d 102 f · s· a 1 u es o g an 1n epen ence, orc1ng 1r Henry to 
conclude that the "exclusive treaty" was effectively lost. 
Tarzi 1 s disillusionment with the British forced the 
still unratified treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. to his atten-
tion. The assurances he had received from Suritz and 
Raskolnikov that the Soviet government would be approached 
after its ratification for a denial of their interest in 
the "eastern consulates" could not be regarded as rendering 
that treaty completely harmless, but the Afghan authorities 
evidently decided that they could hope for little better 
:fur the time being. Suritz's replacement by Raskolnikov 
had produced something of the same effect as that of 
Bravin 1 s by Suritz; a new enthusiasm was brought to the 
still uncompleted Soviet task by the new ambassador, and 
this probably combined with the failure of the "exclusive 
treaty" with Britain to induce Amanullah to add his sig-
lOJ · 
nature to the Soviet treaty on 14 August. The Afghan 
government tried to keep the news of the ratification 
the British until the beginning of September, 104 just 
from 
as 
they had previously withheld that of Suritz 1 s and 
Raskolnikov 1 s "supplementary letters", but Dobbs had known 
of the event soon after it had occurred, and, as the 
Viceroy put it, had decided that the "exclusive treaty" had 
been "finally ruled out of court" by this new development~05 
102. ~·, No.2Jl. 
103. So\det Documents, Vol. III, No. 309. 
104. F.D., 2(B)-F 192J,No.246. 
105. Ibid,, No. 161. 
8. The Government of India formulate the "pis aller" 
and the "neighbourly treaty", 
The British had devised two draft treaties to deal 
with this situation, The first, known as the "pis aller", 
involved little more than a re-statement of the terms 
of the "Mussoorie memorandum!!. It stated that Afghani-
stan was to be free to enjoy normal diplomatic relations 
with the R.s.F,S.R,, and could accept economic aid from 
Moscow; the British subsidy was to be resumed, but the 
"eastern consulates" were to be formally excluded, The 
second draft treaty developed from the growing British 
realisation that the effort and money they were so 
sedulously expending (or had hitherto intended to expend) 
in the hope of securing a friendly Afghanistan was hardly 
worthwhile, This, the "neighbourly treaty11 , 106 was to 
treat Afghanistan as a foreign country like any other, to 
whom no special favours were due, and from whom none 
would be requested, Ambassadors and consuls were to be 
exchanged, but little else; the question of the "eastern 
consulates" passed unmentioned in the original draft, 107 
and it thus seems that the British had finally resigned 
themselves, after so many months insistence on the 
point, to the abandonment of their demands on this score. 
106. Known also as the "gentlemanly treaty" - though why 
it should have been considered more "gentlemanly" than 
any other of the possible Anglo~fghan agreements is not 
very obviouso 
107. Ibid., No. 122. 
373 
The adoption of the policy of the "neighbourly 
treaty" represented, in its way, almost as great a 
watershed in British thiriking as the note by Denys Bray 
of February 1919 which had set the scene for the develop-
.108 
ments of that year. All the agreements which had 
been suggested by the British up to the August of 1921 
had envisaged the reconstruction of British influence at 
Kabul in some way which did not formally restrict 
Afghanistan's complete independence, Afghan friendship 
was to be purchased by grants of material and money, 
The investment was considered a good one because the 
alternative, Russian penetration of Afghanistan, was 
feared with an intensity born of two Afghan wars fought 
specifically to exclude it, and of the Indian government's 
unfamiliarity with, and hence fear of, a situation 
involving a common frontier with a major world power, 
By the summer of 1921, however, the Indian government 
had experienced two years of Soviet representation and 
influence at Kabul, and while we have no expos~ of the 
change of attitude which took place, such as that which 
Denys Bray had given to explain the change of heart of 
1919, it seems reasonable to suppose that by the August 
of 1921 the Indian government had begun to realise that 
a Soviet ambassador in Kabul,even Soviet consuls in 
eastern Afghanistan, were not the terrifying ogres they 
had once seemed. Of the "eastern consulates" the 
Viceroy Reading remarked in a candid moment fuat they 
were not "really much more dangerous than a Soviet 
Minister at Kabul", and that the principal reason for 
insistence on their exclusion was now recognised to be 
the fact that "they have been publicly described as the 
main obstacle both in India and in England,·11 l09 
108. See supra, pp.205-08, 
109. F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, No; 48. 
Once they had ascertained that a treaty with 
Afghanistan ejecting the Soviet ambassador from Kabul 
was unworkable, the Government of India decided that to 
compete with him in favours to the Amir was an unprofitable 
investment, The news of Suritzls and Rakolnikov's 
letters to the Afghan government on the score of the 
"eastem consulates" simply served to strengthen the 
British belief that the principle of the "neighbourly 
treaty" was a viable one; a draft "neighbourly treaty" 
had been discussed and agreed to in British circles 
before Tarzi told Dobbs of the Soviet ambassadors' 
assurances, To this extent, the change in Soviet policy 
represented by Suritz 1 s letter did not have the effect on 
the British attitude which might have been expected. 
What is perhaps surprising about the policy of the 
"neighbourly treaty" is that it was accepted without 
apparent demur from London, and was indeed partly 
initiated by the India Office. One is presented with 
an inexplicable paradox in the policy of the Lloyd George 
government; that a cabinet whose Foreign Secretary 
could maintain that nothing had happened since 1919 
to alter effectively the settlement of 1880, could con"' 
tain also a Secretary of State for India who could 
suggest that Britain need establish a position in 
Afghanistan formally no different from that of Italy or 
any other power whose chose to establish diplomatic rela~ 
t · . th th A . llO Th. l k f f. d 1ons w1 e mlra' 1s ac o 1xe purpose on 
the part of the London government had been evident on 
110, The emphasis should be on the word "formally". The 
proximity of British India obviously made the position of 
a British ambassador in Kabul different from that of his 
Italian colleague, whatever the textual similarity 
between the Italo....Afghan and the proposed 11 neighbourly" 
Anglo....Afghan treaties, 
l . . lll t severa prev1ous occaslons, bu must remain unex-
3Q1 U1 
plained until the archives of the India Office and 
Foreign Office become available for examination. The 
only fact of which we have clear evidence is that Dobbs 
was instructed in mid-August to negotiate with Tarzi on 
the basis of the "neighbourly treaty" if the "pis aller" 
failed, as many feared it must. 
The task Dobbs was now set was in fact no easier 
than any of those which had preceded it, During the 
testing period of his relations with Tarzi which followed 
the early news of Muhammad Wali's experiences in Europe, 
the British diplomatic bags were captured by Afghans 
near Jalalabad under circumstances which were never 
fully cleared up, and formal negotiations were suspended 
between 8 and 21 August while an explanation was awaited 
112 from the Afghan government. Informal Anglo~Afghan 
discussions were held during this period, just as they 
had been on a not dissimilar occasion at Mussoorie, and 
113 the bags were eventually returned to Dobbs unopened, 
but the incident did little to improve the atmosphere in 
which Sir Henry and Tarzi had to work. Nor was the re-
sumption of formal negotiations followed by any effective 
discussion of the new British treaty proposals, for Dobbs 
had been reminded by his government that a statement by 
Tarzi of the terms of the now ratified Soviet-Afghan 
treaty, demanded by the Secretary of State as a precondition 
for the opening of negotiations so many months previously, 
111. See, ~' the incident described supra,pp.263-64. 
112. F.D,, 2(B)-F 1923, Nos. 81 and 181. Dobbs claimed 
on 8 August that "There can ••••• no longer be any doubt 
that the seizure of the bags was carried out by men of 
the Amir or Nadir Khan", (~., No.llO), but Tarzi main-
tained that the theft was the work of bandits who planned 
to hold the bags as security for their release from 
other criminal charges. (Ibid., No,l81), 
/(112)(113) 
still remained to be made, On 19 September Tarzi 
finally told Dobbs that an unsigned statement of the 
treaty which he had given Sir Henry one week previously114 
was the limit to which he could go; Dobbs exploited this 
opportunity to tell the Afghan Minister that his intran-
sigence on this point made it impossible to offer the 
"pis aller" treaty which had been discussed the previous 
February,ll5 and forced him back to the 11 neighbourly 
treaty" to which Tarzi was still a stranger. 116 
9. Amanullah takes over, and rejects the British pro-
posals: September~December l92l. 
Although Tarzi took a fairly favourable attitude 
towards the "neighbourly treaty" when Dobbs first showed 
it to him on 19 September;17 it soon became evident that 
his royal master did not, Amanullah's part in the Kabul 
discussions had not so far been a particularly active one, 
and while he almost certainly dictated the broad lines of 
(112) Sir Henry believed that the incident was a blessing 
in disguise since it afforded him 11 a signified excuse for 
delay", during which the respective merits of the "pis 
aller" and 11 neighbourly" treaties were discussed between 
him and his superiors. 
(ll3} A fact which may argue against Dobbs' belief that 
the theft was politically motivated. 
ll4. Ibid,, No, 305, This outline corresponded to the 
text of the treaty which the British had received almost 
four months earlier from another source. The Secretary 
of Sta~s insistence on its disclosure by Tarzi was in-
tended simply as a test of the Afghan government's good 
faith. 
115. See supra, p.360. 
116. F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, No. 318. 
117. Ibid,, Tarzi's reaction to the "neighbourly" draft 
is alm~as surprising as that of the India Office. The 
success of his policy towards the British rested essentially 
on his ability to bluff Dobbs into taking the Russian bogey 
seriously; (Suritz had equally to be convinced of the 
reality of a British bogey), In presenting him with the 
/(ll7) 
Afghan policy to his Foreign Minister, his appearances at 
the conference table had been relatively infrequent, It 
seems possible that the "exclusive treaty" had been his 
brainchild rather than Tarzi 1 s, and fairly certain that he 
regretted its failure more than Tarzi had done. He may 
also have felt that Tarzi's conduct of the negotiations 
thus far had been insufficiently frank, and that the 
presentation by Dobbs of the "neighbourly treaty" proved 
that the Foreign Minister's policy of arranging favourable 
settlements with both Britain and Russia had failed, As 
from 26 September he effectively cut Tarzi out of all 
discussions with the British representatives, and attempted 
to settle all questions a deux with Sir Henry,llS calling 
occasionally on the Turkish military instructor Mahmud 
Samill9 to add a third voice to the conversations. The 
young Amir's unpredictability, and the absence of any 
restraining hand at these conferences, was to make Dobbs' 
task no easier. 
Amanullah's clear aim was to revive and re-negotiate 
the "exclusive treaty", He opened his campaign by ex-
pressing effusive friendliness towards the British, 
implying that it was only Tarzi and his Foreign Ministry 
who had driven the two sides apart, and that this 
estrangement had been strengthened by the sinister influence 
(ll7) draft 11 neighbourly treaty" Dobbs effectively called 
Tarzi's bluff, yet the latter accepted the draft without 
attempting to remind Sir Henry of the dangers to Britain 
of Soviet penetration in Afghanistan, 
ll8. So much so that, as Mr. 'Abdul Wahab Tarzi told the 
writer, heand his father knew virtually nothing of what 
passed between Amanullah and Dobbs from the end of 
September until Dobbs' departure in early December. 
See supra, p.4l. 
of Jemal Pasha who, as he was able to point out, had now 
left Kabul, 120 The Clause XV of the original draft "exclu-
sive treaty", Amanullah explained, was the sole point of 
serious dispute between the two governments, and a satis-
factory settlement of the issues raised by it could surely 
l2l be evolved, The Amir claimed that his ratification of 
the Soviet-Afghan treaty made little difference, for he 
could always denounce it and then force Tarzi and the 
other Afghan leaders to approve his action. 122 He added 
that the "Question of Bokhara could still be used as pre-
text for cancelling treaty with Russia". 123 Amanullah 
evidently considered it possible that his denunciation of 
the Soviet treaty might not result in the withdrawal of 
the Soviet embassy from Kabul, and to 
offers were adjudged a bad bargain by 
this extent 
124 Montagu, 
his 
but he 
still demanded the gifts of British arms and money mentioned 
in previous discussions of the "exclusive treaty". 
120, Jemal appears to have departed from Kabul at about the 
end of August l92l, Tarzi claimed, (F,D., 2(B)-F 1923, No. 
246), that his departure was "due to Anatolian affairs," 
but the nature of this connection seems hard to establish. 
With the ratification of the Afghan treaties with Turkey 
and the R.S.F.S,R. it is easy to imagine that Jemal 
considered his tak in Kabul completed, and that he left 
for that reason. He was killed in Tiflis in 1922, 
Amanullah made his first independent approaches to Dobbs on 
12 September. The occasion was a tennis party at Paghman, 
the Amir's summer residence near Kabul, at which "All 
[Afghan] Foreign Office taint was excluded", Mahmud Sami 
and members of the Yahya Khel "were set to pour into our 
ears the Amir 1 s intense desire :fir friendship", Dobbs re-
ported, 11 Mahmud Sami named all those who were present and 
after each name with an ingratiating leer whispered 'Anglo-
phil. Tres Anglophil' "• 11 We came away feeling that a last 
great attempt had been made to bamboozle us •• ,It was an 
amusing experience and I am very ill from having consumed 
a bright magenta ice there." (Ibid,, Note to No,325), 
l2l. ~·• No, 364, See supra,pp.369-70. 
122. When Dobbs expressed his doubts on this score, Aman-
ullah replied in Hindi: "I shall lift up my hand and say 
~ [quiet!] and the assembly will approve my decisions". 
\F.D,, 2(B)-F 1923, Note to No, 385). 
123, ~·, No, 364. 
124, Ibid., No. 365. 
Dobbs' reaction to Amanullah's proposals was one of 
bewilderment and mistrust. He was unable to interest the 
Amir in the "neighbourly treaty", which offered no 
financial or military concessions to Afghanistan, Sir 
Henry was staggered also by Amanullah's change of mood, 
following so hard on the heels of the ratification of 
the Soviet treaty, "I feel that the situation has almost 
got beyond me," he wrote "with this neurotic young 
monarch constantly looping the loop." 125 "If within six 
weeks after ratification and after receiving subsidy Amir 
tears in pieces treaty with Russia he could equally well 
tear up ours. 11126 If the Amir kept his bargain with the 
British, their arms could still be used for dangerous 
military adventures against the Soviets; if he broke it, 
they could still be turned against their donors. 
Dobbs could not but believe the Amir when he des-
cribed the "neighbourly treaty" as inacceptable, but he 
was equally unwilling to reconsider the "exclusive treaty" 
which he stigmatised as "dead and buried", 127 His 
attitude was supported by the Government of India and the 
India Office who, once they had reconciled themselves to 
the alternatives of the "neighbourly treaty" or the "pis 
aller" were unable to regain their old enthusiasm for the 
"exclusive" agreement, and were more fully cognisant of 
its dangers. In the face of Amanullah 1 s stated opposition 
to the "neighbourly treaty", the "pis aller" seemed to 
offer the only open road, 
125. Ibid,, Note to No. 385. 
126. Ibid,, No, 364. 
127. Ibid, 
It was a road blocked only by the reservations of 
Montagu, who reminded Dobbs, through the Viceroy, that the 
Amir had still failed to reveal the terms of his treaty 
with the R.S.F.S.R. Montagu maintained that no offers 
of a subsidy, such as were contained in the "pis aller", 
could be made by Britain unless this condition was ful-
filled,128 Montagu's obstinacy on this point was matched 
by that of Amanullah who, while willing to annul his 
treaty with Soviet Russia if a sufficiently good bargain 
was offered by the British, was not prepared to make its 
clauses public in order to secure a half-way settlement. 
The Viceroy had by now decided that it would be better 
to offer the Amir the "pis aller" w:ifuout insisting on a 
statement of the Soviet-Afghan treaty, than to confine 
British offers to the "neighbourly treaty", but in spite 
of much discussion of the point with London (from 24 
October to 5 November)l 29 he was unable to gain Montagu's 
consent to this, and was eventually forced to inform 
Dobbs on 6 November that if Amanullah's obduracy continued, 
he would have to secure acceptance of the 11 neighbourly 
treaty" or else leave Kabul without delay.lJO 
10. A final vol te face by Amanullah, and its results 
Dobbs attempts to re-introduce discussion of the 
11 neighbourly treaty" resulted on ll November in a 
"complete impasse". Amanullah 11admitted that there was 
nothing contrary to Afghans' independence in the draft 
treaty but he could not accept it because it gave 
Afghanistan no special advantage 11 ,lJl So near did a break 
128. It will be remembered that Tarzi had given Dobbs 
an unsigned statement of the Soviet treaty on l9 September 
but this was regarded by Montagu as insufficient. (See 
supra,p,J82. 
129. F,D., 2(B)~F l92J Nos, 416, 4l9, 432 and 4J8. 
lJO, Ibid,, No. 448, 
/(lJl) 
seem that the Government of India actually prepared a 
press communigu~ to explain why Sir Henry had been forced 
to leave Kabul after almost eleven months of negotiation, 
with no treaty signed with the Amir.lJZ It was in these 
conditions that Amanullah performed a final and again 
unexplained volte face. A final meeting, presumably for 
the exchange of polite pleasantries between Dobbs and the 
Amir before the former's departure, had been arranged 
for 12 November, In the event, the discussion turned to 
serious topics, and Dobbs found himself able to introduce 
the subject of the "neighbourly treaty" without receiving 
an immediate rebuff. He was even able to suggest a new 
clause to the 11 neighbourly 11 draft, supplemented by yet 
another "supplementary letter", which provided for the 
exclusion of Soviet consulates from eastern Afghanistan, 
and to obtain Amanullah's provisional assent to it by 
offering a custom rebate on all goods transported across 
India to Afghanistan,lJJ Afghan demands for an amnesty 
(lJl) Ibid., No, 476.Sir Percy Sykes writes that "on 
November 8 the Amir stated that without large tribal con-
cessions an understanding was impossible", and explains 
the impass.e in this light,· (History of Afghanistan, 
Vol,!T. p,1295), The writer must state that on the basis 
of contemporary evidence this conclu6on is incorrect. The 
real reason for the impasse, as he has attempted to show, 
was the British refusal to consider Amanullah1 s "exclusive 
treaty". Sir Percy studiously avoids mentioning the 
"exclusive treaty" at any point, 
lJ2. F.D., 2(B)QF l92J, No, 49J, 
lJJ, See Appendix Jl, supplementary letter No,· J.Dobbs 
seems to have secured this concession on his own initiative: 
it will be remembered that the Government of India had not 
intended to stipulate for exclusion of the "eastern con-
sulates" in the first draft of the neighbourly treaty and 
had begun to doubt the value of any such provision. 
('See supra, p, 37 8,) 
for the Pashtun tribesmen on the British side of the 
Durand line (demands which, it should be noted, Amanullah 
had not pursued with any vigour in his conversations 
with Dobbs) were met by Sir Henry wilh a further 11 supple-
mentary letter" stating that the British government "has 
every intention of treating them generously". Dobbs 
expressed the hope that this unspecific declaration of 
principle "will cause you satisfaction11 • 1 34 Sir Henry's 
letter probably "caused satisfaction" to Amanullah only 
because the Amir's thoughts had been temporarily distract-
ed by the prospect of military adventures in Russian 
central Asia, a programme represented by the "exclusive 
treaty", and because his concern for the Pashtuns had 
been temporarily forgotten, 
solved nothing. 
In the long run it obviously 
For all this, Dobbs' simple message to Delhi of 
15 November, "Amir accepted neighbourly draft treaty to-
day after eleven hours private discussion", 135 leaves 
many questions unanswered, After so many months of full 
reporting of all his encounters with the Amir, Sir 
Henry failed to relate exactly how the monarch had 
accepted a treaty which only one week before he had re-
jected flatly, It must be concluded that Amanullah had 
changed his mind as suddenly and as with as little overt 
reason as when he had attempted to rescue the "exclusive 
treaty" from oblivion; certainly the remaining eight 
years of his reign were to bring proof that he was not a 
man of constancy of purpose. There was little which Dobbs 
had added to the "neighbourly treaty" in the final week 
134. Appendix 31, supplementary letter No. 4; 
135, F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, No. 507, 
38 
of negotiations to make it more attractive to the Amir, 
and Dobbs' offer of an immediate gift of a limited 
quantity of telegraph and other supplies was not made 
until after Amanullah had accepted the "neighbourly 
treaty", and had "made a dignified but almost pathetic 
appeal. •'•'•',asking for something tangible and immediate 
which he could show to his people as a result of his 
desire to renew once more his friendship with Great 
Britain11 • 1 3 6 
The implications of the conclusion of the 11neighbour-
ly treaty" were considerable, and are summarised in the 
following chapter, All that should be noted here and in 
passing is that this, the most lasting of all the 
agreements which successive British governments had made 
with successive rulers of Afghanistan, was regarded by its 
negotiator Sir Henry Dobbs as little more than a temporary 
expedient, The Amir, he believed, would follow the pre-
cedent traditionally set by ambition Afghan monarchs, 
and would be forced to maintain support at home by con~ 
quest abroad. His eyes would inevitably be directed 
towards India and Russian central Asia,l37 and it was up 
to the Government of India to see that he chose the 
latter, Dobbs predicted that the first permanent 
British ambassador in Kabul would find himself approached 
by the Amir with a new form of the "exclusive treaty" and 
Sir Henry was not sure that the Indian government would 
be able to ignore him. 1 38 To Dobbs, and perhaps to 
136. Ibid,, No, 524. The gifts granted were those 
outlined:"In Clause 5(B) of the "Mussoorie memorandum", 
(see Appendix 26), 
137. Dobbs correctly surmised that there was little 
worth conquering in Persia at that time. 
138, F,D., 224-F 1923, P• 20, 
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many of his contemporaries in India, the future of 
central Asia still seemed full of doubt and bloodshed. 
It was fortunate indeed for both India and Afghanistan 
that the Government of India stoutly refused to share 
Dobbs' enthusiasm for an Afghan-British alliance to 
expel Russia from her Turkistan possessions, 139 and 
that Amanullah saw in the task of internal reform and 
modernisation a programme more attractive and more real-
istic than a ,jehad against Britain or Russia, 
139. Ibid., Enclosure No. 2, 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The treaty which Dobbs signed with Amanullah on 22 
November 1921 was valid for only three years; after 
November 1923 either party was free to repudiate it on one 
year's notice,1 In June 1923 Major Francis Humphrys,the 
first permanent British ambassador in Kabul, wrote that "it 
seems fairly certain that the present Anglo-Afghan Treaty 
will be denounced by the present .Afghan Govt, [~] next 
November, and a new treaty will presumably be negotiated 
during the summer and autumn of 1924",2 Humphrys failed to 
state his reasons for believing that a re-negotiation of 
Dobbs< treaty would become necessary, nor did he outline 
the form of the new Anglo-Afghan agreement which he expected. 
His prognostications, which paralleled those which Dobbs 
himself had expressed soon after his retura from Kabul, 
were proved unfounded; in 1930 the British conducted a 
formal exchange of notes with Amanullah's successor Nadir 
Shah confirming that the treaty of 1921 ••as still in force,3 
but no important revisions of the settlement which Dobbs 
had achieved were ever made, This is not to suggest that 
l, See Appendix 31; Article XIV. 
2, F.D., 357-F 1923: p.15, 
3· Exchange of Notes between 
Kin dom and 
the signature of the 1921 treaty ushered in a new era of 
Anglo-Afghan amity, or that all the problems which had 
beset Anglo-Afghan relations during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were solved overnight. At his very 
first interview with Humphrys in March 1922 Amanullah ful-
filled Dobbst predictions4 that he would attempt to induce 
the British to reconsider their rejection of the "exclusive 
treaty"; 5 after the Indian government persisted in their 
refusal to support his irridentist plans in Russian central 
Asia he reverted to the time-honoured Afghan practice of 
fostering rebellion among the "independent" tribes on the 
British side of the Durand line. The British maintained 
in 1923 that the Amir had provoked disturbances in Waziri-
stan; they detained in Bombay a shipment of arms which he 
had ordered from France, presented a stern note of protest 
to the Afghan government in the September of that year, and 
made preparations for the evacuation of the British embassy 
from Kabul in the following December. Amanullah predictably 
disclaimed all involvement in the Waziristan disturbances, 
much as his father had done in similar circumstances, and 
the British once more decided that the Amir was powerless 
4, See supra, P• 389, 
5• F,D,, 425-F 1923, No.4, 
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to control the more reckless elements among the tribesmen, 6 
The crisis was fortunately passed, but not without a brisk 
dispute between the British and Soviet governments over 
alleged Soviet participation in the Amir~s "intrigues" in 
British territory.? After the departure of Lord Curzon 
from the Foreign Office in January 1924 the British became 
less attached to a policy of active involvement in the 
politics of Afghanistan, Amanullah was overthrown by a 
popular rebellion in January 1929, and Afghanistan relapsed 
into ten months of virtual anarchy under the bandit Amir 
Bachah-i-Saqao until Nadir Khan recaptured the throne of 
Kabul for the Muhammadzais. The Government of India 
formally adopted an attitude of strict non-intervention 
in Afghani.stan•s civil war, 8 in the face of active Russian 
6, F.D., 502-F 1923, p.l2, 
7, See Jane Degras, ed,, op.cit,, Vol,I, pp.4l8-20. 
8, Sir W, Kerr Fraser-Tytler admits that "It was in fact 
widely held at the time and for many years afterwards, in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, that the fall of Amanullah 
had been deLi.berately brought about by the British Govern-
ment and that Nadir Khan was their nominee to replace 
him", but adds that "this was not the case", (Op.cit,, 
p,221). Fletcher (op.cit,, pp.222-25) suggests that the 
British played some part in fomenting Bachah-i-Saqao's 
rebellion against Amanullah, even if they refrained 
from supporting Nadir Khan's cause, While he admits that 
he has made no study of original British sources for this 
period, the writer would maintain that the British, 
however much they would have liked to see Amanullah 
deposed, would hardly have preferred the anarchis condi-
tions which obtained in Afghanistan under the Bachah, 
Fraser-Tytler's claim thus appears to be fairly well-
founded, 
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support for Amanullah's dying cause,9 Such restraint 
would have been barely thinkable if Afghanistan had been 
subjected to similar upheavals thirty years earlier, and 
illustrated the changes in the British attitude towards 
Afghanistan~s fortunes which had taken place during the 
first two decades of this century. 
The transformation of British policy could be traced 
to the signature of the Anglo-Russian convention in 1907, 
only two years after the conclusion in Kabul of an agree-
ment confirming the subjection of the Amir to British 
control of his country's foreign relations. The Government 
of India had reacted unfavourably to the Foreign Office's 
policy of supplanting the Anglo-Afghan alliance with an 
Anglo-Russian entente, but they had been unable to prevent 
the conclusion of the convention, and some seven years 
after its signature they acquiesced in a revision of the 
1907 agreement which carried stj.ll further the principles 
on which it had been based. There was nothing in the 
articles of the convention or its suggested and successive 
revisions which loosened the British hold over the Afghan 
9. In March 1929 Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, Amanullah 's 
ambassador in Moscow, appeared in northern Afghanistan 
with a force equipped by the Soviet government which 
included many volunteers from the Russian side of the Oxus. 
He captured Mazar-i-Sharif, but was eventually forced to 
retreat to Russian territory, after which the Soviet 
authorities evidently decided to follow the British in a 
policy of non-intervention. 
government's foreign policy - rather the reverse - but the 
entente with Russia certainly made the AlLglo-Afghan agree-
ments of 1880 and 1905 less necessary. The alignments of 
the first world war strengthened some of the tendencies 
which had been evident in the pre-war period. An uneasy 
Anglo-Russian entente became an active military alliance, 
and the old AlLglo-Afghan agreements, which had been designed 
to counter the advances of a Russia assumed to be permanently 
hostile, lost much of their meaning. The Indian government 
certainly remained suspicious of Russia's ultimate intentions, 
but agreed nevertheless to cede to Russia rights in northern 
Afghanistan which undermined their once rigid insistence 
on the total excJ.usion from Afghanistan of all influence 
but their own. The appearance in Kabul of the German 
mission, and t;he Amir's not unfriendly attitude towards it, 
served equally to demonstrate that the British were unable 
to compel the Amir to adhere to the letter of the restric-
tions which they had placed on his independence in 1905. 
By 1914 the British had already begun to take the Russian 
threat to India less S<)riously than at the time of Curzon's 
Viceroyalty; after the Russian revolutions of 1917 they 
began to doubt that Russia would ever regain the strength 
required to invade the subcontinent, The British control 
of Afghanistan's foreign relations now seemed less necessary, 
and harder to enforce in the face of the nationalist 
ideologies which had penetrated Afghanistan and other 
middle eastern countries, 
The principle that Afghanistan should be left free to 
enjoy dj.plomatj_c relations with third powers was not 
immediately or easily accepted by all Briti.sh statesmen. 
A powerful section of the Lloyd George cabinet favoured 
intervention against the Bolsheviks in central Asia as well 
as in Europe, and were hardly ready to accept the steady 
withdrawal from Britain's position in Afghanistan which 
the Indian government advocated, The Foreign Department 
thus formulated a compromise policy which placed no formal 
restrictions on Afghanistan's independence, but which pre-
supposed that the Amir would be forced to rely on the 
British for advice and financial support, Once it became 
evident that this programme could not be realised, and that 
the Amir was willing and able to invite the Soviet govern-
ment to play the part which the British had putatively 
reserved for themselves, the Indian government were forced 
to reconsider their plans. It was only after several years 
of almost continuous Anglo-Afghan negotiations, and after 
the London government had signed an agreement with the 
R,S,F,S,R, which formally prevented the Soviet government 
from using Afghanistan as a base for anti-British activities 
in India, that a third policy was formulated. The'neighbourly 
treaty", as has been seen, offered Afghanistan nothing which 
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would not have been offered to any other independent state 
with whom the British enjoyed normal diplomatic relations, 
and depended for its success on the assumption that British 
interests in Afghanistan did not merit special efforts to 
gain the good will of the Amir's government, 
Had Curzon, as Viceroy, been faced with this situation 
in 190.5, he would probably have shuddered at the prospect, 
The Soviet government had signed a treaty with the Amir 
prom.ising an annual subsidy of one million roubles and 
other developmental and military assistance. It must have 
seemed probable that Afghanistan would fall steadily into 
the Soviet orbit; and that the Russ:Lan domination in Kabul 
which the British had laboured so long to prevent would 
become a reality, During the 1920s, however, fears of this 
kind gradually receded, The signature of the "neighbourly 
treaty" of 1921 can be regarded as proof of the British 
realisation that the "Afghan problem" was less important 
than it had once seemed. Before the first world war, the 
task of keeping imperial rivals at a safe distance from the 
frontiers of India had preoccupied the Indian government, 
During the inter-war years a more fundamental and perhaps 
more complicated problem engaged the attention of the Indian 
authorities - the problem of providing for increased native 
participation in the government of India, and eventually, 
of planning a total withdrawal from the subcontinent. T1Cle 
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spectre of Russian invasion was replaced by the more real 
one of serious internal disturbances, and the Delhi govern-
ment lost much of their old interest in maintaining a firm 
control over Afghanistan and other states whose territory 
adjoined that of India. The "Afghan problem" was not solved 
by treaty in the sense that the 1907 convention had attempted 
to solve it - its relative importance merely declined, 
This outcome was made possible by simultaneous changes 
in Russian policy. The Russo-Japanese war had probably 
convinced the Tsarist government that the invasion of India 
was beyond their power, but (as the Anglo-Russian discussions 
of 1906-15 demonstrated) they were still anxious to keep 
old ambitions alive, as a bargaining point with the British 
if nothing else. The turmoil of revolution had thrown 
former policies into the melting-pot, however, and it was 
not for several years that a new and definite programme 
emerged, Between 1917 and 1919 the civil war in Russiarrcent-
ral Asia reduced to vanishing point the Soviet government's 
ability to intervene in Afghanistan; Lenin and his colleagues 
were committed to the support of anti-imperialist movements 
throughout the world, but were physically unable to aid 
the Afghans against the British, The course of the Soviet-
Afghan negotiations of 1919-21 showed that material induce-
ments would have to be offered to Afghanistan if the Amir 
was to be persuaded to ali~< himself with the R,S,F,S,R,, 
J" oJ g L ,, 
while the Soviet-Afghan dispute over the status of Bokhara 
combined with Soviet ambitions in eastern Afghanistan to 
complicate further the tas.k of arranging an entente between 
Moscow and Kabul. At the end of 1921 the Soviet subsidy of 
one million roubles was the only weapon on which the 
Soviets could rely to defeat such influence as the British 
could bring to bear in Kabul, and j_t was a weapon which the 
Russian government soon decided to lay aside. By July 1923 
the first instalment of the subsidy (for the year 1921-22) 
had been paid in full, but no subsequent payments appear to 
have been made; the bulk of the Russian arms granted to 
Afghanistan under the treaty of 1921 had been delivered, 
but the promised aeroplanes had not made their appearance.10 
The Russian position in Afghanistan, in fact, was not very 
different from that of the Indian government. The Soviet 
ambassador enjoyed no special privileges at the Afghan 
court, and had abandoned schemes for purchasing Afghan good 
will by the grant of subsidies; at the same time, Amanullah's 
irridentist claims in Russian central Asia encumbered day-
to-day relations between Russia and Afghanistan, just as his 
ambitions in India's North-West Frontier Province bedevilled 
relations with the British. 
A letter which Chicherin had sent to Raskolnikov in 
June 192111 outlined the principles which have governed 
10. F.D., 502-F 1923, No,J, p.l2, 
11. Reproduced as Appendix J2, 
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Soviet policy towards Afghanistan since the early l920s, 12 
The Soviet goverrunent's most important task, Chicherin 
explained, was the reconstruction and industrialisation 
of the Russian economy, and peaceful co-existence with the 
capitalist powers was essential to this purpose. It was 
Raskolnikov's duty to "observe most strictly the provisions 
of the Anglo-Russian agreement" 13 and to respect the 
authority of the A.rnir's goverrunent. Afghanistan was passing 
through the stage of "enlightened absolutism, of the type 
of our own eighteenth century", and many years of further 
development were required before a socialist goverrunent 
could be introduced there, Amanullah and his bourgeois 
nationalist regime should be supported, since the Amir's 
success hastened the day of the eventual socialist revolu-
tion, At the same time "the dangerous tendency of certain 
Afghan political personalities towards reactionary pan-
Islamic hegemony" required careful attention, and was 
obviously to be discouraged, Here were interesti.ng parallels 
12. Except, perhaps, during the period 1945-53 (see 
Fletcher, op.cit., p.258), The present writer would dispute 
Fletcher's contention that it was "the traditional Leninist-
Stalinist view that the success of their revolution could 
only be achieved by •armed struggle' waged by local Communist 
parties against the national bourgeois goverrunent". (Ibid.) 
"Stalinist" it may have been, but the letter to Raskolnikov 
discussed above ind:i.cates that Lenin's pol:i.cy differed from 
Stalin's, and closely resembled that of Khrushchev, 
13, An agreement which, the British claimed, was honoured 
more in the breach than the observance, 
4 0'.! __ L 
with contemporaneous trends in British policy - non-
intervention in Afghanistan's domestic politics, but close 
attention to movements which threatened the territorial 
integrity of one or other of the great powers1 full 
recognition of Afghanistants independence, and a general 
emphasis on problems nearer home which reduced the relative 
importance of the old "Afghan problem", As A.J,p, Taylor 
has remarked: "Not a single one of the problems outside 
Europe which had raised difficulties before 1914 caused a 
14 
serious crisis among the European powers between the wars". 
This conclusion is as true of Afghanistan as it is of the 
near east, Africa and China, and serves as a reminder of 
the overriding importance of European problems during the 
inter-war years. 
Changes in the attitudes of the British and Russian 
governments had played the major part in determining the 
settlement of 1921 1 but the growth of nationalist sentiment 
in Afghanistan cannot be dismissed as a negligible factor; 
it was Habibullah's request for representation at the 
Versailles conference in 1919 which had prompted the Govern-
ment of India to "scrutinise our traditional policy anew",l5 
and by 1918 the Amir's attitude differed from that of his 
14, The Origins of the Second World War, p,41, 
15, In Denys Bray's words; see supra, P• 206. 
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father as much as Hamilton Grant's differed from that of 
the Viceroy Curzon. Had the rulers of Afghanistan been 
less anxious to secure the complete independence of their 
country, or less capable, the story presented in these pages 
might have been different; Afghanistan mj_ght have followed 
the unfortunate course which Iran seemed destined to follow 
after the first world war, before Reza Shah reinvigorated 
his nation. As it was, Afghanistan emerged as the gainer 
from the decline in importance of the old "Afghan problem", 
'Abdur Rahman and his son had benefited in some ways from 
the Anglo-Russian rivalry of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, for the British had subsidised the 
Amirts government and guaranteed his frontiers for fear that 
t~e Russians might otherwise conquer Afghanistan, but their 
involvement in the struggle between the two great powers was 
not without its dangers and disadvantages for the Afghans. 
There was always the chance that the great powers might 
attempt to solve the "Afghan problem" by partitioning 
Afghanistan, while the isolation of their country and the 
subjection of their government to that of the British in 
matters of foreign policy was frustrating to the "young 
Afghans" who wished to see Afghanistan internally progressive 
and externally independent, The economic advancement of 
Afghanistan was inevitably hindered by the Afghan government's 
reasonable fear that the foreign capital and expertise on 
which the development of' industries and communications 
depended would lead inevitably to foreign political 
domination, As a later Afghan Prime Minister, Dr. Muhammad 
Yusuf', put it: 
In the period of' the industrial revolution when 
sc.ience and technology affected most countries of' 
the world, we Afghans were too busy defending our 
liberty to devote attention to scientific and 
economic advancements and to keep pace with the 
rest of' the world.l6 
It was only in the l920s 1 when British and Russian 
attentions turned elsewhere, that the Afghan rulers felt 
able to embark on a thoroughgoing programme of' internal 
reform, and it is only from this point that the historian 
of' Afghanistan must examine in detail the economic and 
social problems they encountered. 
l6. Speech delivered over Radio Kabul, l4 March l96J, 
Reproduced by Louis Depree, The Decade of' Daoud Ends, 
Appendix II, 
APPENDIX 1 
Letter from Amir 'Abdur Rahman Khan to Lepel Griffin, 
Chief Political Officer at Kabul, dated 22 June 1880, 
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"The kind letter sent by the hand of Taj Muhammad 
Khan, telling me of your welfare and friendship, arrived 
on the 11th Rajab (20th June) and caused me great pleasure, 
What was the object of myself and people, you yourself 
have kindly granted. 
Regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan which were 
settled by Treaty with my most noble and respected grand-
father, Amir Dost Muhammad, these you have granted me, 
And the Envoy which you have appointed in Afghanistan, 
you have dispensed with, but what you have left to (be 
settled according to) my wish is, that I may keep a 
Mussalman Ambassador, if I please, This was my desire 
and that of my people, and this you have kindly granted, 
About my friendly relations and communications with 
Foreign Powers, you have written that I should not have 
any without advice and consultation with you (the British), 
You should consider well that if I have the friendship 
of a great Government like yours, how can I communicate 
with another Power without advice from and consultation 
with you? I agree to this also, 
You have also kindly written that, should any 
unwarranted (improper) attack be made by any other Power 
on Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford 
me assistance; and you will not permit any other person 
to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan, 
This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted, 
As to what you have written about Herat, Herat is at 
present in the possession of my cousin, So long as he 
does not oppose me and remains friendly with me, it is 
better that I should leave my cousin in Herat, rather 
than any other man, Should he oppose me, and not listen 
to my words (advice) or those of my people, I will after-
wards let you know, Everything shall be done as we both 
deem it expedient and advisable, 
All the kindness you have shown is for my welfare and 
that of my people; how should I not accept it? You have 
shown very great kindness to me and my people. 
I have written and sent letters containing full 
particulars to all the tribes of Afghanistan, and I have 
APPENDIX l (contd.) 4 :) 
given copies of those papers to Sardar Muhammad Afzal 
Khan, for transmission to you, and I have also communicated 
verbally to Afzal Khan certain matters." 
(From F.D., S.F.Jul,l905, Enclosure No.l in No.6l). 
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APPENDIX: 2 
Letter from A,C, Lyall, Foreign Secretary to the Government 
of India, to Amir 1Abdur Rahman Khan, dated 20 July 1880, 
"His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in 
Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has 
proceeded towards Kabul in accordance with the invitation 
of the British Government, Therefore, in consideration of 
the friendly sentiments by which Your Highness is animated 
and of the advantage to be derived by the Sardars and 
people from the establishment of a settled government 
under Your Highness's authority, the British Government 
recognises Your Highness as Amir of Kabul. 
I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy 
and Governor-General of India, to inform Your Highness 
that the British Government has no desire to interfere in 
the internal government of the territories in the possession 
of Your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident 
should be stationed anywhere within those territories, 
For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such 
as is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be 
advisable that a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government 
should reside by agreement at Kabul, 
Your Highness has requested that the views and inten-
tions of the British Government, with regard to the position 
of the ruler at Kabul in relation to Foreign Powers, 
should be placed on record for Your Highness's information. 
The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council authorise me 
to declare to you that, since the British Government admits 
no right of interference by Foreign Powers within 
Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged 
to abstain from all interference with the affairs of 
Afghanistan, it is plain that Your Highness can have no 
political relations with any Foreign Power except with the 
British Government. If any Foreign Power should attempt 
to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference 
should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of 
Your Highness, in that event the British Government would 
be prepared to aid you1 to such extent and in such manner 
as may appear to the British Government necessary, in 
repelling it, provided that Your Highness follows unreservedly 
the advice of the British Government in regard to your 
external relations." 
(From F.D, 1 S,F,Jul,l905, Enclosure No,J in No,61), 
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APPENDIX J 
"Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, 
G.c.s.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on 
the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I,E., 
C,S,I,, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on 
the other part, 11 
"Whereas the British Government has represented to 
His Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses 
for the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of l87J between 
Russia and England by which it was decided that the river 
Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan, 
from Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) or Sarikol on the east 
to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas 
the British Government considers itself bound to abide by 
the terms of this Agreement, if the Russian Government 
equally abides by them, His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman 
Kha~G,C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, 
wishing to show his friendship to the British Government 
and his readiness to accept their advice in matters affect-
ing his relations with Foreign Powers, hereby agrees that 
he will evacuate all the districts held by him to the north 
of this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that 
all the districts lying to the south of this portion of 
the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be handed over 
to him in exchange, And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, 
K,C,I,E., C,S,I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
India, hereby declares on the part of the British Govern-
ment that the transfer to His Highness the Amir of the 
said districts lying to the south of the Oxus is an 
essential part of this transaction, and undertakes that 
arrangements will be made with the Russian Government 
to carry out the transfer of the said lands to the north 
and south of the Oxus," 
(From F.D., S,F, Jul.l905, Enclosure No.4 in No,6l), 
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"Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, 
G,C,S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, 
on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, 
K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Govern-
ment of India, representing the Government of India 
on the other part. 
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the 
frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and where-
as both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India 
are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly 
understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective 
spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be 
no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied 
Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
(l) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's 
dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow 
the line shown in the map attached to this agreement. 
(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise 
interference in the territories lying beyond this line on 
the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will 
at no time exercise interference in the territories lying 
beyond this line on the side of India. 
(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness 
the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far 
as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he 
will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or 
Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The 
British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness 
the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already 
given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the 
rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also 
relinquishes his claim to Chageh. 
(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid downm 
detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable 
and desirable, by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, 
whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at 
a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible 
exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this 
agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights 
of villages adjoining the frontier. 
(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the 
Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Canton-
ment and concedes to the British Government the rights 
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purchased by him in the Sirkai Tibrai water. At this 
part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows: 
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the 
Peha Ketal, which remains in British territory, the line 
will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and 
the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way 
between the new Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known 
locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-
way between the railway station and the hill known as 
the Mian Baldak, and turning southwards, will rejoin the 
Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British 
territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south 
of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not 
exercise any interference within half a mile of the road. 
(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by 
the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of 
Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all 
the principal differences of opinion which have arisen 
between them in regard to the frontier, and both the 
Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake 
that any differences of detail, such as those which will 
have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed 
to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a 
friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future, as far 
as possible, all causes o.f doubt and misunderstanding 
between the two Governments, 
(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good-
will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghan-
istan independent and strong, the Government of India will 
raise no objection to the purchase and import by His High-
ness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him 
some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark 
their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness 
the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Govern-
ment of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs 
of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted 
to His Highness, 
Kabul; ) 
The l2th November l893) 
(Sd.) H,M, DURAND 
(Sd,) ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN" 
(From F,D,, S.F. Jul. l905, Enclosure No,5 in No.6l). 
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APPENDIX 5 
Treaty sig·ned at Kabul by Amir Habibullah Khan and L.ouis 
Dane on 2l March l905. 
"Praise be to Allaht 
His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din Amir Habibulla 
Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its 
dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr, Louis 
William Dane, C ,S .I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty 
Government of India and Representative of the exalted 
British Government, on the other part, 
His said Majesty does hereby agree to this that, in 
matters of principle and of subsidiary importance of the 
Treaty regarding internal and external affairs and of the 
engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, 
Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy, may God 
enlighten his tomb~ concluded and acted upon with the 
exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, 
and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I 
will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise, 
The said Honourable Mr, Louis William Dane does hereby 
agree to this that as to the very agreement and engagement 
that the exalted British Government concluded and acted 
upon with the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-
wa-ud-din, that is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, 
who has found mercy, regarding internal and external affairs 
and matters of principle or of subsidiary importance, I 
confirm them and write that they (the British Government) 
will not act contrary to those agreements and engagements 
in any way or at any time, 
Made on Tuesday, the l4th day of 
of the year lJ2J Hijri, corresponding 
Muharram-ul-Haram 
to the 2lst day of 
March of the year l905 A,D, 
Louis W, Dane, 
Foreign Secretary, 
!Persian seal of Amir Habibulla 
-Khan. J 
This is correct, I have sealed 
and signed, 
AMIR HABIBULLA 
representing the Government of India." 
(From F,D,, S,F, Jul,l905 1 Enclosure No,6 in No,6l), 
First Russian draft 
agreement, handed by 
Izvolsky to Nicolson 
on l5 May l907. 
"The High Contracting 
Parties, in order to 
ensure the perfect 
security of their 
respective frontiers in 
Central Asia, and to 
maintain there a solid 
and lasting peace, have 
agreed as follows:-
Article I 
Afghanistan will con-
stitute a buffer state 
between the respective 
possessions of the two 
contracting Powers. 
Article II 
The Imperial [Russian] 
Government recognises 
that Afghanistan is 
outside the sphere of 
Russian influence, and 
engages that all its 
political relations with 
Afghanistan shall be 
conducted through the 
intermediary of the 
British counter-draft, 
given by Nicolson to 
Izvolsky on l7 June 
l907· 
"The High Contracting 
Parties, in order to 
assure the perfect 
security of their re-
spective frontiers in 
Central Asia, and to 
maintain there a solid 
and lasting peace, have 
agreed as follows:-
Article I 
The Russian Government 
recognise Afghanistan 
as outside the sphere 
of Russian influence, 
and engage that all their 
political relations with 
Afghanistan shall be 
conducted through the 
intermediary of His 
Majesty's Government; 
they further undertake 
not to send any Agents 
into Afghanistan. 
Royal [British] Government. 
Text of the Anglo-Russian 
nconvention concerning 
Afghanistan" signed at 
St. Petersburg on 3l 
August 1907· 
"The High Contracting 
Parties, in order to ensure 
perfect security on their 
respective frontiers in 
Central Asia and to maintain 
in these regions a solid and 
lasting peace, have concluded 
the following Convention: 
Article I [l> 
'tl 
'tl 
His Britannic Majesty's 1?i 
Government declare that they S 
have no intention of changing ~ 
the political status of 
Afghanistan, 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Government further engage to 
exercise their influence in 
Afghanistan only in a pacific 
sense, and they will not them-
selves take in Afghanistan, 
nor encourage Afghanistan to 
take, any measure threatening 
Russia. 
""' 
~ 
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RUSSIAN DRAFT 
Article III 
Great Britain engages 
not to annex or occupy 
any part of Afghanistan 
or its dependencies and 
not to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the 
country. 
The Government of His 
Britannic Majesty will 
not exercise their 
influence in Afghani-
stan except in a pacific 
sense, and will not 
themselves take, nor en-
courage Afghanistan to 
take, measures which 
could be considered a 
menace to the Russian 
frontier. 
BRITISH COUNTER-DRAFT 
Article II 
The British Government 
having recorded in the 
Treaty signed at Kabul 
on the 21st March, 1905, 
that they recognise the 
agreement and the engage-
ments concluded with the 
late Ameer Abdur Rahman, 
and that they have no 
desire to interfere in 
the internal government 
of his territories, 
Great Britain engages not 
to annex or to occupy in 
contravention of that 
treaty any portion of 
Afghanistan or to inter-
fere in the internal 
administration of the 
FINAL TEXT 
The Imperial Russian Govern~ 
ment, on their part, declare 
that they recognize Afghaniw 
stan as outside the sphere 
of Russian influence, and 
they engage that all their 
politicaJ. relations with 
Afghanistan shall be con-
ducted through the inter-
mediary of His Britannic 
Majesty's Government; they 
further engage not to send 
any Agents into Afghanistan, 
Article II 
The Government of His 
Britannic Majesty having de-
clared in the Treaty signed 
at Kabul on the 21st March 
1905 that they recognize the 
Agreement and the engagements 
concluded with the late Ameer 
Abdur Rahman, and that they 
have no intention of inter-
fering in the internal govern~ 
ment of Afghan territory, 
Great Britain engages neither 
to annex nor to occupy in 
contravention of that Treaty 
any portion of Afghanistan 
or to interfere in the 
internal administration of 
the country, provided that 
the Ameer fulfils the 
~ 
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RUSSIAN DRAFT 
Article IV 
Russia engages not to 
send Agents into Afghani-
stan, If, nevertheless, 
the development in the 
future of Russian commerce 
with Afghanistan should 
BRITISH COUNTER-DRAFT 
country, provided that 
the Ameer fulfils the 
engagements already 
contracted towards His 
Majesty's Government 
under the above-mentioned 
Treaty. Great Britain 
further undertakes to 
exercise her influence in 
Afghanistan only in a 
pacific sense towards 
Russia, and will not her-
self take in Afghanistan, 
or encourage Afghanistan 
to take, any measures 
threatening the Russian 
frontier. On the other 
han~ the Russian Govern~ 
ment undertake not to 
annex or to occupy any 
part of Afghanistan, not 
to take any measures in~ 
volving interference 
with the internal 
government of the terri-
tories of the Ameer. 
FINAL TEXT 
engagements already con~ 
tracted by him towards his 
Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment under the above-
mentioned Treaty. 
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RUSSIAN DRAFT 
demonstrate the evident 
utility of commercial 
agents in that country, 
the Imperial [Russian] 
Government will enter into 
an exchange of views 
with the Royal [British] 
Government to that effect. 
Article V 
The authorities of the 
Russian and Afghan front~ 
ier provinces specially 
designated for the pur-
pose may establish 
direct relations with 
each other for the 
settlement of local 
questions of a non-
political character. 
Article VI 
The Imperial [Russian] 
Government declares that 
it does not at present 
apply, and will not apply 
in the future to Russian 
commerce with Afghanistan, 
BRITISH COUNTER-DRAFT 
Article III 
The Russian and Afghan 
authorities on the 
frontier specially de-
signated for the purpose 
may,When the consent of 
the Ameer shall have been 
obtained by His Majesty's 
Government and communic-
ated to the Russian 
Government by them, 
establish direct relations 
with each other for the 
settlement of local 
questions of a non-
political character. 
FINAL TEXT 
Article III 
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The Russian and 
Afghan authorities, 
specially designated 
for the purpose on 
the frontier or in 
the frontier prov-
inces,may establish 
direct reciprocal 
relations with each 
other for the settle-
ment of local 
questions of a non-
political character. 
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RUSSIAN DRAFT 
special measures of 
favour, except those 
which are or may be 
taken in a general 
way as regards all 
Russian exports in any 
country whatsoever. 
Article VII 
BRITISH COUNTER~DRAFT 
Article IV 
Russian commerce, traders The Governments of Great 
and citizens shall be Britain and Russia affirm 
placed on a footinj in 
Afghanistan [which 
both from the point o.f 
view of customs rights 
and internal taxes, and 
in other respects, [will 
be] the same as that . 
which English and Anglo~ 
Indian traders and subQ 
jects enjoy in that 
country at present or 
may be accorded in the 
future, and will profit 
from the same facilities, 
It is understood that a 
uniform customs system 
[ 11 r~gime 11 J will be 
established along the 
whole of the Afghan 
frontier.:" 
their adherence to the 
principle of equality o:f 
commercial opportunity, 
and agree that any 
facilities which may have 
been or shall hereafter 
be obtained for British 
and British-Indian 
traders, shall be equally 
enjoyed by Russian 
traders. Should the proA 
gress of commerce 
establish the necessity 
for commercial agents, 
the two Governments will 
agree as to what measures 
shall be taken, due re• 
gard being had to the 
Ameert s sovereign powers •'" 
FINAL TEXT 
Article IV 
His Britannic Majesty's 
Government and the Russian 
Government declare that 
they recognise as regards 
Afghanistan the principle 
of equality of treatment in 
matters concerning commerce, 
and they agree that any 
facilities which may have 
been, or shall be hereafter, 
obtained for British and 
British~Indian trade and 
traders, shall be equally 
applied to Russian trade 
and traders~' Should the 
progress of trade establish 
the necessity for commercial 
agents, the two Governments 
will agree as to what 
measures shall be taken, due 
regard, of course, being had 
to the Ameer 1 s sovereign 
rights. 
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RUSSIAN DRAFT BRITISH COUNTER~DRAFT FINAL TEXT 
Article V 
The present arrangements 
will only come into force 
when His Britannic Majesty's 
Government shall have 
notified to the Russian 
Government the consent of 
the Ameer to the terms 
stipulated above;" 
(From G. e T,, Vol. IV, No. 482. Columns l and 3 are translations). 
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APPENDIX 7 
Draft British formula relating to northern Afghanistan, 
as accepted by the Government of India on 10 June 1915 1 
and subsequently amended by the India Office, 
"His Majestyts Government taking note of the 
declaration of the Russian Government that it has no 
political interest in Afghanistan, and recognising that 
its desires with regard to the conservation and utilisation 
of the water supply of the Oxus, the Hari Rud, the Murghab 
and their tributaries have reference solely to the 
economic development of its own territories limitrophe 
with those of the Amir 1 and having themselves no interest 
in irrigation projects on the rivers in question, will be 
willing after the conclusion of the war to use its good 
offices to induce the Government of Afghanistan to agree 
to the appointment of a technical Commission, on which the 
three Governments shaQ be represented, to ascertain the 
hydrographic conditions and irrigational needs of these 
limitrophe regions, and to report as to what measures 
might be taken by the Governments of Russia and Afghanistan 
severally in their respective territories, in mutual 
agreement, for the better control, distribution and 
augmentation of the above mentioned rivers, In their 
investigations and suggestions the Commission shall be 
debarred from questioning any rights of the Afghan 
Government and its subjects in the water supply of these 
rivers that were recognised by the Boundary Commission, 
Neither the Russian nor the Afghan Government shall be 
under any obligation to give effect to the suggestions 
of the Commission, and any undertaking founded thereon 
shall be the result of the mutual good-will and free 
agreement of the two Governments." 
(From P.E.F., 1912, Vol. 82 1 P• 18). 
APPENDIX 8 
Letter from the German Chancellor BethmannHollweg to 
Amir Habibullah, n.d. 
"Your Majesty, 
The bearer of this document, the Imperial 
Legationssekretfir Leutnant von Hentig, has been ordered 
to accompany the Kumar Raja Mahendra Pratap of Mursan to 
Your Majesty 1 s capital. The Kumar Raja, whom His Majesty 
the Emperor and King, my gracious master, received in 
audience and who had the opportunity to convince himself 
that Germany and her allies - Austria-Hungary and the 
Ottoman empire - will be the victors in the fight against 
England, Russia and France, now wishes to picture to 
Your Majesty the impressions which he gained in Germany 
and to ask for Your Majesty 1 s advice as to how India, 
now groaning under the yoke of a foreign government, 
may be liberated, so that it may take its proper place in 
the councils of nations. 
The Imperial government is convinced that Your 
Majesty, whose victorious armies have already driven the 
English and Russians before them, will show the Kumar 
Raja the right way for the attainment of his high aims. 
The Imperial government seizes with extreme satis-
faction this opportunity to convey to Your Majesty its 
special respect and esteem in the hope that between the 
noble kingdom of Afghanistan and the German empire lasting 
relations may be established from now on for the use and 
benefit of both countries. 
The Imperial Legationssekretfir von Hentig has 
instructions to give to Your Majesty all details as to 
the present state of the war and to make important 
revelations to Your Majesty of the future relations be-
tween Afghanistan, the German empire, Austria-Hungary 
and Turkey, which are hoped for by the Imperial government, 
(signed) von Bethmann Hollweg," 
(Translated from A.A. volume "Entw!lrfen von 
AllerhBchst. Handschreiben an den Emir von Af hanistan 
und an indische Ffirsten": GFM ::1 -.1 2j F.l74Q75• Appears 
also in F.D., S,W, July 1917, No,l51, Enclosure No.J; in 
Gehrke, op.cit., Vol.LI, pp.Jl7-l8, and in Hentig, ~ 
Leben eine Dienstreise, p. 444.) 
APPENDIX 9 
Letter from the German under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmermann to Legationssekret!ir 
w.-o. von H~~tig 1 dated 17 April 1915. 
"I hereby instruct you to proceed to Kabul, to 
strike up contact with the Amir of Afghanistan, and to 
present Kumar Mahendra Pratap to him, The latter is 
bringing to His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan a 
gracious letter from His Majesty the Emperor and King, 
and a letter of greetings from the Imperial government. 
I respectfully request you to support Kumar Pratap 
in every way in his treatment of Indian affairs, which 
are entrusted to him exclusively. 
I hereby entrust the leadership of the expedition 
LJ1 ".J 
....._ .l. \_ 
to Kabul, and all measures necessary for its accomplishment, 
in particular all arrangements concerning the journey, 
choice of routes, halts, and the administration of the 
expedition funds, to you 
The Imperial Legationssekret!ir 
Herr Leutnant von Hentig 
Constantinople 
and grant you, if necessary, the rank of representative." 
( "Vertreter") 
(Translated from Gehrke, op.cit,, Vol, II, pp.Jl6-l7; 
appears also in Hentig 1 op.cit,, p.44J,) 
APPENDIX 10 
Letter from King George V to Amir Habibullah. 
MY DEAR FRIEND, 
"Buckingham Palace 
24 September 1915, 
I have been much gratified to learn from the 
Viceroy of India how scrupulously and honourablY Your 
Majesty has maintained the attitude of strict neutrality 
which you guaranteed at the beginning of this war, not 
only because it is in accordance with Your Majesty's 
engagements to me but also because by it you are serving 
the best interests of Afghanistan and of the Islamic 
religion. I am confident that Your Majesty will con-
tinue to preserve unchanged this friendly attitude to-
wards me and my Government till victory crowns the arms 
of the Allies, a prospect which daily grows nearer. You 
will thus still further strengthen the friendship, I so 
greatly value, which has united our peoples since the days 
of your father of illustrious memory, and my revered pre-
decessor, the great Queen Victoria, 
Believe me, 
Your Majesty's sincere friend, 
GEORGE R.I." 
(From F.D,, s.w. Mar,l9l6, No.l84.) 
APPENDIX ll 
Part of a letter from the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, to 
Amir Habibullah, accompanying that given in Appendix 10. 
Dated 29 October 1915, 
"In forwarding this letter I have the pleasure to 
inform you that, as a token of appreciation of your 
attitude and in order to enable you to convince those of 
your advisers and people who question the wisdom of 
your present neutrality, that it carries with it some 
material advantage, His Majesty's Government have been 
pleased to increase Your Majesty's subsidy by two lakhs 
of rupees a year, It is hoped that this earnest of 
their goodwill will not only strengthen the ties of 
friendship between the two Governments, but will add to 
the power and prosperity of the Afghan Government," 
(From F ,D., S .W, Mar, 1916, No .188), 
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APPENDIX 12 
Letter from Amir Habibullah to King George V. 
"0 God 
MY HONOURED AND KIND FRIEND. 
Dilkusha Palace 
lOth Rabi~ul-Awal lJJ4, 
[16th January 1916], 
I have had the honour of receiving Your Majesty's 
422 
kind letter dated 24th September 1915 and am pleased and 
thankful for the expression of Your Majesty's friendly 
pleasure and gratification, I am grateful that Your 
Majesty is convinced of the neutrality of the sublime 
God-granted Government of Afghanistan, for which Your 
Majesty has expressed your gratification and pleasure to me, 
In future also, provided no injury or loss occurs to 
Afghanistan, the sublime God-granted Government of 
Afghanistan will remain neutral and will always view with 
satisfaction and honour the friendship of Your Majesty's 
Government. 
I have also perused the letter from His Excellency 
the Viceroy of India, which was forwarded with Your 
Majesty's friendly letter, I hope that Your Majesty will 
become acquainted with its contents and will try to further 
my interests. 
Your Majesty's friend, 
SIRAJ -UL-MILLA T-WAD-DIN," 
(From F,D,, S.W, Jun,1916, No,lJJ,) It is said 
that the despatch of this letter was delayed, because 
the original from King George appeared in typescript, 
and the Afghan authorities, believing that protocol 
demanded that their reply should also be typewritten, 
spent some time searching for a Persian typewriter, 
(Private information,) 
APPENDIX 13 
Draft of Treaty of Alliance between Afghanistan and 
Germany. 
4 
"The following Friendship Treaty is concluded between 
the sublime God~granted government of Afghanistan and the 
High German government, to which, on the part of the God~ 
granted government of Afghanistan, His Majesty Siraj-ul-
Millat-wad~Din the King of the God-granted government,and 
on the part of the High German government the [open passage 
in draft] have bound themselves, 
May this union and friendship exist in the present and 
future between the sublime God=granted government of 
Afghanistan and the High German government, and their re-
spective and honoured rulers. 
1. The government of Afghanistan commences [ * ] its 
full independence and political freedom. 
2, The German government undertakes to help the govern~ 
ment of Afghanistan, as far as possible, recognises 
the independence of Afghanistan, and prevails upon 
the Bulgarian government and the Turkish government to 
acknowledge this [ * ] 
3• The government of Afghanistan begins immediately to 
improve its military forces and administration as well 
as its political relations with the people of Persia, 
India and Russian Turkistan. 
4. The German government is prepared to grant, as quickly 
as possible, to the government of Afghanistan, 
100,000 rifles of the latest type and 300 pieces of 
artillery, large and small, with suitable munitions 
and also the necessary war materiel and one [ * ] 
pounds, or ten million pounds sterling, free and with-
out counter-obligation, as aid, She further undertakes 
to open the route through Persia, and the German 
government sends officers, engineers and other 
functionaries which Afghanistan needs as employees of 
the government of Afghanistan, who will continue to be 
and be treated as such, 
[The present writer has omitted this clause as the 
original is badly mutilated and incomprehensible.] 
* Telegraphic group missing in original. 
4 
APPENDIX lJ (contd,) 
6. If Afghanistan enters the war, or undertakes 
immediate preparations in the military and internal 
political fields, the Afghan [~-German?] 
government undertakes to support the re-occupation of 
lost and conquered territories, and to protect the 
government of Afghanistan for all time and in every 
way against foreign invasions, in the interests o.f 
the government of Afghanistan. 
7. The Afghan government recognises the Imperial German 
Legationssekret&r von Hentig, and immediately sends 
the said envoy to the Persian [1] court with limited 
authority, so as to negotiate in secret with the 
German ambassador, the Turkish ambassador and the 
Austrian ambassador. As soon as he can openly show 
himself to be the authorised representative of the 
government of Afghanistan he will be publicly recog-
nised as minister of Afghanistan, 
Addendum 
At the time of the conclusion of a general peace a 
person will be chosen with full authority as the plenipoten-
tiary representative of Afghanistan, to represent the 
claims of the Afghan government. 
8. [Gives detailed regulations regarding embassies to be. 
established, Excludes extra'-territorial legal rights.] 
9. After the conclusion of a general peace a commercial 
treaty between the governments of Afghanistan and 
Germany will be concluded with reciprocally binding 
obligations, 
10, Both parties will regard themselves as bound by this 
treaty when the Afghan envoy at the Persian court is 
informed that it is accepted by the German government, 
Transcript of the signature of His Majesty, 
On behalf of the sublime government of Afghanistan, 
I desire that an agreement be concluded in accordance with 
the stipulations of the above treaty with the honoured 
German government. 
Signed: Sira,j-ul-Millat-wad-Din. 
18th Rabi-ul-Awal 1334 A.H. 
1. In original "nach einer persischen Residenz 11 • 
APPENDIX 13 (contd,) 
Transcript of the signatures of Capt. Niedermayer 
and von Hentig. 
The government of Afghanistan is desirous of the 
friendship of the German government and wishes to conclude 
a treaty on the basis of the above draft. I am sending a 
copy of this Afghan treaty to the German government, 
Since I have visited Afghanistan I recommend it to the 
German government and I hope that it will accept this 
friendship treaty. 
24th January 1916 A.D. 
Niedermayer, Von Hentig," 
Remarks of von Hentig sent with the above to the German 
Foreign Office:-
"Niedermayer 1 s and my own observations appear at the 
request of the Amir and Nasrulla, but I make it quite 
clear that none of my previously recorded reservations 
should be ignored and that a recommendation of acceptance 
should have the sole aim, stated by them, of facilitating 
for them the task of putting across the draft to the local 
chiefs. I request, however, that you treat this draft 
seriously to the extent that it affords a basis for an 
immediate settlement, and, with German cooperation, in-
volves war along the lines of Niedermayer 1 s proposals," 
(Translated from Unternehmungen, Vol, 27, Hentig 
to A.A., 24.1.16: GFM 14/141, F.532~J4, Appears also 
in Gehrke, op. cit., Vol,II, pp,J60-62). 
APPENDIX 14 
Letter from Sardar Nasrullah Khan to the German 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, dated 12 May 1916, 
4 
"The Imperial Envoy Leutnant von Hentig has brought 
Your Excellencyts letter to His Majesty my illustrious 
Sovereign, and has also presented His Highness Raja 
Mahendra Pratap Mursani to His Majesty, His Majesty has 
in his grace accepted them and counts them as honoured 
guests of the Afghan government, Furthermore, His Highness 
Raja Mahendra Pratap Mursani is dedicating himself to his 
tasks in Kabul, and the Afghan government will extend its 
support and cooperation to the said Raja. 
It was also written in Your Excellency's letter that 
the Imperial government ~eizes with the greatest pleasure 
and delight this opportunity to present to His Majesty its 
expressed esteem and sincere appreciation, in the hope that 
between the mighty government of Afghanistan, by God 1 s grace, 
and the German empire, friendly relations and lasting friend-
ship will endure henceforth and for all eternity, in the 
interests of both and the power and renown of the two states. 
The Imperial envoy von Hentig was instructed to lay before 
His Majesty all necessary information about the present state 
of the war and about the future strengthening of relations 
between the Afghan kingdom and the states of Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Turkey, the development of which the 
Imperial German government envisages, and to explain certain 
important matters to the sublime throne, 
Your Excellency~ His Majesty my sovereign and the 
Afghan government are most gratified and delighted at this 
sincere desire on the part of the Imperial German government, 
The Afghan government also has the keenest desire for the 
lasting friendship of the Imperial German government, in the 
interests of both countries, and hopes that the friendship 
of the two states, which redounds to the benefit of both 
countries, will soon assume the shape of a treaty agreement. 
Your Excellency! The Afghan government requested 
Herr von Hentig to conclude an official treaty of friendship 
between the Afghan government and the Imperial German 
government, and also laid its requirements before Herr von 
Hentig, He said: "I cannot conclude the treaty in an 
official manner, but I may submit it to the Imperial German 
government, If I or some other person be granted plenipo-
tentiary powers, then the official treaty between the Afghan 
government and the Imperial German government will be 
concluded." 
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APPENDIX 14 (contd,) 
Since Herr von Hentig has asked that a request for 
plenipotentiary powers be made on his behalf, I am 
writing this letter to Your Excellency, and express the 
sincere feelings of friendship on the part of the kingdom 
of Afghanistan towards the Imperial German government in 
the hope that the friendship of the two governments of 
Afghanistan and the Imperial German government may be 
transferredframthe plan to the reality. I hope that 
Your Excellency is in the best of health and fortune, 
Written this Wednesday the 14th of the month of Ra,iab 
of the year 1334 A.H,, corresponding to the 12th of the 
month of May of the year 1916 A.D. 
(Autograph signature) ;:u 
(Translated from Unternehmungen, Vol. 27, A.A. to 
Political Section, General Staff, 17 .10,'16: GFM 14/141, 
F .576-77 •) 
APPENDIX 15 
Letter from Amir Habibullah to the Viceroy, Lord 
Chelmsford, dated 2 February 1919. 
"As for long years past relations of friendship and 
ties of unity have existed with the utmost love and concord 
between the Exalted Governments of Afghanistan and England 
and friendly conversations and communications have been 
going on and passing between them, Your Excellency's Govern-
ment have because of that always written about the advancement, 
liberty, freedom of action and independence of the Sublime 
God-granted Government of Afghanistan and expressed their 
solicitude for its well being, Now that it is understood 
from the writing of Newspapers that the representatives of 
the belligerent and neutral Powers from all directions, 
including even two persons from India, will attend the 
general Peace Conference at Versailles in France to safeguard 
the rights and strength of their Governments and nations 
and will urge their right claims for strengthening and 
confirming the important affairs of their countries and 
nations, the Sublime God-granted Goverrunent of Afghanistan 
which has reckoned itself free and independent in every way 
and remained neutral and not engaged on either side during 
the present war considers itself entitled to send its repre-
sentative to participate in the said Conference, so that he 
may, like other Powers and nations, secure the rights of 
liberty, independence and freedom of action for his Government. 
Therefore, on this occasion it is necessary that Your 
Excellency .'.s Government should pay such friendly and sympathe-
tic attention to the Government of Afghanistan as is fitting 
for friends, Hence I have considered it necessary and 
incumbent on me to write to Your Excellency to say that if 
the Exalted Government of England can obtain from all the 
attendants and members of the said Conference a written 
agreement recognising the absolute liberty, freedom of action 
and perpetual independence of the Sublime Government of 
Afghanistan free from future interference, damage and loss, 
and hand it over to me, well and good; otherwise it will be 
unavoidable for the representatives of the Sublime Government 
of Afghanistan to attend the said Conference to put forward 
and argue all their established rights of liberty, complete 
freedom of action and settled independence and to obtain, 
God willing, a written agreement according to their own 
desire under the signatures of the Peace makers there. In 
these circumstances kindly send me a definite reply 
immediately whether Your Excellency's mighty Government 
will undertake or not to obtain the agreement in question 
for the Government of Afghanistan so that I may know." 
(From F.D., S,F, Oct, 1920, No.705)• 
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Telegram from the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, to the 
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, giving outline 
of the reply proposed to the letter appearing as Appendix 
15. Dated ll February 1919• 
"Outline of my proposed reply is as follows:-
Conference is strictly confined to belligerents, and it 
would not be possible for England to propose exception in 
favour of Afghanistan, India is not parallel as she is inte-
gral portion of Empire and has played belligerent's part, 
If Amirts letter is designed as reminder of assurance given 
in my letter of the Jlst July 1916 [*] that assurance is 
reaffirmed, But certain expressions suggest possible desire 
for alteration in existing engagements, Yet this seems 
doubtful, as he himself refers appreciatively to ties of 
unity, etc,, of which those engagements are the basis, 
Perhaps he desires that engagements should be re-inforced 
by some sort of guarantee of the Powers at the Peace Confer-
ence, Yet, seeing that guarantees on the one part ordinarily 
presuppose concessions on the other, this too can hardly be 
the case, unless indeed Amir is now disposed, contrary to 
traditional policy, to extend to subjects of guaranteeing 
powers that freedom of intercourse and commerce that mark 
the ordinary relations of nation with nation, Matter is too 
important to be left in uncertainty, so will he explain his 
wishes freely and frankly, recognising possibility of 
misunderstanding when friends are forced to discuss matters 
of high moment by letter? ~· 
Do you concur in reply on these lines? It seems 
desirable that a clearer statement of Amirts ambitions should 
be elicited, Though his letter is in fact obscure, they 
appear to centre round political freedom, When his wishes 
are clearly known it will be for consideration how far we 
can go , 11 
(From F,D, S,F, Oct, 1920, No, 706, In view of the 
fact that this reply was filed in the records of the 
Government of India in the above draft form only, it would 
seem likely that a letter on the lines proposed was never 
actually sent to the Amir, Moreover, Montagu~'~s comments 
on this draft did not arrive in India until after it was 
known in Delhi that the Amir had been murdered, and the 
Government of India rarely despatched letters of this 
degree of importance without having received the advice 
* The writer has been unable to locate this letter in 
the files of the National Archives of India, 
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of the Secretary of State. This draft appears to have 
been the final form the letter in question ever reached), 
APPENDIX 17 
Letter from Amir Amanullah Khan to the Viceroy, Lord 
Chelmsford, dated J March 1919, 
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"After compliments. -I am desirous of informing my friend, 
His Excellency the Viceroy of the great and mighty British 
Government in the Indian Empire, with much despair and 
regret, of the particulars of a crime full of poignant 
grief, namely, the crime of the unjust and unlawful assassin-
ation of my late father, His Majesty Siraj-ul-Millat-wad-din 
Amir Habibulla Khan, King of the Government of Afghanistan, 
who was killed by a pistol shot at J A,M, in his royal bed 
on Thursday, the 18th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra, correspond-
ing to the 20th February 1919, during his stay at a place 
called Kalla Gosh in his royal dominions by the hand of a 
treacherous perfidious traitor, I have no doubt that Your 
Excellency, my friend, will be much touched by the news of 
this painful event, for the observance of all the conditions 
of neutrality and the upright conduct and friendly relations 
displayed during the past and present by His Majesty my 
late father, the martyr, towards my esteemed friend's mighty 
Government were clearly proved and require no mention, I, 
Your Excellency's friend, had been appointed by order and 
command of His late Majesty, my assassinated pious father, 
as his plenipotentiary in the capital of Kabul, and consider 
myself in every way as his heir and successor as Amir and 
the rightful caller to account and avenger at this time of 
my fatherts blood. The people and populace of the capital 
of Kabul and its surroundings, Saiyads, Ulemas, military 
and civil classes, traders, artisans, Muhammadan and Hindu 
subjects of Afghanistan itself, as well as all foreign 
subjects who were in the capital, unanimously and unitedly, 
with great enthusiasm and of their own free will and consent, 
swore allegiance to me, your friend; and putting my trust 
in God I placed on my head the crown of the Amirship of my 
Government of Afghanistan in the capital of Kabul amid the 
loud acclamations of the people and troops. And this by the 
grace of God. Later on our Government Armies in camp at 
Jalalabad also took their stand on the path of Right, which 
was wholly on our side, and proved their fidelity and loyalty 
by deposing and divesting of office my uncle Sardar Nasrulla 
Khan, who had as asurper declared himself Amir at 
Jalalabad, and by submitting to me their oaths of 
allegiance, Therupon my uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan 
abdicated the throne of the kingdom, and my brothers 
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Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other 
members of the Royal family, who had sworn allegiance 
to him, considered that allegiance illegal and submitted 
their oaths of allegiance to me at Kabul and acknowledged 
and recognised my succession as Amir and King. 
Therefore relying on the friendship and sympathy that 
exist and will continue to exist between us, I have 
considered it necessary to do myself the great honour 
of informing my friend, 
Nor let this remain unknown to that friend that 
our independent and free Government of Afghanistan 
considers itself ready and prepared at every time and 
season to conclude, with due regard to every consideration 
for the requirements of friendship and the like, such 
agreements and treaties with the mighty Government of 
England as may be useful and serviceable in the way 
of commercial gains and advantages to our Government 
and yours". 
(From Parliamentary Papers, No,l), 
APPENDIX 18 
Letter from the Viceroy to Amir Amanullah Khan, dated 
15 April 1919. 
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"After compliments, -I have received from you with deepest 
regret the lamentable news of the untimely death of your 
revered father His Majesty the late Amir Habibulla Khan 
Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din, United from old by ties of 
friendship, the British Government and the Government of 
Afghanistan are now united in a common sorrow. For while 
Afghanistan mourns the loss of a great ruler who ever 
sought the welfare of his countrymen and by his wise 
statesmanship preserved it from the horrors which the war, 
just ended, has brought upon so many nations, the British 
Government mourns the loss of a staunch friend who through-
out his reign maintained firm the alliance between the two 
Governments, 
I thank you for informing me that you have been 
unanimously acknowledged as Amir by the populace of Kabul 
and its surroundings, Saiyads, Ulemas 1 Military and Civil 
classes, that your uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan has abdicated, 
and that your brothers Sardars Inayatulla Khan and 
Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family, 
together with the troops at Jalalabad, have sworn allegiance 
to you, 
I note with pleasure that you say that you have sent 
me this information relying upon the friendship and 
sympathy which exist and will continue to exist between 
the two Governments. That friendship is based on the 
treaties and engagements concluded with the British 
Government by the late Zia-ul-Millat-Wad-din and confirmed 
by the late Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din, and I understand 
from what you say that the Government of Afghanistan 
intends to act upon them as in the past, 
You say moreover that the Government of Afghanistan 
considers itself ready at every time and season to conclude 
such agreements and treaties with the British Government 
as may be to the commercial advantage of the two Govern-
ments, From this it seems possible that the commercial 
requirements of Afghanistan are thought to call for some 
agreement with the British Government subsidiary to the 
treaties and engagements above mentioned. At this period 
of mourning I refrain from pursuing the matter further. 
But the Government of Afghanistan may rest assured that I 
shall be prepared at all times to invite His Majesty,1,s 
Government to give careful consideration to anything it may 
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wish to put forward and that it will be my constant 
endeavour in the future as in the past to foster friendly 
relations between the two Governments," 
(From Parliamentary Papers, No. J.) 
APPENDIX 19 
Draft treaty with Afghanistan proposed by the India 
Office on 7 July 1919. 
"(l) Amir will hold no political relations with any 
foreign power except British Government. He will follow 
unreservedly the advice of the British Government in 
regard to his relations with all foreign powers. 
(2) If any foreign power should attempt to interfere 
in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to 
unprovoked aggression on dominions of Amir, the British 
Government will be prepared to support Amir against such 
aggression to such extent as may appear to them necessary, 
and in such manner as they may deem advisable. 
(J) The Government of India will at no time exercise 
interference in territories lying beyond their frontier on 
the side of Afghanistan, and the Amir will at no time 
exercise interference in territories beyond this line on 
the side of India, The tribes of the Afghan side of 
frontier shall not receive allowances from the British 
Government and the tribes on Indian side of frontier shall 
not receive allowances from the Afghan authorities. 
(4) The frontier from the Nawa peak to Sassobi shall 
follow the line in map attached to this treaty and shall 
be demarcated by a British Commission and Amir shall 
accept such demarcation. 
(5) Amir shall co-operate with British Government for 
the maintenance of peace and order upon their common 
frontier and for removal of outlaws and notorious raiders 
and shall instruct his officers accordingly. 
(6) British Government have decided, in consequence 
of wanton and unprovoked aggression of Amir, and in re-
paration for material loss and damage caused thereby, to 
treat as forfeited all arrears of subsidy of late Amir 
and these will not, in any circumstances, be paid. 
(7) British Government are unable to continue to 
Amir privilege of maintaining an Afghan Postmaster at 
Peshawar, in view of manner in which this privilege has 
been abused. 
(8) British Government are not willing to grant 
renewed subsidy to Amir or to accord him the privilege 
enjoyed by his predecessor in respect of importation of 
arms and munitions through India to Afghanistan, until 
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such time as he shall have shown by his conduct that he 
is deserving of these proofs of confidence, If at the end 
of six months the Amir has satisfied British Government in 
this respect and has faithfully observed the terms of 
this treaty, they will be prepared to grant him a subsidy 
to be hereafter determined and to allow importation of 
arms. 11 
(From F.D., S,F, Aug, 1919, No, 415.) 
APPENDIX 20 
Draft treaty with Afghanistan proposed by the Government 
of India on 29 June l9l9. (This may be compared with 
the final signed version, reproduced as Appendix 22 .• ) 
Art. 1. "From day of signing of this treaty there shall 
be peace between British Government on the one 
part and Amir of Afghanistan on the other." 
Art, 2, "In view of wanton and unprovoked aggression of 
Amir, which has brought about the present war 
between British Government and Afghanistan, 
British Government, to mark their displeasure, 
withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs 
of importing arms, ammunition and warlike 
munitions through India to Afghanistan," 
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Art, 3· "The arrears of late Amirls subsidy are further-
more confiscated, and no subsidy is granted to 
Amir Amanulla Khan," 
Art, 4, "At same time British Government are desirous of 
re-establishment of old friendship that has so 
long existed between Afghanistan and Great 
Britain, provided they have guarantees that 
Amir is contrite for the past and on his part 
anxious to regain the friendship of the British 
Government, The British Government are prepared, 
therefore, provided Amir proves this by his 
acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan 
mission after six months for discussion and 
settlement of matters of common interest to the 
two Governments and re-establishment of old 
friendship on satisfactory basis," 
Art, 5• "Until that friendship has been re-established in 
manner indicated in last Article, the British 
troops will remain in their present position in 
Afghan territory, west of undemarcated frontier 
in vicinity of Khyber where Afghan aggression 
took place, both as further token of displeasure 
of British Government and as safeguard against 
repetition of similar aggression, The British 
troops now in occupation of Spin Baldak and other 
portions of Afghan territory will be withdrawn 
forthwith," 
The following alternative version of Article 5 was also 
suggested by the Indian government:-
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Art. 5, "The Amir accepts the Indo-Afghan f'ront:ier' 
accepted by his late father, His Majesty Amir 
Habibulla Khan. He further agrees to the 
early demarcation by a British Commission of' 
the undemarcated portion of' the line west of' 
the Khyber, where the recent Afghan aggression 
took place, and to accept such boundary as the 
British Commission may lay down. The British 
troops on this side will remain in their present 
positions until such demarcation has been 
effected." 
The Government of' India requiredthe following 
guarantees of' the Amir 1 s good behaviour before a final 
treaty of' friendship could be signed with Afghanistan, 
"(1) That he should dismiss from his country all 
hostile foreigners, in particular Bolshevik Missions 
and Bolshevik, German, and other foreign agents. 
(2) That he should have no relations with foreign 
countries and that he should conduct his foreign 
relations, as heretofore, through us. 
(J) The expulsion of' Obaidulla and other named 
Indian seditionists. 
(4) Genuine co-operation in keeping peace on our 
common border, including removal of' outlaws and 
notorious raiders and abstention from all intrigues 
with our frontier tribes directed against us. 
(5) The improvement of' position of' British Agent in 
Kabul and of' our representatives in Afghanistan, 
admitting of' their free movement and free intercourse 
with Afghan officials, 
(6) A corresponding improvement in powers and 
position of' Afghan Envoy with Government of' India." 
(From F.D,, S,F, Aug. 1919, No, 360,) 
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"Supplementary letter" to 'Ali Ahmad Khan proposed by 
Sir Hamilton Grant on 4 August 1919. 
"You asked me for some further assurance that the 
Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government 
contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty 
of Afghanistan in external or internal matters. My friend, 
if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care you will 
see that there is in it no such interference with the 
liberty of Afghanistan, You have informed me that the 
Government of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew the 
arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla Khan, 
agreed to follow the advice of the Government of Great 
Britain in matters affecting the external relations of 
Afghanistan, without reserve. I have therefore refrained 
from pressing this matter of which the Treaty of Peace 
contains no mention, By the said Treaty and this letter, 
therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and 
independent in its affairs, both internal and external. 
At the same time I impressed on you that the British 
Government will regard the Amir '.s conduct of his foreign 
relations as an important test of the friendliness of 
his feelings towards them, and will be ready, at any time 
he may wish, to assist him with advice in these matters," 
(From F,D,, S,F, Sept. l9l9 1 No, 165)• 
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Text of the treaty between the Afghan and British 
Governments signed at Rawalpindi on 8 August 1919, 
"The following articles for the restoration of peace 
have been agreed upon by the British Government and the 
Afghan Government:- Article 1, From date of signing of 
this treaty thereffiall be peace between the British 
Government on the one part and the Government of 
Afghanistan on the other. Article 2, In view of the 
circumstances which have brought about the present war 
between the British Government and the Government of 
Afghanistan the British Government to mark their displeasure 
withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing 
arms, ammunition, or warlike munitions through India to 
Afghanistan, Article J, The arrears of the late Amirts 
subsidy are furthermore confiscated and no subsidy is 
granted to the present Amir, Article 4. At the same time 
the British Government is desirous of the re-establishment 
of the old friendship that has so long existed between 
Afghanistan and Great Britain provided they have 
guarantees that the Afghan Government are on their part 
sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British 
Government, The British Government are prepared therefore, 
provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts 
and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after 6 
months for the discussion and amicable settlement of 
matters of common interest to the two Governments and 
the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory 
basis, Article 5, The Afghan Government accept the Indo-
Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir, They further 
agree to the early demarcation by a British commission of 
the undemarcated portio~ of the line west of the Khyber 
where the recent Afghan aggression took plac:e and to 
accept such boundary as the British commission may lay 
down, The British troops on this side will remain in 
their present positions until such demarcation has been 
effected," 
(From Parliamentary Papers, No, 66,) 
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"Supplementary letter" from Sir Hamilton Grant handed 
to 'Ali Ahmad Khan on 8 August l9l9. 
"You asked me for some further assurance that the 
Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government 
contains nothing that interferes with the complete 
liberty of Afghanistan in external or internal matters, 
My friend, if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care 
you will see that there is in it no such interference 
with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me 
that the Government of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew 
the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla 
Khan, agreed to follow the advice of the Government of 
Great Britain in matters affecting the external relations 
of Afghanistan, without reserve. I have therefore 
refrained from pressing this matter of whxn the Treaty 
of Peace contains no mention, By the said Treaty and 
this letter, therefore, Afghanistan is left officially 
free and independent in its affairs, both internal and 
external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been 
cancelled by this war," 
(From Parliamentary Papers, No, 67). 
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Note on the connection between the third Afghan 
war and the Punjab disturbances of April 1919, 
During the controversy which followed the suppression 
of the Punjab disturbance of April 1919, several authorities 
in the Punjab claimed that they knew of the impending 
attack from Afghanistan, and that the harsh measures used 
in putting down the rebellion were therefore justified. 
Sir Michael O,'Dwyer, former Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab, 
wrote in 1925 that "the Afghans and the Frontier tribes, 
incited by Indian emissaries, began to move towards the 
frontiers early in April ,,, and began a concerted attack 
on the North-West Frontier at the end [~] of April" 
(India as I Knew It, p.272), and he disputed the conclusions 
of the Hunter Committee, which later investigated the 
Punjab disturbances, that "On the evidence before us there 
was nothing to show that the outbreak in the Punjab was 
part of a pre-arranged conspiracy to overthrow the British 
Government of India by force" (~., po313 1 and Disorders 
Inguiry Committee, 1919-20 1 Report, p.l02), The earliest 
report of the Afghan troop movements towards the Indian 
frontier which the writer has been able to find in the 
files of the former Foreign Department is that of the British 
Agent in Kabul, dated 26 April, which would not have 
reached India until the beginning of May (F,D,, S,F, Jul. 
1919 1 Note to No.1), so Sir Michael's clain that the Afghans 
were moving towards the frontier in early April, and that 
this was "well known" (op.cit,, po272), seems somewhat 
extraordinary, His contention that the Afghan attack 
on India began at the end of April (~,) is simply a 
mis-statement of fact, for the first act of overt hostility 
from the Afghan side did not occur until 3 May (see supra, 
P•2fi). It may be noted that observers in India at the 
beginning of May did see a connection between the Punjab 
uprising and the Afghan troop movements, but it was a very 
different connection from that which Sir Michael later 
claimed to have perceived, Roos-Keppel 1 for instance, 
believed that Amanullah moved his troops into the border 
regions at the end of April in order to prevent the 
disturbances in the Punjab from spreading into Afghanistan, 
and not in order to take advantage of these disturbances 
at the expense of the British (F,D., S,F, Jul 1 1919 1 No.1), 
That Roos-Keppel_'s interpretation may have been a correct 
one is indicated, perhaps, by Amanullah's farman to the 
hakims of the border areas, issued at the end of April, 
in which the Amir warns hE officials of the uprisings in 
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the Punjab, and advises them "to be on the alert against 
the commission of some foolish act in British Territory 
by any Afghan subject" (Parliamentary Papers, No.5)• 
It is the writer's belief that the Afghan troop 
movements in question were necessitated by the reaction of 
the troops and some of the frontier tribesmen to the findings 
of the judicial darbar of lJ April, and that it was only 
when the Punjab disturbances had been effectively crushed 
that Amanullah made his decision to invade India, planning 
an uprising in Peshawar to coincide with this. Brig.-
General Dyer<s action at Amritsar, which naturally proved 
a central point in the heated discussion of the rightness 
of the steps taken by the Punjab government, took place 
on the very same day as the judicial darbar in Kabul, and 
Dyer's claim, (quoted by Arthur Swinson, Six Minutes to 
Sunset, p.l86) that "I know of the cloud from Afghanistan 
which broke three weeks later", seems quite untenable. 
(Dyer never put this point to the Hunter Committee, and 
this statement was in fact made to the House of Commons and 
the Army Council in London in the summer of 1920; it seems 
not unreasonable to suppose that it had been suggested to 
him at a late stage, while he was preparing the statement 
of his case to be put before the London government,) 
Maj,-General Sir George Barrow, an ex-member of the Hunter 
Committee, refuted Dyer's claimed knowledge of the danger 
from Afghanistan with the words "It was not the business 
of a comparatively junior officer to take this into account 
without instruction from higher authority," (Quoted ibid., 
p.l87.) Barrow might equally have pointed out that "higher 
authority" had no knowledge of any such danger from 
Afghanistan at the time, and that the claim of the "compara-
tively junior officer" that he had such knowledge was quite 
ridiculous. 
None of the above will prevent a supporter of O'Dwyer's 
and Dyer •_s actions from maintaining that their quick 
suppression of the Punjab rebellion greatly strengthened 
the British position once the Afghans mounted their attack, 
But to contend, for instance, that Dyer foresaw the Afghan 
attack at the time he entered Amritsar, is to attempt the 
impossible. Nor is there any evidence that the Afghan 
government played any part in promoting disturbances in the 
Punjab in mid-April l9l9, 
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Note on the Parliamentary Papers dealing with the Third 
Afghan War ("Papers regarding Hostilities with Afghani-
stan, 1919"). 
In September 1919 an Indian Foreign Department 
official described the proposed Blue Book on the third 
Afghan war as "most incomplete and inadequate", (F.D., 
F.B, Sep. 1919, Nos. 92-lOl, Notes p. 8~,) A survey of 
the :full official records on the subject is bound to 
support this contention. It appears that it was Edwin 
Montagu 1 s original intention to publish a full selection 
of documents relating to the war early in June 1919, but 
that the process o:f publication was :for some reason de-
layed until the autumn, when the text of the treaty o:f 
Rawalpindi and Grant's "supplementary letter" to tAli 
Ahmad Khan was simply added to the original collection, 
(Ibid,, Notes P•' 9 .) The Blue Book thus contains no 
documents to show how the Rawalpindi settlement was 
arrived at, nor does it include any correspondence between 
the Government o:f India and the India O:f:fice bearing on 
the questions discussed during the Rawalpindi conference. 
Other notable omissions include the exclusion o:f the 
discussion between the authorities in India and London on 
the proposed advance to Jalalabad, due to the reluctance 
of the Army Department of the Government o:f India to 
disclose "why we attach such importance to an advance on 
Jalalabad", (Ibid., Notes p,·, l.) The important corres~ 
pondence between the Indian authorities and Amir 
Habibullah during the final weeks o:f the latter's reign 
might also have been represented, This would admittedly 
have made :for an extremely lengthy Blue Book, but some 
omissions from the very :full selection of documents 
covering the period :from mid~pril to the end of May 
might have been made to compensate for this, 
Alterations and omissions in the documents actually 
published are not especially numerous, nor always 
explicable. (A document deposited in the Delhi archives 
will normally be worded differently :from the copy o:f the 
same document deposited in London, but this is presum-
ably due to the system o:f telegraphic coding used.) 
The more important are as follows:-
(l) No.lO in the Parliamentary Papers (F.D., S,F, Jul. 
1919, No,' 46). The sentence: "It is clear :from 
reports of our Agent in Kabul that Amir 1 s enquiry 
into circumstances o:f murder o:f late Amir has 
caused deep dissatisfaction among populace" should 
read "From reports received :from the British Agent 
il • 
::t':l. 
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(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
in Kabul it is clear that people's profound 
dissatisfaction with Amanulla 1 s enquiry into 
Habibulla 1 s murder and suspicion of Amir's own 
complicity are real cause of Amir's anti-British 
policy", The reference to Amanullah's presumed 
complicity in the murder of his father was probably 
omitted in order to avoid giving offence to the 
Amir, 
No. 23 in the Parliamentary Papers (F.D., S,F, 
Jul. 1919, No, 224), Three messages from the 
British Agent in Kabul have been omitted from the 
published version of this telegram from the Viceroy 
to the Secretary of State, (see supra, p ,241), 
No, 29 in the Parliamentary Papers (F,D,, S,F, Aug, 
1919, No. 28), The original text of this telegram 
includes the transcript of a message from Roos-Keppel 
to Grant of 21 May discounting the good faith 
of the contemporary Afghan requests for an armistice, 
together with the Viceroy's own comments on the 
situation, Both were excluded from the version 
published in the Parliamentary Papers. 
No. 27 in the Parliamentary Papers (F,D,, S,F, Aug, 
1919, No.l24), The published version of this 
telegram omits a reference by the Viceroy to the 
fact that contemporary Afghan propaganda claimed, 
inter alia, that the Government of India was "turning 
deaf ear to Amanulla's petition for peace", which 
appears in the original. 
No. 60 in the Parliamentary Papers (F.D., S,F, Aug, 
1919, No. 396), The telegram reproduced here 
originally included a discussion by the Viceroy of 
the advisability of continuing the war with Afghanistan, 
a reference to the contemporary conflict of views 
on this point, which was based on Montagu's doubts 
that Amanullah was really anxious for peace, 
APPENDIX 26 
The "Mussoorie memorandum", ("Note on the Proposals of 
the British and Afghan Governments discussed by the 
Delegates of the Two States at the Conference held at 
Mussoorie 1 between the months of April and July 1920, as 
a Preliminary to Definite Negotiations for a Treaty of 
Friendship.") Handed to the Afghan delegates at Mussoorie 
on 25 July 1920, 
"(l) It was agreed that it is in the mutual interest 
of both Governments that the Afghan State shall be strong 
and prosperous. 
(2) The British Government will be prepared to 
reiterate the undertaking, already given by them, to respect 
absolutely the integrity and independence of Afghanistan, 
both in internal and external affairs, and to restrain to 
the best of their ability all persons with the British 
boundaries from taking action obnoxious to the Afghan 
Government. 
(3) The British Government expect that the Afghan 
Government will similarly undertake to prevent to the best 
of their ability all action within the boundaries of 
Afghanistan, whether by their own subjects or by British 
subjects who are or may in the future be refugees from the 
British Dominions, or by subjects of other nations, which 
may tend to stir up strife or produce enmity against the 
British Government within the boundaries of India, The 
British Government expect that the Afghan Government will 
undertake in particular to restrain their subordinate 
officials and others from inciting the frontier tribes 
within the British Boundaries against the British: to prevent 
to the best of their ability the passage through Afghan 
territory to the British frontier of arms and ammunition 
and of persons intending to raise an agitation against the 
British Government, to prohibit preparations within Afghan 
territory for making raids into British territory, to punish 
persons found guilty of committing such raids, and to abstain 
themselves from all interference with tribes or persons on 
the British side of the frontier, and from all kinds of 
political propaganda within the British Empire, 
(4) If the Afghan Government were willing to give 
formal undertakings as set forth in the foregoing para-
graph, then the British Government, in the event of a 
Treaty of Friendship being signed, and in order to show 
their sympathy with the desire of the Afghan Government 
to develop their country would be willing to consider, 
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as part of a Treaty of Friendship, the grant, for so long 
as the Afghan Government performed its undertakings to the 
satisfaction of the British Government on the following lines: 
(a) A yearly subvention of eighteen lakhs of rupees, 
(b) Reasonable assistance towards the education in 
Europe, at such places as might be agreed upon be..; 
tween the two Governments, of a moderate number of 
Afghan youths, to be selected by the Afghan Govern-
ment with due regard to their educational qualifica-
tions. 
(c) Reasonable assistance, to be granted gradually, 
as financial and other circumstances might permit, 
towards the construction in Afghanistan of railways, 
te.legraph clines, and factories, and towards the 
development of mines. 
(d) Technical advice regarding irrigation, 
(e) The manufacture and supply of specially prepared 
paper for the printing of Afghan currency notes and 
(if necessary) provision of machines for note print-
ing. 
(f) Technical advice regarding the establishment of 
an Afghan Goyernment or Commercial Bank, and regarding 
possibilities of improving the system of commercial 
credit in Afghanistan. 
(g) The restoration of the privilege of importing 
arms and ammunition and military stores through 
India to Afghanistan, provided that the Government 
of Afghanistan shall first have signed the Arms 
Traffic Convention, and provided that such importation 
shall only be made in accordance with the provisions 
of that Convention. 
(h) The grant in respect of all goods imported into 
India at British ports for re-export to Afghanistan, 
and exported to Afghanistan by routes to be agreed 
upon between the two Governments, of a rebate at the 
time and place o:f export of the :full amount of 
customs duty levied upon such goods, subject to a 
deduction of not more than one-eighth of such duty 
as recompense for the work of customs registration, 
and provided that such goods shall be transported 
through India in sealed packages which shall not be 
broken before their export from India,· 
4 
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(i) An undertaking to levy no customs duty on such 
goods of Afghan origin or manufacture as may be 
lawfully imported into India provided that such goods 
shall not be exempted from the levy of the present 
Khyber tolls, and from the levy of octroi in any 
Indian Municipality, in which octroi is, or may be 
hereafter, levied, 
(j) An undertaking to permit the export from Afghani-
stan through India, inbond, and in sealed packages, 
by routes to be agreed upon between the two Govern-. 
ments, o.f opium and charas produced and manufactured 
in Afghanistan, provided that such opium and charas 
shall not be despatched from Indian ports to any 
destination to which the British Government are under 
an obligation to prohibit or limit the despatch of 
opium or charaso 
(k) The facilitating of the interchange of postal 
articles between India and Afghanistan, and arranging 
in accordance with a separatepostal agreement for the 
establishment of offices of exchange on their frontiers, 
provided that neither Government shall be permitted 
to establish a post office in the territory of the 
other Government. 
(l) Permission to establish at Peshawar and Quetta 
trading agencies of the Afghan Government, provided 
that the personnel and property of the agencies 
shall be subject to the operatton of all British laws 
and orders and to the jurisdiction of British 
courts, and that they shall not be recognised by the 
British authorities as having any official or privil-
eged position. 
(m) Permission to establish Afghan Consulates at 
Calcutta, Bombay and Karachi, provided the Afghan 
Government permit the establishment of British Con-
sulates at Jalalabad, Ghazn~ and Kandahar, The 
Consuls of both Governments, with their staffs, to 
enjoy all the privileges conceded by international 
practice to such officials. 
(5) In the event of the conclusion of a Treaty of 
Friendship the British Government would be prepared, on 
its signature, to make the following gifts to the Afghan 
Government, as immediate and tangible tokens of the 
sincerity of their intentions: 
Either the following: 
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A 
(a) 160 miles of steeJ. telegraph posts, with a double 
wire, to be handed over either at Chaman or at Peshawar. 
(b) 10 new large motor lorries with spares. 
(c) 20 new touring cars with spares, American make, ow-
ing to difficulty in obtaining prompt delivery of new 
English cars, 
(d) JOO soldiers' pals (bivouacktents). 
Or the following: 
B 
460 miles of steel telegraph posts with a double 
wire. (N,B, - This would be sufficient for the con-
struction of a telegraph system from the British frontier 
to Kabul and from Kabul to Kandahar; but it must be 
explained that immediate delivery could be made only of 
160 miles, which would suffice for a line from the 
British frontier to Kabul. The balance of JOO miles 
could not be made available in less than a year from 
now, owing to the shortage of material in India,) 
(6) The following points are reserved for further 
consideration at the time of negotiating a Treaty of 
Friendship: 
(a) Permission to export from Afghanistan rouble 
notes through India to countries outside India where 
their entry is permitted. 
(b) Representation of the Afghan Government in 
London, 
(From F.D., S.F. Jan. 192l,No, 96. Appears also 
in Sir Percy Sykes, History of Afghanistan, Vol,II, 
pp.J60~6J,) 
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Preamble to the Anglo-Russian trade agreement, signed on 
16 March 1921 by Sir Robert Horne, President of the 
British Board of Trade, and Leonid Krassin, Peoples' 
Commissar for Trade and Industry of the R,S,F,S,R, 
"Whereas it is desirable in the interests both of 
Russia and of the United Kingdom that peaceful trade and 
commerce should be resumed forthwith between those countries, 
and whereas for this purpose it is necessary, pending the 
conclusion of a formal general peace treaty between the 
Governments of these countries by which their economic and 
political relations shall be regulated in the future, that a 
preliminary agreement should be arrived at between the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, hereinafter 
referred to as the Russian Soviet Government 
The aforesaid partners have accordingly entered into 
the present agreement for the resumption of trade and 
commerce between the countries. The present agreement 
is subject to the following conditions, namely:-
(a) That each party refrains from hostile action 
or undertakings against the other and from conducting 
outside of its own borders any official propaganda, 
direct or indirect, against the instructions of the 
British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic 
respectively, and more particularly that the Russian 
Soviet Republic refrains from any attempt by 
military or diplomatic or any other form of action 
or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia 
in any form of hostile action against British interests 
or the British Empire especially in India and in the 
independent State of Afghanistan, The British 
Government give a similar particular undertaking to 
the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the 
countries which formed part of the former Russian 
Empire and which have now become independent. 
(b) That all British subjects in Russia are immediately 
permitted to return home, and that all Russian citizens 
in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire 
who desire to return to Russia are similarly released. 
It is understood that the term "conducting any 
official propaganda" includes the giving by either party 
of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted 
outside its own borders, The parties undertake to give 
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forthwith all necessary instructions to their agents and 
to all persons under their authority to conform to the 
stipulations undertaken above," 
(From The Manchester Guardian, 17 March 1921). 
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Treaty between the R.S.F,S,R, and Afghanistan signed in 
Moscow on 28 February 1921, ratified by the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee of the R,S,F,S,R, on 20 April 
1921 1 and by Amir Amanullah on 14 August of the same year, 
"With a view to strengthening friendly relations 
between Russia and Afghanistan and confirming the actual 
independence of Afghanistan, the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic on the one part and the Sovereign State of 
Afghanistan on the other part have decided to conclude the 
present treaty, for which purpose they have been appointed 
as their plenipotentiaries:-
For the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic 
Georgiy Vasil'yevich Chicherin 
Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan 
For the Government of the Sovereign State of 
Afghanistan 
Muhammad Wali Khan 
Mirza Muhammad Khan 
Ghulam Sadiq Khan 
The above mentioned plenipotentiaries, after mutual 
presentation of their credentials, which were found to be 
in due and proper form, have agreed as follows:-
I 
The High Contracting Parties, recognising their mutual 
independence and binding themselves to respect it, now 
mutually enter into regular diplomatic relations, 
II 
The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to 
enter. into any military or political agreement with a third 
State which might prejudice one of the Contracting Parties. 
III 
[States usual rules applicable to embassies and 
consulates,] 
APPENDIX 28 (contd,) 
IV 
The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to the 
opening of five consulates of the Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic on Afghan territory and of 
seven consulates of Afghanistan on Russian territory, 
of which five shall be within the boundaries of Russian 
Central Asia, 
Note: In addition to those mentioned above, the opening 
of further consulates and consular offices in Russia and 
Afghanistan shall in each given case be determined by a 
special agreement between the High Contracting Parties, 
v 
Russian consulates shall be established at Herat, 
Maimana, Mazar-i~Sharif, Kandahar and Ghazni, Afghan 
consulates shall be established as follows:- A Consul-
General at Tashkent and consulates at Petrograd, Kazan 
Samarkand, Merv and Krasnovodsk, 
Note: the manner and time of the actual opening of the 
Russian consulates in Afghanistan and of the Afghan con-
sulates in Russia shall be defined by special agreement 
between the two Contracting Parties. 
VI 
Russia agrees to the free and untaxed transit 
through her territory of all kinds of goods purchased by 
Afghanistan either in Russia herself, through State 
organisations, or abroad, 
VII 
The High Contracting Parties recognise the freedom 
of Eastern nations on the basis of independence and in 
accordance with the general wish of each nation, 
VIII 
In confirmation of Clause VII of the present treaty, 
the High Contracting Parties accept the actual freedom 
and independence of Bokhara and Khiva, whatever may be 
the form of their government, in accordance wi til the wishes 
of their peoples, 
IX 
In fulfilment of and in accordance with the promise 
of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 
expressed by Lenin as its head to the Minister Pleni-
potentiary of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan, Russia 
agrees to hand over to Afghanistan the Frontier districts 
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which belonged to the latter in the last century observ-
ing the principles of justice and self-determination of 
the population inhabiting the same. The manner in which 
such self-determination and will o.f the majority of the 
regular local population shall be expressed shall be 
settled by a special treaty between the two States, through 
the intermediary of Plenipotentiaries of both parties, 
X 
In order to strengthen friendly relations between the 
High Contracting Parties, the government of the Russia11. 
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic agrees to give 
Afghanistan financial and other assistance. 
Xi 
The present treaty is drawn up in the Russian and 
Persian languages; both texts are accounted authentic. 
XII 
The present treaty shall come into force upon its 
ratification by the Governments of the High Contracting 
Parties, The exchange of ratifications shall take place 
at Kabul, in witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of 
both parties have signed the present treaty and set their 
seals thereto, 
Drawn up in Moscow on the 28th day of February 1921. 
SUPPLEMENTAR'{ CLAUSE 
In amplification of Clause X of the present treaty, 
the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet 
Republic gives the following assistance to the Sovereign 
State of Afghanistan: 
(1) A yearly free subsidy to the extent of one 
million gold or silver roubles, in coin or 
bullion, 
(2) Construction of the Kushk-Herat-Kandahar-
Kabul telegraph line, 
(J) In addition to this the Government o:f the 
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic 
expresses its readiness to place at the dis-
posal of the Afghan Government technical and 
other specialists. 
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The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic shall afford this assistance to the Govern-
ment of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan within two 
months of the coming into force of the present treaty," 
(From F,D,, 2(A)-F 1923, No. 270. This text had been 
given to the British government by Chicherin in June 1921, 
For some reason 1 the second paragraph of Article IV is 
missing from it, The Russian text appears in Soviet 
Documents, Vol.III, No,J09. The latter appends the plenipo-
tentiaries' signatures after Article XII, and omits the 
"Supplementary Clause" and the succeeding "supplementary 
letters".) 
Supplementary letter No, 1. From Suritz to Tarzi 1 dated 
28 June 1921. 
"Having become aware of difficulties which have 
befallen Afghan Government in the matter of Consulates of 
Kandahar and Ghazni which were to be granted to us under 
the treaty I give an undertaking to the Afghan Government 
that immediately after the ratification of the treaty by 
the Afghan Government, I will inform my Government of all 
the difficulties in connection with the opening of the 
Consulates of Kandahar and Ghazni, I strongly hope that 
my Government will give earnest consideration to this 
matter owing to its desire to remove all difficulties. And 
for the present I will not open Consulates in Kandahar an~ 
Ghazni." 
Supplementary letter No, 2, From Raskolnikov to Tarzi, 
dated 23 July 1921, 
"Having acquainted myself with text of letter of my 
predecessor Suritz, I have the honour to inform you that, 
in the matter of Consulates on account of difficulties which 
have supervened, I am in entire agreement with the text 
thereof and I consider myself bound by promise expressed in 
that letter," 
Supplementary letter No. J, FromRaskolnikov to Tarzi 1 
dated 31 July 1921, 
"To the contents of letter from Suritz above quoted 
I wish to add that as I am confident that this concurrence 
and undertaking is fit to be accepted so that [sic] I am 
confident that it will not make any difference";;T""delay in 
agreement ratified between Afghanistan and Russia and in 
general terms of clauses ihereof •" 
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(From F.D., 2(B)~F l92J, No, 256.) 
Supplementary letter No. 4. Note by Amanullah appearing 
below his ratification of the treaty (14 August l92l). 
"Having signed and ratified the treaty of friend-
ship between Russia and my Government which was made 
necessary by the representatives of two parties at Moscow, 
28th February l92l, I promise to execute it w.ithout change 
having accepted as Sanads letters No. l, l02l and 8 of the 
Ambassadors of Russia," 
(From F,D,, 2(B)·-F 1923, No. 257. It appears 
from ibid., No. 280, that the letters referred to by 
Amanullah are those reproduced here as "supplementary 
letters" Nos. l-J· The Arabic word "sanad" means "some-
thing reliable", hence 11 {-written) promise"), 
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Treaty between Afghanistan and the Government of the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey, signed at Moscow on l March 1921, 
"In view of the bonds which unite the two Moslem and 
brotherly States of Turkey and Afghanistan and of the 
historical duties which devolve on them in these days of the 
incipient awakening of the East and of their decision to 
transfer to the Political plane the long-existing spiritual 
and natural alliance, the two Governments have agreed as 
follows:-
Article l, The Government of the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey being in possession of independent existence for 
as long as God wills, recognises the independence of the 
Afghan nation to which it is bound by ties of the utmost 
sincerity, 
Article 2, - The two High Contracting Parties agree that 
the Eastern nations are endowed with full liberty and rights 
of independence and that each is free to adopt and apply the 
form of administration which it individually desires. They 
also confirm the independence of the States of Bokhara and 
Khiva. 
Article J, - Turkey having for centuries given guidance to 
and rendered distinguished services to Islam, and in her 
hands the standard of the Khilafat having been maintained, 
Afghanistan in this connection recognises the leadership 
of Turkey, 
Article 4, - Each of the High Contracting Parties will 
regard any aggression against the other on the part of any 
Imperialist Power whatsoever pursuing a policy of exploita-
tion as directed against itself and undertakes to resist it 
by all ava~ble means in its power, 
Article 5. - Neither of the Contracting Parties will 
conclude any treaty or international instrument in compliance 
with the wishes of any third Power which is at variance 
with the other or injurious to the interestsof the two 
Contracting Parties; and each Contracting Party will, as 
brethren, give notice to the other of the forthcoming 
conclusion of an agreement with any nation whatsoever, 
Article 6, - [Arranges for the exchange of ambassadors 
and consuls.] 
Article 7• - [Arranges 
two countries,] 
for postal services between the 
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Article 8,~ Turkey undertakes to help Afghanistan 
generously and to send to her instructors and officers. 
These missions of teachers and officers shall serve for a 
minimum period of five years, and on the expiration of that 
time, if Afghanistan so desires, a new mission of instruc-
tors will be sent. 
Article 9.- This treaty shall come into force on ratifica-
tion. 
Article 10,- This treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in 
two copies, of which one will be retained by the dele-
gates of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the 
other by the delegates of Afghanistan." 
(From F,D,, 2(A)-F 1923, No. 422) •' 
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Draft of the .Anglo-Afghan "exclusive treaty", as it stood 
on ll .August l92l, 
"The British Government and the Government of 
.Afghanistan with a view to the strengthening of the ties of 
friendship between them have agreed to the articles written 
hereunder whereto the undersigned duly authorised to that 
effect have set their seals:-
CLAUSE I. 
The British Government and the Government of 
.Afghanistan mutually accept and certify each with respect to 
the other all rights of internal and external independence. 
Further, in view of the traditional friendship between the 
British Government and the Government of .Afghanistan, the 
British Government, on its part, hereby undertakes to render 
to .Afghanistan assistance in the event of any unprovoked 
aggression by a third Power upon .Afghanistan and the Afghan 
Government, on its part, hereby undertakes to use its utmost 
endeavours for the maintenance of peace on the North-West 
Frontier of India, 
CLAUSE II, 
The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the 
Indo-Afghan Frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government 
under .Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on 
the 8th .August 1919, [and as established by the British 
demarcation in the Khaibar of .August-September l9l9]• 
CLAUSE III, 
The British Government agrees that a Minister from His 
Majesty the .Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the 
Court of St, Jamests, London, to which the Envoys of all 
other Powers are accredited and to permit the establishment 
of an Afghan Legation in London, and the Government of 
Afghanistan likewise agrees to receive in Kabul a Minister 
from His Britannic Majesty the Emperor of India and to permit 
the establishment of a British Legation at Kabul, provided:-
First, that, in view of the close connection of India 
with Afghanistan, the diplomatic relations of the Afghan 
Minister in London shall ordinarily be conducted with His 
Britannic Majesty''s Secretary of State for India, With 
regard to matters which have no concern with India, he will 
act as the Envoys of the other Powers do, 
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Secondly, that the Afghan Government shall continue 
as heretofore to depute an Envoy to reside at the Court 
of India, 
Thirdly, that the two Governments shall, in the first 
place, conduct all such discussion as relates altogether or 
mainly to matters affecting India either through the British 
Minister at Kabul or through the Afghan Envoy in India. 
Each party shall have the right of attaching a Military 
Attache to its Legation. 
CLAUSE IV, 
[Establishes British consulates at Jalalabad and Qandahar, 
and Afghan consulates at Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay.] 
CLAUSE V, 
[Provides for the exercise of normal rights by ambassadors 
and consuls.] 
CLAUSE VI. 
The Government of Afghanistan agrees that, with a 
view to the maintenance of harmony, it will not permit the 
establishment of Consuls or Agents of any third Power within 
those Afghan provinces or districts which are contiguous 
to the Indo~Afghan boundary, namely, within the Afghan 
territories lying to the East of a straight line drawn from 
Faizabad in Badakhshan to Kabul and lying South of a straight 
line drawn from Kabul to Farah, such consultates and agencies 
no"b being excluded from the towns of Faizabad, Kabul and 
Farah themselves, and the British Government similarly 
agrees that it will not permit the establishment of the 
Consuls or Agents of any third Power within those Indian 
provinces or districts which are contiguous to the same 
boundary, namely, the North-West Frontier Province, the 
district of Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Baluchistan Agency, 
CLAUSE VII. 
[Allows the unrestricted import into Afghanistan through 
India of all ordinary goods provided that the Afghan 
government informs the Government of India "on each 
occasion before importation of arms and ammunition of the 
orders which it proposes to give." Provides for the un-
restricted export of Afghan goods to India.] 
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CLAUSE VIII. 
[Provides that no import duties shaLL ·:Je charged in 
India on goods imported into Afghanistan through India 
by the Afghan government, provided that such goods travel 
in sealed packages and are "not for the purposes of any 
State monopoly or State trade'',] 
CLAUSE IX, 
[Allows full Indian customs rebate on all goods imported 
into Afghanistan through India, less a maximum of 12~ as 
customs registration charge.] 
CLAUSE X, 
[Provides that no duty shall be charged in India on 
imports from Afghanistan,] 
CLAUSE XI, 
The British Government agrees to the establishment of 
trading agencies by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, 
Quetta and Parachinar, provided that the personnel and 
property o.f the said agencies shall be subject to the 
operation of all British laws and orders and to the juris~ 
diction of British Courts; and that they shall not be re-
cognised by the British authorities as having any official 
or privileged position. The Government of Afghanistan 
similarly agrees that, though at present the British 
Government does not consider it necessary,to have a trade 
representative or trade agency in Afghan territory, yet if 
the said Government, hereafter, considers it necessary, 
the trade agencies in question shall, in accordance with 
a separate agreement, be established on the condition 
mentioned above, at the places agreed upon between the two 
Governments. 
CLAUSE XII. 
[Details postal arrangements, for which a separate Postal 
Convention shall later be concluded. Neither Britain nor 
Afghanistan "shall be allowed to establish Post Offices 
within the territory of the other".] 
CLAUSE XIII. 
The two High Contracting Parties having mutually 
satisfied themselves each regarding the goodwill of the 
other, and especially regarding their benevolent intentiocB 
towards the tribes residing close to their respective 
boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in 
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future of any military operations of major importance 
which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order 
among the frontier tribes residing within their respective 
spheres, before the commencement of such operations, 
Further, for the better promotion of neighbourly 
relations, more especially in frontier matters, appert-
aining on the one hand to the question of the Pathan 
tribes within the British border in whose welfare the 
sentiment of the Afghan nation is concerned by reason of 
their proximity to the Afghan border, and appertaining 
on the other hand to the tribes within the Afghan border 
whose welfare reacts similarly on British territory, the 
two High Contracting Parties agree that there shall in 
future be a periodical exchange of visits between their 
respective frontier officers, as shall be subsequently 
laid down in detail for the purpose of exchanging views 
regarding the best means of preserving the peace of the 
frontier and regarding the betterment of the tribes, 
CLAUSE XIV, 
The Government of Afghanistan agrees to prevent to 
the best of its ability, all action within the boundaries 
of Afghanistan, whether by its own subjects, or by British 
subjects who are or may in the future be refugees from the 
British Dominions, or by subjects of other nations, which 
may tend to stir up strife or produce enmity against the 
British Government within the boundaries of India, The 
Afghan Government undertakes in particular to restrain its 
subordinate officials and others from inciting the frontier 
tribes within the British boundaries against the British, 
to prevent to the best of its ability the passage through 
Afghan territory to the British frontier of arms and 
ammunition and of persons intending to raise an agitation 
against the British Government, to prohibit preparations 
within Afghan territory for making raids into British 
territory, to punish personsfbund guilty of committing 
such raids, and to abstain itself from all interference 
with tribes or persons on the British side of the Frontier, 
and from all kinds of political propaganda within the 
British Empire, The British Government similarly agrees 
to restrain to the best of its ability all persons within 
the British boundaries from taking action obnoxious to 
the Afghan Government and to abstain from all interference 
with tribes or persons on the Afghan side of the frontier, 
and from all kinds of political propaganda within Afghan 
territory. 
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CLAUSE XV, 
Each of the two High Contracting Parties hereby 
declares that it has not entered into any treaty, agree-
ment or understanding with a third party directed against 
the interests of the other High Contracting Party, and 
agrees that it will not, during the continuance of this 
treaty, enter into any such treaty, agreement or under-
standing. Further, each of the two High Contracting 
Parties declares that it will not without previous ex-
change of views with the other High Contracting Party 
enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a 
third party affecting the mutual interests of the two 
High Contracting Parties. 
CLAUSE XVI. 
The British Government, in order to mark its sense 
of the friendly spirit shown by His Majesty the late Amir 
during the recent war and in consideration of the fulfil-
ment in their entirety by the Government of Afghanistan 
of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, 
agrees to pay to the Govermne;:1t of Afghanistan annual,Jy 
the sum of 40 lakhs of rupees in four equal instalments 
payable at the end of every three months. Further, as an 
additional token of the goodwill which it bears towards 
Afghanistan the British Government agrees to make a gift 
to the Government of A±'ghanistan of the material necessary 
for a telegraph line with two wires from Landi Khana to 
Kabul and from Kabul via Kandahar to Herat, of which 
material for .160 mile-;8hall be deli•rered immediately 
after signature of this treaty and the balance as soon 
thereafter as may be possible. 
CLAUSE XVII. 
Nothing contained in this treaty shall override any 
obligation which may have been incurred or may in the 
future be incurred by either of the two High Contracting 
Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or 
under any Convention on Freedom of Transit which may be 
adopted by the League of Nations and be entered into by 
either of the two Parties, 
CLAUSE XVIII, 
The provisions of this treaty shall come into force 
from the date of its signature, 
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rschedules I and II" then follow, defining (l) the 
boundary at Tor Kham and (2) the exact rights o.f 
ambassadors and consuls.] 
Supplementary letter No.l. From Tarzi to Dobbs, 
4 
"With reference to Clause III of the Treaty of 
Friendship signed between the British Government and the 
Government of Afghanistan, the latter Government agrees 
that the British Minister at Kabul shall be either an 
European or an Asiatic British subject as may seem fit 
to the British Government from time to time." 
Supplementary letter No. 2. From Tarzi to Dobbs, 
"The Afghan Government having no intention or desire 
to pursue a policy of aggression against the territories 
of the Russian Government has trw honour to enquire what 
steps the British Government proposes to take in pursuance 
of Clause I of the Treaty of Friendship signed between 
them in the event of an unprovoked aggression by the 
Russian Government upon Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Government further, in full exercise of 
its right of deciding independently all matters appert-
aining to its external relations, desires to inform the 
British Government that it has now, like the majority of 
the other civilised Powers of the world, owing to recent 
information as to the proceedings and intentions of the 
Russian Government, been forced to the conclusion that 
political relations with that Government are not for the 
benefit of Afghanistan, and that it aan enter on1_y into 
col11Iliercial rela t:ions with the Russian Government. Afghani-
stan has, therefore, decided to break off political rela-
tions with Russia. This will necessarily bring about the 
withdrawal of the Russian Minister from Afghanistan. If, 
at any tirne, circumstances so alter that the Afghan Govern-
ment is assured that political relations with Russia 
shall not be dangerous to Afghanistan and it seems advis-
able to the Afghan Government to re-open negotiations 
for a political treaty with Russia, the Afghan Government 
will, before taking any steps to that end, inform the 
British Government of its views and proposals and will 
give to the British Government an opportunity of discuss-
ing with the Afghan Government the situation thus arising. 
Similarly, the Afghan Government will give to the British 
Government an opportunity of discussing with it the terms 
of any purely commercial agreement or arrangement which 
it may desire to conclude with Russia, in the event of 
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such an agreement or arrangement seeming advisable after 
the breaking off of political relations with Russia." 
Supplementary letter No. J, From Dobbs to Tarzi, 
11 The British Government notes with satisfaction 
that the Afghan Goverrunent has no intention or desire 
to pursue a policy of aggression against the territory 
of the Russian Goverrunent. In view of the statement of 
the Afghan Goverrunent, in its letter rmder reply, that it 
intends to discontinue po.l·Ltical relations with Russia, 
and of the signature of a treaty of close friendship 
between the British Goverrunent and the Goverrunent of 
Afghanistan, the British Government rmdertakes immediately 
on the open discontinuance r-by Afghanistan of political 
relations with Russia and of the departure from Kabul 
of the Russian Minister, to deliver to the Agents of 
the Afghan Government at either Peshawar or Chaman, or 
partly at the one place and partly at the other, as the 
Afghan Government may desire, the following material:-
(a) Twenty thousand magazine , JOJ rifles 1d th 100 
rounds of ammunition per rifle to be delivered 
immediately, and 400 addi.tional rounds per 
rifle to be delivered within three weeks, and 
500 rounds additional per rifle to be delivered 
within one year. 
(b) Two hundred Lewis guns with 1,000 rounds of 
ammunition per gun, 
Further, within three weeks o.:f the said discontinuance 
of political relations the British Government will deliver 
at the Afghan fronti<>:CC two batteri<3S or 18-pounder grms, 
horsed and equipped, and also twelve 10-pounder mountain 
grms in two batteries with mules and equipment, and 
with each of the above..,mentioned grms, 100 rounds of 
ammt:mition" 
Further, the British Government will immediately 
on the said discontinuance of political relations receive 
in India not more than 24 Afghan subjects for instruction 
in aviation and will, 1qithin six months, deliver to the 
Afghan Government six aeroplanes (or, if the Afghan 
Government prefers, the British Goverrunent will imme;:liately 
deliver two leso good aeroplanes and four at the end of 
six months). 
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Lastly, in the event of an unprovoked attack by 
Russia upon Afghan territory, the British Government will 
support the Afghan Government during the operations 
necessitated by such Russian aggression with such further 
assistance in money, munitions and aeroplanes and in 
the training of aviators as the two Governments, after 
consultation, may deem the extent and nature of the 
operations to require. 11 
Supplementary letter No. 4. From Dobbs to Tarzi. 
[States that 11 since.•o•••written assurances have been 
given by the Afghan Government to the British Government 
to the effect that political relations will be completely 
severed between Afghanistan and Russia", the British 
government is prepared not to occupy the Mahsud and Wazir 
country permanently.] 
Supplementary letter No. 5. From Dobbs to Tarzi, 
"With reference to Clause XV of the Treaty of 
Friendship concluded between our two Governments the 
British Government have the honour to enquire which, in 
the opinion <llf' the Government of Afghanistan, are the 
Governments with which the Governments of Afghanistan and 
Great Britain are likely to conclude treat:tes or agree-
ments of such a nature as to require previous exchange 
of views between the two Governments •" 
Supplementary letter No. 6. From Tarzi to Dobbs. 
"In reply to your letter, I have the honour to inform 
you that the Government of Afghanistan considers the 
following Governments to come within the category of 
Governments with which a treaty or agreement to be 
concluded by either of the two Governments would require 
exchange of views between the two Governments:-
!! 
Russia 
Persia 
Bokhara 
Khiva 
The Republic of Azarbaijan. 
Of the foregoing a treaty with Russia, Persia or Bokhara 
must necessarily affect the mutual interests of the two 
Governments owing to their geographical position while 
any treaty with fue others must affect the mutua]. interests 
of the two Governments owing to their being at present 
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dominated by Russia," 
Supplementary letter No. 7. From Dobbs to Tarzi. 
"I have the honour to acknowledge your letter and 
to say that the British Government accepts the list of 
Governments suggested by the Afghan Government as being 
Governments with whom any treaty which either of the 
two Governments might wish to execute would require 
previous exchange of views under Clause XV of the treaty." 
Supplementary lett''"'' No, 8, From Dobbs to Tarzi. 
"The British Government regrets that it has not 
found it possible to agree to the suggest.ion made by the 
Government of Afghanistan that the question of the Turkish 
peace terms should be mentioned in the Treaty of Friend-
ship signed between the two Governments; but it has 
authorised me to declare that it is earnestly desirous 
of befriending all Musalmans and to assure the Government 
of Afghanistan that it wishes to see an independent, 
free and prosperous Turkey." 
Supplementary letter No, 9. From Dobbs to Tarzi. 
[Grants free telegraph concessions for correspondence 
between the Afghan Foreign Ministry and the Afghan 
ambassador in London.] 
(From F.D., 2(B)-F 1923, No, 174a), 
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Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan signed at 
Kabul on 22 November 1921. (The "neighbourly treaty"), 
"Preamble, 
468 
The British Government and the Government of 
Afghanistan, with a view to the establishment of neighbourly 
relations between them, have agreed to the Articles written 
hereunder, whereto the undersigned, duly authorised to that 
effect, have set their seals: 
Article I. 
The British Government and the Government of 
Afghanistan mutually certify and respect, ezch with regard 
to the other, all rights of internal and external independence, 
Article II. 
The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the 
Indo-Afghan Frontier, as accepted by the Afghan Government 
under Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on 
the 8th August 1919 [and as established by the British 
demarcation in the Kaaibar of August-September 1919.] 
Article III, 
The British Government agrees that a Minister from His 
Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan shall be received at the 
Royal Court of London, like the Envoys of all other Powers, 
and to permit the establishment of an Afghan Legation in 
London, and the Government of Afghanistan likewise agrees to 
receive in Kabul a Minister from His Britannic Majesty the 
Emperor of India, and to permit the establishment of a 
British Legation at Kabul, 
Each party shall have the right of appointing a 
Military Attache to its Legation. 
Article IV, 
The Government of Afghanistan agrees to the establish-
ment of British Consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad, and 
the British Government agrees to the establishment of an 
Afghan Consul-General at the headquarters of the Government 
of India, and three Afghan Consulates at Calcutta, 
Karcchi and Bombay, In the event of the Afghan Government 
desiring at any time to appoint Consular officers in any 
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British territories other than India, a separate agree-
ment shall be drawn up to provide for such appointments, 
if they are approved by the British Government, 
Article V, 
[Provides for the exercise o:f normal rights by ambassadors 
and consuls.] 
Article VI, 
[states that the British government allows unrestricted 
import into India of goods destined for Afghanistan and 
purchased by the Afghan government, and that the Afghan 
government allows free export from Afghanistan of goods 
purchased by the British government, "the export of 
which is not against the internal law o:f Afghanistan", 
"With regard to arms and munitions, the British Govern-
ment agrees that, as long as it is assured that the 
intentions of the Government o:f Afghanistan are friendly, 
and that there is no immediate danger to India from such 
importation in Afghanistan, permission shall be given 
without let or hindrance for such importation," If the 
Arms Traffic Convention "is ratified by the Great Powers 
of the world", Afghanistan shall become a signatory to it, 
and shall be bound by its terms,] 
Article VII, 
[States that no import duties shall be charged in India on 
goods imported into India for re-export to Afghanistan, 
provided (1) that such goods are purchased by the Afghan 
government, (2) that certain formalities respecting 
certification, etc., are fulfilled, (J) that such goods 
are "not for the purposes o.:f any State monopoly or State 
trade. 11 
Allows full Indian customs rebate on all other goods 
imported into Afghanistan through India, provided that 
such goods travel in sealed packages. 
Further provides that no customs duties shall be 
charged in India on imports from Afghanistan. If the 
British government later decides to charge duty on goods 
imported by land or river from states contiguous to India, 
then the customs duty levied on goods imported f'rom 
Afghanistan will not be higher than those levied on 
imports from other neighbouring states.] 
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Article VIII, 
4,... 0 (l 
The British Government agrees to the establishment 
of trade agents by the Afghan Government at Peshawar, 
Quetta and Parachinar, provided that the personnel and 
the property of the said agencies shall be subject to 
the operations of all British laws and orders and to the 
jurisdiction of British Courts; and that they shall not 
be recognized by the British authorities as having any 
official or special privileged position. 
Article IX, 
[States that goods imported into Afghanistan through 
India under the provisions of Article VII may be opened 
at the crossing-points on the Anglo-Afjhan frontier, as 
transhipment requirements necessitate. 
Article X, 
[Provides for the interchange of postal articles. A 
separate Postal Convention will later be concluded between 
he two countries, of which "neither shall be allowed to 
establish Post Offices within the territory of the other".] 
Article XL 
The two High Contracting Parties having mutually 
satisfied themselves each regarding the good will of the 
other, and especially regarding their benevolent intentions 
towards the tribes residing close to their respective 
boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in 
future of any military operations of major importance, 
which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order 
among the frontier tribes residing within their respective 
spheres, before the commencement of such operations, 
Article XII. 
[states that representatives of the two countries will 
later meet to negotiate a trade convention to deeide 
questions not fully settled by the present treaty.] 
Artiele XIII, 
The two High Contracting Parties agree that the 
first and seeond schedules attached to this treaty shall 
have the same binding force as the Articles contained in 
this treaty. 
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Article XIV. 
The provisions of this treaty shall come into force 
from the date of its signature, and shall remain in 
force for three years from that date. In case neither of 
the High Contracting Parties should have notified, 
twelve months before the expiration of the said three 
years, the intention to terminate it, it shall remain 
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on 
which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have 
denounced it. This treaty shall come into force after the 
signatures of the Missions of the two Parties, and the 
two ratified copies of this shall be exchanged in Kabul 
within 22 months after the signatures. 
(Sd.) MAHMUD TARZI (Sd.) HENRY R.c. DOBBS 
Chief of the Delegation 
of the Afghan Govern-
ment for the conclusion 
of the Treaty. 
Tuesday, 30th Aqrab 1300 
Hijra Shamsi (correspond-
ing to 22nd November 1921). 
Envoy Extraordinary and 
Chief of the British 
Mission to Kabul, 
This twenty-second day 
of November one 
fuousand nine hundred 
and twenty-one. 
["Schedules I and II" then follow, defining (l) the 
boundary at Tor Kham, and (2) the exact rights of 
ambassadors and consuls.] 
Supplementary letter No.l. From Dobbs to Tarzi. 
"With reference to the provisions contained in 
Article VI of the Treaty concluded 1_,etween the Government 
of Afghanistan and the British Government, I have the 
honour to inform and assure you that, although the 
British Government has in that Article reserved to itself 
the right exercised by every nation to stop the trans-
portation to a neighbouring country of arms and ammunition, 
in the event of its not being assured of the friendly 
intentions of that country, the British Government has no 
desire to make trifling incidents an excuse for the 
stoppage of such arms and munitions. It would only be 
in the event of the Government of Afghanistan showing 
plainly by its attitude that it had determined on an 
unfriendly and provocative course of policy to Great 
Britain contrary to the neighbourly treaty above-mentioned 
that the latter State would exercise the right of stoppage, 
There is every ground for hope that such a contingency 
will not arise, in view of the friendly relations which 
are expected to spring from the Treaty which has now been 
concluded. n 
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Supplementary letter No. 2. From Tarzi to Dobbs. 
"Regarding the purchase of arms and munitions 
which the Government of Afghanistan buys for the pro-
tection of its rights and welfare from the Governments 
of the world (and) imports to its own territory from the 
ports of Great Britain and British India, in accordance 
with Article VI of the Treaty between the two great 
Governements, I, in order to show the sincere friend-
ship which my Government has with your Government, promise 
that Afghanistan shall, from time to time before the 
importation of the arms and munitions at British ports, 
furnish detailed list of those to the British Minister 
accredited to the Court of my sacred and great Government, 
so that the British Government having known and acquainted 
itself with the list and number of imported articles 
should, in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty 
between the two Governments, afford the necessary 
facilities." 
Supplementary letter No, 3. From Tarzi to Dobbs. 
"As in Article VII of the Treaty between the two 
great Governments of Britain and Afghanistan, your 
Government has with great sincerity granted a discriminat-
ing exemption from Customs duties on the goods required by 
my Government and on the trade goods imported to Afghani-
stan from the ports of Great Britain and British India 
and has not imposed Customs on goods produced and manu-
factured in Afghanistan, I therefore also, in consideration 
of the friendship (between) the two Governments, write that 
my Government will not give the opportunity of establish-
ing a Consul-General or Consul or representatives of the 
Russian Government at the positions and territories of 
Jalalabad, Ghazni and Kandahar, which are contiguous to 
the frontiers of India, If the Consulates or representa-
tives of the Government of Russia are allowedin the 
parts mentioned, the Government of Afghanistan shall not 
have the above-mentioned right of exemption. Of course, 
the temporary association of the Russian Minister with 
His Majesty's move to Jalalabad in winter will be an 
exception. 11 
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Supplementary letter No, 4, From Dobbs to Tarzi 
11As the condition of the frontier tribes of the two 
Governments are of interest to the Government of Afghani-
stan I inform you that the British Government entertains 
feelings of good will towards all the frontier tribes 
and has every intention of treating them generously, pro-
viding they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants 
of India, I hope that this letter will cause you satis-
faction." 
Countries. Edition of 1933, Vol.~ 
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Letter from G.V. Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, to F. Raskolnikov, Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, 
dated J June 1921, (A passage here marked by asterisks 
has been omitted for the sake of brevity), 
"Dear Comrade, 
You are appointed to a position which until now was 
occupied by Com. Suritz, at the very moment when we are 
concluding a Treaty with England, which obliges us, especially 
as far as Afghanistan is concerned, to conform to certain 
decisions, which are known to you, It is your responsibility, 
in the course of your political work, in Afghanistan, to 
observe most strictly the provisions of the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement, However, the course traced by the latter is 
only a partial expression of another, more important, basic 
factor of our policy, Both the internal and external policy 
of Soviet Russia can at present be summed up in a single 
word - reconstruction, 
All our forces are directed towards the rehabilitation 
of our economy, and to positive creative work on the basis 
of our form of government, We shall be even more effective 
in implementing our ideas if we concentrate our forces in 
positive creative work and in the economic reconstruction 
of Russia, This is the only way open to us at present in 
order to fulfill our historic mission, Both in my reports 
to the sessions of the all-Union Central Executive Committee, 
and in repeated utterances of Com. Lenin, the relations 
between Soviet Russia and the surrounding capitalist world 
have been characterised as a peaceful contest on the basis 
of reconstruction of the destroyed economy. He who wins 
in this peaceful contest of economic creative work will 
be the victor in realising this or that set of ideals in 
setting up this or that form of government, 
The dominating position of England in the world economy 
makes peaceful cooperation with England in the economic 
sphere especially important for us. In your political work 
in the East you must take into account also our general 
situation, which forces us to put first the tasks connected 
with the reconstruction of our economy, and you must take 
into account the significance which England has for us from 
this point of view," 
*** 
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"Our policy in the East is not an aggressive one, 
It is a policy of peace and friendship, In all your 
work you must lay stress on this main feature, and in 
particular, in Kabul, you must make the main aim of your 
activity the development of our friendship with Afghani~ 
stan. Friendship presupposes mutual cooperation, and 
proceeding from our desire to assist as much as possible 
in the development and welfare of the friendly Afghan 
state, we are prepared to render it in this peaceful 
enterprise all assistance in our power, You must ascer-
tain the needs and requirements of Afghanistan, and 
familiarise yourself with the desires of her Government, 
in order that, in accordance with the Russo~fghan 
Treaty, we may render it all the assistance in our 
power in order to facilitate its development and welfare, 
You are instructed to pay especially seriorn 
attention to the Amir 1 s reform programme, At the present 
stage of development of Afghanistan, enlightened absolutism, 
of the type of our own eighteenth century, is for her an 
important progressive phenomenon. We cannot, and we must 
not, approach Afghanistan with the standards which are 
appropriate for the economically developed countries. It 
goes witho~t saying that we must not for a moment forget 
and leave in the shade the tremendous difference between 
the programme of Communism, and that programme which is 
being implemented, and which can be implemented by the 
present Afghan Government. We must not for a moment hide 
our face, but this must not prevent us from expressing 
sympathy and rendering complete cooperation with the 
reformist initiative of the friendly Afghan Government, 
and to the friendly progressive creative activity of 
enlightened absolutism in Afghanistan. We are not for a 
moment becoming either monarchists or supporters of 
absolutism. This should be clear to all. But we must 
render all possible assistance to the reformist ideas of 
the progressively-minded Amir, 
We must do our utmost to avoid the fatal error of 
artificial attempts of planting Communism in the country. 
We must say to the Afghan Government: "You have one form 
of government, we have another form of government, We 
have one set of ideals. You have another one. We are 
however united by common aspirations for complete inde-
pendence and independent activity of our peoples, We 
do not interfere with your internal affairs. We do not 
infringe upon the independent activities of your people. 
We render assistance to every phenomenon playing a pro-
gressive role in the development of your people, We do 
not for a moment intend to impose upon your people a pro-
gramme foreign to it in its present stage of development," 
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On the other hand, you must take into considera~:L,.Jn 
the dangerous tendencies o:f certain portions o:f the 
A:fgh~~ ruling circles, who are harbouring the desire o:f 
creating a coalition o:f the react:Loc'lary Moslem states 
under A:fghan hegemony. Up to now, E~glish agents have 
done their best to develop and :foster these tendenci<1s of 
certain circles o:f the A:fghan Government which are 
dangerous to us, We are implementing with complete 
loyalty our treaty wit~ England, and :for our part we have 
the right to insist that she exhibit the same loyalty, 
You are instructed to wa.te''l closely :for possible continua-
tion o:f the attempts on the part of' English representatives 
fu utilise the dangeroc1s tendency o:f certain A:fghan 
political personalities towards reactionary pan-Islamic 
hegemony and to keep watch over the attempts o:f English 
agents to create in this manner di:f:ficulties :for the 
Soviet Government in Central Asia,' 
Peaceful cooperation between peoples, to speak in 
concrete terms, is envisaged by us mainly in the :form of 
exchange of connnodU:ies, and in this respect Afghanistan 
is of great value to us. It is not the place here for me 
to enter into details of this problem, since this problem 
is a concern of the P. eo:12.1cs 1 Commissariat for Foreign 
Trade [Narkomvn.yeshto~J· I shall only point out that 
in this sphere there are certain dangerous tendencies 
against which you shm~ld be on your guard, I have in mind 
the tendency of a certain portion of A:fghan trading circles 
to engage in speculation in Central Asia, and to cause 
serio::ts harm to the economie situation there. It is pre-
cisely the economic sphere of our cooperation with Afghani-
stan, which, given its positive significance for us and 
the serious nature of that harm whic1'1 could be caused by 
the aforementioned dangerous tendencies in this sphere 
which prompts us to pa)" serious attention to the develop-
ment o:f our Consular network in Afghanistan, ••hich we are 
entitled to do by the Russo .. Afghan Treaty. Consuls in 
Afghanistan are necessary for the development of commodity 
exchange, and they are also necessary to counteract those 
negative tendencies which I have mentioned previously, 
We are hoping that you wil.l carefully L!Vestigate this 
matter and will send us as soon as possible a detailed 
repo:ct about the economic perspective in Afghanistan, and 
the tasks in this connection which our Consular Represent-
atives have to face. 
The main idea with whidl you have to approach all 
the problems which confront you is the protracted 
character of' the present period of' our development and of 
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